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‘Transitions in Energy Efficiency and Demand is at the forefront of research 
on energy innovation and energy demand, providing new and in- depth 
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dents, and anyone else interested in a low- carbon, energy- efficient and low- 
demand energy transition.’
Marilyn Brown, Professor, Georgia Tech, USA
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Introduction
Meeting the goal enshrined in the Paris Agreement of limiting global temper-
ature increases to less than 2°C above pre- industrial levels demands rapid reduc-
tions in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. For example, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that to provide a high likelihood (66 per cent 
probability) of meeting that target, cumulative global CO2 emissions between 
2015 and 2100 must be less than 880 Giga- tonnes (Gt) (IEA, 2017). For the 
energy sector alone, the IEA estimate a smaller ‘carbon budget’ of 790 Gt. To 
put this in perspective, global energy sector emissions stood at 32.5 Gt in 2017 – 
an increase of 1.4 per cent on the previous year and equivalent to ~4 per cent of 
the remaining budget (IEA, 2018). If emissions continue at this level, the 
budget will be exhausted in less than 25 years. Hence, to achieve the 2°C target, 
energy- related carbon emissions must fall very rapidly. The IEA estimate that 
emissions must fall by ~70 per cent by 20501 – implying a near complete decar-
bonisation of the electricity sector, retrofitting of the entire existing building 
stock, a major shift towards low- emission vehicles and an 80 per cent reduction 
in the carbon intensity of industrial sectors (IEA, 2017). By the end of the 
century, any residual anthropogenic CO2 emissions would need to be balanced 
by CO2 removals from the atmosphere.
 There is no historical precedent for transforming energy systems at this scale 
and at this speed. Achieving this goal will require the rapid and extensive 
deployment of low- carbon technologies throughout all sectors of the global 
economy, with far- reaching implications for markets, infrastructures, institu-
tions, social practices and cultural norms. What is more, emission reduction 
efforts will simultaneously have to address other concerns, including questions 
of social justice, energy access and energy security.
 There is certainly some degree of political ambition to revolutionise the 
energy landscape. The 2016 Paris Agreement provides a strong basis for global 
mitigation efforts and these in turn have encouraged (and have been facilitated 
by) major improvements and cost reductions in renewable energy, electric 
vehicles, energy storage and other low- carbon technologies (UNFCC, 2015). 
Electricity from wind and solar is projected to be cheaper than fossil fuels by the 
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mid- 2020s, and global trends show a rapid uptake of these and other low- carbon 
technologies (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018; IEA, 2017). Modern 
renewables now provide 10 per cent of global final energy demand and more 
than a quarter of global electricity generation, with a record 157 gigawatts 
(GW) being commissioned in 2017 (Frankfurt School–UNEP Centre/BNEF, 
2018).
 Yet despite these encouraging trends the rate of progress remains too slow, 
particularly in relation to improving energy efficiency and reducing energy 
demand. Global primary energy intensity (the ratio of primary energy consump-
tion to GDP) fell by 1.2 per cent in 2017, but this is less than half the rate 
required to meet the 2°C target (IEA, 2017). While a business as usual scenario 
suggests a ~40 per cent increase in global primary energy demand by 2050, a 
2°C scenario suggests practically no increase – unless negative emission tech-
nologies are deployed (IEA, 2017). There are a growing number of policy initi-
atives targeting energy demand, but many of these focus upon incremental 
technological improvements (e.g. insulation) and necessitate only modest 
changes in energy- related behaviour. But to meet the emission reduction targets, 
we must achieve radical changes in energy demand throughout all sectors of the 
global economy. Since only limited increases in global energy demand appear 
compatible with ambitious climate targets (Loftus et al., 2015), developing 
countries must follow very different development paths than have been 
observed historically – leapfrogging to highly energy- efficient technologies and 
providing high levels of human welfare with much lower energy consumption 
that has been required in the past (Steckel et al., 2013). And to allow space for 
increased energy demand in the developing world, there will need to be abso-
lute reductions in energy demand in the developed world. Few countries have 
achieved this in the past, and it is likely to prove very challenging.
Reducing energy demand
The IEA estimates that improved energy efficiency and reduced energy demand 
could contribute up to half of the reductions in global carbon emissions over the 
next few decades (IEA, 2012a; IEA, 2015). In other words, changes in energy 
demand could contribute as much carbon abatement as all the low- carbon 
energy supply options combined. Similarly, the United Kingdom (UK) govern-
ment has recognised that reducing energy demand can be a highly cost- effective 
approach to reaching climate targets, and positions both energy demand reduc-
tion and increased energy efficiency as core policy goals (DTI, 2003, 2007; 
DECC, 2011). But questions remain on how best to achieve these goals.
 The demand for energy is driven by the demand for energy services, such as 
thermal comfort, illumination and mobility. Energy services form the last stage 
of an energy chain that begins with primary energy sources such as crude oil and 
nuclear power, continues through secondary energy carriers such as gasoline and 
electricity and then through end- use conversion devices such as boilers, fur-
naces, motors and lightbulbs. These conversion devices provide ‘useful energy’ 
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such as low- and high- temperature heat, mechanical power and electromagnetic 
radiation, which in turn is preserved or trapped within ‘passive systems’ for a 
period of time to produce final energy services (Cullen and Allwood, 2010). So, 
for example, the heat delivered from a boiler (conversion device) is held within 
a building (passive system) for a period of time to provide thermal comfort 
(energy service).
 It follows that there are three ways to reduce energy demand:
1 Improve conversion efficiencies and reduce transmission losses at all stages 
of the energy chain, including from primary to final energy (e.g. more effi-
cient power stations) and from final to useful energy (e.g. more efficient 
boilers, engines and refrigerators).
2 Improve the ability of passive systems to trap energy for periods of time (e.g. 
more aerodynamic vehicles, better insulated buildings).
3 Reduce demand for energy services, such as heating, lighting and cooling, 
(e.g. lower internal temperatures, fewer overseas flights).
These changes can be achieved through a combination of retrofitting existing 
technologies (e.g. insulating a house), investing in new technologies (e.g. 
installing a condensing boiler) and changing energy- related behaviour (e.g. 
turning off lights when not in use). The latter in turn may involve either 
restraint (e.g. turning the thermostat down, giving up flying) or substitution by 
less energy- intensive services (e.g. shifting from cars to buses). Large improve-
ments in energy efficiency are often associated with simultaneous shifts towards 
different energy carriers – such as replacing gas boilers with (more efficient) 
electric heat pumps or replacing gasoline cars with (more efficient) battery–
electric vehicles. But much of the potential for reducing energy demand requires 
inter- linked changes in all of these areas. More fundamentally, radical reduc-
tions in energy demand are likely to require transitions to entirely new systems 
for providing energy services – such as intermodal transport, compact cities, and 
smart homes.
 None of these options are straightforward and the complexity of the pro-
cesses involved can easily be underestimated. Sorrell (2015) notes, for instance, 
that previous attempts to reduce energy demand have often proved unsuccess-
ful; the assumptions on which policy interventions are based do not always 
reflect either the challenge involved or the factors shaping individual and 
organisational decision- making; and the complexity of economic systems can 
undermine the success of even well- designed interventions. There are numerous 
stumbling blocks on the road to energy demand reductions:
•	 Reducing energy demand is complex: Historically, economic growth has 
been closely linked to increased energy consumption, and few countries 
have achieved ‘absolute decoupling’ of primary energy consumption from 
gross domestic product (GDP) (see Chapter 8). The expectation that 
improved energy efficiency will lead to proportional reductions in energy 
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demand can be misleading (Sorrell, 2009). The links between efficiency 
and demand are complex and rebound effects – in which consumers 
increase their consumption of energy services to take advantage of the fact 
that these services are now cheaper – can partly offset and sometimes com-
pletely eliminate the associated energy savings. In this regard, projections 
of the impact of policy instruments on energy demand often rely upon over-
simplified assumptions (Wilhite et al., 2000; Sorrell, 2015).
•	 Large- scale, rapid change is required: Previous energy transitions (e.g. 
from localised wood use to centralised fossil fuels) have generally been long 
and arduous affairs (Smil, 2010). There may be some hope here, as past 
transitions have generally not been the result of deliberate government 
intervention (Geels et al., 2017). Yet the urgency of the climate change 
agenda means that we require larger, faster and more pervasive changes 
than have been achieved before, supported by policy efforts that have not 
existed in previous energy transitions (Sovacool, 2016). Such efforts will 
require substantial and sustained political commitment, combined with 
global cooperation in the face of powerful incentives to defect and free ride.
•	 Energy demand is rising: Even if the most optimistic forecasts for the 
upscaling of low- carbon energy supply are exceeded, increases in energy 
consumption will blunt their impact. Decarbonisation of energy supply 
must be combined with a break with the historically observed relationship 
between energy consumption and economic growth. If the rate of decar-
bonising energy supply is less than anticipated by the more optimistic scen-
arios, climate targets will only be achieved through greater efforts to reduce 
energy demand or the deployment of negative emission technologies. Given 
the uncertainties associated with the latter (Anderson and Peters, 2016), 
reducing energy demand must be a priority.
•	 Societies are disinclined to change: Energy demand is shaped by large- scale, 
capital- intensive and long- lived technologies and infrastructures (e.g. trans-
port systems, buildings) that constrain the feasible rate of change. This inertia 
is reinforced by the entrenched habits and social practices that develop along-
side these technologies and infrastructures, together with powerful political 
interests that resist change (Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2014). For 
example, policies aimed at reducing automobile dependence face a backlash 
from motorists whose work and leisure patterns are built around the private 
car, and from motor and fossil fuel industries whose economic interests are 
threatened (Dudley and Chatterjee, 2011). For this reason, energy- and 
carbon- intensive forms of energy service provision continues to dominate and 
will be difficult to dislodge.
•	 Carbon pricing is insufficient: Carbon pricing can encourage reductions 
in energy demand and carbon emissions but is unlikely to be sufficient by 
itself. Carbon prices remain much lower than required to meet ambitious 
climate targets and attempts to raise them must overcome formidable 
political obstacles (Loftus et al., 2015). Carbon pricing can encourage 
organisations and individuals to pursue energy efficiency, but many are 
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locked in to energy- inefficient systems and practices, with the costs of 
switching to more efficient systems frequently offsetting the financial 
benefits of lower energy consumption (see Gillingham et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the economic theories underpinning carbon pricing provide a 
poor guide to real- world individual and organisational behaviour (Brown, 
2001; Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007).
•	 Current policies neglect innovation: Energy demand reduction requires 
rising energy/carbon prices alongside policies to reduce the economic 
barriers to improved energy efficiency (Sorrell et al., 2004). It requires inter-
ventions that encourage individuals and households to adopt existing 
energy- efficient technologies and practices, alongside support for new 
energy- efficient technologies throughout all stages of the innovation chain. 
But many policy measures are underrepresented in the current policy mix 
(e.g. innovation support) while others are confined to relatively incremen-
tal improvements (e.g. insulation). Thus, in the face of multiple barriers, 
current policy approaches appear insufficient.
Two things are clear from the preceding discussion. First, to reach our climate 
change targets, we must significantly reduce energy demand relative to business- 
as-usual scenarios, and possibly also in absolute terms. Second, the pathways to 
doing so defy simple or straightforward solutions. This brings us to the challenge 
of finding the most effective approach, and to the contribution of a ‘sociotech-
nical’ perspective on energy demand.
Perspectives on reducing energy demand: the sociotechnical 
approach
The challenge of reducing energy demand has been approached from many 
different theoretical perspectives including neoclassical economics (focusing on 
economic barriers to energy efficiency), social psychology (focusing on cogni-
tive, emotional and affective influences on energy- related choices) and social 
practice theory (focusing on how habitual behaviour and social norms shape 
energy demand). Each approach offers valuable insights, but also has blind spots 
and weaknesses – particularly in relation to achieving more radical reductions 
in energy demand. This book therefore proposes a complementary sociotechnical 
perspective that can overcome some of these limitations. The sociotechnical 
approach is well established in the academic literature but has rarely been 
applied to energy demand.
 A distinguishing feature of the sociotechnical approach is the expansion of 
the unit of analysis from individual technologies to the sociotechnical systems 
that provide energy services such as thermal comfort and mobility. Sociotechni-
cal systems are understood as the interdependent mix of social and technical 
entities that function collectively to deliver specific energy services. They 
include physical artefacts (e.g. infrastructures, conversion technologies, passive 
systems), social arrangements (e.g. firms, supply chains, markets, regulations) 
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and intangible elements such as skills, habits, routines, expectations and social 
norms (Geels, 2004). The sociotechnical system associated with electricity, for 
example, includes: physical artefacts such as power stations and transmission 
lines; social arrangements such as electricity markets, technical standards and 
industry associations; and intangible elements such as electrical engineering 
skills and the social practices associated with electricity provision and use 
(Hughes, 1983). Sociotechnical systems develop over many decades and the 
alignment and co- evolution of the different elements leads to mutual depend-
ence and resistance to change (Geels, 2002). Since the configuration of socio-
technical systems shapes the level, nature and pattern of energy demand, 
significant reductions in energy demand requires not just changes in individual 
technologies, but far- reaching changes in the sociotechnical systems themselves. 
We term such changes sociotechnical transitions.
 The sociotechnical perspective has its roots in the study of innovation but 
differs from more conventional approaches to innovation by: first, focusing on 
broader systems and processes of long- term change in those systems; and second, 
understanding innovation as both a technical and social process that necessi-
tates complex relationships between a range of actors (including firms, research-
ers, policymakers and consumers). These actors develop strategies, make 
investments, learn, open up new markets and develop new routines. As an 
example, a sociotechnical account of transitions in the electricity system would 
include the changes within and interrelationships between: public policies and 
industry regulators; the strategies of generation, network and supply companies; 
the practices of electricity consumers; and the cognitive, normative and regula-
tive rules that underpin different elements of the system (Geels, 2002; 
Hammond et al., 2013).
 This book investigates how transitions in sociotechnical systems occur and 
their potential contribution to reducing energy demand. We assume that such 
transitions centre around particular low- energy innovations – defined as technolo-
gies or social practices that differ significantly from existing technologies and 
practices and have the potential to radically improve energy efficiency and/or 
reduce energy demand. An example would be the central role of heat pumps in 
a transition from gas to electric heating systems. We seek to make a distinctive 
contribution to the energy demand literature by developing a sociotechnical 
understanding of the emergence, diffusion and impact of such innovations. We 
aim to uncover the processes and mechanisms through which different types of 
low- energy innovation become (or fail to become) established, identify the role 
of different groups, explore the resulting impacts on energy demand and other 
social goals, and develop practical recommendations for both encouraging the 
diffusion of such innovations and maximising their long- term impact.
 Our approach rests upon two assumptions. First, innovations must be situated 
and studied within broader sociotechnical systems, particularly when their diffu-
sion is associated with fundamental changes in those systems (sociotechnical 
transitions). Second, to have a significant impact on energy demand, such 
innovations should be technologically radical, socially radical, or a combination 
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of the two – what Dahlin and Behrens (2005) term ‘systemically radical’. 
Radical innovations disrupt established sociotechnical systems – in this case the 
dominant energy- and carbon- intensive systems – and lead to far- reaching 
changes in the nature and functioning of those systems (see Chapter 2).
UK policy on energy demand
This book focuses primarily on the UK, one of a small number of countries that 
have made significant progress in reducing energy demand. Between 2001 and 
2017, UK GDP grew by 31 per cent and population grew by 11.7 per cent, but 
primary energy demand fell by 19 per cent. These reductions have partly been 
achieved by the diffusion of low- energy innovations – such as energy- efficient 
lighting, appliances, boilers, electric motors and vehicles – and these in turn 
have been encouraged by policies such as building regulations, appliance stand-
ards and energy efficiency obligations. But demand reductions have also resulted 
from economic restructuring and the ‘offshoring’ of energy- intensive manufac-
turing to other countries. In this regard, reductions in UK energy use and emis-
sions have been offset by increased energy use and emissions elsewhere. While 
such reductions may contribute to UK climate targets, they do little to address 
global climate change. Barrett et al. (2013) estimate, for instance, that while 
the UK’s territorial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions fell by 27 per cent 
between 1990 and 2008, it’s ‘consumption- based’ emissions increased by ~20 
per cent as a consequence of imported consumer goods displacing (more energy 
efficient) domestic production.
 The UK has set long- term, legally binding targets for reducing GHG emis-
sions and has established an independent Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC) to set intermediate targets and oversee progress. But the CCC (2018) 
warns that the UK is not on course to meet its ‘carbon budgets’ and that urgent 
action is required to both bring forward new policies and to reduce the risk of 
existing policies failing to deliver. Despite the UK’s progress to date, new meas-
ures are urgently required to deliver deeper and faster improvements in energy 
efficiency, particularly in ‘more difficult’ sectors such as domestic heating 
(Shove, 2017; Staffell, 2017).
 The UK has long history of energy efficiency policies and several of these have 
been very successful – including the series of obligations on energy suppliers to 
improve household energy efficiency (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2014) and the EU 
standards on the energy efficiency of domestic appliances. But there have also been 
notable failures, including the flagship Green Deal policy that was intended to 
deliver large- scale energy efficiency retrofits but was terminated only two years after 
its launch (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). The IEA observes that UK energy efficiency 
policy has neglected security of supply and other concerns (IEA, 2006, 2012b; Kern 
et al., 2017), the CCC criticise the large- scale decline in investment after 2013 and 
the current dearth of policy initiatives, and Hardt et al. (2018) highlight the slow-
down in the rate of efficiency improvement in industry and the limited scope for 
further energy savings through offshoring.
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 Overall then, the UK serves as both an exemplar of successful measures and a 
cautionary tale. While offshoring is clearly unsustainable in terms of reaching 
global emissions goals, the UK provides some good examples of what can be 
done, as well as what should be avoided. Several of these cases are covered in 
this book2 and provide lessons that are relevant to a range of contexts.
About the book
This book is based upon research by the Centre on Innovation and Energy 
Demand (CIED), a five- year, social science research centre funded by the UK 
Research Councils. Focusing primarily on the UK, the book uses a sociotechnical 
approach to explore the challenge of reducing energy demand. The book 
includes theoretical discussions, literature reviews and a series of empirical case 
studies organised around the themes of emergence, diffusion and impact of low- 
energy innovations. The chosen cases include both new technologies (e.g. smart 
meters, vehicle automation and district heating) and new organisational 
arrangements (e.g. integrated policy mixes) that either have or could have signi-
ficant impacts on energy demand. The book has the dual aim of improving the 
academic understanding of sociotechnical transitions and energy demand and 
providing practical recommendations for public policy.
Structure
This booked is structured around the themes of emergence, diffusion and impact 
– introduced in full in Chapter 2. We do not argue that all innovations follow a 
linear progression between these stages (which often overlap), but instead 
present them as a useful framework for conceptualising the innovation journey.
 Emergence: The term emergence does not refer to the initial invention of 
new ideas (e.g. from scientific research), but the introduction of those ideas into 
society. Emerging technologies, behaviours, institutional arrangements and busi-
ness models struggle to become established against more dominant systems and 
can easily fail. Before innovations can break through into broader markets, 
space needs to be created for learning and improvement, for the building of 
social networks and for stabilisation around a dominant configuration or design. 
The chapters on emergence examine these processes for specific low- energy 
innovations and uncover the conditions for their success.
 Diffusion: Innovations spread when their performance improves and costs 
fall as a result of network, scale and learning economies; when public policies 
support their adoption; and when they become aligned with people’s expecta-
tions and behaviours. Diffusion does not happen into an ‘empty’ world, but in 
the context of existing sociotechnical systems that provide barriers and active 
resistance. Many low- energy innovations are not intrinsically attractive to the 
majority of consumers since they are often (initially) more expensive and 
perform less well on key dimensions. The chapters on diffusion explore the 
mechanisms driving this process for selected low- energy innovations, and 
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examine how infrastructures, business models, social norms, values and public 
policies need to change for such innovations to succeed.
 Impact: The diffusion of low- energy innovations will only contribute to 
climate goals if they lead to significant reductions in economy- wide energy con-
sumption. But research on innovation and sociotechnical transitions has paid 
relatively little attention to the ultimate impact of innovations on energy 
demand or other social goals. More generally, the links between economic 
growth, energy efficiency and energy consumption remain poorly understood. 
The chapters on impact therefore employ both orthodox and novel methods for 
estimating the historical impacts of low- energy innovations and for projecting 
their potential future impacts.
Chapters
Across each chapter, Transitions in Energy Efficiency and Demand moves from 
contextually- specific first principles through to empirical research in selected 
areas and, finally, to ideas for how these systems can be most effectively be 
changed. While each chapter is structured differently, they all include specific 
policy recommendations.
 The first section of the book, ‘Analytical perspectives’ provides a conceptual 
and normative orientation to the problem of reducing energy demand. Chapter 
2, provides a theoretical primer on the problems addressed by this book, and the 
potential contribution of the sociotechnical approach. This includes an over-
view of the ‘multi- level perspective’ on sociotechnical transitions and a survey 
of key debates relevant to emerge, diffusion and impact. Chapter 3 adds an 
ethical dimension to this discussion, considering the broader normative prob-
lems of energy provision through a case study of fuel poverty in the UK.
 Chapter 4 begins the section on ‘The emergence and diffusion of innovations’ 
by considering visions of personal transport futures in the UK and the role of elec-
tric vehicles therein. It argues that policymakers would benefit from engaging with 
a variety of future visions, including the possibility of disruption and shocks and 
the failure to meet emission reduction targets. Chapter 5 then examines the exper-
imentation with automated vehicles that is underway in several UK cities. It 
points to the highly managed processes of these experiments (e.g. where and when 
experiments occur, who is included/excluded, what counts as an experiment), 
which limit the opportunity for second- order learning and surprises. Chapter 6 
explores the evolution of the UK smart meter rollout, including the obstacles 
faced and the potential implications for energy justice and consumer vulnerability. 
Lastly, Chapter 7 investigates the mammoth task of comprehensively upgrading 
UK residential buildings, highlighting the need for consistent and ambitious policy 
targets; the importance of new business models and finance mechanisms; and the 
role of intermediary actors in supporting policy implementation.
 Moving on to the ‘Societal impacts and co- benefits’ section, Chapter 8 explores 
the importance of energy for economic growth and summarise a number of recent 
studies which suggest that efficiency improvements are key driver of growth and 
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that the rebound effects from those improvements can be large. Chapter 9 is more 
forward- looking, using macroeconomic modelling to explore the economy- wide 
impacts of UK household energy efficiency improvements. They show how these 
can stimulate economic activity, leading to increased employment, investment 
and savings, and argue that a focus on rebound effects can obscure the wider eco-
nomic and social benefits of improved energy efficiency.
 The section on ‘Policy mixes and implications’ considers the policy frameworks 
for facilitating low- energy innovation. Chapter 10 uses a series of historical cases 
studies to investigate how policymakers can deliberately accelerate sociotechnical 
transitions – highlighting the importance of ‘disarming’ resistance from incumbent 
actors, popular support for the transition and the level of maturity of the core 
innovation. Chapter 11 goes on to discuss the challenge of delivering energy effi-
ciency policy in the UK, arguing that political sensitivities about energy prices, 
neglect of the social benefits of energy efficiency and rigid adherence to neoclassi-
cal economic theory have hampered effective policy. This feeds directly into 
Chapter 12 on policy mixes for energy demand reduction. This chapter draws on 
the emerging policy mixes for energy transitions literature and highlights the com-
parative neglect of energy efficiency policy mixes. It goes on to summarise the 
empirical findings conducted as part of CIED with a view to both: (1) drawing out 
overall insights and avenues for future research and (2) establishing policy reflec-
tions on design principles for policy mixes in which energy efficiency plays a key 
role. Closing this section, Chapter 13 reviews the literature on Strategic Niche 
Management (SNM), identifying some lessons for both researchers and policy-
makers working towards low- energy transitions.
 The conclusion (Chapter 14) summarises and elaborates the contributions of 
each chapter and develops a summative list of conceptual and policy principles 
for accelerating energy demand reduction. Taken together the chapters provide 
a comprehensive, sociotechnical account of the energy demand challenge and 
provide both new empirical results and practical suggestions for achieving 
meaningful change. We hope you enjoy!
Notes
1 This is a higher rate of reduction than assumed in many scenarios, since it excludes 
the possibility of temporarily overshooting the 2°C target and compensating subse-
quently through the use of negative emission technologies.
2 Although we also reference Denmark, Japan, Finland, New Zealand and the Nether-
lands, for example.
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Introduction
Improvements in energy efficiency are widely expected to contribute more than 
half of the reductions in global carbon emissions over the next few decades (IEA, 
2012) and are considered critically important to delivering the pledges made in 
the Paris Agreement (IEA, 2015). These improvements are expected to reduce 
energy demand below that projected in ‘business as usual scenarios’ and may also 
need to deliver absolute reductions in energy consumption. To provide a likely (66 
per cent) chance of limiting global temperature increases to below 2°C, net global 
carbon emissions must peak by 2020 and fall to zero by approximately 2070 – an 
extraordinarily demanding target. In the near term (2040), this implies more than 
doubling the annual rate of energy efficiency improvement in appliances and the 
building stock (IEA, 2017). The rate and scale of change required is best described 
as revolutionary: there are few historical precedents for such accelerated efficiency 
improvements and existing policy initiatives have achieved only incremental pro-
gress towards that end (Geels et al., 2017).
 To deliver such an ambitious target will require the rapid development and 
diffusion of multiple ‘low- energy innovations’ – innovations that differ signifi-
cantly from existing technologies and practices and have the potential to 
improve energy efficiency and/or reduce energy demand. Many of these tech-
nologies, such as electric vehicles (EVs) or heat pumps, also involve a switch to 
low- carbon energy sources.
 To date, policy efforts to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy demand 
have primarily been informed by neoclassical economics, behavioural economics 
and social psychology. These perspectives have numerous strengths, but also 
important limitations for understanding both the nature of the low- carbon chal-
lenge and the appropriate policy response to that challenge. In particular, they 
provide limited guidance on the emergence and diffusion of low- energy innova-
tions and the associated processes of system transformation (Sorrell, 2015).
 Neoclassical economics considers energy or carbon prices to be the critical 
variable in reducing energy demand, supported where appropriate by policies to 
reduce various economic barriers to energy efficiency, such as split incentives 
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and asymmetric information (Brown, 2001; Sorrell et al., 2004). However, for 
most consumers energy efficiency represents a secondary and largely invisible 
attribute of goods and services, thereby muting the response to price incentives. 
Factors such as comfort, practicality and convenience commonly play a much 
larger role in energy- related decisions, with energy consumption being domi-
nated by habitual behaviour that is shaped by social norms (Shove, 2003). 
Moreover, carbon pricing is politically unpopular and energy efficiency remains 
a low political priority, resulting in a policy mix that is frequently ineffective 
(Kern et al., 2017). Neoclassical economics also assumes rational decision- 
making by firms and individuals and thereby pays insufficient attention to the 
broader, non- economic determinants of decision- making (Stern et al., 2016).
 Insights from behavioural economics and social psychology can reveal the 
cognitive, emotional and affective influences on relevant choices and routines 
and suggest ways to ‘nudge’ people and organisations towards more energy- 
efficient choices and routines (Andrews and Johnson, 2016; Steg, 2016). But 
social–psychological research focuses overwhelmingly upon individual con-
sumers and neglects the importance of interactions with other actors, organisa-
tional decision- making and economic and social contexts. More fundamentally, 
both economic and social psychology have an individualist orientation that 
underrates the significance of the collective and structural factors that shape 
behaviour, guide innovation and enable and constrain individual choice.
 Thus, the dominant perspectives on reducing energy demand have a number of 
limitations and these limitations are reflected in the partial focus and frequent 
ineffectiveness of the current policy mix. Given this, we suggest a broader 
‘sociotechnical’ perspective that more fully addresses the complexity of the chal-
lenges involved and which integrates insights from a number of social science dis-
ciplines, including innovation studies, science and technology studies, and history. 
We argue that reducing energy demand involves more than improving individual 
technologies or changing individual behaviours, but instead requires interlinked 
and potentially far- reaching changes in the broader ‘sociotechnical systems’ that 
deliver energy services, such as lighting, thermal comfort or mobility. We term 
these changes ‘sociotechnical transitions’. These transitions are typically complex, 
protracted, multi- dimensional and path dependent, and the outcomes are difficult 
to predict. A sociotechnical transitions perspective acknowledges these character-
istics and seeks to understand the transition process as a whole, rather than focus-
ing upon individual technologies and behaviours.
 Drawing from earlier work (Geels et al., 2018), we have organised our discus-
sion of sociotechnical systems and low- energy innovations under three research 
themes, namely: emergence, diffusion and impact. Although this is suggestive of 
a linear model of innovation, we think the distinction is useful since each 
theme encompasses very different analytical topics. Emergence and diffusion of 
radical low- energy innovations refer to different phases in decades- long trans-
ition processes (although the boundaries between them may be fuzzy). Impact 
refers to the ultimate effect of low- energy innovations on energy demand. 
Acknowledging complexities, we also identify crosscutting debates that span the 
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three themes. The focus throughout is on theoretical and conceptual issues 
rather than specific empirical insights. Many of the debates are relevant to 
research on ‘sociotechnical transitions’ in general as well as to research on 
energy demand in particular.
The sociotechnical transitions approach
Numerous social scientific theories identify themselves as being ‘sociotechnical’, 
although they interpret that term in different ways. One recent review identi-
fied no less than 96 distinct theories that call themselves sociotechnical across 
more than a dozen disciplines (Sovacool and Hess, 2017). Nonetheless, there 
are some key distinctions that set our sociotechnical perspective apart from 
others, which we examine here.
 Substantial reductions in energy demand will require transitions towards new or 
durably reconfigured sociotechnical systems for delivering heating, lighting, 
motive power, mobility and other energy services. For example, lower energy and 
lower carbon mobility may require: transforming the car fleet towards lightweight 
EVs; developing and diffusing associated technologies in materials, battery storage, 
controls and electric propulsion; establishing a national charging network; integ-
rating this network with a smart transmission and distribution grid (including 
using EVs for electricity storage); developing new models for vehicle sharing and 
ownership; significantly expanding the share of public transport in total mobility; 
redesigning cities to encourage walking and cycling and so on.
 Promising low- energy innovations provide the seeds for such transitions, but 
many of them initially have a very small market share and face uphill struggles 
against existing technologies and practices and the sociotechnical systems in 
which they are embedded. One implication is that current policy interventions 
(which revolve around more narrow dimensions such as cost structures, informa-
tion provision and regulation) may be insufficient to bring about such non- 
marginal change. A second implication is that low- energy innovations should 
not be studied in isolation, but in the context of their compatibility with and 
struggles against existing sociotechnical systems. The specific framework we use 
to understand these issues is the Multi- Level Perspective (MLP), which we 
briefly summarise.
 The MLP distinguishes three analytical levels (Geels, 2002; Geels and Schot, 
2007; Rip and Kemp, 1998).
1 The incumbent sociotechnical system refers to the interdependent mix of 
technologies, industries, supply chains, consumption patterns, policies and 
infrastructures. These tangible system elements are reproduced by actors 
and social groups, whose perceptions and actions are shaped by formal rules 
(e.g. regulations, standards) and informal institutions (e.g. shared meanings, 
heuristics, rules of thumb, routines, social norms). The rules and institutions 
within a sociotechnical system are referred to as the sociotechnical regime. 
Owing to various ‘lock- in’ effects (Unruh, 2000), innovation in existing 
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systems is mostly incremental and path dependent, aimed at elaborating 
existing capabilities. Sources of lock- in include sunk investments (in skills, 
factories and infrastructures), economies of scale, increasing returns to 
adoption, and the momentum of established rules and institutions (Hughes, 
1987). These reinforcing factors act to create stability in the incumbent 
system, and resistance to change.
2 Niche innovations refer to novelties that deviate on one or more dimensions 
from existing systems. The novelty may be a new practice (e.g. car- sharing), 
a new technology (e.g. battery–EVs), a new business model (e.g. energy 
service companies) or a combination of these. Many radical innovations 
initially have poor price/performance characteristics and are misaligned 
with – and obstructed by – the established sociotechnical system. Radical 
innovations therefore initially emerge in ‘niches’, which act as ‘incubation 
rooms’ that protect them against mainstream selection environments 
(Kemp et al., 1998). Examples are: particular application domains (e.g. the 
military), geographical areas, markets or subsidised programmes. Radical 
innovations are often developed by networks of ‘fringe’ actors, rather than 
by dominant firms (Van de Poel, 2000).
3 The sociotechnical landscape forms an exogenous environment beyond the 
direct influence of niche and regime actors but influencing them in various 
ways. This may be through gradual changes, such as shifts in cultural prefer-
ences, demographics and macro- political developments, or through short- 
term shocks such as macro- economic recessions and oil crises.
Niche actors are continually working on radical innovations (e.g. developing 
and improving technologies, opening up markets, finding customers, attracting 
investment, lobbying policymakers for support), but usually experience uphill 
struggles against existing systems, which are stabilised by multiple lock- in 
mechanisms. The MLP therefore suggests that transitions require the alignment 
of several processes within and between the three analytical levels: 
a) ‘niche innovations gradually build up internal momentum (through 
learning processes, price/performance improvements and support from 
powerful groups), b) changes at the landscape level creates pressure on the 
regime, c) destabilisation of the regime creates windows of opportunity for 
niche innovations. 
(Geels and Schot, 2007, p. 400)
This combination of processes allows niche innovations to break through, and 
to trigger a series of broader changes in supply chains, infrastructures, policies, 
expectations and behaviours that ultimately transform the regime. The MLP has 
been illustrated and refined with historical case studies of transitions as well as 
contemporary applications.
 Figure 2.1 schematically represents the MLP as a ‘big- picture’ understanding 
of transitions. The next three sections draw upon this framework to further 
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assess the processes through which low- energy innovations emerge and diffuse, 
together with their potential impacts on energy demand. In each section, we first 
provide a general conceptualisation of the relevant theme (emergence, diffusion, 
impact) and then highlight research debates. Although Figure 2.1 portrays these 
processes as three consecutive phases, real- world transitions deviate from the 
implied linearity.
Emergence of low- energy innovations
Sociotechnical research on emergence does not focus on the initial invention of 
new knowledge (e.g. from scientific research), but on the early introduction of 
innovations in real- world application domains, labelled ‘niches’ (Kemp et al., 
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Figure 2.1  Multi-level perspective on transitions – illustrating the emergence, diffusion 
and impact of radical innovations as three consecutive circles.
Source: adapted from Geels (2002), with permission.
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1998). The introduction of innovations tends to be difficult because the support-
ive sociotechnical contexts that allow innovations to thrive – e.g. networks of 
institutions, formalised and tacit knowledge, social norms and expectations, design 
standards, financial resources, supportive regulations and so forth – have yet to be 
established. A common manifestation of the absence of supportive contexts for 
innovations is the so- called ‘valley of death’ in innovation financing (Auerswald 
and Branscomb, 2003), where an emerging technology becomes too capital inten-
sive for venture capital firms, while at the same time being too risky for project 
finance. Many novelties fail to cross this chasm or take a very long time to do so.
 According to the Strategic Niche Management approach (Geels and Raven, 
2006; Kemp et al., 1998; Schot and Geels, 2008; Smith and Raven, 2012), the 
creation of ‘niches’ or ‘protective spaces’ is a useful and important means of 
encouraging emerging innovations because they shield those innovations from 
the pressures imposed by the existing system and give them time to mature. 
Such protective spaces allow actors associated with innovations to address and 
reduce a wide range of uncertainties, including:
1 Techno- economic uncertainties: There may be competing technical configu-
rations (EVs, for instance, may use lead acid, nickel metal hydride, lithium 
ion or zinc air batteries), each with different advantages and disadvantages.
2 Finance and investment- related uncertainties: Often it is difficult not only to 
obtain the funding that is necessary for technical development and practical 
experimentation, but also to evaluate the rationality of investments in 
innovations. To attract finance, product champions often make positive 
promises (Geels, 2002) and even expert analysts in technical areas often suffer 
from ‘appraisal optimism’ (Gilbert and Sovacool, 2016; Gross et al., 2013).
3 Cognitive uncertainties: Actors developing niche innovations often have 
different views and perceptions about technical specifications, consumer pref-
erences, infrastructure requirements, future costs, and so forth (Sovacool et 
al., 2017). This ‘interpretive flexibility’ gives rise to debates, disagreements, 
discursive struggles and competing visions (Geels and Verhees, 2011; 
Goldthau and Sovacool, 2016).
4 Social uncertainties: The networks of actors developing niche innovations are 
often unstable and fluid. Actors may enter into partnerships for a few years, 
but then leave if difficulties arise or funding runs out (Olleros, 1986). Start- up 
or spin- off firms may be attracted by new opportunities, but then may also exit 
when economic ventures fail (as they often do in early phases).
To address these uncertainties, three core processes in the development of niche 
innovations have been identified in the literature (see Schot and Geels, 2008, 
for a summary):
•	 Articulation of expectations and visions: Expectations (defined as ‘representa-
tions of future technological situations and capabilities’ (Bakker et al., 
2011)) are considered crucial for niche development because they provide 
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direction to learning processes, attract attention from policymakers, inves-
tors and other actors, and legitimate protection and nurturing (Borup et al., 
2006; Melton et al. 2016; Van Lente, 2012).
•	 Building of social networks: This process is important to create a constituency 
behind an innovation, to facilitate interactions and knowledge exchange 
between relevant stakeholders, and to provide the necessary resources (e.g. 
venture capital, people, and expertise) for further development and sub-
sequent diffusion (Kemp et al., 1998).
•	 Learning processes along multiple dimensions (Sengers et al., 2017), including: 
technical aspects and design specifications; market and user preferences; cul-
tural and symbolic meanings; infrastructure and maintenance requirements; 
production processes; supply chains and distribution networks; regulatory 
standards; societal acceptability and environmental impacts.
Niches gain momentum if: first, visions and expectations become more precise 
and more broadly accepted; second, the alignment of various learning processes 
results in shared expectations and a ‘dominant design’; and third, networks 
increase in size, including the participation of powerful actors that add legiti-
macy and expand resources (Schot and Geels, 2008). These processes of stabili-
sation, acceptance and support and community building tend to occur over 
sequences of concrete demonstration projects, experiences and trials (see Geels 
and Raven, 2006, for one conceptualisation of these processes).
 Having summarised and characterised the niche innovation literature, we 
now identify two research debates that are relevant to the emergence of low- 
energy innovations.
The contribution of outsiders and incumbents to emergence
One debate relates to the role of new entrants relative to actors within incum-
bent regimes such as electric utilities and car manufacturers. The Strategic 
Niche Management (SNM) literature and the grassroots innovation approach 
(Seyfang and Haxeltine, 2012; Smith and Seyfang, 2013) often argue that start- 
ups, civil society organisations and ‘grassroots’ innovators tend to pioneer 
radical niche innovations because they are less ‘locked in’ and willing to think 
‘out of the box’. Incumbent actors, in contrast, focus on incremental innova-
tions that fit easier with existing capabilities, capital investments and interests.
 Recent work, however, has questioned this simple dichotomy, identifying 
many instances where incumbent actors develop radical niche innovations 
(Berggren et al., 2015; Geels et al., 2016). New entrants may also collaborate 
with incumbents in order to draw on their financial resources, technical cap-
abilities and political connections. This may accelerate emergence but also 
entail some ‘mainstreaming’ and weakening of the more radical aspects of the 
innovation (Smith, 2007). The first research debate thus concerns the relative 
importance and roles of new entrants and incumbents in the emergence of low- 
energy niche innovations.
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The role of visions and expectations in emergence
There are different views on sociotechnical visions and expectations, which 
underpins debates about their relative discursive (and material) strengths. Some 
(e.g. Loorbach, 2007) have an operational view and see visions as indicating 
long- term directions of transitions, which can then be explored with short- term 
projects that produce learning outcomes which can be used to adjust and fine- 
tune visions.
 Sociologists of innovation, in contrast, have a more constructivist view that 
emphasises the ‘performative’ roles that visions and expectations play in early 
technological development (Bakker et al., 2011; Borup et al., 2006). Nightingale 
(1998) sees technological optimism and fantasy as an elemental part of the ‘cog-
nitive’ dimension of innovation. Berkhout (2006) qualifies visions as strategic 
‘bids’ for public support, which are an emergent property in all transitions. Van 
Lente (2012) further identifies three roles of expectations: they raise attention 
and legitimate the innovation as worthy of investment and support; they 
provide direction for search and learning processes; and they coordinate action 
in dispersed social networks.
 There are also more critical views that emphasise ‘hype- cycles’ or cycles of 
‘promises- and-disappointment’ and the strategic efforts by firms and engineers 
to push their innovations onto policy agendas by (over)promising their develop-
ment speed and impact. Hype- cycle theory suggests that technologies move 
along a path from a trigger to a peak in expectations, then plummeting into a 
trough of disillusionment before eventually giving rise to a range of somewhat 
more modest expectations (Van Lente, 2012; Van Lente et al., 2013). Hype- 
cycles are one mechanism behind the non- linearity of innovation journeys: 
climate change policies and low- carbon innovations can experience setbacks or 
accelerations, as well as repeated cycles of hype and disappointment, e.g. in low- 
carbon transport, where high hopes of battery–EVs (1990s) were followed by 
fuel cells and hydrogen (early 2000s), biofuels (early 200s), hybrid electric cars 
(mid- 2000s) and battery–EVs again in the early 2010s (Melton et al., 2016). 
This more critical view means that one should not necessarily assume that 
visions are a good basis for transition management. Visions can also be self- 
serving or keep more radical visions off the public agenda.
 As a second research debate, researchers could fruitfully investigate how 
important these different roles of visions and expectations are in the emergence 
of low- energy innovations.
Diffusion of low- energy innovations
The widespread diffusion of low- energy innovations is necessary to achieve 
energy efficiency improvements on a substantial scale. However, large- scale dif-
fusion in mass markets often means ‘head- on’ competition with incumbent 
socio technical systems, which are stabilised through the alignment of existing 
technologies with the business, policy, user and societal contexts. Therefore, the 
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diffusion of low- energy innovations does not happen in an ‘empty’ world, but in 
the context of existing systems and incumbent actors who may pursue active 
resistance (Geels, 2014).
 Another problem is that many low- energy innovations are not intrinsically 
attractive to the majority of consumers, since they are often (initially) more 
expensive and perform less well on key dimensions such as availability (early 
compact florescent lights and then LEDs) cost (early heat pumps or battery–
EVs), or performance. Much of the recent policy interest in low- energy innova-
tion is driven by public good concerns (e.g. sustainability, climate change) 
rather than by private interests (e.g. profit, utility), which implies that diffusion 
is unlikely to be driven solely by economic mechanisms, even with the help of 
carbon pricing. Policy support, cultural discourse and changing social practices 
are likely to be critically important factors as well, which means that a multi- 
dimensional approach is required.
 The MLP conceptualises diffusion as entailing two interacting developments: 
(1) the creation of endogenous momentum of niche innovations; and (2) the 
embedding of niche innovations in wider contexts and environments.
 Endogenous momentum arises gradually from the same processes that drive the 
emergence of innovations, namely: developing larger social networks with 
greater legitimacy and resources; aligning learning processes on multiple dimen-
sions (technical, market, infrastructural, social political, cultural) often resulting 
in a ‘dominant design’; and forming of clear and widely accepted visions of the 
future of the innovation. The gradual shift from the emergence phase to the dif-
fusion phase is characterised by a reversal, with the innovation shifting from 
initial flexibility (when it is fluid and socially shaped) to ‘dynamic rigidity’ 
(Staudenmaier, 1989). Hughes (1987) describes the emerging momentum of new 
systems in terms of an increasing ‘mass’ of technical and organisational compon-
ents, emerging directionality and system goals, and an increasing rate of per-
ceptible growth. Thus, endogenous momentum is driven by multiple and 
reinforcing causal mechanisms including: expansion of social networks and 
bandwagon effects; positive discourses and visions; learning by doing; increasing 
returns to scale; network externalities; strategic games between firms (e.g. ‘jock-
eying for position’); and increasing support from policymakers who see the 
innovation as a way of solving particular problems.
 The diffusion of low- energy innovations also requires embedding within 
policy, social, business and user environments (Deuten et al., 1997). This 
external fit may be difficult to foresee, as Rosenberg (1972, p. 14) noted more 
than 40 years ago: ‘The prediction of how a given invention will fit into the 
social system, the uses to which it will be put, and the alterations it will 
generate, are all extraordinarily difficult intellectual exercises.’ Achieving this 
fit may be especially difficult for more radical niche innovations that face a 
‘mismatch’ with the existing sociotechnical system (Freeman and Perez, 
1988). The process of societal embedding is conceptualised as a co- construction 
process that entails mutual adjustments between the innovation and wider 
contexts (Rip and Kemp, 1998). The degree of adjustment is a question for 
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research: at one extreme end, the innovation is adjusted to fit in existing con-
texts, while, at the other end, the contexts are adjusted to accommodate the 
innovation (Smith and Raven, 2012).
 The distinctive contribution of a sociotechnical approach to diffusion is to 
study the interaction between endogenous mechanisms and embedding in wider 
contexts. Although adoption decisions by individual consumers remain 
important, the sociotechnical perspective focuses upon the activities of a 
broader range of actors and the interrelationships between them. Within this 
literature, we highlight two debates that are relevant to the diffusion of low- 
energy innovations.
Political will and contextual pressures for deliberately 
accelerated diffusion
Ambitious climate targets will require much faster rates of technology diffusion 
than has been achieved in the past, potentially combined with the early retire-
ment of existing technologies and infrastructure. Hence, a critically important 
debate relates to the best way to accelerate the diffusion of low- energy techno-
logies. The German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 2011, p. 1) 
suggests that technical and policy instruments for low- carbon transitions are 
well developed, but that it is ‘a political task to overcome the barriers of such a 
transformation, and to accelerate the change’. There are different views on the 
nature of this political task.
 One view suggests that accelerated diffusion depends on ‘leadership’ or ‘polit-
ical will’ or courage from policymakers (e.g. Figueres et al., 2017; United 
Nations Climate Change Secretariat, 2016). But such a voluntarist orientation 
places very high hopes on the importance of politicians’ own volition, and it 
reduces everything to politics. It also under- appreciates the fact that policy-
makers are locked- in by policy and wider sociotechnical regimes (Wilson, 2000) 
and tend towards risk avoidance (Howlett, 2014), especially for policies with 
diffuse and distant benefits.
 A second view therefore suggests that it is more important to understand the 
conditions in which policymakers are more likely to introduce decisive policies 
(Meadowcroft, 2016). Conditions for accelerated diffusion may derive from 
external (landscape) shocks that change socio- political priorities and create a 
sense of urgency to accelerate deployment (Delina and Diesendorf, 2013; Sova-
cool, 2016). Pressure for stronger policies may also come from changes in public 
attention or discursive framings, social movement campaigns or from business 
interests that see commercial opportunities in low- carbon innovations (Raven 
et al., 2016; Roberts and Geels, 2018).
Policy mixes for accelerated diffusion
Complementing the political focus above, there is ongoing discussion on how dif-
fusion can be accelerated, which is especially relevant to low- carbon transitions 
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and the time- sensitive problem of climate change (Grubler et al., 2016; Kern 
and Rogge, 2016; Sovacool, 2016). The mainstream climate mitigation liter-
ature (IPCC, 2014) has identified a range of options where strengthened 
policies could help accelerate low- carbon transitions, such as R&D subsidies, 
feed- in tariffs, carbon pricing, performance standards and removing fossil fuel 
subsidies. But views differ on what combination of policy instruments is likely 
to be most effective and the manner in which they should be sequenced 
(Meckling et al., 2017).
 In line with the systemic approach to innovation taken throughout this 
chapter, we also take a systemic view of policy and policymaking. As Kern et al. 
(2017) identify, much of the policy advice literature still focuses on individual 
policy instruments, pairwise instrument interactions or intended policy mixes, 
neglecting the analysis of complex, real- world mixes, their development over 
time, and their consistency and coherency. We agree with Kivimaa and Kern 
(2016) about the need for a comprehensive policy mix, rather than individual, 
isolated instruments that tend to operate in a non- predictable and non- 
synergetic matter. As an example, Givoni et al.’s (2013) exploration of the 
transport sector illustrates that the deliberate and careful combination of mutu-
ally supportive policy packages may result in more effective and efficient out-
comes through increasing public and political acceptability and the likelihood 
of implementation. It is important therefore to look at the whole system of 
policy instruments, to identify positive and negative interactions between pol-
icies, and overall characteristics of policy mixes (such as their coherence, con-
sistency, comprehensiveness or credibility) and investigate how these hinder or 
stimulate the emergence, diffusion and impact of low- energy innovations.
Impact of low- energy innovations
Comprehending the impacts of low- energy innovations on improved efficiency 
or demand is central to public policy: energy efficiency improvements are con-
sidered to be the most promising, fastest, cheapest and safest means to mitigate 
climate change, as well as providing broader benefits, such as improved energy 
security, reduced fuel poverty, and increased economic productivity (Ryan and 
Campbell, 2014). However, compared to the large body of work on emergence 
and diffusion, the analysis of the impacts of low- energy innovations has received 
much less attention from sociotechnical researchers. Authors often emphasise 
the limitations of linear, deterministic approaches to projecting impacts; the fre-
quency with which expectations of impacts are confounded by real- world 
experience (Gilbert and Sovacool, 2016); and the challenges associated with 
both anticipating impacts ex ante and measuring them ex post (McDowall and 
Geels, 2017).
 Quantification of impacts is difficult within complex social systems but may 
nevertheless be feasible for more incremental kinds of innovations within 
restricted spatial and temporal boundaries, e.g. the adoption of condensing 
boilers and the retrofitting of loft and cavity wall insulation (Dowson et al., 
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2012; Hamilton et al., 2013). In these examples, sufficient data exists for the 
historical impacts of these changes to be measured and the relevant systems are 
sufficiently stable for the future impacts to be modelled.
 But establishing the historical or potential future impact of more radical 
innovations over longer periods of time presents much greater difficulties. For 
example, commonly used modelling tools may not capture all of the relevant 
mechanisms (McDowall and Geels, 2017), and certain types of outcomes may 
be difficult or impossible to anticipate (such as Brexit in the UK or the election 
of President Trump in the United States). The impacts of any change within a 
complex system are necessarily mediated through multiple interdependencies, 
time- delayed feedback loops, path dependencies and threshold effects. More 
fundamentally, the basic concept of ‘impact’ is problematic from a sociotech-
nical perspective, because of its connotations of technological determinism – 
with technology impacting on society in a linear and straightforward fashion 
(Rosenberg, 1995).
 Hence, for radical and systemic innovations it is difficult to establish 
causality, assess historical impacts and project future ‘impacts’. While historical 
analysis can provide rich descriptions of the co- evolutionary processes involved, 
the primary lesson is the contingent nature of impacts and our limited ability to 
anticipate them in advance. In this context, authors in the sociotechnical tradi-
tion have focused more upon transition processes than on the ultimate 
(environmental) impacts of those transitions.
 Against this background, we identify two important research debates that are 
relevant to the impact of low- energy innovations.
Rebound effects of low- energy innovations
First, there is a critical debate on the rebound effects from low- energy innova-
tions and the extent to which these may undermine their anticipated climate 
benefits (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2008). Such effects result from mechanisms 
operating at different levels, across geographical scales and over different time 
periods, but only some of these are amenable to quantification. Moreover, atten-
tion to date has focused almost exclusively upon economic mechanisms to the 
neglect of other co- determinants.
 As an illustration, consider the following example from transport systems: 
(a) fuel- efficient cars make travel cheaper, so people may choose to drive further 
and/or more often, thereby offsetting some of the energy savings; (b) joint deci-
sions by consumers and producers may channel the benefits of improved tech-
nology into larger and more powerful cars, rather than more fuel- efficient cars; 
(c) drivers may use the savings on fuel bills to buy other goods and services 
which necessarily require energy to provide; (d) the energy embodied in new 
technologies (e.g. lightly materials) may offset some of the energy savings, espe-
cially when product lifetimes are short; (e) reductions in fuel demand translate 
into lower fuel prices which encourages increased fuel consumption, together 
with changes in incomes, prices, investments and industrial structures 
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throughout the economy; and (f ) more fuel- efficient vehicles deepen the lock- in 
to the sociotechnical system of car- based transportation, with associated and 
reinforcing changes in infrastructure, institutions, regulations, supply chains and 
social practices.
 Rebound is therefore an emergent property of a complex system. A growing 
body of research is exploring mechanisms a- b, and to a lesser extent mechanisms 
c- e in transport and other areas (e.g. Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Stapleton et al., 
2016), but this research excludes non- economic mechanisms, tends to be con-
fined to the short to medium term and stops short of assessing the impacts of 
broader changes in the relevant systems. Nevertheless, such studies indicate 
significant departures from anticipated impacts. There is a need to apply the rel-
evant techniques to other innovations, contexts, datasets and time periods, and 
to extend the analysis to include broader psychological, social, institutional and 
other factors that either offset, reinforce or contribute additional rebounds – for 
example, the phenomena of ‘moral licensing’ (Harding and Rapson, 2013; 
Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). More fundamentally, methods need to be found or 
refined to investigate the longer- term impacts of sociotechnical transitions, and 
to evaluate the sustainability claims of proponents of particular low- energy 
innovations. Without more careful investigation of their impacts, such claims 
may rest more on hope than on evidence.
Frameworks for evaluating broader impacts
Low- energy innovations may have wider impacts that go beyond energy demand 
reductions. Although this section is less of a debate, it highlights two research 
approaches (energy justice and exergy economics) that provide frameworks to 
assess these broader impacts.
 The material and social transformations associated with low- energy innova-
tions may involve contestations over what is just, equitable and right. Thus, there 
is a need for frameworks that explore questions of ethics and justice, including 
concern for where, how and with whom new technologies are socially 
embedded. Without a focus on justice, a low- energy revolution may fail to 
acknowledge the burden of not having enough energy, where some individuals 
lack access, are challenged by under- consumption and poverty, and face health 
burdens and shortened lives as a consequence of restricted energy choices 
(Jenkins et al., 2016; Sovacool et al., 2016). While some policies may have 
positive implications for equity and social justice (e.g. insulation retrofits for 
low- income households) others may have negative impacts – for example, sub-
sidies for EVs, solar- photovoltaic (PV) and whole house retrofit often dispropor-
tionately benefit wealthier households.
 Also important are broader debates about energy use, energy efficiency and 
economic growth. One emerging area of research that has the potential to throw 
new light on these issues is ‘exergy economics’ (Ayres and Warr, 2010). This 
approach hinges upon the thermodynamic concept of exergy and the use of 
second- law (systems move towards entropy and disorder) rather than first- law 
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(energy can be neither created nor destroyed) measures of thermodynamic effi-
ciency. The focus is on the useful exergy inputs into national economies – where 
useful exergy is the exergy outputs of end- use conversion devices, such as the 
mechanical drive from an engine or the high- temperature heat from a furnace. 
The core claim of researchers in this area, backed up by an increasing volume of 
empirical research, is that useful exergy drives economic activity (Ayres and Voudaris, 
2014; Kümmel et al., 2015; Laitner, 2015). Increases in useful exergy, in turn, can 
be achieved by using more primary energy, shifting towards higher- quality energy 
carriers (e.g. from coal to oil) and improving energy efficiency. This claim directly 
contradicts orthodox economics that ignores the distinction between energy and 
exergy and ascribes little or no role to energy in explaining economic growth. A 
key implication of this emerging perspective is that energy efficiency improve-
ments by producers may significantly boost economic growth, and that the eco-
nomic importance of those improvements has been undervalued (Brockway et al., 
2017). Clearly, a deeper understanding of this question is important to understand 
the broader economy- wide impacts of low- energy innovations.
 Having discussed six research debates across emergence, diffusion and impact, 
we end with a brief discussion of research and policy implications.
Conclusion and policy implications
A sociotechnical approach focuses upon how radical innovations lead to new 
sociotechnical systems through the co- construction of multiple elements. 
Informed by detailed case studies, this perspective sheds new light on how socio-
technical systems evolve, stabilise and transform through the alignment of 
developments on multiple levels. The themes of emergence, diffusion and 
impacts are useful heuristic devices through which to understand the sociotech-
nical transitions required to accelerate improvements in energy efficiency and 
the means through which these can be encouraged. This introductory chapter 
has explored the sociotechnical conceptualisation of emergence, diffusion and 
impact and identified several research debates within each theme. These themes 
and debates are summarised in Table 2.1, together with the chapters in the book 
that relate to them.
 In conclusion, the innovation, energy, transport and climate policy com-
munities need to improve their analytical understanding of sustainable energy 
transitions and of the policy approaches to encouraging such transitions, espe-
cially in the area of energy efficiency and energy demand. There is a need to 
adopt a broader view of the process, which takes into account learning and 
experimentation, the multiple conditions necessary for systemic change and the 
coalitions of interests that can block or support emerging niche innovations. 
Analysts and policymakers should look beyond carbon pricing as a policy 
panacea and recognise that disagreement and contestation are normal dimen-
sions of low- carbon transitions that need to be accommodated rather than 
ignored. The topic of sustainable energy transitions is too empirically rich and 
socially complex to be left to economists and social psychologists alone.
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3 A normative approach to 
transitions in energy demand
An energy justice and fuel poverty 
case study
Kirsten E.H. Jenkins and Mari Martiskainen
Introduction
Meeting the emissions targets enshrined in the Paris Agreement will necessi-
tate low- carbon, sustainability- oriented transitions across multiple sociotech-
nical domains, including electricity and heat, industry and buildings, and 
transport, to name a few. As acknowledged by a sociotechnical approach, this 
requires not only the rapid transformation of our physical energy systems, but 
of the societies that create and use them. Indeed, in the case of transitions in 
energy demand, it will influence who uses which energy source, how and 
when. Electrification is projected to influence patterns of mobility, changing 
the ways in which we drive and fuel our vehicles (see Bergman, Chapter 4; 
Bergman et al., 2017); the introduction of smart metering in the United 
Kingdom (UK) is enabling remote reading, with implications for user practice 
and social vulnerabilities, (see Jenkins et al., Chapter 6; Sovacool et al., 
2017); and residential retrofit will alter the performance of our homes (see 
Brown et al., Chapter 7), for instance.
 While these energy transitions are promised with the best in mind – often 
manifesting as a push towards low- carbon energy production forms and energy 
efficiency measures – it is inevitable that there will be winners and losers. Perti-
nently, this includes those unable to access or afford them. In this vein, making 
sure that all voices are represented in transitions plans and their actualisation is 
undoubtedly a question of social justice, equity and fairness.
 As outlined by Jenkins et al. (2018, p. 67), failure to adequately engage with 
questions of justice throughout the transition process is dangerous given that it 
‘may lead to aggravated poverty, entrenched gender bias and non- participation 
as outcomes or by- products of ‘blinkered” decision- making’. Indeed, without a 
focus on justice, transitions may fail to acknowledge two sides of the debate sur-
rounding energy demand: (1) the burdens of having too much energy or too 
many energy services, including subsequent waste, over- use and pollution, and 
(2) not having sufficient energy services, where some individuals lack access, are 
challenged by under- consumption and poverty, and may face health burdens 
and shortened lives as a consequence of restricted energy choices (Sovacool 
et al., 2016). Thus, our starting assertion is that justice is, and must be, central 
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to transitions debates and planning, even in the context of demand reduction. 
This is not always the case, however.
 Scholars and analysts frequently envision the process by which sustainability 
transitions take place to be one of disruptive change through transformative 
innovation (Markard et al., 2012; Schot and Steinmuller, 2016). As a result, 
proponents of transformative change suggest that by involving stakeholders 
from the outset, it can present more all- encompassing, robust solutions to 
sustainability challenges. For instance, Linnenluecke et al. (2017) identify that 
plans for transformational change recognise that environmental challenges 
present opportunities to meet the (currently unmet) needs of those at the 
‘bottom of the pyramid’ – including the poorest of the poor (see also Bezboruah 
and Pillai, 2013; McAlpine et al., 2015; Tebo, 2005). Within the transitions 
literature, then, there appears an emerging concern for particular individuals 
who are seen to deserve more socially just outcomes.
 Yet despite ongoing debates about ethics and justice across many fields of 
academic literature, one social element missing from transitions frameworks is 
explicit, practice- oriented engagement with the energy justice concept and 
related approaches to justice concerns (Jenkins et al., 2018); an omission that, 
arguably, is mirrored in practice. Indeed, beyond the walls of academia, and 
despite the broadening utilisation of the transitions concept, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that the ‘socio- ’ or social element is frequently missing in the 
transitions literature and transition plans, including failures to recognise 
their social justice and equity implications (see Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012; 
Jamieson, 2014; Markowitz and Shari, 2012; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; 
Sovacool et al., 2016; Swilling and Annecke, 2012).
 As an illustration, the 2009 UK government’s Low Carbon Transition Plan 
(DECC, 2009) (the last document of its type) includes only passing reference to 
justice concepts as it mentions ‘fairness’, which is characterised as the fair distri-
bution of costs only without attention to wider aspects of accessibility, fairness 
in the decision- making process, or the inclusion of all stakeholders and users.1 
For this reason, Eames and Hunt (2013, p. 58) note that even ‘a ‘low- carbon’ 
transition has the potential to distribute its costs and benefits just as unequally 
[as historical fossil- based transitions] without governance mindful of distribu-
tional justice’ or, as is argued throughout, issues of justice as recognition and 
procedural justice too.
 This chapter serves a dual purpose. First, it reiterates and reaffirms the need 
for socially just transitions approaches in energy demand scholarship and 
explores the role of the three- tenet energy justice framework in this. In so 
doing, it introduces a potentially new audience to energy justice scholarship. 
Second, through a case study of fuel poverty, it begins to explore both the 
dangers of failing to acknowledge justice outcomes and, conversely, what 
doing so may practically look like. We close with policy- relevant recom-
mendations towards the integration of energy justice thinking in demand 
reduction efforts.
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Normative approaches to transitions in demand
Arguably, there are (at least) two weaknesses in our attempts to understanding 
the normativity of energy demand challenges to date. First, a large proportion of 
the research on normative approaches to energy demand – that relating to how 
things should or ought to be – is conducted from an individual’s perspective, 
considering personal normativity and moral choice. As we aim to reduce energy 
demand, this is a clear advantage. Yet while they capture some concerns of nor-
mativity, they do not allow an understanding of how such normative approaches 
might be embedded in and emerge from transitions in energy demand. Further, 
individuals may find it difficult to change as they are locked into unsustainable 
infrastructure, including living in sub- standard housing stock or working on the 
minimum wage, thereby confining choice. Moreover, with these limitations in 
mind, a focus on individuals does not provide opportunities for the forms of 
systematic change we require.2 For that, we need a broader outlook.
 As a second weakness is that we, as scholars, have yet to agree on who we are 
concerned about. A large proportion of justice scholarship in the energy demand 
domain focuses on vulnerable consumers – those ‘left behind’ without regular or 
affordable access to energy, and this can vary considerably depending on 
context. Indeed, a range of work has emerged that considers particular vulner-
able groups including the elderly or the unwell (Thomson et al., 2017a), those 
living in adverse housing conditions (Healy and Clinch, 2004), or individuals 
living with disabilities (Snell et al., 2015).
 Yet work by Chatterton et al. (2016) shows that there are in fact only a few 
(typically well off ) minority groups that place the greatest burden on energy 
networks due to their high energy consumption.3 Therefore, they argue that we 
should target the less vulnerable in order to make meaningful progress with 
demand reduction. As an illustration, they state that 
in order to make these reductions, rather than assuming a need for an 80 
reduction across all of society, it makes sense to at least examine the poten-
tial for reducing consumption in that sector of society that is consuming 
greater than 30% more energy per household than the average. 
(Chatterton et al., 2016, p. 87)
In this case then, the measures needed to reach each group would trade off. 
Indeed, these different approaches raise contrasting normative questions around 
who we should engage with, how and to what end.
 While any one approach is inevitably limited in its ability to resolve a 
problem entirely – especially one as large and complex as injustice – the remain-
der of this chapter positions the energy justice framework as one way of further 
considering and potentially overcoming these challenges above challenges.
 In line with the sociotechnical approach, the energy justice framework is one 
that forcefully reminds us that energy dilemmas are about more than merely 
hardware (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). The concept has emerged amid the 
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realisation that our energy structures require widespread reform, and out of a 
growing interest in the justice implications of energy consumption and energy’s 
societal impacts (Hall, 2013). Against the background of the environmental 
and climate justice literatures, and in light of this surrounding context, energy 
justice thus aims ‘to provide all individuals, across all areas, with safe, affordable 
and sustainable energy’ (McCauley et al., 2013, p. 1).
 As part of its growing popularity, energy justice is increasingly characterised as 
an analytical tool – one that, for Heffron et al. (2015), can achieve a just balance 
in the energy trilemma, which they typify as economics (energy finance), the 
environment (climate change mitigation) and politics (energy security). As one 
example, Heffron et al. (2015, p. 172) develop an energy justice metric, which is 
designed to connect with economists through quantitative analysis of energy 
justice, allowing it to be evaluated in monetary terms. This approach produces 
three results: (1) an individual–country energy justice metric and (2) an energy 
justice metric for each type of energy generation source, e.g. nuclear power, both 
of which allow (3) the cost of energy justice to then be factored in to an economic 
model calculation in the form of a cost–benefit analysis. Sovacool and Dworkin 
(2015, p. 436) state in relation to such models, that energy justice thus ‘presents a 
useful decision- making tool that can assist energy planners and consumers in 
making more informed energy choices’ as well as serving as ‘an important 
analytical tool for energy researchers striving to understand how values get built 
into energy systems or to resolve common energy problems’. In this regard, the 
energy justice concept shares some commonalities with the political reach of 
the transitions concept and sociotechnical approach more broadly.
The energy justice tenet framework
A range of tenet frameworks have emerged within the energy justice field. 
McCauley et al. (2013) use three – distributional justice, procedural justice and 
justice as recognition – whereas others dismiss the inclusion of recognition as a 
tenet, including Sidortsov and Sovacool (2015) who instead focus on distribu-
tional justice, procedural justice and cosmopolitanism as core concepts. In addi-
tion, Heffron and McCauley (2017) consider restorative justice and Sovacool et 
al. (2016) add the eight concerns of availability, affordability, due process, intra-
 generational equity, intergenerational equity, sustainability, transparency and 
accountability, and responsibility. In keeping with McCauley et al. (2013), 
however, this chapter utilises the framework of three core tenets, distributional 
justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition, including justice as recog-
nition as the third tenet based on the works of Fraser (2014).
 In a change from the norm, the order in which the tenets are typically used – 
distribution, procedure, recognition – is altered and, instead, justice as recogni-
tion is in second place. This leaves the structure of distributional justice, justice 
as recognition and procedural justice. This approach builds upon the work of 
Jenkins et al. (2016) who argue for a reordering of the tenets on the logic that if 
injustice is to be tackled, you must (a) identify the concern – distribution, 
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(b) identify who it affects – recognition, and only then (c) identify strategies for 
remediation – procedure. This is, in effect, a ‘what, who and how’ approach to 
tackling energy justice concerns, with the intention that energy justice can exist 
as a solution- based framework that not only characterises injustices but can also 
help tackle them. To this end, the following paragraphs not only introduce the 
conceptual background to these tenets, but also provide real- world case studies 
of their meaning in practice.
Distributional justice: fuel poverty in the UK and beyond
The first tenet of energy justice is distributional justice. Energy justice is an 
inherently spatial concept that includes both the physically unequal allocation 
of environmental benefits and ills and the uneven distribution of their associ-
ated responsibilities (Walker, 2009, p. 615): for example, exposure to risk. Thus, 
energy justice can appear as a situation where ‘questions about the desirability of 
technologies in principle become entangled with issues that relate to specific 
localities’ (Owens and Driffill, 2008, p. 4414), and represents a call for the dis-
tribution of benefits and ills on all members of society regardless of income, race 
etc. (Bullard, 2005; Heffron et al., 2015). To illustrate the application of distri-
butional justice, we move here to the illustrative example of fuel poverty both 
in the UK and briefly, beyond.
 In consumption terms, distributional justice is typically discussed in relation 
to the issues of affordability, availability and sustainability (Sovacool and 
Dworkin, 2015). This explains the ready application of energy justice literature 
to the issue of fuel poverty (see Fuller and McCauley, 2016; McCauley et al., 
2013; Sovacool, 2015; Walker and Day, 2012), which was originally defined as 
having to spend more than 10 per cent of a households’ income on energy bills 
(Boardman, 1991). Distributional justice in this early scenario reflected a 
concern for the unequal allocation of energy resources and the sometimes- 
prohibitive costs of them. Yet while the 10 per cent definition was useful (and 
indeed, is still a widely used indicator in many countries) it was deemed by 
many to be too rigid to enable for all the complexities linked to fuel poverty to 
be taken into account (Thomson et al., 2017b).
 Throughout the history of the fuel poverty concept, then, the 10 per cent 
definition has been further divided into three main causes: (1) living in an 
energy- inefficient home, (2) having a low income and (3) facing high energy 
bills. Indeed, fuel poverty, or energy poverty,4 has evolved to become a concern 
for the inability to ‘attain a socially and materially necessitated level of domestic 
energy services’ (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015, p. 31) – a wider definition than 
a simple proportion of income that considers the intersections between a home, 
its occupants and the energy system, all of which will vary depending on cul-
tural and contextual factors. Nonetheless, despite this broadening context, what 
is being discussed here is what energy resources we do or do not have access to – 
a manifestation of energy outcomes that distributional justice can reveal and 
help us to understand.
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 To clarify, given that distributional justice is concerned with the distribution 
of goods and services across society, it follows that fuel poverty is a clear 
example; the majority of individuals enjoy better access to energy services than 
a minority few and the resultant injustices across social groups (e.g. according to 
their housing type or geography) leaves some groups more vulnerable than 
others. This is, first and foremost, a failure of not only energy policy, but also 
policies on housing, social issues and welfare standards. Second, it is something 
that we have to account for as we consider not only how to alleviate fuel 
poverty equitably, but how energy demand policy may further compound or 
enable this (Gillard et al., 2017).
 The reported incidence rates of fuel poverty are high. In England, 11.1 per 
cent of the population were thought to be in fuel poverty in 2016, a figure that 
corresponds to approximately 2.55 million households (BEIS, 2018). This is 
despite positive progress towards the interim 2020 fuel poverty target, which 
presents a legal obligation for as many fuel poor homes as ‘reasonably practica-
ble’ to be raised to Band E in the first instance, with Band C as the 2030 goal5 
(White et al., 2014). Rates in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are even 
more concerning. In 2016, 26.5 per cent of the total Scottish population, or 
649,000 homes, were deemed fuel pool and of those, 183,000 were extremely 
fuel poor (Scottish Government, 2018). The latest figures for Northern Ireland 
are 42 per cent and for Wales 23 per cent of households living in fuel poverty6 
(Department for Communities, 2018; Welsh Government, 2018). In this regard, 
distributional inequities are rife.
 While numerous advocates have stated that improving energy efficiency and 
reducing demand can reduce fuel poverty (e.g. Sorrell, 2015), we must be careful 
of two caveats: first, that fuel poverty is not experienced the same way every-
where and second, that it can go beyond simple maldistribution.
 The UK’s framing of fuel poverty has been influential in other developed eco-
nomies, including researchers in New Zealand (Day et al., 2016; Howden- 
Chapman et al., 2012; O’Sullivan et al., 2012; Viggers et al., 2013) and Europe, 
where concerns have appeared around a household’s ability to heat their home, 
manifestations of damp and mould and energy bill debts (Day et al., 2016; Healy 
and Clinch, 2004; Thomson and Snell, 2013), and increasingly overheating. For 
example, a recent European- funded initiative – EU Energy Poverty Observatory 
(EPOV) – brings together researchers, academics, policymakers and practitioners 
across the EU, aiming to understand and address energy poverty in Europe in a 
more coherent way. EPOV seeks to illustrate, that (a) our assets are not distributed 
equally and (b) that through this maldistribution, issues of inequity emerge. It 
follows that when planning to overhaul energy infrastructure for low- carbon goals, 
we should also anticipate and mitigate the potential impacts of our choices with a 
view to reducing unequal burdens across a wide range of contexts, including atten-
tion to the potential externalisation of UK energy policy ‘ills’.
 Second, access cannot always be evenly distributed, at least not without 
major grid infrastructural changes. Access to ground source heat pumps or local-
ised district heating systems that may lower localised energy costs is restricted, 
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for instance, and although we use an old reference, some island communities in 
the UK still do not have mains gas supply for heating (Barbour and Twidell, 
1981). Thus, Walker and Bulkeley (2006) and Eames and Hunt (2013) note 
that unequal distribution is not always unjust. Instead, it is often the ‘fairness’ of 
the processes surrounding infrastructural development that is important (Walker 
and Bulkeley, 2006, p. 4), and as such claims for distributional justice require 
that evidence of inequality are combined with an argument for fair treatment 
(Eames and Hunt, 2013). Throughout this chapter such arguments are taken to 
manifest as calls for justice as recognition and procedural justice too.
Justice as recognition
Justice as recognition is taken to be a means of engaging with the questions of 
‘who’ is energy justice for, and, importantly, who is responsible for its provision. 
It appears as a concern for ‘how people are involved in environmental decision- 
making, or “who (and what) is given respect” ’ (Eames, 2011). Drawing on 
Fraser (1999), Schlosberg (2007, p. 18) conceptualises the concerns around 
justice as recognition as three separate issues: (1) practices of cultural domina-
tion, (2) patterns of non- recognition (invisibility of individuals and their con-
cerns), and (3) disrespect through stereotyping and disparaging language: 
misrecognition. Within this context, justice as recognition is more than toler-
ance, and requires that individuals must be fairly represented, that they must be 
free from physical threats, and that they must be offered complete and equal 
political rights (Schlosberg, 2003).
 The process of cultural domination may include, as one of innumerate poten-
tial examples, ‘the process of disrespect, insult and degradation that devalue 
some individuals and some places’ identities in comparison to others’ (Walker 
2009, p. 615). In this context, justice as recognition calls for the respect of 
difference, and a move to prevent one group dominating others (Martin et al., 
2013). Further, justice recognition also represents a call to acknowledge diver-
sity within and between environmental justice movements (Hall et al., 2013). 
Thus, it includes calls to recognise the divergent perspectives of different ethnic, 
racial and gender differences (Fraser, 1999). Justice as recognition also appears 
as non- recognition, the invisibility of individuals and their concerns, as exem-
plified by the often- cited issue of fuel poverty. Finally, concerns may also arise 
not over a failure to recognise, but as misrecognising, a distortion of individual’s 
views that may appear demeaning or contemptible (Schlosberg, 2003).
 Fuel poverty has been shown to affect a household’s health, wellbeing and 
quality of life. For example, living in a cold home has been linked to weight 
gain in babies and young children, while damp and mouldy homes can cause 
breathing problems and respiratory illnesses such as asthma (Guertler and 
Royston, 2013). The lack of heating and insulation can mean that those facing 
fuel poverty often live in very cold homes, being only able to heat certain parts, 
or room/s, which limits their use. It is also likely that with warming tempera-
tures, overheating and being able to cool a home will become concerns too.
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 For those living in fuel poverty, their home becomes a place of discomfort, ill 
health and even death. In this respect, the health impacts of fuel poverty are 
very significant. It is estimated that each year, the English National Health 
Service (NHS) faces a bill of £1.36 billion for treating illnesses linked to fuel 
poverty (Public Health England, 2014). Mental health problems, respiratory 
problems like asthma and circulatory illnesses such as heart disease have been 
linked to cold and damp homes (Marmot Review Team, 2011). Indeed, as per-
plexing as it sounds, in a country of seemingly high development status, indi-
viduals die each year due to cold homes (Jolin, 2014). Fuel poverty can also 
have an impact on children’s education. Living in a cold home can make com-
pleting homework difficult and illnesses due to cold and damp homes mean chil-
dren have to take more time off school (Guertler and Royston, 2013). This 
comes as acknowledgement that different individuals can experience vulner-
ability to fuel poverty in different ways, depending on their personal circum-
stances (Middlemiss and Gillard, 2015).
 In his exploration of affordable warmth and justice, Sovacool (2015) highlights 
concern for a particular group in society – those unable to access affordable heat, 
who often become visible through the effects listed above. Yet Walker and Day 
(2012, p. 71) state that fuel poverty ‘can be read as a lack of recognition of the 
needs to certain groups, and, more fundamentally, as a lack of equal respect 
accorded to their wellbeing’. We seek to highlight here that fuel poverty is both 
visible and invisible and that one of the largest challenges is establishing who is 
being affected. Indeed, while identifying those who face fuel poverty is key towards 
recognising the problem and addressing it, it is not always easy to identify those 
who are suffering. Often, there is stigma attached to being fuel poor (Hards, 2013), 
so much so that households avoid seeking help for fear of being seen not being 
able to cope with certain aspects of their life. Furthermore, there are also those 
who may not realise that they are in fact living in fuel poverty, a factor that has 
recently been recognised by the ‘Being Warm Being Happy’ (2017) research 
project, which examines fuel poverty among adults with learning disabilities.
 Beyond specific social groups that are statistically more likely to be affected, 
England’s leading fuel poverty charity National Energy Action (NEA) identifies 
that fuel poverty can occur for anyone (NEA, 2017). Previous research has 
recognised that those considered vulnerable groups, i.e. children, the elderly and 
individuals with disabilities or long- term health conditions, can be especially 
susceptible to the impacts of fuel poverty (Public Health England, 2014). 
However, fuel poverty often becomes an issue at a time of crisis, when an indi-
vidual’s circumstances change dramatically and they become unable to ‘function 
according to the dominant expectations of present- day energy markets’ 
(Martiskainen et al., 2018, p. 29). In this regard, Sovacool (2015) outlines that 
the issue of fuel poverty intersects with procedural justice, as affected house-
holds have neither the time nor the means to participate in energy decision- 
making that may rectify injustices.
 As we move towards policy for reducing fuel poverty and for reducing energy 
demand, it becomes paramount to both understand the links between the two 
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and to gain a more nuanced recognition of energy needs and their link to vul-
nerability within particular groups (Gillard et al., 2017); a justice as recognition 
concern. This includes ongoing reflexivity around who is being negatively 
impacted by policy choices and who is responsible for those outcomes. In this 
context, Gillard et al. (2017, p. 55) identify that ‘a recognition- based approach 
can help to identify the particulars of energy injustice for different groups and 
strengthen the political response’.
Procedural justice
The last tenet in the reordered tenet framework is procedural justice, or the 
‘how’ of energy justice. Procedural justice concerns access to decision- making 
processes that govern the distributions outlined above, and manifests as a call 
for equitable procedures that engage all stakeholders in a non- discriminatory 
way (Bullard, 2005; Walker, 2009). It states that all groups should be able to 
participate in decision- making, and that their contributions should be taken ser-
iously throughout. It also requires participation, impartiality and full informa-
tion disclosure by government and industry (Davies, 2006), and the use of 
appropriate and sympathetic engagement mechanisms (Todd and Zografos, 
2005). It is concerned, then, about the fairness of decision- making processes, or 
justice in ‘doing’, and emerges as a claim for representational space and free 
speech (Sayer, 2011; Sze and London, 2008). For Walker (2012) these require-
ments can be split in to four key rights:
1 access to information, what type of information and who it is provided by;
2 access to and meaningful participation in decision- making;
3 lack of bias on the part of decision- makers;
4 access to legal processes for achieving redress.
Procedural justice manifestations include, as an illustration, questions arising 
around how and for whom community renewables projects are developed 
(Walker and Devine- Wright, 2008), and the ethics of the emergent voluntarism 
debate, where communities volunteer to host facilities (Butler and Simmons, 
2013).
 Several programmes provided by the UK government, non- governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and charitable organisations have addressed fuel poverty 
over the years (see for example Rosenow et al., 2013; Sovacool, 2015). Address-
ing fuel poverty has been, for example, one of key drivers for building- related 
energy efficiency policies (Kern et al., 2017). However, despite all the efforts 
and government pledges to eradicate fuel poverty, it still exists widely in the UK 
and the number of fuel poor households has been rather stable in recent years.
 The government’s rhetoric outlined in 2001 was to end the problem of fuel 
poverty for vulnerable households by 2010. In 2002, this was clarified to reflect 
the goal of ending fuel poverty for vulnerable and non- vulnerable households 
living in social housing by 2010. Fuel poverty in other households was to be 
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targeted after progress in these groups, with a target that by November 2016, 
English citizens should not be living in fuel poverty (DEFRA, 2003). This has 
changed to instead improving a reasonable proportion of fuel poor housing. In 
2015, the UK government published a Fuel Poverty Strategy (DECC, 2015) for 
the first time in 14 years. This set out a new target for England: ‘The fuel 
poverty target is to ensure that as many fuel poor homes as is reasonably practi-
cable achieve a minimum energy efficiency rating of Band C, by 2030’ (DECC, 
2015, p. 12). This change in rhetoric was also coupled with the reduction in the 
number of households that had received energy efficiency measures under the 
various government schemes (for detailed analysis on UK policy mix changes, 
see Kern et al., 2017).
 Fuel poverty is not an easy problem to solve. As fuel poverty has causes and 
implications that go beyond energy, addressing it will also require considering 
issues beyond energy policy (e.g. housing, social and health policy). Recently, 
scholars in the field of energy research have highlighted that fuel poverty needs 
to be rethought as a complex issue (e.g. Baker et al., 2018) However, there is a 
danger that those facing fuel poverty are still rather invisible in the quarters 
where energy, or social, policy decisions are made. Furthermore, as Sovacool 
(2015) has highlighted, households affected by fuel poverty may not have the 
time nor the means to participate in energy policy decision- making. As Gillard 
et al. (2017) identify, this can be either through a lack of capability, or a lack of 
trust. While there are several charitable organisations and community initi-
atives – such as Energy Cafés, which provide locally- targeted advice for those 
facing fuel poverty (see Martiskainen et al., 2018), these are often limited in 
scope, stop- start in nature and have to rely on external support and volunteer 
effort. The lack of sufficient government effort to get to the root of the problem 
indicates how those living in fuel poverty in the UK have become the invisible, 
yet accepted, losers in the UK’s energy system.
Conclusions and policy recommendations: towards just 
energy transitions
As a result of our reflections, this section makes both conceptual and empiri-
cally founded conclusions and policy recommendations. First, as a larger con-
ceptual claim and in line with previous work (Jenkins et al., 2018), we present 
the argument that it is within the overarching process of sociotechnical change 
that issues of energy justice emerge, where inattention to social justice issues 
can cause injustices, or via their inclusion can provide a means to solve them. 
Thus, we argue for greater engagement with the energy justice approach in both 
academia and in practice, where it can be used as a means to guide ethically 
sound decision- making. This comes partly as acknowledgement that social 
science perspectives on energy transitions are under- represented in academic 
scholarship (Guy and Shove, 2000; Sovacool, 2015; Wilhite et al., 2000) and, 
that where they do exist, the economic and geopolitical aspects of energy take 
precedence (Edberg and Tarasova, 2016).
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 As an illustration of why this is necessary in the context of energy demand, 
we have sought to highlight both the dangers of failing to appreciate justice out-
comes and the factors that doing so may reveal, from patterns of poor housing 
infrastructure to vulnerable groups, inadequate processes, and even affluent 
parties who, through a process of redistribution may not only lower fuel poverty 
rates, but also decrease energy demand in the process. The target here is not 
only to make sure that demand processes are sustainable but, as a fundamental 
part of that, that they are fair.
 We have highlighted that fuel poverty is an urgent issue that needs to be 
addressed as an energy, social and health issue, and at all levels of government, 
local authorities and health authorities. In this context, it is possible to give a 
series of case- specific, policy- relevant recommendations that illustrate the 
potential mobilisation of energy justice approaches. We base these both on our 
own analysis, and as a synthesis of recommendations based across relevant aca-
demic literature.
 First, we identify that government and businesses must identify those who 
may be vulnerable and then both ascertain and make provision for vulnerable 
customers through targeted subsidies, exemptions and efficiency measures. This 
recommendation has bearing on energy efficiency policy in particular, where 
questions are raised about the equity and design of its implementation. In this 
context, justice principles can provide guidelines for policy interventions by 
ensuring that energy efficiency schemes reach households in a way that meets 
their specific needs (Gillard et al., 2017).
 Second, as acknowledgement that fuel poverty goes beyond simple afford-
ability to an outcome of living in an inefficient home, we require strong and 
consistent policies to upgrade the national housing stock (see also Chapter 7), 
combined with consumer engagement programmes to enable participatory 
justice throughout this process. At the same time, we must be careful not to 
reinforce structural or social inequalities e.g. through stereotyping recruitment 
practices (Gillard et al., 2017).
 Third, in terms of achieving procedural justice, funded Energy Cafés can act 
as a triage service, bringing together local authorities, health workers, com-
munity organisations and individuals in a trusted setting, providing advice and 
ensuring that energy needs are met (Martiskainen et al., 2018). This becomes 
especially important when you consider that the more individuals that are suc-
cessfully engaged and take on energy efficiency schemes, the greater the poten-
tial success of transition pathways. These and similar ventures require grant 
funding in order to provide a continued service, train fuel poverty advisors and 
transfer learning to others.
 Fourth, we must acknowledge the impact of energy pricing and subsidies and 
their knock- on effects especially on low income and other potentially vulner-
able or low- income consumers (see Chapter 6 on smart metering, as an 
example). This comes as acknowledgement that despite some positive policy 
measures (including the English Warm Front Scheme which was partially 
merged into the Energy Company Obligation), increasing prices for electricity 
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and natural gas have rapidly increased compared to incomes, thereby mitigating 
some positive effects (Sovacool, 2015). In this regard, we need socially justice 
energy policy mixes (see Chapter 12).
 Through these measures and others in the domain of energy demand, we 
have the potential to both acknowledge and embed normativity in energy 
demand reduction efforts.
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Notes
1 Rawls (1985) describes that ‘justice’ can be divided into the principles of liberty and 
equality, with a further subdivision of the latter including the principle of ‘fair equality of 
opportunity’. In this regard, they can be seen as fundamentally interlinked concepts.
2 Unless, of course, they are persuasive on a large scale, though there is limited evidence 
of this level of effectivity to date.
3 See Chatterton et al. (2016) for an exploration of who ‘high consumers’ may be con-
sidered as in the UK context, including the ‘energy decadent’, where individual cir-
cumstances allow high consumption through choice.
4 We acknowledge here that there is a muddied history around ‘fuel’ and ‘energy’ 
poverty distinctions. In line with Bouzarovski and Petrova (2015, p. 33), we present 
the case that both can be considered under the same umbrella – ‘a set of domestic 
energy circumstances that do not allow for participating in the lifestyles, customs and 
activities that define membership of society’. This definition arises despite the fact that 
energy poverty arguably has a tradition in developing world electrification and fuel 
poverty in developed world originated as a concern for unaffordable warmth within 
the home.
5 An Energy Performance Certificate (or EPC) is required for properties when con-
structed, sold or let. The EPC provides details on the energy performance of the prop-
erty and what you can do to improve it. It is banded between A (the highest) and G 
(the lowest).
6 Note that different indicators are used in England, and Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland for measuring fuel poverty. England uses a ‘low income high costs’ indicator, 
which states that a household is in fuel poverty if their fuel bills are above national 
average and, were they to pay those costs, their residual income would be below the 
official poverty line. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland use the 10 per cent of indi-
cator, i.e. a household is in fuel poverty if they have to spend more than 10 per cent of 
their income on fuel bills.
References
Baker, K., Mould, R. and Restrick, S. (2018) Rethink fuel poverty as a complex problem, 
Nature Energy 3: 610–612 .
Barbour, D. and Twidell, J. (1981) Energy use on the island of North Ronaldsay, Orkney. 
Energy for Rural and Island Communities: 39–51.
46  Kirsten E.H. Jenkins and Mari Martiskainen
Being Warm Being Happy (2017) Being Warm Being Happy Homepage. Available 
online at: https://beingwarmbeinghappy.org/.
BEIS (2018) Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics Report (2016 data). Department for Busi-
ness, Energy and Industrial Strategy, London, UK.
Bergmans, N., Schwanen, T. and Sovacool, B.K. (2017) Imagined people, behaviour and 
future mobility: Insights from visions of electric vehicles and car clubs in the United 
Kingdom. Transport Policy 59: 165–173.
Bezboruah, K.C. and Pillai, V. (2013) Assessing the participation of women in micro-
finance institutions: evidence from a multinational study. Journal of Social Service 
Research 39(5): 616–628.
Boardman, B. (1991) Fixing Fuel Poverty: Challenges and Solutions. Belhaven Press, 
London, UK.
Bouzarovski, S. and Petrova, S. (2015) A global perspective on domestic energy depriva-
tion: Overcoming the energy poverty- fuel poverty binary. Energy Research and Social 
Science 10: 31–40. DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2015.06.007.
Bullard, R.D. (2005) Environmental Justice in the 21st Century. In: Dryzek, J. and 
Schlosberg, D. (Eds) Debating the Earth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Butler, C. and Simmons, P. (2013) Framing Energy Justice in the UK: The Nuclear Case. 
In: Bickerstaff, K., Walker, G. and Bulkeley, H. (Eds) Energy Justice in a Changing 
Climate: Social Equity and Low- carbon Energy. Zed Books, London, UK.
Chatterton, T.J., Anable, J., Barnes, J. and Yeboah, G. (2016) Mapping household direct 
energy consumption in the United Kingdom to provide a new perspective on energy 
justice. Energy Research and Social Science 18: 71–87.
Davies, A. (2006) Environmental justice as subtext or omission: Examining discourses of 
anti- incineration campaigns in Ireland. Geoforum 37: 708–724. 
Day, R., Walker, G. and Simcock, N. (2016) Conceptualising energy use and energy 
poverty using a capabilities framework. Energy Policy 93: 255–264.
DECC (2009) The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: National Strategy for Climate and 
Energy. Department of Energy and Climate Change, London, UK.
DECC (2015) Cutting the Cost of Keeping Warm – A Fuel Poverty Strategy for England. 
March 2015. HM Government, London, UK.
DEFRA (Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) (2003) The UK Fuel 
Poverty Strategy: 1st Annual Progress Report. HM Government, London, UK.
Department for Communications (2018) Fuel Poverty. Available at: www.communities-
 ni.gov.uk/topics/housing/fuel- poverty.
Eames, M. (2011) Energy, innovation, equity and justice. Energy justice in a changing 
climate: Defining an agenda. InCluESEV Conference, London 
Eames, M. and Hunt, M. (2013) Energy Justice in Sustainability Transitions Research. 
In: Bickerstaff, K., Walker, G. and Bulkeley, H. (Eds) Energy Justice in a Changing 
Climate: Social Equity and Low- Carbon Energy. Zed Books, London, UK. 
Edberg, K. and Tarasova, E. (2016) Phasing out of phasing in: Framing the role of nuclear 
power in the Swedish energy transition. Energy Research and Social Science 13: 
170–179. 
Fraser, N. (1999) Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. In: Henderson, G. 
and Waterstone, M. (Eds) Geographical Thought: A Praxis Perspective. Routledge, 
Oxford, UK. 
Fraser, N. (2014) Justice Interrupts. Routledge, London, UK.
Fuller, S. and McCauley, D. (2016) Framing energy justice: Perspectives from activism 
and advocacy. Energy Research and Social Science 11: 1–8. 
Transitions in energy demand  47
Gillard, R., Snell, C. and Bevan, M. (2017) Advancing an energy justice perspective on 
fuel poverty: Household vulnerability and domestic retrofit policy in the United 
Kingdom. Energy Research and Social Science 29: 53–61.
Goldthau, A. and Sovacool, K.B. (2012) The uniqueness of the energy security, justice, 
and governance problem. Energy Policy 41: 232–240. 
Guertler, P. and Royston, S. (2013) Fact- file: Families and Fuel Poverty. Association for 
the Conservation of Energy, London, UK. Available at: www.ukace.org/wp- content/
uploads/2013/02/ACE- and-EBR- fact-file- 2012-02-Families- and-fuel- poverty.pdf.
Guy, S. and Shove, E. (2000) A Sociology of Energy, Buildings and the Environment: Con-
structing Knowledge, Designing Practice. Oxford, Routledge, UK.
Hall, S.M. (2013) Energy justice and ethical consumption: Comparison, synthesis and 
lesson drawing. Local Environment 18(4): 422–437.
Hall, M.S., Hards, S. and Bulkeley, H. (2013) New approaches to energy: Equity, justice 
and vulnerability: An introduction to the special issue. Local Environment: The Inter-
national Journal of Justice and Sustainability 18(4): 413–421. 
Hards, S.K. (2013) Status, stigma and energy practices in the home, Local Environment 
18(4): 438–454.
Healy, J.D. and Clinch, J.P. (2004) Quantifying the severity of fuel poverty, its relation-
ship with poor housing and reasons for non- investment in energy- saving measures in 
Ireland. Energy Policy 32(2): 207–220.
Heffron, R.J. and McCauley, D. (2017) The concept of energy justice across the discip-
lines. Energy Policy 105: 658–667.
Heffron, R.J., McCauley, D. and Sovacool, B.K. (2015) Resolving society’s energy 
trilemma through the Energy Justice Metric. Energy Policy 87: 168–176.
Howden- Chapman, P., Viggers, H., Chapman, R., O’Sullivan, K., Barnard, L.T. and 
Lloyd, B. (2012) Tackling cold housing and fuel poverty in New Zealand: A review of 
policies, research, and health impacts. Energy Policy 49: 134–142.
Jamieson, D. (2014) Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle against Climate Change Failed 
– and What it Means for Our Future. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Jenkins, K., McCauley, D., Heffron, R., Stephan, H. and Rehner, R. (2016) Energy 
justice: A conceptual review. Energy Research and Social Science 11: 174–182.
Jenkins, K., Sovacool, B.K. and McCauley, D. (2018) Humanizing sociotechnical trans-
itions through energy justice: An ethical framework for global transformative change. 
Energy Policy 117: 66–74.
Jolin, L. (2014) The scandal of Britain’s fuel poverty deaths. Guardian. 11 September 
2014. Available at: www.theguardian.com/big- energy-debate/2014/sep/11/fuel- poverty-
scandal- winter-deaths.
Kern, F., Kivimaa, P. and Martiskainen, M. (2017) Policy packaging or policy patching? 
The development of complex energy efficiency policy mixes. Energy Research and Social 
Science 23: 11–25. DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2016.11.002.
Liddell, C. and Morris, C. (2010) Fuel poverty and human health: A review of recent 
evidence. Energy Policy 38: 2987–2997.
Linnenluecke, M.K., Verreynne, M., de Villiers Scheepers, M.J. and Venter, C. (2017) 
A review of collaborative planning approaches for transformative change towards a 
sustainable future. Journal of Cleaner Production 124(4): 3212–3224.
Markard, J., Raven, R. and Truffer, B. (2012) Sustainability transitions: An emerging 
field of research and its prospects. Research Policy 41(6): 955–967.
Markowitz, E.M. and Shari, A.F. (2012) Climate change and moral judgment. Nature 
Climate Change 2: 243–247.
48  Kirsten E.H. Jenkins and Mari Martiskainen
Marmot Review Team (2011) The Health Impacts of Cold Homes and Fuel Poverty. 
Written by the Marmot Review Team for Friends of the Earth. University College 
London, London, UK. Available at: https://friendsoftheearth.uk/sites/default/files/
downloads/cold_homes_health.pdf.
Martin, A., Gross- Camp, N., Kebede, B., McGuire, S. and Munyarukaza, J. (2013) 
Whose environmental justice? Exploring local and global perspectives in a payments 
for ecosystems services scheme in Rwanda. Geoforum 54: 167–177. 
Martiskainen, M., Heiskanen, E. and Speciale, G. (2018) Community energy initiatives 
to alleviate fuel poverty: the material politics of Energy Cafés. Local Environment 
23(1): 20–35.
McAlpine, C.A., Seabrook, L.M., Ryan, J.G., Feeney, B.J., Ripple, W.J., Ehrlich, A.H. 
and Ehrlich, P.R. (2015) Transformational change: Creating a safe operating space for 
humanity. Ecology and Society 20(1): 56–61.
McCauley, D., Heffron, R., Stephan, H. and Jenkins, K. (2013) Advancing energy 
justice: The triumvirate of tenets. International Energy Law Review 32(3): 107–110.
Middlemiss, L. and Gillard, R. (2015) Fuel poverty from the bottom- up: Characterising 
household energy vulnerability through the lived experience of the fuel poor. Energy 
Research and Social Science 6: 146–154.
NEA (2017) UK Fuel Poverty Monitor 2016–2017. A review of progress across the 
nations. National Energy Action (NEA) and Energy Action Scotland (EAS). Avail-
able at: www.nea.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2016/05/FPM_2016_low_res.pdf.
Newell, P. and Mulvaney, D. (2013) The political economy of the ‘just transition’. The 
Geographical Journal 179(2): 132–140.
Owens, S. and Driffill, L. (2008) How to change attitudes and behaviours in the context 
of energy. Energy Policy 36(12): 4412–4418. 
O’Sullivan, K., Howden- Chapman, P. and Fougere, G. (2012) Death by disconnection: 
The missing public health voice in newspaper coverage of a fuel poverty- related death. 
Kōtuitui: the New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences 7: 51–60.
Pereira, R., Barbosa, S. and Carvalho, F.P. (2014) Uranium mining in Portugal: A review 
of the environmental legacies of the largest mines and environmental and human 
health impacts. Environmental Geochemistry and Heath 36(2): 285–301.
Public Health England (2014) Fuel Poverty and Cold Home- related Health Problems. 
Health equity briefing 7. September 2014. Public Health England and UCL Institute 
of Health Equity, London, UK.
Rawls, J. (1985) Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14(3): 223–251.
Rosenow, J., Platt, R. and Flanagan, B. (2013) Fuel poverty and energy efficiency 
obligations – A critical assessment of the supplier obligation in the UK. Energy Policy 
62: 1194–1203.
Sayer, A. (2011) Habitus, work and contributive justice. Sociology 45(1): 7–21. 
Schlosberg, D. (2003) The Justice of Environmental Justice: Reconciling Equity, 
Recognition, and Participation in a Political Movement. In: Light, A. and de- Shalit, 
A (Eds) Moral and Political Reasoning in Environmental Practice. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, USA.
Schlosberg, D. (2007) Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements and Nature. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Schot, J. and Steinmuller, E.W. (2016) Framing Innovation Policy for Transformative 
Change: Innovation Policy 3.0. Science and Policy Research Unit, University of 
Sussex, Brighton, UK.
Transitions in energy demand  49
Scottish Government (2018) High Quality Sustainable Homes: Safe. Available at: www.
gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms/partnerstories/HARO/Indicators/High- 
quality-sustainable#A1. 
Sidortsov, R. and Sovacool, B.K. (2015) Left out in the cold: Energy justice and Arctic 
energy research. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 5: 302–307.
Snell, C.J., Bevan, M. and Thomson, H. (2015) Justice, fuel poverty and disabled people 
in England. Energy Research and Social Science 10: 123–132.
Sorrell, S. (2015) Reducing energy demand: A review of issues, challenges and 
approaches. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 47: 74–82.
Sovacool, B.K. (2015) Fuel poverty, affordability, and energy justice in England: Policy 
insights from the Warm Front Program. Energy 93(1): 361–371.
Sovacool, B.K. and Dworkin, M.H. (2015) Energy justice: Conceptual insights and prac-
tical applications. Applied Energy 142: 435–444.
Sovacool, B.K., Heffron, R.J., McCauley, D. and Goldthau, A. (2016) Energy decisions 
reframed as justice and ethical concerns. Nature Energy 1: 16–24.
Sovacool, B.K., Kivimaa, P., Hielscher, S. and Jenkins, K. (2017) Vulnerability and resist-
ance in the United Kingdom’s smart meter transition. Energy Policy 109: 767–781.
Swilling, M. and Annecke, E. (2012) Just Transitions: Explorations of Sustainability in an 
Unfair World. UCT Press, South Africa.
Sze, J. and London, J.K. (2008) Environmental justice at a crossroads. Sociology Compass 
2(4): 1331–1354.
Tebo, P.V. (2005) Building business value through sustainable growth. Research- 
Technology Management 48(5): 28–32.
Thomson, H. and Snell, C. (2013) Quantifying the prevalence of fuel poverty across the 
European Union. Energy Policy 52: 563–572.
Thomson, H., Snell, C.J. and Bouzarovski, S. (2017a) Health, well- being and energy 
poverty in Europe: A comparative study of 32 European countries. International Journal 
of Environmental Research and Public Health 14(6): 1–17.
Thomson, H., Bouzarovski, S. and Snell, C. (2017b) Rethinking the measurement of 
energy poverty in Europe: A critical analysis of indicators and data. Indoor and Build 
Environment 26(7): 879–901.
Todd, H. and Zografos. C. (2005) Justice for the environment: Developing a set of indi-
cators of environmental justice for Scotland. Environmental Values 14(4): 483–501. 
Viggers, H., Howden- Chapman, P., Ingham, T., Chapman, R., Pene, G., Davies, C., 
Currie, A., Pierse, N., Wilson, H., Zhang, J., Baker, M. and Crane, J. (2013) Warm 
homes for older people: Aims and methods of a randomised community- based trial for 
people with COPD. BMC Public Health 13: 176. DOI: 10.1186/1471-2458-13-176.
Walker, G. (2009) Beyond distribution and proximity: Exploring the multiple spatialities 
of environmental justice. Antipode 41(4): 614–636. 
Walker, G. (2012) Environmental Justice: Concepts, Evidence and Politics. Routledge, 
London, UK.
Walker, G. and Bulkeley, H. (2006) Geographies of environmental justice. Geoforum 
37(5): 655–659.
Walker, G. and Day, R. (2012) Fuel poverty as injustice: Integrating distribution, recog-
nition and procedure in the struggle for affordable warmth. Energy Policy 49: 69–75.
Walker, G. and Devine- Wright, P. (2008) Community renewable energy: what should it 
mean?. Energy Policy 36(2): 497–500.
Welsh Government (2018) Fuel Poverty. Available at: https://gov.wales/topics/environ 
mentcountryside/energy/fuelpoverty/?lang=en.
50  Kirsten E.H. Jenkins and Mari Martiskainen
White, V., Hinton, T., Bridgeman, T. and Preston, I. (2014) Meeting the Proposed Fuel 
Poverty Targets: Modelling the Implications of the Proposed Fuel Poverty Targets 
using the National Household Model. Centre for Sustainable Energy Report for the 
Committee on Climate Change, London, UK. Available at: www.theccc.org.uk/wp- 
content/uploads/2014/11/CCC_ModellingProposedFuelPovertyTargets_FinalReport_
Nov2014.pdf.
Wilhite, H., Shove, E., Lutzenhiser, L. and Kempton, W. (2000) The Legacy of Twenty 
Years of Energy Demand Management: We Know More about Individual Behaviour 
but Next to Nothing about Demand. In: Jochem, E., Sathaye, J. and Bouille, D. (Eds) 
Society, Behaviour and Climate Change Mitigation. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Springer, USA.
Part II
The emergence and 
diffusion of innovations

4 Electric vehicles and the 
future of personal mobility  
in the United Kingdom
Noam Bergman
Introduction
The future of transport, and specifically, the question of how to achieve sustain-
able personal mobility, is a much- debated topic, considering environmental 
issues such as air pollution, inequality of access to mobility and urban traffic 
congestion. Further, growing concerns over climate change have put pressure on 
the transport sector to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. Transport accounts 
for approximately 25 per cent of the UK’s CO2 emissions, nearly two- thirds of 
which comes from cars and vans (CCC, 2014). There are also major concerns 
over air pollution and road congestion.
 However, changes to the road transport system are considered especially 
challenging. In the UK, like other countries in the developed world, road- based 
transport centred on the private car for personal mobility is dominant. 
Discourses among transport professionals and policymakers portray unrestricted 
mobility as a right (Doughty and Murray, 2016). A UK government- issued 
review on low- carbon cars opened with the statement ‘Road transport underpins 
our way of life’ (King, 2007, p. 3), and ties road transport with economic growth 
and technological progress, an approach still evident in the recent Industrial 
Strategy (HMG, 2017). The UK has a large automotive industry, with a turn-
over of £77.5 billion, employing over 800,000 people, including 169,000 in 
manufacturing (SMMT, 2017), making change politically and economically 
challenging. Overall, the UK is locked into automobility, where privately owned 
car use is reinforced by infrastructure, regulations, institutions, vested interests, 
norms, cultures and practices (Paterson, 2007; Schwanen, 2015; Urry, 2004). A 
significant shift towards sustainable personal mobility therefore requires systemic 
change – a sociotechnical transition.
 Various technological and cultural innovations exist with the potential to 
make transport more sustainable, such as low- emission vehicles, integrated 
transport, and car- sharing clubs. A prominent example is electric vehicles (EVs) 
– an innovation with technical potential to reduce emissions from road trans-
port, if powered by low- emission electricity. However, consumer uptake has 
been very slow, and EVs have met resistance from within the traditional auto-
motive industry and ambivalence from policymakers. That might be changing 
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with a variety of EVs available on the market in different countries. In the UK, 
sales have risen steeply in the past few years, with 37,000 new EVs1 registered in 
2016, and 47,000 in 2017 – nearly 1.9 per cent of total sales (SMMT, 2018). 
While EVs might leave many aspects of automobility intact, they have the 
potential to significantly change the transport system through diverse electrified 
transport not limited to cars, causing tension with existing industry, infrastruc-
ture and driving and refuelling norms.
 This chapter considers future visions of personal transport, as imagined by 
influential transport policy and automotive industry actors. It builds on a recent 
study (Bergman, 2017; Bergman et al., 2017) that looked at visions of the future 
of UK road transport, by analysing documents including forecasts, pathways and 
scenarios by diverse transport sector actors in order to explore how current chal-
lenges are perceived, what strategies these incumbent (i.e. regime) actors follow, 
and what role EVs might have. This chapter continues that research with a 
transitions theory perspective, complemented by concepts from institutional 
dynamics.
 The research found that regime actors’ visions reflect regime actor strategies: 
in most visions there is a similar trajectory of continued automobility, which 
offers little discontinuity or disruption compared to the present and recent past, 
but rather favours gradual change with conventional vehicles prominent in the 
medium term, and radical innovations institutionalised to reduce their threat. 
This chapter argues that the creation of visions is an act of ‘institutional work’ 
by incumbents, aimed at shaping the future to minimise change that could 
undermine their power.
 We next consider useful concepts from transition theory and institutional 
dynamics, and the role of visions of the future in these, before introducing the 
challenge of automobility and sustainable transport through these lenses.
Theoretical background
Transitions
This chapter considers two aspects of transition theory: First, regime actors and 
their strategies, and the dynamics of regime–niche interactions, for example, 
whether niche–regime relationships are competitive or symbiotic; the latter occurs 
when radical innovations are seen as complementary to the interests of regime 
actors and they become absorbed in the prevailing sociotechnical system (Geels 
and Schot, 2007). Bakker (2014) considers when incumbent actors might stra-
tegically support an innovation, considering that newly emerging systems might 
align with their short- or long- term interests, and that individual or collective 
expectations might guide them to engage with the innovation. Positive collective 
expectations of an innovation, which might serve an actor’s long- term interests, 
could lead to supporting a transition (and therefore the innovation) through 
influencing the configuration of the emerging system ‘just in case the transition 
does take place’ (Bakker, 2014, p. 65).
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 Second, potential future trajectories of the transport system, including per-
sonal mobility, could be viewed using the typology of transition pathways (Geels 
and Schot, 2007) described below. These pathways are archetypal, and a trans-
ition could involve elements of different pathways, or begin following one 
pathway and continue in another.2
 When there is ongoing moderate landscape pressure on the regime, but niches 
are not sufficiently developed to pose a threat, regime actors can respond by modi-
fying trajectories and innovation activities, possibly adopting ideas from niche 
innovations, with cumulative readjustments. The regime changes trajectory, but its 
basic architecture remains largely unchanged in a transformation pathway. In some 
instances, the adopted innovations trigger further changes in the architecture of 
the regime, with ongoing adoption leading to changes to rules, technologies, policy 
and user practices, all accumulating to a major reconfiguration. Struggles between 
policy actors and industry are possible in both these pathways (Smink et al., 2015).
 If a large, sudden landscape change occurs and incremental change is insuffi-
cient, the regime struggles in competition between incumbents and newcomers. 
If developed niche innovations exist, one innovation can ultimately break 
through to replace the existing regime, in a (technological) substitution. If, on the 
other hand, niches are insufficiently developed, regime actors might lose faith 
leading to collapse, or de- alignment, of the regime. There is a period of com-
petition between co- existing niches, leading to multiple innovation trajectories 
– but also uncertainty. Eventually, one niche will win out and a new regime will 
be formed, completing the de- alignment and re- alignment pathway.
 In the absence of strong landscape pressure, the regime exhibits dynamic 
stability in a reproduction pathway. Even in reproduction, regime actors need to 
act in order to maintain power.
Visions
It is well established that visions of the future, and the expectations they 
generate, are central to the process of technological innovation. Visions can 
motivate engineers and designers to initiate projects (van Lente, 1993), be used 
to attract financial support for research and innovation (Fujimura, 2003), and 
raise interest from a wide range of stakeholders, increasing an innovation’s legit-
imacy and uptake (Geels and Verhees, 2011; Schot and Geels, 2008). Studies 
like Levidow and Papaioannou (2013) suggest the importance of visions for 
innovation processes in personal transport, considering different innovation 
pathways for different visions.
 Uncertainty plays an important role in sustainability transitions, due to long 
time horizons and large investments, in which societal change and other (land-
scape) effects occur in addition to innovation and technological development. 
This suggests visions could be especially important in the transitions approach 
(Budde et al., 2012).
 Visioning is a deeply political technique. Visions created by regime actors are 
part of the sociotechnical system’s ‘culture’, and therefore might influence 
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expectations and strategies of all actors. Regime actors can use visioning exer-
cises to suit their ends: delay pressures, neutralise some risks and threats (e.g. 
perceived uncertainties over incumbent technologies ability to adapt) while 
sensitising audiences to others (e.g. end- users’ unfamiliarity with yet- to-be- 
proven technologies), and present the future as a more or less linear extrapola-
tion of the (recent) past. This is one reason why genuinely new or unexpected 
events or systemic changes are rarely considered in visioning exercises. Mean-
while, niche actors can deploy visions to enhance their legitimacy by building 
networks and gathering support and resources for their innovations (Schot and 
Geels, 2008).
Institutional dynamics
Recent thinking on institutional dynamics (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014; 
Geels, 2014; Smink et al., 2015) suggests that regime actors must work to uphold 
incumbent institutions, as these ‘do not automatically persist. Instead, they need 
constant maintenance’ (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2016, p. 301). Rather than 
reacting to developments, incumbents seek to proactively shape the institutions 
through which they interact with other social groups. This institutional work 
includes lobbying policymakers by incumbent firms and, vice versa, policy-
makers reaching out to incumbent service or technology providers; communica-
tion with the general public via advertising, press conferences and releases, and 
information/education campaigns; commissioning research and technical 
reports; the formulation of technical standards; and the shaping of discourse 
(Geels, 2014; Smink et al., 2015). In Multi- Level Perspective (MLP) terms, the 
dynamic stability of the regime is maintained by regime (incumbent) actors per-
forming institutional work to maintain power in the present and shape the 
future to reproduce present power structures.
 Pulling these strands together, this chapter suggests that visioning is a 
powerful and effective strategy of institutional work. First, because the formation 
of visions draws on the imagined future to justify action in the present 
(Anderson, 2010; McCormack and Schwanen, 2011). Second, because vision-
ing exercises allow actors to ‘craft’ development trajectories that suit their 
agendas. A vision of the future with clear expectations (Geels and Verhees, 
2011), framed as technological progress with market potential (Ruef and 
Markard, 2010) can help an innovation secure legitimacy and get the public 
onside (Walker et al., 2010).
Automobility
A powerful regime
The UK transport system is underpinned by the regime of automobility. This can 
be described by rules that favour privately owned cars; see car mobility as both 
a right and a necessity; link (car) mobility to economic development and 
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technological progress; and see cars as (capable of ) becoming green and clean 
through technological change (e.g. Schwanen, 2015). There are widely shared 
expectations of (relative) continuity of the system, and so far, the automobility 
regime has remained dynamically stable.
 Regime actors include the automotive industry and transport bodies, but also 
many planners, consultants and policymakers because their livelihoods and/or 
the wider social or political–economic orders of which they are part depend on 
automobility’s endurance (Cohen, 2012; Paterson, 2007; Unruh, 2000). Path 
dependencies also derive from the lifestyles of numerous households, and the 
sunk investments in road infrastructure and car manufacturers’ production pro-
cesses (Driscoll, 2014; Penna and Geels, 2015). Increasing returns and adaptive 
preferences, as well as ‘interlinked networks of dependency’ to the sociotechni-
cal systems of housing development and fossil fuel extraction further entrench 
the automobility regime (Driscoll, 2014; Penna and Geels, 2015; Urry, 2004; 
Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2012).
Potential for change
While the automobility regime is powerful and enduring, there are a range of 
landscape dynamics putting pressure on the regime in recent years, which might 
have weakened it in the long run, thereby opening a window of opportunity 
(Budde et al., 2012). Increased concerns over climate change and air pollution 
have led to tighter regulation and legislation. Private car use and ownership 
have stabilised and even declined across much of the Global North since around 
1990, especially among younger people and in cities – described as peak car 
(Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013). Cultural change has led to the image of the 
car shifting from an ‘icon of modernity’ to a more utilitarian perspective 
(Cohen, 2012). Finally, there seems to be a reduced commitment of policy-
makers to automobility (Geels, 2012), e.g. actors at the European Level (EU) 
level have increasingly challenged the automobility regime over the last 20 
years through regulations on CO2 emissions and proposed roadmaps towards sus-
tainable mobility (Weyer et al., 2015). In conjunction with these trends, there 
is a differentiation of strategy among car manufactures and other incumbents 
(Budde et al., 2012): different firms might make different choices in terms of 
investment in EVs, other technologies, or improved internal combustion engine 
vehicles (ICEVs).
 EVs may benefit from this differentiation as a long- standing innovation 
that has until now remained a niche. They offer a technological solution, 
while seemingly minimising behaviour and cultural change, although major 
infrastructural and industry changes are implied – including a reduction in oil 
consumption. Until recently, EVs had little involvement from regime actors 
(van Bree et al., 2010), with sales and performance too low to be considered a 
serious threat. However, this has changed in recent years. All major car manu-
facturers now produce EVs, suggesting that the industry has ‘picked its 
winning technology’ (Bakker and Farla, 2015). Moreover, recent sales across 
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the developed world, while still modest, suggest uptake is accelerating beyond 
the demonstration phase (Bakker and Farla, 2015; Nykvist and Nilsson, 
2015). There is undoubtedly increased hype around EVs, with the Organiza-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countires (OPEC) increasing their 2040 
forecast for plug- in EVs by nearly 500 per cent from 2015 to 2016, and the 
International Energy Agency more than doubling its central forecast for 2030 
EV fleet size (BNEF, 2017). However, taking the long- term view of a trans-
ition, it is too soon to say if this is another hype cycle that will be followed by 
disappointment, or the beginning of a transition to electric transport.
What would a transition to EVs look like?
Looking at potential transitions to EVs in Germany, Augenstein (2015) finds 
discrepancies between visions of the future based on sustainable electric mobil-
ity, and strategies rooted in the current regime; battery EVs as a techno- fix could 
jeopardise ‘deeper’ sustainability transitions to lower car dependency. Augen-
stein concludes that EVs cannot simply replace ICEVs, as they are a radical 
innovation that does not fit the current mobility regime. Success depends on 
the emergence of ‘new functionalities’ (Geels, 2005) that ICEVs can’t offer, 
such as EV- based energy storage, or even EVs as mobile power supply and others 
we cannot predict. This could imply redefining the role of the car in society, 
matching the technological substitution pathway.
 Van Bree et al. (2010) construct future transport visions using transition 
pathways. Some of their scenarios envision government measures to reduce 
emissions as the main driver for change, forcing manufacturers to scale up low- 
carbon vehicles experiments. EVs winning out requires entrance of new actors 
and significant change to rules and practices (e.g. reduced driving range and 
overnight recharging), suggesting a transition pathway of regime de- alignment 
and re- alignment. Other scenarios envision consumer preferences and high 
fuel prices forcing manufacturers to change. EVs win out if fast recharging 
infrastructure is rolled out, with ongoing systemic changes suggesting regime 
reconfiguration.
 These different perspectives suggest a transition to EVs would cause signi-
ficant disruption to the automobility regime. It follows that regime actors would 
attempt to either prevent a transition to electric mobility, or reduce the disrup-
tion by performing maintaining institutional work, which can alter technology’s 
design, function, practices and image during its diffusion process (Fuenfschilling 
and Truffer, 2016). In transition terms, regime actors are expected to work 
towards a transformation pathway if reproduction is no longer tenable; however, 
the systemic changes EVs would cause to the entire transport system might 
make this more of a reconfiguration. Lending a historical perspective, Dijk et al. 
(2015) suggest that when EVs emerged in European markets in the mid- 1990s, 
the transport regime protected itself by transforming and adapting the poten-
tially disruptive innovations of EVs, by favouring hybrid cars (regime sustain-
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 This chapter builds on previous work in considering the connection between 
visions of the future of personal mobility in the UK as they are constructed and 
used by incumbent (regime) actors and transition theory, specifically transition 
pathways and regime–niche interactions.
Methodology
The main research method was analysis of documents that discuss the UK’s 
transport future. Documents were found through online searches and references 
in reports and academic papers. These documents were written by, and for, a 
range of stakeholders in the UK transport sector, including government, indus-
try, consultancies and other bodies. Only documents that explicitly discuss EVs 
as part of the UK’s transport future, and which contain projections about the 
mid- term future (2020s through 2050s) were selected. Over 30 documents pub-
lished in 2002–2015 were identified and 16 were selected for in- depth textual 
analysis, still giving a wide range of perspectives. These are listed in Table 4.1.
 The documents were coded through quantitative content analysis. A priori 
coding included searches for projections of future transport and factors separat-
ing different scenarios, such as drivers and barriers for innovation and uptake. 
Further coding looked for emerging themes and narratives. Some qualitative 
analysis was also used to understand the tone and context and to infer actors’ 
agendas and strategies.3
 The documents appear to be dominated by visions from incumbents (regime 
actors). This might be partly an artefact of the research approach. However, this 
might also be (partly) a consequence of the deliberate attempts of incumbents to 
engage in institutional work seeking to absorb EVs into the deep structure that has 
ensured the survival of automobility since at least the Second World War (cf. 
Geels, 2011). Moreover, incumbents are more likely to possess the resources and 
skills to produce the sort of system- level visions that are considered here.
Findings: visions and trajectories
The analysed documents were produced by a range of actors and are different in 
style and substance. Some use model forecasts, some review scenarios from other 
sources, and some use heuristic scenarios or storylines, demonstrating what 
‘could be’ achieved. Nonetheless, there are some clear common themes emerg-
ing in the future trajectories, which one might call a ‘central vision’. This 
section explores the central vision, the factors and assumptions underlying it, 
and highlight trajectories which notably diverge from it. The timeline of the 
central vision is briefly described in Figure 4.1.
The central vision
The most striking feature of this near- consensus future is that almost all of the 
visions analysed are dominated by an assumption of continued automobility. 
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Even the most recent documents do not take into account the ‘peak car’ phe-
nomenon, but use long- standing, powerful discourse in which car- based road 
transport is central to mobility and tied to progress and economic growth. These 
visions assume that the UK’s high travel demand will continue through 2020, 
2030 or 2050, and that it will be met mostly through privately owned vehicles.
 Many of the forecasts focus on what technology or fuel will power the cars of 
the future, as opposed to how or how much people will travel, or the broader 
question of the role the (private) car in the future. The challenge of reducing 
emissions is therefore seen primarily as a technical question of the distribution 
of different vehicle types. While the great reduction in emissions is seen as chal-
lenging, in almost all detailed scenarios the targets are met.
 Another feature of the central vision is the link between automobility and a 
strong economy. Some documents explicitly link low- carbon vehicles (LCVs) 
to economic growth, suggesting the UK automotive industry can use its excel-
lence in ICEV production to reach the forefront of LCV production. Further, it 
In the years to 2020, emission reductions could be achieved 
through efficiency of conventional cars (ICEVs), sometimes 
considered ‘easy wins’ (CCC, 2014; DECC, 2011; EST, 2007; King, 
2007). Alternatively, electric vehicles (EVs) and other low-carbon 
vehicles (LCVs) could reach hundreds of thousands by 2020.
For 2030 the general picture is of mixed ICEVs and LCVs. Hybrids, 
plug-in hybrids and EVs, or a mixture of these technologies, are all 
possible, with fuel cell-powered cars plausible if EVs fail to deliver. 
However, uptake rates of LCVs vary significantly, depending on 
technological development and public attitudes; ICEVs are still a 
significant part of the stock. While details differ, most trajectories 
see an upturn in LCV uptake in the 2020s or 2030s.
The pressure of the 2050 target leads a couple of visions to 
suggest that 100 per cent of new cars need to be battery electric 
by 2035 (CCC, 2010) or ‘near zero tailpipe emissions’ for new cars 
by 2040 (DECC, 2011). Plug-in hybrids and battery EVs can lead 
to a 90 per cent reduction in emissions, reliant on decarbonisation 
of the grid (King, 2007; Lane, 2011), although some ICEVs are still 
expected to be on the road, probably hybrids. Overall, the 





Figure 4.1 Timeline of the central vision.
Source: the author.
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is suggested that this engineering and manufacturing would deliver jobs and 
growth. Perhaps the most optimistic vision suggests the transition to LCVs has 
‘the potential to create jobs, rebalance the British economy towards manufac-
turing and exports, and promote sustainable economic growth in the UK’ (Straw 
and Rowney, 2013, p. 8).
Factors affecting trajectories
There are many factors that are seen as affecting EV trajectories, including tech-
nology, public acceptance and uptake, policy, and economic factors.
 Technological innovation is seen as a necessity for EVs to become mainstream 
in many visions, and most prominent is the battery – its performance, weight, 
price and reliability. Battery improvement is seen as essential for market pene-
tration, as EVs have to compete both with ICEVs and with other low- carbon 
technologies. Battery cost is often portrayed as the most significant and least 
controllable factor affecting EV market penetration, but battery weight and life-
time, range and recharging times are also considered significant barriers.
 While there is a common assumption that technological progress will act as a 
driver, uncertainty around specific technologies is commonly highlighted. This 
includes EVs, but also the rate of improvement in ICEVs and the rate of electri-
city decarbonisation; the collective effect is that the advantage of EVs is posi-
tioned as unknown (Dings, 2009; Lane, 2011). The earliest document (EST, 
2002) is highly pessimistic about EVs, considering hydrogen more promising. 
There is more optimism later, suggesting EV rollout depends only on price 
coming down, although there is also acknowledgement of hype around EVs (e.g. 
Dings, 2009).
 Technical issues and public acceptance issues overlap, for example, nearly 
every vision suggests that limited vehicle range and high upfront cost are crucial 
barriers to uptake. Lack of variety of car models and brands is seen as a barrier to 
uptake, suggesting EVs must mimic ICEVs in performance and choice, and meet 
expectations of comfort and speed, if they are to be widely purchased (CCC, 
2014; EST, 2007; King, 2007). It appears that, with increasing confidence in EV 
technology over time, there has been a shift towards greater focus on public 
acceptance and awareness, with EVs’ image seen as crucial to success. For 
example, Lane (2011) suggests manufacturers are rising to the challenge of 
developing low- carbon cars, leaving demand as the central obstacle.
 Many of the documents portray people as fairly homogenous consumers 
having a passive role in any transition, limited almost exclusively to the choice 
of vehicle they purchase. Other behaviours, such as modal shift, trip reduction 
and eco- driving are not linked to EV trajectories; they appear to be seen as too 
marginal to significantly affect car sales. This is tied to the assumption that 
technological breakthroughs are needed if EVs are to succeed because of the 
presumed behavioural inertia and resistance from users, leaving little room for 
adaptation among consumers. The central vision seeks to replace ICEVs with 
LCVs with limited behaviour change or other disruption, indirectly delaying 
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LCVs until they can easily replace ICEVs. So, despite highlighting the need to 
create and sustain acceptance demand for EVs, consumers are not generally per-
ceived as a driving force in the documents, in contrast with some scenarios of 
van Bree et al. (2010).
 The role of government through policy and legislation has been described as 
‘the single biggest influence on the future of low- carbon cars and fuels’ (Kay 
et al., 2013, p. 123). Various market interventions to support EVs are discussed, 
including subsidies to reduce upfront price; other incentives for purchase, such 
as free parking or bus- lane use; investment in technologies through R&D 
funding; demonstration and commercialisation programmes, such as procure-
ment of fleet vehicles; and supporting infrastructure.
 Visions are also affected by economic forecasts. Most notably, the economic 
downturn in 2008 led to a drop in car manufacturing volumes, leading Hazel-
dine et al. (2009) to base their scenarios on severity of recession and speed of 
recovery, as these could affect development and deployment of EVs. The Com-
mittee on Climate Change pushed back its 2010 estimate (CCC, 2010) of EVs 
reaching cost- effectiveness in the mid- 2020s to 2030 in a 2013 estimate (CCC, 
2013).
 These factors show that the central vision is not inevitable but relies on a 
variety of assumptions about the future. This makes it all the more important to 
contrast it with alternative visions, of which there are disappointingly few in 
these documents.
Specific trajectories of interest
A few visions have specific trajectories of interest, which challenge some of the 
assumptions above or stray significantly from the central vision. They both 
expose (often implicit) assumptions and agendas in the central vision and high-
light different responses to the challenges the regime faces.
 One vision (Kay et al., 2013) contrasts an ‘evolutionary’ EV trajectory, which 
fits the central vision, with a ‘revolutionary’ trajectory. In the latter, new market 
entrants revolutionise vehicle design and manufacturing, introducing Informa-
tion Computer Technology (ICT)-connected cars and compact, lighter (and 
therefore cheaper) designs suitable for shorter distances, leading to rapid uptake 
beginning in cities. The description suggests new functionalities, some still 
unknown, play a part. This is one of the only trajectories across all the analysed 
documents to suggest disruption, rather than incremental change, leading to 
greater institutional changes and potentially new norms around travel, a signi-
ficant deviation from the central vision.
 The Foresight work (Curry et al., 2006), based on consultations with stake-
holders from business, research and the public sector, is an outlier in its future 
visions. Its four scenarios are built around the two biggest uncertainties: whether 
technological progress will indeed deliver a low- carbon transport system, and 
whether people will accept intelligent infrastructure. Questioning the success of 
technology, independent from public acceptance, deviates from the consensus 
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vision, and allows for futures that depart significantly from the present and 
recent past. Questioning public acceptance and according a significant, active 
role to the wider population also contrasts with the central vision, where user 
practices are principally seen as barriers to EV uptake.
 Finally, the National Grid (2015) vision considers electricity use throughout 
the economy, including future projections of EVs. It differentiates trajectories 
by level of prosperity and level of ‘green ambition’. This is the only document 
that considers the level of social ambition to decarbonise the economy, as 
opposed to actions by government, industry or consumers. Only one of their 
four scenarios, which has an environmentally engaged society and moderate 
economic growth, achieves the UK’s renewable energy and emission reduction 
targets on time. This is the only document that explicitly constructs scenarios 
that fail to meet the targets, highlighting presumed success in many others.
Discussion and analysis
This section considers how the visions reflect actors’ strategies, offering an ana-
lysis from a transition pathways perspective and an institutional work per-
spective, noting that some actors might consider LCVs inevitable and are acting 
to create a new consensus about the future.
Transition pathways in the visions
Considering the four archetypal transition pathways (Geels and Schot, 2007), 
the central vision conforms best to the transformation pathway. While change is 
seen as inevitable following landscape pressures in the form of policies and 
targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it is envisioned as gradual, linear and 
hardly disruptive, with the main elements of automobility unchanged: transport 
is centred around privately owned cars; users are seen as consumers or drivers 
with high transport demand; large companies will shift over to making LCVs. 
While the arrival of new entrants is certainly possible, change is slow enough to 
allow many ICEV- producing incumbent firms to adapt. The transition dynamic 
is of regime actors adopting new technologies, gradually and almost seamlessly 
replacing ICEVs with LCVs (probably EVs). In other words, the regime reori-
ents its trajectory. This is not surprising, considering the visions come from 
regime actors with strong vested interests.
 Using the visions, regime actors craft possible futures in a way that makes the 
continuity of the sociotechnical regime more plausible. This is strengthened 
when visions by different actors converge towards a consensus or ‘central vision’. 
Regime actors seek certainty over future policy, as it is questionable whether 
LCVs can reach a big market without government regulation and investment in 
infrastructure and R&D.
 The transformation pathway sees incumbent manufacturers understanding the 
need for change, and over time ‘gradually increasing use of electrification in the 
powertrain’ (Kay et al., 2013, p. 125) as they develop EVs from existing models, all 
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without relinquishing power. This suggests extensive experimentation with altern-
ative technologies and fuels largely carried out or controlled by regime actors, in 
contrast to outsiders; it could be seen as niche absorption, making the regime more 
fit for purpose in a changing landscape through acquiring new attributes and 
changing its trajectory (Haxeltine et al., 2008). A similar dynamic is described in 
van Bree et al. (2010, p. 537): ‘Once carmakers become convinced that they can 
no longer address further tightening of regulations via adaptations of existing tech-
nology … and that non- compliance will lead to substantial (financial) con-
sequences, they scale up [fuel cell] and BEV experiments’.
 In contrast, the ‘revolutionary’ trajectory (Kay et al., 2013) has elements of a 
technological substitution, where ICT- connected EVs taking off in cities leads to 
significant change in institutions and norms, disrupting the ICEV- based regime. 
The regime is found not fit for purpose when the landscape changes, and a more 
suitable niche innovation breaks through, changing not only the technology, 
but resulting in new travel norms and institutional changes.
 In the Foresight visions (Curry et al., 2006), the ‘Urban Colonies’ scenario 
combines low- impact transport with strong public attitudes reducing acceptance 
of intelligent infrastructure, leading to a world where technological investment 
is focused on reducing environmental impact. Compact cities with a local focus 
reduce the need for travel, and transport is restricted to cleaner forms. This 
could be seen as a reconfiguration with extensive changes to infrastructure, insti-
tutions and travel norms, in contrast to the central vision.
 The Foresight ‘Tribal Trading’ scenario (Curry et al., 2006) envisions a world 
after a severe energy shock, with the global economy damaged and infrastruc-
ture falling into disrepair. Transport has high environmental impact and is 
greatly reduced, with mobility no longer seen as a right. This trajectory has ele-
ments of de- alignment and re- alignment, where regimes collapse from strong pres-
sure, and new ones emerge in a very different world. This contrasts sharply with 
the lack of disruption or discontinuity in the central vision.
 In summary, disruptive change is unrealistically lacking in the central 
vision. The smooth transition does not take into account the radical nature of 
EVs which might rely on ‘new functionalities’ to succeed (Augenstein, 2015) – 
as opposed to a direct one- for-one replacement of ICEVs with EVs. It is 
important to appreciate that the regime of automobility is not entirely homo-
geneous or free from tensions; one disruption clearly lacking in the visions is 
change in fuel provision, as road transport is the biggest global source of oil 
demand. A shift to EVs would affect supply chain actors in the automobility 
system, requiring a significant reconfiguration of part of the regime. The lack of 
disruption is also evident in the paucity of scenarios in which emission targets 
are missed. Even economic disruption (recession) is seen as temporarily redu-
cing car sales and delaying LCV development and deployment but does not 
challenge the regime. This analysis suggests that the central vision is closest to the 
transformation pathway not because of inevitability or likelihood, but because it best 
suits incumbent actors’ agendas. This use of visions could be defined as institu-
tional work, as described below.
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Visions as institutional work
Creating visions can be seen as a strategy that regime actors use to maintain or 
restore institutional structures, by expressing expectations about the (long- term) 
future in order to influence the present (and near future). This section high-
lights some strategies deployed within these visions to neutralise the potentially 
disruptive nature of radical or niche innovations.
 The visions show a varied, and sometimes contradictory, mix of imagined 
roles and responsibilities for government and policy. On the one hand, there are 
calls for non- meddling support for manufacturing, and on the other, recom-
mendations that government work together with industry to develop the future 
of the automotive strategy in the UK. There are various calls for government to 
ensure funding for research and development (R&D) and not just basic research, 
and to guarantee long- term support for purchase in order to sustain demand, 
creating certainty for the industry. This suggests a recognition that creating a 
successful, sustained EV market is non- trivial and requires intervention and 
(financial) support. Uptake is seen as one of the biggest challenges and most 
documents identify ways to incentivise users through financial instruments, such 
as grants or subsidies for purchase, and some also suggest ways to raise awareness 
and improve EVs’ image.
 Both the call for government to tackle barriers to uptake and support the 
markets, and the focus on users and demand, arguably work to shift responsibil-
ities for change away from manufacturers towards the state and civil society. 
These calls have a neoliberal character, minimising risk to the private sector 
and allowing industry actors their freedom without bearing full responsibility for 
emissions reduction targets, while potentially public and private sector grow 
closer. From an institutional perspective, this can be seen as enabling work, ‘the 
creation of rules that facilitate, supplement and support institutions’ (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006, p. 230).
 From a regulation perspective, documents from a range of actors call for gradu-
ally, but significantly, tightening emission targets. This would allow both 
improvement of ICEVs and increased uptake of LCVs, ‘[giving] the industry the 
required long- term security for investments in low- carbon car technology and 
infrastructure’ (Dings, 2009, p. 7). There are calls for regulations to ‘capture 
well- to-wheel (or even life cycle) emissions’ (Kay et al., 2013, p. xi). However, 
this could increase uncertainties around EVs since their well- to-wheel and life- 
cycle emissions depend on the electricity grid and the wider vehicle manufac-
ture process, respectively. Institutionally, this could be seen as a delay tactic, 
favouring incumbents in the short term, while allowing them time to adapt.
 Many of the documents recommend ‘technology neutrality’, the assumption 
that with the right supporting policies, markets will choose the best options 
among fuel and engine technologies through competition and deliver required 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions with no major changes to mobility traject-
ories. Several documents call on government to ensure a level playing field 
rather than pick winners, stressing manufacturers’ support for a technology 
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neutral approach. Some government documents reaffirm allowing industry to 
develop the low- carbon technologies most appropriate for users. Government 
and industry seem to be reassuring each other through the narrative of techno-
logical neutrality, possibly a sign of a regime alliance between incumbents and 
policymakers (Geels, 2014). This could be interpreted simply as prudent gov-
ernment action in the face of technological uncertainty: hesitation by the state 
has been observed elsewhere in relation to EVs and is particularly likely when 
the free market paradigm prevails (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015). For the industry, 
this could be another delay tactic that preserves the regime’s stability as ICEV 
improvements can meet emission targets in the short term.
 This analysis highlights the profoundly political nature of visioning, seeking 
to order the institutional constellation and identify and assign responsibilities to 
different groups of actors. Delay tactics prevent more profound changes, allow-
ing more efficient ICEVs (or hybrids) to continue their dominance in coming 
years. Industry seeks close alliance with the government with public investment 
and assurances, while arguing for regulatory approaches that favour incumbents 
to minimise risk.
 Finally, some factors are under- emphasised in the central vision. Behaviour 
changes beyond choice of vehicle for purchase are portrayed as marginal, and 
the heterogeneity of mobility patterns and complexity of awareness and accept-
ance of LCVs are simplified. Deeper changes to the automobility system are 
almost entirely absent. These could include infrastructural shifts, such as 
compact cities that reduce the need for personal motorised travel or shifting 
norms away from seeing high travel demand as normal and high mobility as a 
right. Even the observed trend of peak car is ignored. The central vision is limited 
in scope, hindering genuine transformation, as the unsavoury parts of the transition 
are downplayed, problematised or ignored.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
This chapter has analysed visioning documents of the future of the UK’s system 
for personal transport, integrating lessons from transition pathways and institu-
tional dynamics. The focus is on the role of EVs, in the context of growing land-
scape pressure of climate change- related policy to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from transport.
 Some regime actors might consider LCVs to be inevitable, and others might 
be supporting EVs in order to hedge their bets, and to serve their agendas by 
influencing the future configuration of the system (Bakker, 2014). Either way, 
regime actors are working to define future trajectories and make the emerging 
niche as regime- symbiotic as possible, using visioning documents among other 
things. They work for slower change, by pressing for a continued high demand, 
private car- based personal transport system, which allows ICEVs to persist for 
years to come, and crucially – acts for LCVs to adapt to current automobility, 
rather than allowing the mobility system to adapt to and be shaped by these 
technologies. From a transitions perspective, when landscape pressures make the 
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dynamically stable reproduction pathway untenable, some incumbents work 
towards a transformation pathway, which minimises disruption and allows many 
regime actors to maintain power.
 One of the most striking features of the central vision is the focus on incre-
mental change with an almost complete lack of discontinuities or serious disrup-
tions to the regime or the transport system more generally. This matches other 
recent research that found that ‘alternative visions of mobility that really might 
challenge the incumbent regime are rather rare’ (Weyer et al., 2015, p. 20). This 
is unrealistic, as EVs cannot simply replace conventional cars without allowing 
new approaches to vehicle manufacture or design by new entrants (Kay et al., 
2013), perhaps even redefining the role of the car in society (Augenstein, 2015). 
The fuel shift away from oil would itself be hugely disruptive to the system and 
is not engaged with in these trajectories. This vision is limited, and limiting, in 
scope, potentially preventing a deeper transition towards sustainability by 
locking out alternative futures and limiting EVs to the role of a techno- fix, 
rather than explore vast possibilities of electrical mobility. For example, EVs’ 
role as electricity storage is a common topic in electricity futures, but its effect 
on travel practices should be considered in transport futures.
 The main recommendation for policymakers is to engage with visions that 
include a larger variety of futures. These must include scenarios of disruption 
and shocks to the system, and possibilities of failing to meet emission reduction 
and other targets. This could be achieved by commissioning visioning docu-
ments from a larger variety of actors, including outsiders and niche players, who 
can challenge, rather than support, futures such as the central vision described 
here. This would offer more scope and choice for policymakers to meet policy 
goals and targets and leave us better prepared for foreseeable and unforeseeable 
changes to transport in the future.
Notes
1 This includes both battery–electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug- in hybrids.
2 In this chapter, trajectories describe possible unfolding transport futures, while pathways 
are theoretical, archetypal trajectories, like those detailed in the transitions literature.
3 For a detailed explanation of the methodology, see Bergman et al. (2017).
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5 Experimentation with vehicle 
automation
Debbie Hopkins and Tim Schwanen
Introduction
Deriving from the Latin experimentum (n.) or experiri (v.), the verb ‘to experi-
ment’ denotes ‘to try’, or ‘to test’. Contemporary forms of experimentation are 
described by Kullman (2013, p. 885) as careful processes of ‘tinkering with relat-
ively limited set- ups of bodies, materials and spaces’. Such processes should have 
sufficient flexibility to allow for reconfigurations, but also sufficient control to 
hold together. Experimentation offers diverse actors – often configurations from 
the public, private and third sectors – a way to make sense of the present, while 
also forming visions of the future (Bulkeley et al., 2015). As such, experiments 
are seen to be crucial to both sustainability transitions and contemporary modes 
of governance (e.g. Bulkeley, 2018; Evans, 2011, 2016), particularly where 
‘capacity to govern is recognised as fragmented and where what it means to 
govern well – to improve the urban condition – is subject not only to uncer-
tainty but to contestation’ (Bulkeley, 2018, p. 1). There is a burgeoning liter-
ature on urban experimentation (e.g. Evans et al., 2016), which has pointed to 
its potentialities and, increasingly, its limitations. In this literature, the relation 
between experimentation and the ‘real- world’ setting has received some atten-
tion (e.g. Karvonen et al., 2014) but requires further exploration because the 
latter is not pre- existing but carefully constructed, managed and sanitised along-
side and as part of the experiment.
 In this chapter, we argue that the real- world character of urban experiments 
needs to be understood as an artefact. This is not only because, as authors like 
Caprotti and Cowley (2017) argue, the real world is rendered knowable to 
actors involved in experiments predominantly through quantitative metrics. It 
is especially so because most what defines a city – heterogeneity, multiplicity, 
surprise – is often carefully selected and sanitised by experimental actors. 
Analysing to what an experiment is exposed and to what it is not therefore con-
tributes to understanding the politics and power- laden nature of urban 
experimentation.
 These propositions are informed by research into the emergence of con-
nected and autonomous vehicle (CAV) technologies, and the ongoing ‘real- 
world’ experimentation as part of the innovation process. We empirically 
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examine CAV experimentation in the UK urban settings of Oxford and the 
London Borough of Greenwich – Greenwich hereafter. CAV innovation and 
experimentation in the UK has been stimulated by national government 
funding priorities and justified by way of the intersecting and wicked problems 
of congestion and air quality together with hoped- for economic benefits as part 
of the UK government’s new Industrial Strategy (HM Government, 2017). 
Claims of energy demand reduction associated with automated vehicles relate 
to: the uptake of alternative fuels – although this is less likely for freight vehi-
cles than passenger; automation enabling efficient driving practices (e.g. smooth 
acceleration and deceleration); and automation- enabled practices such platoon-
ing, which relies on vehicle- to-vehicle connectivity for potential fuel efficiency 
benefits.
Understanding experimentation
The function of experimentation
The distinction between in vitro and in vivo experiments offers a way to under-
standing the current popularity of experimentation in cities and more generally. 
Drawing from the life sciences, Muniesa and Callon (2007) distinguish between 
in vitro experiments that take place in laboratory settings and those run in vivo, 
in ‘real- world’ (‘in situ’) environments. The ‘real- worldness’ of in vivo experi-
ments leads to claims that these types of experiments unfold in uncontained set-
tings and are less controllable than in vitro experiments (Bellamy et al., 2017), 
thereby generating alternative types of knowledge and data.
 The distinction between in vitro and in vivo experimentation is, however, 
underscored by selective interpretations of a (pre-)existing ‘real- world’ environ-
ment, and the objectives of the experimental outcomes. For Caprotti and 
Cowley (2017), the real world or real urban environment becomes known by a 
somewhat messy set of variables and parameters – traffic flows, NOx levels, urban 
developments, and so on – which may include and exclude particular infrastruc-
tures, places, policies and publics, ‘lend[ing] itself to a potentially normative 
epistemological approach to the city’ (p. 1445). Importantly, such exclusion(s), 
management and control of experiments may limit the exposure of whatever 
innovation is at stake to unintended experiences or ‘surprises’ that occur in the 
real world. This is potentially problematic since surprises are a critical aspect of 
successful experimentation (Gross, 2010, 2016). Thus, selectivity in experi-
mental actors, practices and spaces, and carefully managed degrees of openness 
and control restricts the potential benefits of in vivo experimentation.
 Traditional in vivo experimentation fulfils a number of functions according to 
different literatures. For instance, for Strategic Niche Management, experimen-
tation plays a role in reducing wide- ranging uncertainties, including: techno- 
economic uncertainties (e.g. competing sociotechnical configurations), finance 
and investment- related uncertainties (e.g. securing funding for research, 
development and experimentation), cognitive uncertainties (e.g. views and 
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perceptions that differ from those of the regime), and social uncertainties (e.g. 
unstable networks), which can hinder the development of niche innovations, 
and thereby delay or prevent their emergence and subsequent diffusion (Geels 
et al., 2018).
 From a transitions perspective, experiments occur within niches or particular 
environments which are protected from conventional political economy, with 
experimental actors managing how system elements (new technologies, institu-
tions, and actor and network constellations) evolve and potentially align in a 
way that would become stable, and that could replace the current, unsustainable 
system (Bulkeley et al., 2016; de Wildt- Liesveld et al., 2015). However, Marvin 
and Silver (2016, p. 14) go further to show how ‘real- world’ urban experimenta-
tion can also play a role in the validation and legitimation of particular ways of 
thinking about and performing innovation and transitions, which often aligns 
with neoliberal ideas, and may fit with entrepreneurial urban governance.
 From a transition perspective, therefore, experimentation is about various 
forms of learning and institutionalisation by different stakeholders. On one 
level, experimental or demonstration projects are one way to aid niche develop-
ment through first- order learning by public and private sector niche actors and 
wider publics about innovations ‘in real- life circumstances’ (Geels, 2012, 
p. 472). On another level, experimentation is about second- order learning 
through changes to underlying values and norms and about getting ‘outsiders’ 
and regime actors involved and thereby increase the innovation’s legitimacy, its 
institutional embedding, and the availability of resources for its further develop-
ment (Schot and Geels, 2008). In this context, real- world experimentation can 
increase an innovation’s legitimacy by ‘publicly demonstrating proof of concept 
before scaling up’ (Gross, 2016, p. 615) and is a critical step in the innovation 
pathway.
A framework for analysis: experiments and their settings
It is clear from the growing body of literature on experimentation that both the 
material (e.g. people, infrastructures, technologies) and the discursive have key 
roles to play in the recently increased interest in urban experiments with CAVs. 
In this chapter, we analyse the emergence of those experiments using an analyt-
ical framework developed on the basis of the recent literature on urban experi-
mentation that highlights both the material and the discursive. The framework 
focuses on four key aspects: (1) the underlying framings and logics, (2) the prac-
tices of experimentation, (3) the multiple and intersecting roles of the experi-
mental subject(s) and (4) the places and spaces for experimentation.
Underlying framings and logics
In their work on urban laboratories1 – a term that retains the vernacular of in 
vitro experiments, while introducing the real- world situatedness of in vivo 
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experimental configurations: strategic, civic, and grassroots. Strategic laboratories 
are led by government or large private sector actors, and often include multiple 
projects. Civic laboratories are led by urban actors (e.g. universities, urban 
developers), and may involve just one project, often include co- funding. Grass-
roots laboratories, in contrast, are led by not- for-profits or urban civil society 
actors. They often have limited budgets and focus on broad agendas (e.g. well-
being). In some circumstances, the laboratories will evolve over time, morphing 
along with funding regimes and actor group involvement. Building on the work 
of Geels and Deuten (2006, Figure 5.1), we can expect specific laboratories to 
inform global level actions with interconnections across various sites and 
domains into coordinated framings and learning.
 These configurations can presumably operate according to different logics – a 
term used by Marvin and Silver (2016) to refer to the ‘drivers that shape the 
purpose’ of an experiment and frame the rationale and expectations. From their 
research, Marvin and Silver (2016) found four main types of logic: economic 
growth, education/knowledge production, techno- orientation and post- capitalist 
living. In practice, multiple arrangements and logics of experimentation may 
co- exist at any one place and time, depending on the size of the experiment, the 
actor groups involved, collective priorities, and the experiment’s relationship to 
a wider innovation pathway.
Practices of experimentation
This aspect concerns the action- of-experimentation as a nexus and integration 
of discursive and material elements. It highlights that experimentation encom-
passes a variety of activities (Marvin and Silver, 2016) and that the types of 
work undertaken may differ across experiments. Work may include research and 
development (e.g. with new technologies), piloting and testing of new ideas 
(with less emphasis on research), and/or both formal and informal training and 
education (e.g. skill development, behaviour change). Such work can be focused 
on a particular topic (e.g. new technology), or outcome (e.g. sustainability) as 
previously noted, dependent on the experimental arrangement there may be 
one project, or multiple (e.g. McCormick and Hartmann, 2017). Funding will 
have a large impact on the size and duration of experiments (Marvin and Silver, 
2016), with some experiments operating on long(er) timeframes and being well- 
funded, while others are temporary, short term, provisional and constantly on 
the look- out for secure future funding. Nevertheless, narrow depictions of 
funding rounds can overlook the connectedness between local projects, which 
are often part of a wider innovation pathway (Figure 5.1). Hence, while a spe-
cific project may appear short term and provisional due to limited funding, these 
may be continued in different guises by project consortia.
 As expected, experiments take up a multitude of configurations. In reference 
to urban laboratories, McCormick and Hartmann (2017) distinguish between 
capacities by way of the trial, the enclave, the demonstration, and the platform. 
These terms are often used interchangeably but have subtle yet powerful 
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differences in structure and performance. The trial points to the ‘real- world’ 
testing of products, technologies and/or processes, with the ‘real- worldness’ 
determined by key actors. The enclave refers to the spatial segregation of the 
laboratories for innovations to be protected as niches. The demonstration context 
is a managed form of showcasing or exhibiting possible urban futures. Finally, 
the platform seeks to present arenas through which new urban configurations 
can be fostered. The different intentions captured by these configurations may 
have powerful impacts on the practices of experimentation, but are likely to be 
intersecting, with innovation experiments being designed around multiple capa-
cities. McCormick and Hartmann’s (2017) capacities are used in this chapter to 
make sense of the ongoing practice of experimentation with automation in 
Oxford and Greenwich.
Experimental subjects
Contemporary urban experiments often include wide- ranging actor groups, with 
differing purposes and priorities. While involvement in experiments can be 
driven by the prospect of commercial benefits for some, others may have been 
drawn in by the feeling of involvement in ‘cutting edge innovation as it unfolds 
on the ground’ (Karvonen et al., 2014, p. 105). It is tempting to adopt the triple 
helix approach (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1998) to analyse how CAV experi-
ments bring together start- up businesses, incumbent actors from motor, ICT, 
insurance and other allied industries with local and national governments and 
engineers and data scientists from universities. Caprotti and Cowley (2017), 
however, suggest that analyses of experimental subjects should go beyond the 
actor groups involved and consider deeper questions about ‘on whom the exper-
imenting is carried out? And by implication, who decides what is to be an 
experiment?’ (pp. 1445–1446). Addressing such questions recognises the power- 
laden and political nature of urban experimentation and helps to shed light on 
artificial nature of its real- world character.
Places and spaces of experimentation
Experimentation is often geographically situated and linked to a specific place 
and time. There often are clear temporal and spatial boundaries to experiments, 
imposed by limits to funding and jurisdiction. Yet, according to Turnheim et al. 
(2018), experiments are increasingly breaking free of these confines and taking 
on new configurations. Experiments reach across spatial scales simultaneously 
drawing from the national (e.g. government funding and priorities, and national 
organisations), regional (e.g. councils and industry operators) and local (e.g. 
sites of experimentation). They also stretch beyond national boundaries, to 
connect internationally through the transfer of know- how, expertise and tech-
nologies, connecting to global flows, networks and innovation races (e.g. 
Hopkins and Schwanen, 2018a; see also Figure 5.1). For research, the signifi-
cance of connections in shaping experiments calls for relational analytical 
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frameworks that are sensitive to both the circulations of discourses, practices, 
technologies, actors, and so forth and to the wider political economies in which 
those circulations and experimentation are situated.
 The experiment arena – the site of/for experimentation – can be the city- as-
a- whole through to campuses or individual buildings but will frequently draw 
upon expertise, technologies, policies and practices from other territories. 
However, where claims of whole- city experiments are made, practices of experi-
mentation are often concentrated in or even limited to particular sites within 
the city – areas of (re)development, urban centres and wealthy suburbs. As such 
experiments are often co- opted as sources of economic development and iden-
tity formation, linked to regional provenance claims, and used to attract inward 
investment often by means of public–private partnerships. Thus, such experi-
ments will rarely engage with questions of equity, equality, access and social 
inclusivity (e.g. Evans, 2016), even where these may be priorities of certain 
project partners such as local councils.
Experimentation with connected and autonomous 
vehicles (CAVs)
The emergence of CAVs
While framed as particularly novel and contemporary technologies, CAVs have 
undergone multiple waves of hype and experimentation. The current wave is 
perhaps the most geographically dispersed and technologically advanced, although 
previous attempts to develop driverless technologies saw similar dynamics in terms 
of high expectations, public trials and government funding in the 1920s and the 
1960–1970s (Hopkins and Schwanen 2018b). Each of these periods ended with 
the eventual discontinuation of public funding, as technologies failed to meet 
heightened expectations – a fate that on the face of it seems unlikely for present- 
day CAV experimentation but might yet befall them, should future controversies, 
for instance around casualty numbers in traffic accidents, become unmanageable.
 The resurgence of industry and policy interest in CAVs can be related to 
three factors. First, increased technological capabilities following breakthrough 
developments in deep machine learning, coupled with a growth in sensor tech-
nologies and smart connectivity, have provided the technological foundations 
for modern CAV innovation. Second, ongoing and increasingly politicised con-
cerns over traffic congestion, road safety, air pollution and inequitable transport 
provision have stimulated interest in CAV innovation as a potential solution. 
Third, for the UK specifically, interest in domestic innovation through indi-
genous research and development and in a resurgence of manufacturing has 
been intensified because of techno- optimistic and neoliberalised governance 
formations and an economy struggling in the wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis and more structurally because of limited long- term improvements in 
productivity, coupled with instabilities associated with the UK’s exit from the 
European Union (‘Brexit’) (Hopkins and Schwanen, 2018a).
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 Uncertainties in the innovation pathway and potential contributions to 
sustainability agendas notwithstanding, governments across the Western world 
are preparing for, and seek to accelerate, a transition towards automated mobil-
ity. The UK government, for instance, has been active in niche development, 
undertaking a range of tasks, including: future visioning, network building, har-
monising domestic legislation and collaborating on international standards, 
developing a code of practice for experimentation and testing, and funding 
CAV research and development including demonstration projects and consortia 
(Hopkins and Schwanen, 2018b). Since 2014, over £120 million has been com-
mitted to the research, development and demonstration of (elements of ) CAV 
technologies, from discrete sensor technologies through to smart and automated 
transport ecosystems (CCAV, 2018).
 In vivo experimentation with CAVs is widely seen to have multiple, inter-
related benefits. Not only are CAV technologies, infrastructures, practices and 
policies experienced directly in ‘real- world’ conditions, the various automated 
configurations are also made and remade through interactions with ‘real- world’ 
people, places and infrastructures. The resulting algorithmic, behavioural, 
sensory and tacit knowledges are considered indispensable to the further devel-
opment and subsequent scaling of CAVs. Moreover, across the transport sector, 
the Volkswagen emissions scandal – a.k.a. ‘Dieselgate’ – has raised deep suspi-
cion about the validity and transparency of in vitro laboratory testing, exposed 
the (intentional) human interference with putatively objective in vitro testing, 
and highlighted the divergence between in vitro and in vivo trials. Dieselgate 
thus seems to have reinforced a need for public, ‘real- world’ experiments and 
claims of superior knowledge. Nevertheless, the notion of a (set of ) complex 
‘real world(s)’ that will produce additional knowledges can be subject to contes-
tation, not least due to the very specific contexts in which automation is being 
‘experimented’ with, as elaborated further below.
UK national policy and case studies
This chapter draws empirically from 15 interviews with CAV stakeholders in 
both Oxford and Greenwich, across the public, private and third sectors. The 
interviews, part of a broader study about CAV experimentation across the UK, 
were conducted in 2017, audio- recorded and professionally transcribed. The 
interviews were then thematically coded using NVivo 10 qualitative software. 
The case studies presented below draw selectively from this analysis to examine 
the ways through which automation experimentation is taking place in Oxford 
and Greenwich.
National contexts
The UK government’s approach to CAV innovation is broadly in line with the 
processes suggested by the Transition Management cycle (Loorbach, 2010): 
considerable effort has been expended on the strategic activity of future 
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visioning, for instance through policy statements like the ‘Pathway to Driverless 
Cars’ document (Department for Transport, 2015) and the new ‘Industrial 
Strategy’ (HM Government, 2017); the tactical activities of network building, 
the creation of domestic legislation, and the alignment of international stand-
ards; and operational activities relating to technology trials and demonstrations 
(Hopkins and Schwanen, 2018b). With regard to those operational activities, 
national government support has actively stimulated city and regional council 
involvement in the development and testing of automated technologies. This 
activation of local government needs to be seen in the wider context of almost 
a decade of national- level austerity politics, which are affecting local govern-
ment deeply. On the one hand, an austerity- driven push for devolution is 
placing increasing responsibilities onto local authorities, while budget cuts on 
the other hand are significantly narrowing their room to manoeuvre and forcing 
them into all kinds of partnerships with private sector actors.
 The replacement of Regional Development Agencies with Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) in 2010 by the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition 
paved the way for local innovation strategies. In 2014, the LEPs were given 
responsibility for delivering part of the EU Structural and Investment Funds for 
2014–2020. Our interviews found LEPs defined in the following terms: ‘to drive 
economic growth and to provide the strategic leadership that’s necessary in 
order to plan for long term economic growth and transformation’. Oxfordshire 
Local Enterprise Partnership (OXLep), established in 2011, is one of 39 LEPs in 
the UK. OXLep focuses its work on four intersecting themes – people, place, 
enterprise and connectivity – which feature prominently in the strategic plans 
of most LEPs across the country. For Greenwich, as a borough of the City of 
London, the LEP works across the London boroughs to ‘lead economic growth 
and job creation’.
Oxford, Oxfordshire
Oxford is part of the so- called ‘Golden Triangle’ – together with Cambridge, 
Milton Keynes and London – of innovation- intensive industries that are viewed 
as nationally important drivers of economic development. The City of Oxford’s 
growth agenda underscores priorities for the regional and city council, and 
includes increases in retail space, and growth in housing and jobs, each putting 
renewed demands on the stretched regional transport system which is already 
heavily car dependent as far as connections among concentrations of people and 
economic activity is concerned. The City of Oxford has long been associated 
with research and innovation (Lawton Smith, 2003), with numerous institu-
tions including the city’s two universities, research institutes and associated 
spin- out companies, such as Oxbotica – a key player in UK CAV innovation.
 Oxford’s links to the motor industry date back to at least 1912 when William 
Morris moved his motor company to southeast Oxford to begin vehicle mass 
production, and the city now is a hub for the motorsports industry which occu-
pies multiple sites across the Oxfordshire countryside. Building on its historical 
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legacies and driven by the global success of Oxbotica and the strategic activities 
and enthusiasm of ‘middling technocrats’ (Larner and Laurie, 2010, p. 219), 
Oxford has – through a variety of means – signalled its intent to become a fore-
runner in the development, testing and demonstration of CAV technologies. 
Experimentation with vehicle automation in Oxfordshire takes many guises, 
with the city and its various actors hosting a number of discrete projects.
Royal Borough of Greenwich
Greenwich is a relatively diverse London borough situated in the southeast of 
the city. Greenwich is in a period of change and at the cusp of a range of oppor-
tunities linked to the growing economy and regional development, but also 
facing significant challenges, including the transportation of people, goods and 
waste. Greenwich has a historical town centre, and pressure from traffic travel-
ling through Greenwich from the southeast into central London via the Black-
wall Tunnel. Infrastructural responses to Greenwich’s transport issues include 
increasing the capacity of and access to London’s public transport networks (e.g. 
underground, overground, bus) but this has done little to address ongoing con-
gestion of vehicles travelling through Greenwich to central London. Continu-
ing urban development and intensification (e.g. on Greenwich Peninsula), is 
likely to further exacerbate travel demand through the movement of goods (e.g. 
construction processes, waste, produce) and people (e.g. residents and workers).
 As one of the original sites of CAV demonstration, funded by the UK gov-
ernment, Greenwich has become ‘a major centre for testing and demonstration’ 
(Digital Greenwich, 2016). The borough launched its ‘Smart City’ strategy on 
22 October 2015, setting out the Council’s proposal to implement ‘smarter’ 
responses to the borough’s challenges, and the creation of new opportunities for 
local business and communities. Digital Greenwich was founded as an in- house 
team of the Royal Borough of Greenwich Council, charged with the develop-
ment and implementation of its Smart City strategy.
Framings and logics
An experimental approach to transport innovation was understood by research 
participants as an opportunity to find solutions to address air pollution and other 
contested environmental concerns in a context of fragmented governmental 
capacities (cf. Bulkeley, 2018). Participants from Oxford articulated clear expec-
tations about CAV technologies, particularly relating to energy demand reduc-
tions. However, as shown below, these focus particularly on demand 
management and electrification of the powertrain rather than on automated 
technologies per se.
(CAVs will aid energy demand reductions) in two different ways. The one 
is the powertrain in the vehicles, we look forward to electrification. There 
are areas that you cannot just substitute electric vehicles for traditional 
82  Debbie Hopkins and Tim Schwanen
vehicles because of the grid capacity. So, there would need to be a demand 
reduction or local grids or different solutions. The other part is the intelli-
gent part of the mobility which is minimising the demands, both in terms 
of cars and automatically then in terms of power to move these cars around.
(O2: Oxford, Local Government, CAV Innovation)
When you look at something like connected and autonomous vehicles, the 
point there is that you would think there would be more vehicle sharing, 
think there would be more efficient driving, think there’d be better use of 
road space. You’d hope that you’d got these views along with it that you’re 
going to have lower emission vehicles, you’re going to have something 
closer and more akin to a sharing economy with cleaner vehicles that 
operate.
(O8: Oxford, Local Government, Economic Development)
In Greenwich, associated with congestion were concerns about transport- related 
pollution, ‘the pollution from the diesel engines is something that’s attracting a 
lot of attention, a lot of concern because this is already a hugely polluted part of 
the world’ (G2: Greenwich, Community Group). As in Oxfordshire, a connec-
tion was made between current transport concerns – largely related to conges-
tion and air pollution – and the emergence and ‘real- world’ testing of CAVs as 
an appropriate response by local government. The focus on automation was 
viewed to be ‘quite forward- looking’ and driven by a desire for ‘different 
methods to try and address’ (G3: Greenwich, Local Government, Digital Green-
wich) ‘wicked’ transport problems (cf. Ney, 2009). However, this is not the only 
logic at play in Greenwich, with terms such as ‘productivity’, ‘growth’ and 
‘foreign investment’ explicitly linked by Digital Greenwich to its focus on the 
testing of CAV technologies (Digital Greenwich, 2016). Both Oxford and 
Greenwich appear to see CAV experiments as part of the dominant urban 
agenda of neoliberal economic growth (Karvonen et al., 2014), and technolo-
gical solutionism to environmental and social concerns.
Experimental practices
Practices of experimentation differed between Oxford and Greenwich due to 
the different actor groups, and capabilities. Table 5.1 outlines a series of CAV 
activities in Oxford and Greenwich, demonstrating clear overlap between the 
two sites in terms of experimental actors and thus underscoring the need for a 
relational analytical perspective (see above).
 Two key projects that are undertaking a variety of experimental practices in 
Oxford are the ‘Smart Oxford’ lab and the DRIVEN consortium. These two pro-
jects represent diversity in terms of formality, funding and focus. For instance, 
while Smart Oxford was identified as an ‘informal partnership’ and ‘quite a 
nebulous idea’ (O8: Oxford, Local Government, Economic Development), the 
practices of the DRIVEN consortium focus specifically on the development of 
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CAV technologies. The Smart Oxford Lab has a broad remit and a focus on 
building partnerships, creating opportunities, and ‘horizon scanning’. Thus, 
Smart Oxford ‘has a legitimacy but it isn’t a decision- making board’ (O8: 
Oxford, Local Government, Economic Development). In this way, Smart 
Oxford helps to create and nurture an ecology that is conducive to, and makes 
possible, the experimental practices of others, while also actively constructive 
positive visions around Oxfords innovation capabilities.
 In contrast, the DRIVEN project (www.drivenby.ai) aims to deploy a fleet of 
highly automated vehicles on urban roads and motorways, leading to multiple 
journeys between Oxford and London in 2019. The DRIVEN website states that 
it is ‘the most complex CAV trial that’s ever been attempted’ with ‘ground- 
breaking’ research. The novelty appears to lie in its use of ‘fleets of cars’ – six 
autonomous vehicles working ‘cooperatively’ – sharing information between the 
six vehicles to ‘help them know how to behave’ (DRIVEN, 2018). The experi-
mental practices of DRIVEN to date fit with what McCormick and Hartmann 
(2017) refer to as a demonstration as the innovation has been showcased to 
tightly managed, invited audiences.
 CAV projects in Greenwich include partnerships between a variety of 
private and public sector actors and are funded by grants from the European 
Union, Innovate UK and other agencies. The GATEway project (Greenwich 
Automated Transport Environment) was one of the first CAV experiments in 
the UK, and thus presented one of the first opportunities for selected publics – 
by way of an online selection process – to travel in a CAV. Media reporting of 
the experimental practices may have also contributed to more distributed aware-
ness of CAV innovation. MOVE_UK, another partially government- funded 
consortium, speaks specifically of processes of data collection and analytics as 
part of its experimental practices. This include, for instance, the real- time 
capture of vehicle operation and data from the automated driving system tech-
nologies, transmitted via 3G, as well as the automatic transfer of data to a secure 
storage which enables advanced data analytics. These practices effectively 
operate as an amalgamation of particular elements of both in vivo and in vitro 
experimentation, with the boundaries between controlled and uncontrolled, 
and degrees of experimental containment unsettled.
 MOVE_UK and the GATEway project now both sit under the umbrella of 
the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL)’s Smart Mobility Living Lab in 
Greenwich. This is ‘an 18-month project … set up as a testbed in and around 
the whole Borough of Greenwich to allow real- world testing of AVs’ (G3: 
Greenwich, Local Government, Digital Greenwich), designed to ‘speed up’ 
CAV research and development and building upon the portfolio of government 
grants led by TRL and its partners. As an umbrella organisation – and some-
thing of an experimental platform (McCormick and Hartmann, 2017) – the 
Living Lab offers conditions for experimentation and facilitates practice by way 
of on- and off- site sites.
 Another public experiment taking place in Greenwich is led by a private sector 
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testing their last- mile delivery technologies in Greenwich since 2016. These 
experiments involve ‘live’ deliveries using their pavement- based delivery bots, 
designed for ‘local delivery of goods and groceries for consumers for under £1 per 
shipment’ and drawing from sensing technologies including radar, stereo vision, 
ultrasonics and machine learning. The ‘bots’ are currently operated by human 
workers- at-a- distance, as the experiment gathers data and develops the techno-
logy. However, the intention is to achieve autonomous mobility with human 
‘oversight’ in due course. Thus, Starship’s experimental practices are anchored in 
learning- by-doing and the gathering of data to enable fully automation.
 There seem to be a difference in durability and resilience of experimental 
practices in the two cities. A sense of continuity emerges from the capability- 
driven aspects of Oxford’s innovation ecosystem, given that both Oxbotica and 
the UK Atomic Energy Authority’s Remote Applications in Challenging 
Environments (RACE) facility – a centre conducting research on robotic and 
autonomous systems based in Abingdon to the immediate south of Oxford – are 
only to a limited extent dependent on CAV- specific government funding prior-
ities and research grants. In the case of RACE, this is due to the broader remit 
on remote applications of robotics in challenging environments (e.g. nuclear, 
petrochemical and space exploration), which offers their experimental practices 
resilience to funding regimes. In Greenwich, the various activities described 
above are broadly dependent on government funds, albeit with industry co- 
funding projects. Project funding nevertheless appears diverse and ongoing, con-
firming a wider trend of success breeding success in local- level innovation in 
transport in the UK (Schwanen, 2015). However, funding regimes are just one 
aspect influencing the durability and resilience of experimental practices. In the 
long term, the stability of Oxford’s innovation ecosystem could be impacted by 
wider politico- economic and technological trends and buy- outs of smaller firms 
by large transnational corporations. Both could reconfigure the local innovation 
ecosystem considerably.
Experimental subjects
McCormick and Hartmann’s (2017) strategic configurations prevail in CAV 
experimentation in Oxford and Greenwich, with claims of civic involvement 
often poorly substantiated. Both government (national and local) and private 
sector actors lead the various experimental projects often by way of (partial) 
government funding. Greenwich was successful in the UK government’s first 
round of funding for demonstration cities for CAV technologies in 2015. The 
early success established relationships between local government, TRL and 
Oxbotica that have outlasted the initial project. The Council, the Mayor and 
other public sector actors were seen to be pivotal in the construction of Green-
wich as a laboratory for the experimentation and testing of CAV technologies.
I think it’s basically because the Council got in very early … The current 
Leader of the Council is Denise Hyland who is really, to a great extent, 
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responsible for this organisation. She used to be the Cabinet Member for 
Transport and she’s very aware of the importance of keeping the city 
moving, keeping the borough moving and the need for interconnectivity. 
So, I think it was pushing at an open door when this was proposed, abso-
lutely. Greenwich has always been quite forward thinking in economic 
development, in social mobility.
(G3: Greenwich, Local Government, Digital Greenwich)
Oxford stakeholders, including the local government actors, tell a story of 
emergence that is capability led, with clusters of innovation and a retro-
spective action to develop cohesion among these groups of actors. The 
Innovation team at the County Council, OXLep, Oxbotica and RACE were 
all noted as being important in the establishment of an innovation ecosystem. 
In some senses, however, Oxbotica can be identified as the most important 
actor – ‘an extremely capable company’, and ‘number two after Google in 
terms of autonomous vehicle technology’ (O2: Oxford, Local Government, 
CAV Innovation). This framing of Oxbotica undergirded claims in interviews 
with local government actors of local advantage and opportunity that sought 
to differentiate Oxford from other UK cities with CAV experiments, such as 
Greenwich, Bristol and Milton Keynes. Provenance is central to the claims 
made by urban stakeholders in Oxford, for whom intellectual property of 
CAV innovation is seen to be emerging directly from, and as a result of, 
Oxford’s supportive ecosystem.
 Beyond the experimental actor constellation, the role(s) for other experi-
mental subjects – those on whom the experiment was taking place – are largely 
passive. Decisions on sites and practices of experimentation are decided upon by 
selected groups of actors who retain authority and are therefore able to include 
and exclude other experimental subjects. Thus, paying attention to these 
dynamics, as suggested by Caprotti and Cowley (2017), reaffirms the constructed 
nature of ‘real- world’ urban experimentation. Observation of experiments on 
public roads was noted by consortia partners as a way through which publics 
were involved in the experiments, and there have so far been few attempts to 
harness active engagement of publics in Oxford. Key actors in ongoing experi-
ments rather seem to think that flawless technical performance of CAVs is what 
drives public acceptance, as suggested by a DRIVEN project press release:
Possibly the most important thing about these trials is … the building of 
our confidence in how it works, because that will be key to public accept-
ance of driverless vehicles both as road users and in time as potential 
passengers.
(Oxbotica, 2017, NP)
 Similarly, in Greenwich, interviewed members of a community group 
reported learning about the experiments through national newspapers but had 
not experienced those experiments first hand. The limited and passive role of 
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the ‘general public’ in both cities replicates their marginalisation in national- 
level discourses and activities around CAVs (see Hopkins and Schwanen, 
2018a). It draws attention to the political nature of CAV experimentation, 
which has so far been configured around technical performance rather than 
exposure to the starkly differentiated and sometimes unexpected responses and 
actions of city residents and visitors who might one day share the road with 
CAVs or use them for work, care or pleasure.
Spaces and places of experimentation
Both Oxford and Greenwich make claims of geographic and traffic- related 
‘uniqueness’ that is beneficial to the trialling of CAVs. In London this related 
to diversity and being ‘Europe’s only megacity’, and in Oxford the rhetoric to 
the complexity of the transport system, including the historical town centre. 
However, in both places, current sites of experimentation are largely limited to 
new and/or high- income neighbourhoods, and this is particularly evident in 
Greenwich. For instance, the experiments linked to the ‘Smart Mobility Living 
Lab @ Greenwich’ occur on the real- world sites of the Digital Greenwich 
Innovation Centre on the Greenwich Peninsula – a new development on indus-
trial land – and also ‘off- site’ at the TRL’s research and development head-
quarters in Berkshire.
 Claims of public engagement and interaction are, as shown above, often 
overstated, with a very limited and particular type of public included. Moreover, 
despite claims of visibility of urban experiments, even passive interactions are 
unlikely. This was noted by both local government and community participants 
in Greenwich:
In reality, trials are occurring within a very bounded and restricted portion 
of the borough, which represents the population, infrastructures of Green-
wich rather little. Instead, the site of demonstration is a newly developing 
area on Greenwich peninsula, newly gentrified from its industrial roots.
(G3: Greenwich, Local Government, Digital Greenwich)
The difficulty for those of us in Greenwich to actually exercise an opinion 
about it is that it seems to have taken place on the peninsula which, of 
course, is new build, new roads and on the residential streets of the pen-
insula there’s far less traffic than you would actually get on the Blackwall 
Tunnel approach road or down this road at all. So, we haven’t seen much 
of it. I’ve seen the press saying it’s been happening but haven’t actually seen 
much sign of it.
(G2: Greenwich, Community Organisation)
Some of the CAV experimentation in Greenwich, such as the GATEway 
project, thus resembles what McCormick and Hartmann (2017) call enclaves as 
a result of deliberate attempts to shape to what encounters the vehicles are 
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exposed. This spatial reality stands in marked contrast to prevailing discourse 
mobilised by Smart Mobility Living Lab @ Greenwich who frame the experi-
ment as designed ‘to assist with research and development, concept testing and 
validation, launching new technology or services, and understanding how new 
technology is perceived in a real- world environment’ (Digital Greenwich, 
2016, NP).
 Categorisation as enclave is less appropriate for Oxbotica’s experimental 
activities in Oxford, which were described in interviews as
Running in and amongst cars, buses, pedestrians, cyclists, motorbikes, 
people cutting across the front of them, round the back of them, down the 
side of them, reversing out in front of them, in real time and reacting to 
whatever’s in front of them.
(O6: Oxford, Local Government, Local Enterprise Partnership)
Yet, these too appeared to initially take place in a limited portion of the city, 
i.e. the wealthy suburbs of north and central Oxford near to Oxbotica’s 
Summertown offices where, across diurnal and weekly cycles, traffic levels and 
composition will be somewhat less challenging than other parts of the city, 
including demographically and socioeconomically more diverse neighbour-
hoods. A logic of light segregation appears therefore to be at play.
Conclusions and policy recommendations: experimenting with 
automation
This chapter has examined processes of experimentation with automation cur-
rently underway in Oxford and Greenwich. These two cities are neither alone 
nor unique in their experimentation with CAVs but part of a broader move-
ment across the UK stimulated to some degree by national priorities, and the 
international race to automation. From our relational approach to CAV experi-
mentation, we now draw several conclusions.
 From our case study, it is evident that what constitutes the ‘real world’ in 
urban experiments is not pre- given but artificial. It is constructed through the 
actions and decisions of key experimental actors that are typically networked 
across multiple experimental projects and sites. Those actors include some 
groups (e.g. selected innovators, investors, selected publics) while excluding 
others (community groups) and seek to condition CAVs’ – and presumably 
other innovations’ – exposure to the heterogeneity and unpredictability that is 
integral to the city. The (discursive) publicity of ‘real- world’ experiments and 
CAV technology may in the short run heighten the already- hyped expectations 
around the innovation and its purported benefits, but in the long term frustrate 
its diffusion if it turns out that earlier in vivo experimentation has insufficiently 
exposed CAVs to the vagaries, surprises and complexities of urban traffic.
 Similarly, the real- worldness of in vivo experiments – at least those with 
CAVs – is more artificial and political than the discourse mobilised by many 
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influential experimental actors suggests. That real- worldness reflects what those 
actors find important and relevant, which for CAVs in the UK at this point in 
time is more about technical performance, (future) profitability and economic 
development than about interaction with the inevitably diverse general public 
as potential users, fellow road users, citizens, sceptics, and so forth. Besides, 
CAV experimentation is only partly about engagement with the real world. The 
data gathered from such engagement is used for machine learning and digital 
experimentation using simulation techniques that thus hybridise in vivo and in 
vitro elements. This use of experimentation also suggests that data generation 
should be added to trial, enclave, demonstration and platform as a configuration 
in McCormick and Hartmann’s (2017) heuristic scheme.
 Another insight in relation to McCormick and Hartmann’s (2017) classifica-
tion of urban laboratories, and presumably experiments, is that trial, enclave, 
demonstration and platform cannot be seen as mutually exclusive categories. 
The urban experiments with CAVs in Oxford and Greenwich tend to be con-
figured as trials and demonstrations but this capacity is made possible by their 
simultaneous character of being enclaves, with the degree of segregation varying 
across sites and projects. Similarly, by highlighting how in vivo experiments are 
is used to generate data for subsequent (quasi-)in vitro experiments using digital 
technologies, our empirical research also begins to highlight how in vivo and in 
vitro experimentation differ not so much in kind as in degree. In vitro experi-
mentation using digital techniques is not as isolated and free from real- world 
processes as it might appear.
 Schot and Geels (2008) point to the need for second- order learning, the 
development of underlying norms and values through the niche development 
phase. Achieving this requires the involvement of ‘outsiders’ in the experimen-
tation process. Experiments in Oxford and Greenwich could offer an oppor-
tunity for learning about the innovation in ‘real- life circumstances’, as 
previously suggested by Geels (2012), but the limited and managed actor con-
stellations at the current stage of experimentation are significantly restricting 
learning about (potential) user engagement with CAV technologies. The need 
for exposure to surprise and opportunities for second- order learning suggests that 
wide- ranging experimental subjects need to be better understood and incorpor-
ated into processes of urban experimentation with automation.
 The benefits of current forms of real- world experiments are two- fold. First, 
the technology developers are gaining new insights into interactions between the 
innovation and its (carefully constructed, highly selective) environments. 
Second, for the hosts of the experiments – likely to include public- sector actors 
– the experiments are often linked to economic development, identity forma-
tion, and regional provenance claims, and used to attract inward investment 
often by way of public–private partnerships. Proclamations of ‘real- world experi-
mentation’ have important implications for perceptions of CAVs and their 
capabilities. For some audiences, real- world conditions may represent particular 
connotations of vehicle capabilities, including the ability to travel on busy inner 
city public roads. Unless the artificial and highly selective character of the 
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real- worldness of CAV experimentation is recognised and carefully communic-
ated, ongoing in vivo experiments may further entrench already- hyped expecta-
tions about the capabilities of vehicle automation and the time scales for 
widespread diffusion. This is a risk perhaps best to avoided considering previous 
failures of CAV innovation.
 Based on these conclusions, we have three policy recommendations.
 Policy recommendation 1: Innovation literatures highlight the importance of 
second- order learning around niche innovations, such as CAVs. The experi-
mentation process needs to offer opportunities for inclusion of a broader range 
of publics and experimental subjects which offer not only the opportunity to 
learn about the innovation but also opportunities for surprises and unintended 
outcomes. The real- world experiment needs to be acknowledged as highly sub-
jective and managed.
 Policy recommendation 2: Caution in the communication of real- world experi-
mentation and CAV capabilities is encouraged, as real- world experiments can 
contribute to elevated expectations and hype, which may ultimately be unmet.
 Policy recommendation 3: As a technique deployed in policymaking, in vivo 
experimentation is not as neutral and innocent as it may seem. Given that real- 
worldness in experimentation is constructed, policymakers – and others – should 
be reflexive about what forms of exposure are privileged and marginalised in 
actual (urban) experiments, and what the consequences of this might be for 
wider innovation pathways and broader attempts to address wicked problems 
such as road congestion, air pollution, social inequality and excessive energy 
consumption of fossil fuels.
Note
1 Karvonen and van Heur (2014, p. 380) explain that the urban laboratory ‘is part of a 
wider discursive field that includes ideas of Mode 2 science, triple helix formations, 
engaged research, service learning, transdisciplinarity, living laboratories, applied 
innovation and the co-production of knowledge’.
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6 The United Kingdom smart 
meter rollout through an 
energy justice lens
Kirsten E.H. Jenkins, Benjamin K. Sovacool  
and Sabine Hielscher
Introduction
The United Kingdom’s (UK) Smart Meter Implementation Programme (SMIP) 
creates the legal framework so that an in- home display unit (IHD) and a smart 
gas and electricity meter can be installed in every household by the end of 2020. 
Intended to reduce household energy consumption, the SMIP is one of the 
world’s most complex smart meter rollouts. It is also proving to be a challenging 
one as a series of obstacles has characterised and potentially restricted imple-
mentation. This chapter first gives background to the most recent smart meter 
roll- out developments in the UK and second, uses energy justice criteria to 
explore the emergent challenges under the headings of distributional justice, 
procedural justice and justice as recognition.
 We delve into pertinent technical and non- technical issues arising through 
the lens of energy justice, – a now commonly used structure first introduced by 
Schlosberg (2004, 2007) and Walker (2009) and used in a policy setting by 
McCauley et al. (2013). As introduced in full in Chapter 3, this includes a focus 
on three core tenets, which in this chapter manifest as: (1) an analysis of poten-
tial distributional benefits and ills, (2) illustrations of the overlaps between 
smart meters and other social vulnerabilities including poverty, ill health, social 
integration or rural marginalisation, which lead to the need to recognise par-
ticular sections of society and (3) explorations of the role of procedural engage-
ment during the roll- out.
 While the energy justice literature is gaining ever- increasing popularity – 
including in the field of energy ‘end- use’ – no energy justice research has inves-
tigated the development of smart meter technologies to date. This chapter 
makes an early step towards this goal. The success and necessity of doing so is 
clear as applying these three concepts to an analysis of the UK SMIP provides 
opportunities to accurately record, present and expose potential forthcoming 
injustices, with potential policy implications. Thus, in our conclusions and 
policy recommendations section we present a series of take- home recommenda-
tions for policymakers and advocates. We note from the outset that the material 
presented here builds directly on Sovacool et al. (2017).
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Smart meters in the United Kingdom: an introduction
To begin, it is necessary to provide background context. This section of our 
chapter presents the technologies being deployed in the SMIP before describing 
the anticipated benefits of the scheme and the rollout timeline.
 Smart meters have been implemented in several European countries, with 
Italy and Sweden being the first to complete their rollout processes. Other coun-
tries have prepared or started their rollout over the last 5–10 years. The UK is 
among the European Union (EU) countries anticipating a positive business 
case, with the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
presenting that case that as of 2016, ‘the net present value (NPV) for the 
domestic rollout of smart meter in GB is now estimated to be £3.8bn’ (BEIS, 
2016, p. 13).
 The goal of the SMIP is to develop and implement technologies that can 
collect, distribute, and analyse electricity and gas use and production data in 
order to assist current energy demand and supply management (Pullinger et al., 
2014). In this regard, a ‘smart meter’ in the UK setting has been defined by the 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem, 2011) as, ‘a gas and electricity 
meter that is capable of two- way communication’. It measures energy consump-
tion in the same way as a traditional meter but has a communication capability 
that allows data to be read remotely and displayed on a device within the home 
















































Figure 6.1  Key components of the smart meter communication service and service 
providers.
Source: the authors.
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remotely, e.g. to update tariff information or switch from credit to prepayment 
mode. This is, in short, an elaborate way of describing automated meter reading or 
remote meter diagnostics. One component of the system – the ‘in- home display’ or 
IHD – is a monitor that, through a connection to the smart meter, delivers con-
sumers with information about their energy consumption and costs. The UK is 
peculiar in that it pushes both separate gas and electricity meters and promotes the 
use of IHDs, which is not the norm. Beyond the provision of these core units, the 
SMIP also involves the changeover of wireless networks, data and communica-
tions companies (DCCs), service users, and electricity and gas suppliers – a config-
uration of social and technical interactions shown in Figure 6.1.
 The government aims to install smart meters – or smart meter ecosystem – in 
every home in Scotland, Wales and England/(Smart Energy GB) by December 
2020 (BEIS, 2016). Whether this is compulsory has remained confusing. Some 
energy companies have stated that consumers would only be ‘offered’ smart 
meter units, whereas others have, as of July 2017, implied that the rollout would 
be mandatory (Meadows and Brodbeck, 2017).
Proposed benefits
An advanced metering energy infrastructure enabled by smart meters is said to 
create the building blocks for a smart grid, including smarter energy manage-
ment services. This is one of several expected benefits that have been linked to 
the UK rollout, many of which are sustainability oriented. As a summary, this 
includes the fact that:
•	 Energy	suppliers	are	expected	to	reduce	their	operational	overheads	associ-
ated with high level of consumer service enquires and manual meter reading 
and as a result increase customer loyalty. Moreover, they are able to intro-
duce wider range of tariffs and services.
•	 Network	operators	are	said	to	benefit	through	improving	the	efficiency	and	
responsiveness of the network and enable a greater penetration of renew-
able technologies into the network.
•	 Consumers	are	argued	to	benefit	through	empowerment	to	more	appropri-
ately control their energy flows, reducing their bills as they become more 
aware of their energy consumption. Smart meters are also said to allow 
easier transferring between energy suppliers and increased billing accuracy 
(see the summary of benefits in, for instance, McKenna et al., 2012).
Indeed, these are a few of 67 short- and longer- term benefits identified by Sova-
cool et al. (2017) (and summarised in Table 6.1).
 According to the BEIS (previously the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (or DECC)) the total costs of the SMIP were estimated to be approxi-
mately £8 to £11 billion, whereas the financial benefits could be as high as £17.1 
billion when factoring in improvements in air quality and the savings antici-
pated for both consumers and suppliers.
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Table 6.1 Sixty-seven anticipated short- and long-term benefits to smart meters in the UK
No. Short-term benefits 
 1 Offer an alternative to pre-payment meters or bring down costs of pre-payment meters
 2 Help consumers to budget
 3 Increase energy efficiency awareness
 4 Feedback on energy use
 5 Carbon savings
 6 Provide real-time information on energy costs
 7 Provide information to make informed choices/greater understanding
 8 Remote reading, avoid home calls
 9 Energy bills accurate
10 Saving energy/reduce consumption
11 Manage their energy use, avoid waste
12 Customers install microgeneration
13 Remote switching credit and prepayment
14 Smoother switching between suppliers
15 Wide range of tariffs and incentive packages from suppliers
16 Suppliers to reduce costs
17 Customers save money/reduce costs
18 Better services from energy companies
19 Energy network planning
20 Drive uptake of renewable electricity
21 Reduce demand for heat
22 Billions in net benefits to the economy
23 Future innovation
24 Jobs
25 Drive a more vibrant and competitive market
26 Offset price rises
27 Access a full range of energy management tools
28 Changing the way we think about energy
29 Help vulnerable customers
30 Pre-payment replaces by smart meter
31 Promote community energy
32 Consumers more active in the energy system
33 Suppliers offer more cost effective tariffs
34 Record how much consumed 1/2 h period
35 Promote distributed generation or distributed energy resources
36 One day switching
Long-term benefits
37 Demand-side management
38 Reduce peak loads via time of day tariffs
39 Network reinforcement and peak generation avoided
40 Advanced management techniques/automated demand-side response
41 Reduced energy consumption
42 Consumers more flexible and responsive to market signals
43 Smart grid
44 Electric vehicle promotion
45 Automated responses to changes in network
46 Enhanced monitoring flow across the network
continued
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Rollout programme
The rollout of the UK’s SMIP policy, technical and regulatory apparatus began 
in 2010 and is composed of several phases: (1) the policy design stage, (2) the 
foundation stage and (3) the main installation stage. Within the policy design 
stage (July 2010–March 2011) the technical specifications and implementations 
model were negotiated. It was decided that energy suppliers should take respons-
ibility for the rollout and installation of smart meters. The Smart Meter Central 
Delivery Body (SMCDB) was established with the aim to increase awareness 
about smart meters, alongside the currently operative Smart Energy GB market-
ing campaign (‘the national campaign for the smart meter rollout’).
 In addition to setting up the implementation programme, a large- scale trial 
project, Energy Demand Research Project (ERDF ) was conducted from 2007 
onwards and trials ended in autumn 2010. As argued by Darby (2011, p. 6), 
‘they took place at a time when policy of smart metering was already develop-
ing, so the full findings and lessons have not been available to inform policy 
development during this period’.
 Skipping forward in the timeline, the household installation phase during 
which most will have their smart meter installed, started at the end of 2016. 
This start date was pushed back twice from 2014 until November 2016 because 
of several technical difficulties. This included the technical difficulties of 
No. Long-term benefits 
47 Deal with intermittence
48 New products and services/innovation
49 Vibrant, competitive market in energy supply and energy management
50 Improved network efficiencies
51 Update microgeneration
52 Turning off non-essential electrical appliances
53 Energy network management
54 Smart Energy Services supported
55 Smart energy market
56 Network operators understand loads on infrastructure
57 Network operators plan investments
58 Network operators respond faster to supply loss
59 Avoid the need to invest in additional network/and generation capacity
60 Generate capacity to meet peak demand
61 Support smart apps and automated appliances
62 Enhance resilience
63 New opportunities for storage
64 Consumers take advantage of lower price periods
65 Peak shaving
66 Develop a domestic smart appliance industry
67 Large industrial consumers and small-scale generators capacity market
Source: Sovacool et al. (2017), with permission.
Table 6.1  Continued
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enabling broader interoperability so that consumers can switch more easily 
between suppliers. Currently, energy supplier still install the SMETS 1 (Smart 
Metering Equipment Technical Specification) smart meter version that go 
‘dumb’ once the householder switches suppliers and the roll out of SMETS 2 
devices that enable switching has been repeatedly delayed.
 Despite positive potential (Table 6.2), however, capturing these benefits has 
been elusive, and the implementation of the SMIP has been replete with obs-
tacles. The programme is substantially delayed. Up until September 2017, 8.6 
million smart meters have been installed (BEIS, 2017b), corresponding to 15.38 
per cent of the target number of 56 million. Now, to make sure that the SMIP 
meets targets for the remainder of the programme, suppliers must complete 
installations at a rate of about 40,000 per day. The Institute of Directors stated 
in 2017 that 
The programme has already failed to deliver interoperable meters for 
switching, is behind schedule, is over- budget and wedded to out of date 
technology. Not only that, the legal obligation on suppliers to install 
potentially incompatible meters by the deadline of December 2020 or else 
pay large fines is already pushing up inflationary costs in wages and 
advertising. 
(IoD, 2017)
Alongside the above issues, concerns have also arisen around potential customer 
resistance to smart meters (see National Audit Office, 2014).







Consumer benefits (from energy saving and 
microgeneration)
4,295 1,437 5,732
Supplier benefits (including avoided site visits, 
reduced inquiries etc.)
7,970 295 8,265
Network benefits (reduced losses, reduced outage 
notification calls, fault fixing, avoided investment 
from ToU (distribution/transmission) etc.)
877 112 947
Generation benefits (avoided investment in 
generation from peak shifting through ToU)
803 49 852
UK-wide benefits (including CO2 reduction, 
air quality)
867 440 1,307
Total 14,812 2,333 17,103
Source: Sovacool et al. (2017), with permission.
Note
ToU = Time of Use. UK = United Kingdom. CO2 = Carbon dioxide.
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Conceptualising smart meters through an energy justice lens
In the following sections we present the results of our restructured analysis 
according to each tenet of the energy justice framework, distributional justice, 
justice as recognition and procedural justice (see also Chapter 3). We do so in 
order to demonstrate the social challenges associated with the rollout process, 
as well as to position a series of policy recommendations that may smooth its 
execution. We do not provide an in- depth overview of each of these terms as 
to do so would duplicate material elsewhere in this book. As an abbreviated 
summary, however, the notion is as follows: distributional justice refers to the 
unequal distribution of benefits and ills resulting in this case, as a result of an 
energy project (Jenkins et al., 2017); procedural justice considers access to 
decision- making processes that govern the distributions outlined previously 
and manifests as a call for equitable procedures that engage all stakeholders in 
a non- discriminatory way; whereas justice as recognition expresses concern for 
the fair engagement of all individuals in conditions where they are free from 
physical threat and are offered complete and equal political right (Jenkins 
et al., 2016).
Distributional justice
Our analysis revealed numerous technical and non- technical distributional 
challenges resulting from the SMIP. The most frequently discussed relate to the 
technology and unequal access to it. In the work published by Sovacool et al. 
(2017), across a systematic review of 47 articles, 60 per cent discussed variations 
of ‘technological’, ‘technical’ or ‘engineering’ impediments.
 As one illustration, the early meters distributed in 2014 would not function 
properly in one- third of UK homes, including in particular, high- rise flats, base-
ments and remote areas. This leads to unequal access and the marginalisation of 
particular locations and social groups. Part of the cause of this difficulty was the 
chose to pursue a less- customary Wi- Fi or Bluetooth mechanism called Zigbee. 
Within high- rise blocks, where meters tended to be located in basements, the 
signals failed to make it through thick walls. The result was the need to test 
more expensive hardwired cables as well as area network radio systems. Lewis 
and Kerr (2014) draw the conclusion that the SMIP forsake plans to implement 
the rollout to inaccessible flats and tower blocks, removing approximately 7 
million homes from participation.
 Technical disbenefits also appeared for people that did have access. Gosden 
(2015) reports that as of early 2015, one- tenth of the 1.3 million smart meters 
installed in the UK did not function as ‘smart’ meters, but as traditional ones 
requiring manual readings. Moreover, OVO Energy, who supply both gas and 
electricity, reported that 6 per cent of their customers were unable to view or 
pay their bills on their installed meters. EDF also reported technical issues with 
0.5 per cent of their installations (Palmer 2015a). More recently, Utility Week’s 
(2017, p. 4) market research implies that over one- tenth of households will 
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require multiple visits to complete smart meter instillations – a figure that could 
add around £1 billion to the total cost of the SMIP programme. In this scenario, 
limitations with the technology led to the unequal distribution of systems 
burdens.
 Building from the above theme, numerous media outlets reported that large 
numbers of households were ‘trapped’ with malfunctioning smart meters, as well 
as reporting large swings in usage rates displayed on the IHDs, and many con-
sumer complaints (Shannon 2015). These issues were compounded by apparent 
meter incompatibility where, if a household wanted to change energy suppliers, 
they had to wait (occasionally over a year) for a new meter. In some instances, 
smart meters were converted back to ‘dumb’ types that depended on manual 
estimates or readings (Meadows and Brodbeck, 2017; Palmer, 2015b). Other 
consumers complained that their units no long worked even if they were only 
switching between tariffs even with the same energy company (Brignal, 2016). 
Concerns have also arisen around the ability of hackers and cyber- terrorists to 
interfere with systems, where there is some fear that individuals may be able to 
break in, disrupt grid reliability or intercept bills and personal data, thereby 
enabling theft or fraud.
 Beyond device siting and accessibility, distributional injustices also related to 
the uneven impacts of the cost of the SMIP programme and its components. 
Lewis and Kerr (2014) outline that the IHD requirement will cost approxi-
mately £800 million in total, but that there are fears that users fail to engage 
with the units long term. They also state that the IHD requirement could be 
removed and replaced by a phone, tablet or personal computer app that could 
connect to the network with no additional need for hardware installation or 
cost (although we must acknowledge that these cheaper alternatives may also 
present distributional challenges as not everyone has ready access to smart 
phones, tablets or an internet connection (with an impact on the vulnerable 
groups we later go on to discuss)). Here then, the burdens and benefits of the 
rollout are distributed unevenly. What is more, even in 2012 there were several 
devices capable of identifying and displaying consumption data for electric 
appliances in a similar way and at a much cheaper cost (Thomas, 2012). This 
includes the OWL meter, an approximately £40 plug- in device that displays 
energy use over time, giving consumers ‘a clear, accurate picture’ of their usage 
(Thomas, 2012, p. 1061). In this regard, there appeared to be cheaper altern-
atives that would not present such a high burden to customers through their 
energy tariffs.
 Through their cost–benefit analysis, the National Audit Office (2011) out-
lined that despite anticipated savings for energy suppliers, the empowerment 
benefits for consumers were more uncertain, especially as costs will be passed 
directly to them through higher tariffs and bills. Furthermore, the overall gain 
for households appears dependant on the extent to which energy suppliers pass 
savings onto consumers – something that is not guaranteed. The Public 
Accounts Committee (2012) of the House of Commons noted similar concerns, 
outlining that (1) most benefits will be distributed to the suppliers and not the 
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consumers (who have to pay for the cost of the smart meter), (2) that the bene-
fits of smart meters will only be realised if uptake is widespread and they are used 
appropriately, both of which are again, not guaranteed and (3) that still, bene-
fits were unlikely to reach vulnerable customers and/or those on prepayment 
meters. This is an even greater risk when you consider that the £430 cost for a 
gas and electricity meter will be related to consumers directly. The fact that 
most benefits appear to go to producers while the consumers pay the costs for 
the rollout may be considered one of the biggest distributional inequities. In 
critical accounts, some academics (e.g. Strengers, 2013 and Balta- Okzan et al., 
2014) question the promises associated with smart meters, smart grids, smart 
homes and demand- side benefits, for instance, arguing that they are promoted 
by powerful interests. Verbong et al. (2013, p. 121) suggest that: ‘Although 
smart grids are claimed to be in the interest of the end- user, there is some ambi-
guity about that. (…) Despite all promises, it is not so clear which interests are 
primarily served by smart grid developments.’
Procedural justice
Alongside more technical barriers preventing equal access were a series of pro-
cedural justice concerns relating to how particular social groups were or were 
not engaged in decision- making processes about the SMIP rollout (recognising 
that not everyone can be), and whether the way they would use the system had 
been considered.
 Pullinger et al. (2014, p. 1158) give the opinion that the SMETS standards 
(the technical standards behind the SMIP) have been developed in a top- down, 
industry- led way ‘with little input from, or attention to the householder’. This 
lack of consumer engagement implies disconnect between the technical opera-
tionalisation of the SMIP and the narrative of consumer benefit being at the 
heart of it. This may be one reason for what appears to be growing resistance to 
the programme (typified by disengagement with the smart meter, or never 
becoming a smart meter user, for example). Chilvers and Longhurst (2016, 
p. 596) note, in this regard, that during one of the SMIP trials (the Visible 
Energy Trial) individuals ‘resisted’ the smart meter by intentionally failing to 
use it appropriately. This delayed the collection of data and results and ulti-
mately, convinced others not to engage in the trial. They go on to suggest at 
least two potential reasons for this resistance: (1) that the IHD was perceived as 
giving only incremental, inconsequential reconfigurations of consumption and 
behaviour change that did not meaningfully save energy and (2) users felt that 
their meters placed unfair burden on them to take responsibility for carbon 
reductions over industry and government groups, for example. Here, there are 
clear breaches in what is deemed to be necessary procedural justice.
 Compounding concerns over manifestations of consumer resistance, Balta- 
Ozkan et al.’s (2014) comparison of smart meter perceptions in Europe illus-
trated resistance frames in terms of accountability and responsibility. Their 
UK- wide focus groups revealed the expectation that the government was 
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responsible for addressing climate change, not individuals. IHD and smart meter 
users also opposed because of control and privacy concerns – the belief that they 
represented an extension of power companies, which were taking over their 
private lives and homes. Indeed, this manifested as recurring concern for the 
potential of smart meters to ‘compromise security’ and ‘invade privacy’ (Balta- 
Ozkan et al., 2014, p. 1185).
 Yet more consumers expressed frustration caused by the technical problems 
by intentionally overriding the system or practicing inefficient behaviour. One 
implication is that users may opt out of the SMIP. A second is that those 
coerced into participating could disconnect their IHD, sabotage their meter or 
could be unwilling or reluctant to share their data with apparently ‘devious’ 
companies. In short, all reasons culminate in mounting resistance where Rose 
and Thed (2014) report reservations from one supplier that ‘up to 20 per cent of 
customers will refuse to have smart meters installed’ and two firms have docu-
mented additional costs from dealing with ‘reluctant customers’. A recent Smart 
Energy GB report outlines that 16 per cent of the UK adult population are 
‘indifferent’ to smart meters, with a further 18 per cent in the category of 
‘rejector’ (Smart Energy GB, 2017). Furthermore, smart meters can even increase 
consumption – an early (2004) EDF trial showed that gas consumption rose by 
‘almost 50%’ as users became aware of significant under- heating (Mott 
MacDonald, 2007).
 Furthermore, although an August 2017 ‘Customer Experience study’ from 
BEIS involving 2,015 households found mostly positive reactions to smart 
meters, it did note that 7 per cent of customers reported being very dissatisfied 
or somewhat dissatisfied with their smart meter; that 73 per cent of customers 
were not given any information on data storage and privacy, or how data would 
be shared; and that 18 per cent of customers indicated they did not even look at 
the information given on their IHDs (BEIS, 2017a).
 In the event observations reported on by Sovacool et al. (2017), which took 
place between 2015 and 2016, there was also very little focus on what con-
sumers wanted. The only exception was a national grid representative who ques-
tioned ‘can they manage to deliver what customers and consumers want at the 
end of the day?’ (October 2015). This neglect reinforced the idea that the SMIP 
is about increasing the provision of information in order to change behaviour 
(one- way influence), as opposed to creating an energy system that encourages 
user participation and more ‘active’ consumerism where participants influence 
the future of the energy system. This could explain the lack of interest or 
appearance of resistance.
 Where terms such as ‘protection’, ‘engagement’, ‘consumer benefit’, ‘enabling’ 
and ‘empowerment’ appeared in the events observed by Sovacool et al. (2017) 
there was no real reference to what occurs after consumers were enabled or 
empowered. Very few considered acceptance, trust and experience. Indeed, in 
the last event the team observed in November 2016, (the lack of ) ‘consumer 
acceptance’ was outlined as one of the three key challenges remaining for the 
rollout. Smart Energy GB were quoted as saying: 
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There is no mandate on the part of the consumer although there is mandate 
on the part of the energy supplier. And that is a real challenge I think for a 
consumer engagement campaign; how do we make sure every consumer is 
empowered to say ‘yes’. 
 It is a somewhat bleak representation to suggest that resistance always or fre-
quently occurs, of course. A 2017 commercial survey of more than 1,000 UK 
consumers advised that 64 per cent with installed meters ‘enjoyed better visibil-
ity of their energy costs’; 36 per cent reported achieving savings and 76 per cent 
were impressed by the expertise of the people completing their installation 
(Utility Week, 2017, pp. 2–3). Nevertheless, improved procedures may be neces-
sary for engaging consumers in both smart meter implementation and use.
Justice as recognition
It is reasonable to acknowledge that particular groups will encounter problems 
with any new innovation that required technological or behavioural change, 
but without careful implementation, the SMIP programme raises the potential 
exacerbation of pre- existing vulnerabilities among some consumer classes – an 
issue of justice as recognition or the unequal burdens (or benefits) presented to 
particular groups. Notably, early evidence shows that the SMIP may unduly 
burden the elderly, ill, less educated, those living in social housing and/or those 
in the rural periphery at the expense of a preference for supplier and company- 
oriented cost savings and economic competition. If the SMIP can lessen the 
expenditure needed for meter readings, network operation, grid reinforcement 
and electricity generation, among other areas, then consumers should benefit 
from lower energy practice whether or not they make behavioural changed. In 
reality, however, many forms of social inequity and injustice emerge.
 A synthesis report compiled by DECC (2015a, 2015b) presented the results 
of a 4,016 consumer survey, 169 in- depth household interviews with users on 
both credit and prepayment meters, 12 focus groups, and consumption data for 
over 10,000 households and revealed, ultimately, that consumers from so- called 
‘vulnerable groups’ ‘are likely to need more help if they are to obtain the full 
benefits of smart metering’ (DECC, 2015a, p. 22). The report outlined in 
particular that 
Older smart meter customers, those from lower social grades, those with the 
lowest total annual household incomes (below £16,000), those with no 
formal qualification and those who lived with someone who had a long- 
term health condition or disability were less likely to say the IHD was easy 
to use or to say they knew how to operate its different functions. 
(DECC, 2015a, pp. 22–23)
 Barnicoat and Danson (2015) ran an experimental project for elderly tenants 
in rural Scotland where they used sensors and IHDs to measure and display 
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household energy costs over a period of seven months. The aim was to investi-
gate how households interacted with IHDs, or what they term ‘smart energy 
monitors’. The elderly were soon a particularly relevant sample group given that 
they were often in their homes for large amounts of time, are high users of 
domestic energy, may receive fixed incomes that necessitate fuel rationing, 
require higher temperatures due to old age and may also suffer physical limita-
tions that affect their interactions with technological equipment. Barnicoat and 
Danson’s research revealed that despite greater price feedback, little ‘awareness’ 
occurred. Specifically, households did not understand the link between IHDs 
and electrical appliance use. Further, the study suggested that the primary 
benefit of the IHDs was not perceived as being for households, but for the 
energy supply company engineers as it gave them information about household 
use. This was at odds with expectations. Citizens Advice (2017) rehearsed 
similar concerns in a report critiquing the SMIP for its potentially negative 
impacts on low- income and elderly households, including in particular, those 
without a formal education, who did not speak English fluently, or who suffered 
from a long- term illness. According to their report, some consumers were dis-
tressed, confused about, or unable to use smart meter information.
 On the grounds of the events the authors observed, Sovacool et al. (2017) 
discuss a mix of responsibilities necessary to make sure vulnerable groups are 
accounted for and benefit from, smart meters. Smart Energy GB discussed 
‘shared responsibility with suppliers around behaviour change’ (Smart Energy 
GB, 2016) but did not go on to outline how this responsibility was shared. The 
idea of ‘partnering up’ between different organisations to support vulnerable 
users was also discussed with the aim of ‘mobilising’ energy champions, volun-
teers, and a community fund in order to support people so they could ‘make use 
of the benefits’. Again, however, Sovacool et al. reported that there was little 
discussion of who would guide these activities or what role they would play in 
the SMIP rollout. This may be the cause of DECC’s (2015b) move to ask Smart 
Energy GB to advance stronger advisory and supporting materials, including 
increasing its role as a facilitator of knowledge exchange and enabling local- 
level networks and partnerships.
 Alongside elderly populations, which are the most frequently discussed in 
connection to the SMIP, there are several less frequently documented increased 
vulnerabilities. Echoing Sovacool et al. (2017), we briefly discuss two: 
(1) increased rural peripheralisation and (2) externalities and lifecycle impacts. 
The SMIP may worsen the urban/rural divide, or unwittingly increase the pref-
erence for smart meter instillation in urban areas but not rural, countryside 
homes. For example, access to the dedicated network connection services 
required for a functioning smart meter system varies widely across the UK, with 
notably lower accessibility outside of urban centres (Ofcom, 2016). The housing 
stock is also more challenging to access, meaning that installation often requires 
more travel mileage and person hours. This leads to an inequitable, albeit 
understandable, focus on ‘easy to manage’ areas with well- established delivery 
and logistic networks and larger installation volumes.
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Conclusions and policy recommendations
As an outcome of our energy justice evaluation, the main contribution of this 
chapter is to inform current policies and practices concerning the SMIP and 
national energy policy attempts to decarbonise electricity and heat in the UK. 
Most especially, we highlight insufficient consumer engagement with both the 
rollout and the physical infrastructure of smart meters and IHDs and failure to 
fully engage with potential burdens and benefits for vulnerable households. We 
position this finding in the light of critiques coming from a diverse set of actors 
such as academics, consumer bodies, parliamentary committees and newspaper 
articles.
 We suggest that it is necessary to better account for, and manage, potential 
vulnerabilities as well as produce a broader range of outreach and communica-
tion materials that are easier to understand, especially among the elderly or the 
poor (Citizens Advice, 2017). While we acknowledge that Smart Energy GB 
have created a marketing partnership programme to reach out to vulnerable 
customers and increasingly emphasise community engagement (Smart Energy 
GB, 2018), this process must focus not only on outreach and communication, 
but also on the depth of engagement and alternative models for it, such as 
community- led rollout promotions. We encourage the creation of meaningful 
feedback mechanisms to engage consumers, which requires, in part (more) time 
to trial different mechanisms in diverse settings. Doing so can help overcome 
social barriers, perhaps increasing smart meter implementation and ultimately, 
long- term affectivity. Otherwise, the route to a smarter energy system will be 
littered with social obstacles.
 Finally, for several expected benefits to be realised, consumers need to play 
an active part with regards to how and when they consume (and sometimes 
produce) energy (Buchanan et al., 2016). Particularly in the UK, ambitious 
consumer- oriented aims have been set out in the SMIP (Pullinger et al., 2014). 
Smart meters are argued to ‘putting consumers in control, ending estimated bills 
and helping people save energy and money’ (BEIS, 2017b, p. 1). In addition to 
rolling out smart meters, the UK government has decided to provide every 
home with ‘real- time’ feedback with their energy use through an IHD in order 
to facilitate the expected benefits. The inclusion of IHD has been highly 
debated. Energy suppliers have argued that cheaper digital options would be 
more applicable, as they would reduce the cost of the overall rollout whereas 
academics have argued over the effectiveness of feedback devices to help people 
manage their energy consumption (such as Darby, 2006). In 2010, Darby (2010, 
p. 449) argued that ‘it is risky for utilities and their regulators to adapt a ‘fit and 
forget’ attitude to any new technology in the belief that it will, unsupported, 
achieve their goals and be acceptable to consumers’.
 While we have used the UK as a case study, our material contributes to 
debates beyond this one case study. Some R51 billion will be spent on smart 
meter initiatives in the near future across the EU (Darby, 2010). In 2013, 
only about 10 per cent of households in the EU had a smart meter, but the 
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European Commission has mandated that this number rise dramatically to 80 
per cent by 2020 (Viitanen et al., 2015). The European Commission (2017) 
reports that Member States have committed to rolling out close to 200 
million smart meters for electricity and 45 million for gas by 2020 at a total 
potential investment of R45 billion. This study elucidates some of the techni-
cal and social elements befuddling attempts to rapidly diffuse smart meters 
across homes and cities – findings that have relevance for those wishing to 
better understand the temporality and complexity of both national and house-
hold energy transitions.
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7 Overcoming the systemic 
challenges of retrofitting residential 
buildings in the United Kingdom
A Herculean task?
Donal Brown, Paula Kivimaa,  
Jan Rosenow and Mari Martiskainen
Introduction
In Greek mythology, the Hydra was a giant serpent with many heads. The 
second of the 12 labours of Hercules was to kill the Hydra. However, when one 
of the Hydra’s heads was cut off, two more grew in its place. In many ways, over-
coming the ‘multi- headed-challenges’ of achieving widespread energy efficiency 
(EE) retrofit is an equally Herculean task. Policy initiatives in the UK, such as 
the Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) and the Green Deal, have sought and 
failed to achieve the mass uptake of residential retrofit. This chapter will argue 
that such policies have failed to address four systemic challenges that constrain 
uptake for whole house retrofits, and that a more comprehensive and wide- 
reaching policy approach will be needed to overcome each of these challenges. 
The chapter is therefore focused on some of the solutions to these challenges 
from the perspective of three key elements of a retrofit: the business model, 
financing and intermediaries. It also discusses the ways in which policy could 
support these outcomes.
 Retrofit of buildings involves the ‘construction approach involving the 
action of introducing [retrofitting] new materials, products and equipment 
into an existing building with the aim of reducing the use of energy of the 
building’ (Baeli, 2013, p. 17). This is different from renovating or refurbishing 
– which refers to work undertaken to repair homes or make them more 
aesthetically pleasing (Baeli, 2013). Retrofits of residential buildings have 
significant potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (CCC, 2016), fuel 
poverty (Sovacool, 2015), and improve occupant health and wellbeing 
(Willand et al., 2015). However, in the UK, much of this potential is yet to 
be realised. Residential buildings account for almost a quarter of the UK’s 
carbon emissions (CCC, 2016), and for every £1 spent on retrofitting fuel 
poor homes an estimated £0.42 is saved in National Health Service spending 
(UKGBC, 2017). The Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015b) estim-
ates that there is cost- effective1 potential to reduce direct emissions2 from all 
buildings by a third by 2030, with the need to achieve near- zero emissions 
from the sector by 2050 (CCC, 2016). It is estimated that this level of retrofit 
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activity would create a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) effect of approxi-
mately £25.3 billion in gross value added (Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). The 
UK government has therefore announced a target for all UK homes to 
achieve an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating of C or above by 
2035 (HM Government, 2017).
 To achieve these targets, an increasingly comprehensive whole house approach 
to residential retrofit will be needed (Hansford, 2015). Such an approach involves 
multiple measures with strategies for insulation, draught proofing, ventilation, 
heating systems and low- carbon microgeneration (ibid.). However, the traditional 
policy approach to residential retrofit has tended to incentivise single measures 
and piecemeal interventions, which may cause damaging unintended con-
sequences;3 such as mould growth, poor air quality and in some cases structural 
damage (Davies and Oreszczyn, 2012). Thus, a comprehensive whole house retro-
fit; where the entire building is treated as a system rather than as individual ele-
ments or measures, can mitigate such issues and achieve greater reductions in 
emissions (Hansford, 2015). Much literature in this area has focused on the key 
‘barriers’ to uptake (Fylan et al., 2016; Sorrell et al., 2004; Kangas et al., 2018). 
However, this focus on barriers has tended to characterise retrofit decision- making 
in terms of rational choices while ignoring broader social and contextual factors 
(Walker et al., 2014). This framing also carries the assumption that there is a 
latent demand for retrofit (Wilson et al., 2015).
 The UK is an interesting case study – although achieving major progress in 
power sector decarbonisation, it still has one of the least efficient housing stocks in 
Europe. This is despite recent policy initiatives for residential EE. This chapter 
starts with a brief overview of recent UK policy on residential retrofit. It then 
moves onto characterising four challenges that constrain demand for retrofits, then 
proposes solutions centred around three key elements of successful whole house 
retrofits: business models (Brown, 2018); financing (Borgeson et al., 2013) and 
intermediaries (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018). Drawing on recent empirical 
work at the CIED, we then argue that achieving these ambitions will require a 
comprehensive mix of policies (Kern et al., 2017; Kivimaa et al., 2018).
UK policy on residential retrofit
Improved EE has played a pivotal role in reducing the UK’s energy use and 
carbon emissions. On a temperature corrected basis, total UK household energy 
use decreased by 19 per cent between 2002 and 2016, despite a 12 per cent 
increase in the number of households and a 10 per cent increase in population 
(BEIS, 2016). Per- household energy consumption fell by 37 per cent between 
1970 and 2015, with most of this decrease (29 per cent) occurring since 2004 
(ibid.). EE improvements in individual households have offset the 46 per cent 
increase in the number of households, the 5.6°C increase in average internal 
temperatures and the rapid growth in appliance ownership over this period, with 
the result that total household energy consumption has increased by only 7 per 
cent in 45 years.
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 Although rising energy prices and the 2008 recession contributed to recent 
trends, the bulk of the reduction in per- household energy consumption can 
be attributed to public policies to improve EE (CCC, 2017; CEBR, 2011; 
DECC, 2015; Odyssee, 2017). Of particular importance have been the major 
home insulation programmes funded by successive ‘supplier obligations’ (SOs) 
such as the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT – 2008 to 2012) 
(Rosenow, 2012) and ECO – 2013 onwards. Since 1994, energy and carbon- 
saving targets imposed on electricity and gas suppliers have allowed them to 
recover the costs through a levy on household energy bills. Also important 
were the requirement for condensing boilers within the UK Building Regula-
tions and the progressive tightening of EU standards on the EE of electrical 
appliances (CEBR, 2011). Evaluations of these policies have shown them to 
be highly cost- effective, both in terms of the cost savings to participating 
households and in terms of broader societal welfare (Lees, 2006, 2008; 
Rosenow and Galvin, 2013). This experience supports the argument that 
market forces alone cannot deliver all cost- effective investments in residen-
tial buildings, owing to multiple and overlapping market failures. Instead, 
policy intervention can be used to increase the uptake of residential retrofit 
through a mix of regulation, public engagement and incentives.
 Despite dozens of instruments in the broader EE policy mix targeting resi-
dential buildings (Kern et al., 2017) and the apparent success in reducing 
energy demand through policy, in more recent years there has been a marked 
shift in the policy landscape. Previously, SOs supported relatively low- cost EE 
measures, and dedicated grant programmes funded through general taxation 
provided support for low- income households to invest in EE measures. The 
last version of such grant programmes – Warm Front, was terminated in 2011 
and the government decided to radically change the way EE was delivered in 
the UK. Through the introduction of the Green Deal in 2013, an on- bill-
repayment loan scheme, the government intended to trigger substantial 
investment in EE retrofits while the SO would fund only the costlier EE meas-
ures. It is now widely recognised that this approach failed – the Green Deal 
was effectively terminated in 2015 and funding provided through SOs has 
been significantly reduced (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). As a result, the uptake 
rate of EE improvements has stalled since 2012.
 There are, however, signs of a change to the approach taken. The Clean 
Growth Strategy, launched by the UK government on 12 October 2017, sets 
out ambitious long- term targets for EE – especially for buildings and would 
require a significant increase of the current EE improvement delivery rate. The 
targets specify that all homes as far as possible should reach EPC band C by 
2035 and all fuel poor homes by 2030. This requires both adjusting the ambition 
levels of existing policies and the implementation of new instruments. At the 
time of writing, government is consulting on several new policy measures, and 
has recently introduced minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES) for the 
private rented sector.
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Key challenges for residential retrofit
The limited uptake of cost- effective EE measures, characterised as the ‘energy 
efficiency gap’ (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994), remains the focus of much academic 
and policy research. This is especially the case with residential buildings, where 
the benefits of retrofitting go beyond emissions reductions, including improve-
ments to health and wellbeing, social welfare and economic development 
(UKGBC, 2017).
 Previous literature on retrofit has adopted key ‘barriers’ to uptake as the 
theoretical basis for understanding this gap (Fylan et al., 2016; Sorrell et al., 
2004). Yet the original focus of much of this barriers literature, such as Sorrell 
et al. (2004), was on firm level decision- making, rather than on households. As 
such, the focus on barriers has tended to characterise retrofit decision- making in 
terms of rational economic choices, while downplaying social and contextual 
factors (Walker et al., 2014). This framing also carries the inherent assumption 
of latent demand for retrofit once these barriers are removed (Wilson et al., 
2015). This framing has come to dominate the design of recent policy initiatives 
such as the Green Deal and ECO, which were predicated on households saving 
money on their energy bills (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).
 We argue that this framing is problematic, primarily because it misrepresents 
how and why home renovation decisions are made, and by whom. This chapter 
instead frames the problem in terms of four interrelated challenges that con-
tinue to contribute to low household uptake of residential retrofits.
Information, engagement and trust
A lack of knowledge of the specific options and benefits of retrofit remains wide-
spread among households in the UK (Marchand et al., 2015). While many of the 
technologies and tools exist to retrofit existing buildings, their uptake is not wide-
spread, largely due to a lack of household interest (Bonfield, 2016). Public engage-
ment and marketing schemes have tried to generate demand but tended to be 
top- down (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016), short term and focus on specific subsidy 
schemes (UKGBC, 2017). This has also created a supply chain largely reliant on 
short- term policy incentives (CCC, 2015a). Complicated government programmes 
such as the Green Deal have often been difficult for households to grasp (Marchand 
et al., 2015). Households who do decide to retrofit often have to interact with mul-
tiple tradesmen and installers, who influence decisions on technology choices and 
subsequent use (Maby and Owen, 2015). These challenges of gaining appropriate 
advice, concerns over post- retrofit performance, combined with poor- quality work-
manship, has undermined trust with the wider public (Pettifor et al., 2015).
Uncertain benefits and quality
Predicted energy and cost savings from retrofits are based on modelled energy 
performance. There is consistently a ‘performance gap’ between these models 
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and actual energy performance outcomes (Fylan et al., 2016). This is character-
istic of an industry with a reputation for low quality, with few contractual penal-
ties for under- performance (Bonfield, 2016). Equally, retrofit interventions may 
alter a building’s existing features, affecting a household’s routines and practices 
in ways that may make them reticent to change (Wilson et al., 2015). By only 
focusing on financial savings, policies have also failed to recognise that retrofits 
could be framed and promoted in terms of aesthetics, comfort and wellbeing 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Much evidence now suggests that those who under-
take energy retrofits do so because of these non- economic sources of value, such 
as environmental concerns, desire for improved comfort and living standards, 
property longevity and aesthetics (Fawcett and Killip, 2017; Kivimaa and Mar-
tiskainen, 2018).
Complexity, disruption and timing
Whole house retrofits involve multiple activities carried out by multiple con-
tractors and consultants. Management of this process is complex and time con-
suming for the household (Pettifor et al., 2015). Alongside the significant 
disruption of extensive works, this can be a major deterrent to uptake (Snape 
et al., 2015). Thus, households may prefer to retrofit gradually, when it is less 
disruptive to do so, despite the higher costs and longer duration (Fawcett, 
2014). Consequently, energy retrofit may only be considered during wider reno-
vations (Wilson et al., 2015). Identifying such ‘trigger points’ could therefore 
promote retrofit in certain circumstances, such as moving into a new home 
(Maby and Owen, 2015).
Capital cost and split incentives
While retrofits result in long- term energy savings, whole house retrofits typically 
require long periods before the capital cost can be recovered in energy savings 
(Gouldson et al., 2015). Thus, many households lack access to up- front capital, 
with the benefits of the investment not being realised when moving house or in 
a landlord- tenant situation – termed ‘split incentives’ (Sorrell et al., 2004). 
While the up- front cost barrier has largely been the focus of recent policy initi-
atives in the UK, the economics of long- term financing is extremely sensitive to 
interest rates (Gouldson et al., 2015), particularly if energy bill neutrality4 is 
required (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Further, while households may value 
funding for wider non- energy measures, such as general repairs, the majority of 
policies fund EE measures alone (Borgeson et al., 2013). These four related chal-
lenges are shown in Figure 7.1.
 Typically, policy interventions in this area have targeted one or at most two 
of these issues. However, to overcome these ‘multi- headed challenges’ and 
deliver on the promise of residential retrofit, a systemic approach across multiple 
sectors and involving multiple government departments will be necessary (see 
the Conclusions and Policy Recommendations section). This chapter draws on 
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three emerging research themes: business models, financing and intermediaries. 
Building on these insights we then propose policy solutions to overcome the 
challenges for the widespread diffusion of whole house residential retrofit.
Overcoming the challenges for residential retrofit
In the following section we explore how best practice approaches to retrofit – 
business models, financing and intermediaries – can overcome many of the chal-
lenges that constrain uptake identified in the previous section.
Retrofit business models
A business model is defined as the nature of the products or services delivered to 
customers, the activities involved in delivering these and the means of captur-
ing revenue from these activities (Boons et al., 2013). Many radical innovations 
only became widespread once a complementary business model enabled their 
diffusion (Teece, 2010). Examples such as the MP3 player, low- cost air travel 














Figure 7.1 Key systemic challenges for driving retrofit uptake.
Source: the authors.
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with an appropriate business model and in many cases financing package. 
Emerging ‘service- based’ business models provide the useful end service rather 
than the technology or commodities themselves, shifting incentives for resource 
efficiency onto suppliers (Bocken et al., 2014). Consequently, energy service 
business models are promoted as a means of reducing energy demand (Labanca 
et al., 2014). Innovations such as distributed energy5 and whole house retrofit 
may therefore require novel, complementary business models before they are 
viable on a large scale (Hall and Roelich, 2016). Drawing on recent research at 
the CIED (Brown, 2018), we argue that despite significant policy action in this 
area, a major reason for the lack of uptake of whole house retrofit is the limita-
tions of the traditional business model.
 The dominant business model for residential retrofit (Figure 7.2) is character-
ised by a piecemeal offering; with a fragmented supply chain, a focus on single 
(rather than multiple, complementary) measures, and no guarantees on perform-
ance. This is typically marketed on estimated energy cost and carbon savings and 
involves measures and technologies installed by separate contractors. Customers 
procure the individual measures, energy audits and finance separately, with the 
result that multiple interfaces are required for a comprehensive residential retrofit. 
The offer of energy savings is based on modelled impacts of measures, and no per-
formance guarantees are provided. Therefore, any finance package is based on 
estimated rather than guaranteed savings. Such an approach has typified the 
delivery of the EE through UK policies such as ECO and the Green Deal.
 This approach introduces significant complexity for customers in managing 
multiple interfaces with sub- contractors, energy auditors and finance providers, 
also tending to result in major disruption for a whole house retrofit. Equally, the 
narrow emphasis on estimated cost savings, without performance or ongoing 
Customer
Energy auditor 
Installer type 1 Installer type 2
Finance provider 





Figure 7.2 The incumbent ‘atomised market model’ for residential retrofit.
Source: Brown (2018), with permission (and without changes).
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maintenance guarantees, means uncertain benefits for the customer and provides 
limited trust on installation quality. Unsurprisingly, this approach has resulted in 
low demand for comprehensive residential retrofits.
 Recently, novel, integrated business models for residential retrofit have begun 
to emerge. These approaches emphasise a broader source of value for a whole 
house retrofit; focused upon aesthetics, increased property value, comfort, health 
and wellbeing alongside energy and carbon savings. Such approaches involve 
integrated and increasingly industrialised supply chains providing compre-
hensive whole house retrofits, through a single contractor or well- integrated 
network of sub- contractors. These approaches are characterised by a simplified 
customer interface with a single expert point of contact to coordinate the entire 
project. Some examples also offer integrated financing packages, and in some 
cases energy performance guarantees.
 The Energiesprong initiative originated in the Netherlands and has expanded 
into the UK (Energiesprong, 2017). Customers are offered a comprehensive 
residential retrofit, based upon net- zero energy consumption. Typically, an Ener-
giesprong retrofit involves the rapid delivery and installation of off- site manu-
factured, insulated wall facades, integrated with renewable heat systems and 
photovoltaic panels as well as ventilation and controls. The provider offers a 
30-year energy performance guarantee (based on set internal temperature) for 
annual net- zero energy consumption, with specified energy usage limits, along-
side an upstream financing package. An energy service contractor (ESCO) also 
takes on responsibility for the payment of the energy bill of the customer to 
provide ‘total energy management’. This represents a holistic energy services 
offering to the household, commonly termed a Managed Energy Services Agree-
ment (MESA) (Kim et al., 2012; Figure 7.3). This approach is currently being 
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Energy Supply Contract 
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Figure 7.3 The Energiesprong Managed Energy Services Agreement (MESA).
Source: Brown (2018), with permission (and without changes).
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 Integrated business models such as the MESA have significant potential to 
drive demand for residential retrofit. By emphasising broader sources of value and 
including additional renovation measures as part of the offering, suppliers can 
attract customers by appealing to the wider benefits of improved aesthetics, 
increased property value, comfort, health and wellbeing alongside energy and 
carbon savings. Creating a simplified customer journey through an integrated 
supply chain, project co- ordination and a financing offer reduces complexity 
and minimises disruption for households. Further, the offer of energy performance 
guarantees provides certainty surrounding the ongoing performance benefits of the 
retrofit and the quality of the installation. While this may be the optimal solution, 
it is worth noting that integrated business models also face barriers and their 
uptake has been slow in the residential sector (Kangas et al., 2018).
 Business model innovation involves novel approaches and relationships for 
the delivery of products and services (Chesbrough, 2010). However, incumbent 
business models may be heavily embedded with existing industry practices, 
technological artefacts and regulatory regimes (Hannon, 2012). Therefore, 
adopting integrated energy service business models remains a challenge for an 
industry dominated by small- scale small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs).
Retrofit finance
The up- front capital cost of retrofit measures and the split incentives faced by 
tenants and landlords remain a key challenge for the scaling up of compre-
hensive residential retrofits. Many UK households are also still in fuel poverty – 
defined as the necessity to spend more than 10 per cent of household income on 
energy bills (Sovacool, 2015).
 As noted above, the UK’s market- based SOs have funded significant loft and 
cavity wall insulation, low- energy lightbulbs and other low- cost measures 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2014). ECO, the latest evolution of the SO policies, was 
initially designed to fund more expensive retrofit measures, such as solid wall 
insulation. It has since been criticised for its focus on single measures (Brown, 
2018), dis- incentivising comprehensive installations, with no funding for com-
plementary work such as ventilation and damp prevention (Hansford, 2015). 
SO policies require a levy on all households’ energy bills, and thus increase the 
energy bills of households that do not benefit from programmes such as ECO 
(Rosenow et al., 2013). The ECO has now been redesigned to focus on the ‘fuel 
poor’. Although, having added approximately £50 a year to average household 
bills – a total of £1.3 billion annually (DECC, 2013), policies like ECO are 
arguably a poor tool for addressing fuel poverty (Rosenow et al., 2013).
 Meeting the UK’s retrofit targets will require an estimated £85.2 billion of 
net investment to 2035 (Rosenow et al., 2017). Achieving this level of invest-
ment through an SO like ECO could introduce politically unacceptable bill 
rises (Kern et al., 2017) and be particularly regressive for the fuel poor who do 
not adopt retrofit measures (Rosenow et al., 2013). Previous fuel poverty policies 
such as Warm Front did not raise wider energy bills as they were funded by 
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general taxation (Sovacool, 2015). A fuel poverty policy funded by general 
taxation is also more consistent with targeting the co- benefits of social welfare 
(Rosenow et al., 2013) and improved health and wellbeing (UKGBC, 2017).
 Alongside fuel poverty grants, there is a likely need for repayable retrofit 
financing for the ‘able- to-pay’ segment (Freehling and Stickles, 2016). The UK’s 
Green Deal policy involved a novel finance mechanism, intended to deliver 
approximately 2 million retrofit installations per year and leverage billions of 
pounds of private sector investment. The scheme was based on private sector 
lending to households, paid back through energy bills – known as on- bill-
repayment. However, the scheme achieved a fraction of its targets, and resulted 
in a significant loss to the UK taxpayer before its premature scrappage in 2015 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016).
 A range of other retrofit finance mechanisms have been developed in the 
UK, wider EU and USA, including several that have been markedly more suc-
cessful than the Green Deal (EEFIG, 2015). Examples include: property assessed 
clean energy finance (PACE) in the USA, repaid through property taxes (Kim 
et al., 2012); low- cost public loans (such as the German KfW scheme) (Schröder 
et al., 2011); utility funded on- bill-financing (State and Local Energy Efficiency 
Action Network, 2014); retrofit mortgages (EEFIG, 2015); state- backed guaran-
tee funds (Borgeson et al., 2013); and energy service agreements (ESA) – where 
finance for measures is procured upstream by an ESCO as part of an energy per-
formance contract (Kim et al., 2012).
 Examples of successful retrofit financing programmes, including Germany’s 
KfW programme and California’s PACE scheme, share some common features. 
These schemes typically include: a cost of capital that is low enough not to deter 
households and enable deeper retrofit measures to remain cost- effective 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2016); a simplified customer journey – with finance often 
arranged by the contractor or project manager (Brown, 2018), use of an existing 
repayment channel (such as property taxes), attaching the debt to the property 
not the householder (resolving the spilt incentive issue); and funding for broader 
sources of value, such as wider renovation work or essential home improvements, 
that are often more highly valued by households (Fawcett and Killip, 2017).
 By contrast the Green Deal involved a complex vetting and application 
process, that required a separate interface with a third- party provider, with no 
funding available for wider improvements. Introducing significant complexity 
that was likely to be offputting for most households. The Green Deal also had 
relatively high interest rates of 7–11 per cent (Marchand et al., 2015). Indeed, 
the total cost of capital amounted to at least 49 per cent of total Green Deal 
Plan costs over 15 years (UKGBC, 2014). Programmes such as the KfW scheme 
offer finance at extremely low or zero interest rates (>2 per cent) (Schröder 
et al., 2011). Such offers are likely to be more appealing to households (March-
and et al., 2015) and drastically improve the economics of whole house retrofits 
with longer payback periods (UKGBC, 2014).
 Several approaches exist to reduce the cost of capital for retrofit finance. 
Privately funded schemes such as PACE and retrofit mortgages are secured 
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against the property and can be securitised and sold to secondary markets – redu-
cing risk and transaction costs for investors (Borgeson et al., 2013). State actors 
may also assist in reducing the cost of capital, particularly where customers face 
difficulties or high costs in accessing finance. Policy options include interest sub-
sidies (Gouldson et al., 2015), state provision of subordinated (high risk) capital 
(State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network, 2014), investor guarantee 
funds (Borgeson et al., 2013) or the direct provision of low- cost loans, as has been 
the case in Germany’s KfW programme (Schröder et al., 2011).
 However, there are limits to what financing alone can achieve. In most cases 
financing is likely to be an enabler of retrofit projects rather than a driver of 
demand (Borgeson et al., 2014). Consequently, policymakers can introduce a 
range of incentives to promote demand for retrofit. These include fiscal or 
energy supplier incentives, such as variable property taxes (i.e. stamp duty or 
council tax), income tax rebates, VAT reductions or EE feed- in tariffs (Rosenow 
and Cowart, 2017; UKGBC, 2013). Some can be made fiscally neutral through 
penalising properties that do not meet a certain performance level (UKGBC, 
2013). Incentives are likely to be particularly effective when they are available 
at key junctures when broader renovation decisions are being made. Thus, 
approaches that target key trigger points such as when properties change hands, 
during extensive renovations or heating replacements, are likely to be most suc-
cessful (Maby and Owen, 2015).
Retrofit intermediaries
Intermediaries – that can be individuals, organisations or platforms – facilitate 
innovation processes (and broader transition processes) by educating, collecting 
and allocating financial and human resources, assessing new technologies and 
practices, creating partnerships, and influencing changes in regulations and rules 
(Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008). They may also shape how innovation occurs when 
it faces the user and negotiate on behalf of other actors (ibid.). Intermediaries 
may act as a single point of contact between households and retrofit contractors. 
In this section, we focus on how intermediaries can (1) stimulate, guide and 
manage different whole house retrofit projects, and (2) aid the creation of a 
market for new retrofit business models and financing solutions, supporting a 
transition towards a low- energy housing stock.
 To address the challenges of information, engagement and trust as well as the 
complexity of whole house retrofits, intermediary actors are needed both at 
project level (e.g. specific retrofits) and the broader market level. In the former, 
intermediaries interconnect different technological, human and financial solu-
tions. In the latter, they can have a crucial role in building trust and aggregating 
and disseminating clear and reliable information on retrofit techniques, sup-
pliers and contractors.
 A review of European case studies (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018) shows 
that two types of intermediaries are specifically important in driving the market 
for retrofit. First, innovation funders such as Innovate UK are important in 
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supporting successful piloting of complex architectural or systemic innovation 
(i.e. interconnecting innovative and standard solutions to deliver whole house 
retrofits). Second, social housing providers and local community actors are crucial in 
market creation and advancing retrofits in practice. Yet, the role of social 
housing providers has lately diminished through policies introducing rent caps 
and ‘right to buy’ schemes, as well as local authority budget cuts – leaving less 
resources for housing providers to carry out retrofits in their building stock. In 
addition, business networks, such as the Passive House Platform in Belgium 
(Mlecnik, 2013) are important in pooling together different types of companies 
and solutions to create new business models and promote retrofitting. In the 
UK, the Green Deal Pioneering Places also stimulated cooperatives to deliver 
retrofits. What still seems to be largely lacking in the UK are intermediaries that 
can effectively stimulate the market for whole house retrofitting by 
owner–occupiers and private landlords, at the community level.
 At the project level, intermediaries are needed to stimulate interest in whole 
house retrofits, share experiences among home owners, and provide necessary 
expertise during planning and implementation. Platforms, such as Eco Open 
Houses in the City of Brighton and Hove, organised in 2008 and between 
2010–2015, enabled people to see and visit sustainable homes. These cases 
demonstrate that such events have been extremely useful in providing informa-
tion, stimulating engagement and sharing knowledge on whole house retrofits, 
as well as providing details of trusted local tradespeople and installers. When 
planning and executing whole house retrofits, individual actors taking up inter-
mediary roles – for example, architects, building cooperatives or local authority 
officers taking actions beyond their usual roles – are valuable in helping house-
holds make choices over technologies and materials. Previous research has 
shown the importance of local authority energy managers, planners (Lovell, 
2008) and sustainability officers (Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018) as important 
intermediaries in project planning and implementation.
 Recent CIED research involved a case study of a three- bedroom terraced 
home built in 1860 in Southampton Street, Brighton. The house was part of a 
local project obtaining funding from the ‘Green Deal Pioneer Places’ Pro-
gramme (a national government- funded programme that sought to demonstrate 
the benefits of EE). The house has undergone an extensive retrofit, motivated 
by the owners’ interest in climate change and sustainable living, though the 
owners had no specific knowledge or interest to carry out a retrofit themselves. 
This was coordinated by the Green Building Partnership, which was formed ini-
tially to take part in the programme. The owners therefore did not have to 
acquire knowledge on the technical or policy aspects of the retrofit. The retrofit 
measures included external solid wall insulation, loft insulation, improved 
windows, new boiler and heating controls – involving multiple partners. While 
the Green Building Partnership led the process, from the perspective of the 
owner, there was no one key intermediary communicating between the broader 
scheme and the owners, leading to some confusion. Southampton Street later 
became part of local Eco Open Houses event, acting as an example to others.
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 Without these intermediary roles, projects may become much more compli-
cated. Intermediaries provide information on the retrofit options available for 
the building projects and help to create a plan that meets regulations. More 
support is, however, needed from dedicated intermediaries, to facilitate ‘one- 
stop-shops’ for retrofitting (Brown, 2018), through which households can access 
trustworthy advice on technological and financing options, as well as tradesmen, 
contractors and installers. In this way intermediaries are often the key actors in 
providing information for households on the options and benefits of undertaking 
comprehensive retrofits; engaging communities and supply chains to promote 
retrofit at a local level; and are also likely to be more trusted than actors with a 
financial stake in promoting certain services or products.
 Overall, some factors for successful intermediaries can be depicted. On a 
broader scale, most impact occurs over a longer timeframe. For example, the 
Centre on Alternative Technology established in the 1970s still influences the 
expectation and visions behind home retrofits. While the Eco Open Houses events 
have been popular in Brighton, they were not organised in 2016–2017, creating 
uncertainty about future knowledge exchange and example setting locally. 
Another important determinant in market formation is the positioning between 
ambitious sustainability aims and connections to business and supply chains.
 Innovative business models, such as the Energiesprong approach, owe much 
of their success to dedicated intermediaries, often initiated by government 
policy. Energiesprong was brought into being through a R50 m grant from the 
Dutch government, and the setting up of a market development team (Energie-
sprong, 2017). These market development teams brought together stakeholders 
including the construction industry, housing providers, policymakers and finan-
ciers to radically re- think the business model through which EE retrofit is 
delivered. While these approaches still face challenges, they could represent a 
template for how the UK could deliver on its ambitious retrofit targets.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
In the ancient Greek myth, the Hydra was invulnerable only if it retained at 
least one head. Heracles, realising that he could not defeat the Hydra alone, 
worked with Iolaus, and through a combination of decapitating the beasts’ mul-
tiple heads and burning the stumps with a firebrand, stopped them growing 
back. The Hydra’s remaining immortal head was cut off with a golden sword 
given to Heracles by Athena. Heracles placed the head – still alive and writhing 
– under a great rock and shot it with an arrow dipped in the Hydra’s poisonous 
blood. Thus, his second task was complete.
 The previous sections outline how tackling the ‘multi- headed-challenges’ of 
whole house residential retrofit will require a similarly sophisticated and multifac-
eted approach. Promoting business model innovation, delivering a range of financ-
ing options and incentives along with the establishment of strategic intermediaries, 
at both local community and national levels, will require a wide- reaching and 
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financing and incentives along with the establishment of new institutions and the 
recognition of EE as a strategic infrastructure priority. Equally, different solutions 
will be required for socially rented, privately rented and owner–occupier sectors. 
This will require joined up action across multiple government departments includ-
ing but not limited to: Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Depart-
ment for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government’s (MHCLG), the Treasury (HMT), Educa-
tion (DfE) and Health (DH), the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the National Infrastructure 
Commission (NIC). The following section provides an outline of the range of pol-
icies (Table 7.1) that could contribute to achieving the enormous potential for the 
comprehensive retrofit of residential buildings.
Standards and regulations
EE retrofits create economic benefits that are often several multiples of the 
initial investment (Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). Cost- effective investments 
in residential EE to 2035 have a current net present value of £7.5 billion. 
With wider benefits such as gross domestic product (GDP) effects and health 
improvements that could be up to £47 billion (Rosenow et al., 2017). Thus, 
EE investments share the characteristics of other forms of infrastructure as 
identified in HM Treasury’s valuation guidance (Frontier Economics Ltd, 
2015). Therefore, we argue that EE should be re- framed as an infrastructure pri-
ority by the UK government and given the level of strategic support and 
status as other forms of infrastructure; such as road, rail and supply side 
energy infrastructure and be included within the remit of the NIC (Rosenow 
and Cowart, 2017).
 The UK Clean Growth Plan set an aspirational goal for all domestic 
buildings to achieve and EPC level C or higher by 2035. We support these 
aims, but argue the government could go further, mandating MEES for the 
owner–occupier sector in the 2020s. This could take the form of a gradual step 
change through to a minimum EPC level of C by 2035 at the point of sale, with 
potential for ever- tightening standards moving into the 2040s and beyond 
(Sustainable Energy Association, 2017).
 There remain concerns surrounding the standard and quality of many instal-
lations currently funded under ECO, particularly solid wall insulation, which is 
to be a key part of the UK’s targets (Hansford, 2015). Therefore, we support the 
findings of the recent Each Home Counts – ‘The Bonfield Review’, that the 
government should establish a new quality assurance standard such as a home 
Quality Mark (Bonfield, 2016). Such a policy should be designed not to intro-
duce a further regulatory and cost burden on SMEs and could build on existing 
standards of good practice along the lines of the Investor Confidence Project in 
the commercial sector (Investor Confidence Project, 2015).
 Taken together these three high- level regulatory policies would set the stra-
tegic direction for UK residential retrofit policy and would send market signals 
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for the development of integrated business models, novel financing solutions 
and market intermediaries. However, on their own, top- down regulations are 
unlikely to build a sufficient market for whole house retrofit.
Financial measures
Overcoming the up- front capital cost of EE retrofit remains a challenge for 
many households. Current fuel poverty schemes such as ECO are limited in size 
and have inherent design flaws (Rosenow et al., 2013). For those in fuel poverty 
we instead propose that these costs should largely be met through government 
grants in the form of a fuel poverty obligation paid for by general taxation. This 
would allow the government to better spread the costs of such a scheme, and if 
properly designed could reduce spending in areas such as health, social care and 
welfare (Rosenow et al., 2017).
 For the ‘able- to-pay’ segment a range of market- led financing mechanisms 
may eventually emerge, including mortgage- based approaches and other private 
sector offerings. Yet, we argue that the government should learn the lessons of 
the failed Green Deal and promote a new low- cost financing mechanism tied to the 
property, perhaps retaining the on- bill repayment channel. Successful financing 
schemes such as Germany’s KfW programme have used government funds to 
provide a low cost of capital, involved a simplified customer journey and funded 
broader sources of value such as wider renovation works, which are likely to be 
perceived as higher value by households (Schröder et al., 2011).
 Although providing sources of lending for EE measures is key to enabling ret-
rofit projects, it is unlikely that low- cost financing alone will be drive demand 
for retrofit (Borgeson et al., 2014). Therefore, government can introduce a range 
of fiscal incentives at key trigger points to promote uptake. These might include: 
variable VAT, stamp duty land tax, council tax, income tax rebates or an EE 
feed- in tariff for households who have undertaken measures – with increasing 
benefits for deeper retrofits (UKGBC, 2013). Such approaches will be most 
effective when they are targeted at key trigger points such as moving home or 
when undertaking major renovations (Maby and Owen, 2015).
New institutions and intermediaries
A key challenge for residential retrofit remains the paucity of information, 
engagement and trust within communities. Recent work at the UK Green 
Building Council (2017) has highlighted a new role for intermediaries to catalyse 
retrofit and regeneration activity in local areas. These actors would engage local 
communities on the benefits of retrofit and regeneration and be the key point of 
contact for: information, marketing, financing and project delivery, through 
dedicated project managers/coordinators – drawing on the pre- existing networks 
of diffuse intermediaries already operating in many communities (Martiskainen 
and Kivimaa, 2018). These intermediaries could be based on Community Social 
Enterprise or Local Authority Arm’s Length Management Organization 
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(ALMO) delivery models, and funded through a combination of local authority 
budgets, central government grants and community shares (UKGBC, 2017).
 Intermediaries also play a role in promoting business model innovation for 
the delivery of comprehensive residential retrofit. Examples such as the Dutch 
Energiesprong scheme (Brown, 2018) and the RE:FIT programme in London 
(Nolden et al., 2016) demonstrate how public bodies can promote business 
model innovation, through the creation of new market facing intermediaries and 
standardised procurement frameworks. These initiatives help reduce transaction 
costs and bring together stakeholders to foster learning, new funding approaches 
and supply chain integration.
 Achieving the promise of residential retrofit and tackling the ‘multi- headed-
challenges’ that stand in the way, will require a joined up and coordinated strategy 
– as outlined in this chapter. To deliver this vision, we argue that the UK govern-
ment should set up a National Retrofit Taskforce. This body would be responsible 
for the planning and delivery of the MEES targets through an overarching strategy, 
monitoring and verification process that brings together key stakeholders, includ-
ing, Government, Third sector, Industry and Consumer groups (Rosenow and 
Cowart, 2017). This new high- level intermediary would also be responsible for the 
management of a central Information Hub (to act as a collection point for best 
practice advice and guidance) and a Data Warehouse (to act as a store for property- 
level data and information) (Bonfield, 2016). Advising multiple government 
departments, this body could monitor progress towards the UK’s targets for the 
sector and propose polices to keep this progress on track.
 Climate change is perhaps the biggest challenge facing humanity in the 
twenty- first century. Buildings are perhaps the biggest single contributor to 
carbon emissions, with the existing residential buildings by far the largest com-
ponent (CCC, 2016). Such a Herculean challenge will require an equally Her-
culean effort. We argue that the considerable rewards are more than worth 
rising to this challenge, and that the proposals presented here could go a long 
way towards achieving this.
Notes
1 The CCC define the cost- effective path as comprising measures that cost less than the 
projected carbon price across their lifetimes together with measures that may cost 
more than the projected carbon price but are necessary in order to manage costs and 
risks of meeting the 2050 target (CCC 2013).
2 Those that result from heating, ventilation and cooling systems as well as and hot 
water. This term excludes emissions from electricity consumption.
3 Such as mould growth, poor air quality and interstitial condensation due to poor detail-
ing, and insufficient consideration of building physics, airtightness and ventilation.
4 Energy bill neutrality may include requirements that modelled savings are ‘cash- flow 
positive’ meaning that finance repayments are equal to, or result in, net energy cost 
savings (Borgeson et al., 2013).
5 Defined as electricity generation feeding into the local distribution network (operating 
from 132 kV down to 230 V), as opposed to the regional or national transmission grid 
(which operates from 400 kV and 275 kV).
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and economic growth
Paul Brockway, Steve Sorrell,  
Tim Foxon and Jack Miller
Introduction
To be effective in mitigating climate change, technical and policy initiatives to 
reduce energy demand must have significant impacts at the aggregate level. This 
means they must contribute to the decoupling of primary energy consumption 
from economic output for both national economies and the world as a whole. 
However, the feasibility, difficulty and cost of decoupling are disputed.
 The rate of growth of global primary energy consumption has been remark-
ably stable since 1850 (2.4 per cent/year ± 0.08 per cent) and shows little sign 
of slowing down (Jarvis et al., 2012). However, since primary energy consump-
tion (E) has grown more slowly than gross domestic product (GDP) (Y), there 
has been a steady decline in global primary energy intensity (E/Y) – termed 
relative decoupling. Globally, primary energy intensity fell by ~1.3 per cent/year 
between 1980 and 2000, but progress has subsequently slowed to only 0.3 per 
cent/year. To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, global primary energy 
intensity must fall at least six times faster than this – a much faster rate than has 
previously been achieved (Loftus et al., 2014).
 The historical decline in global energy intensity appears largely due to 
countries getting richer rather than from finding ways to produce particular 
levels of wealth with less primary energy consumption (Csereklyei et al., 
2014). This in turn suggests that the technological changes that reduce 
energy intensity are strongly correlated with those that increase wealth – so 
the energy required to produce a unit of output has fallen, but the ‘energy 
savings’ have been partly offset by increased output. It is possible that there is 
a causal relationship between these trends (i.e. lower energy intensity leads to 
increased economic output), but this is difficult to establish empirically. 
Moreover, despite wide differences in energy intensity, very few countries 
have achieved absolute decoupling of primary energy consumption from GDP 
(i.e. GDP rising while energy consumption is falling) for more than short 
periods of time. Also, when absolute decoupling has been achieved (such as 
in the UK) it has partly been driven by the ‘outsourcing’ of energy- intensive 
manufacturing to other regions (Hardt et al., 2018). Such outsourcing is 
clearly not feasible at the global level.
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 This apparently strong link between energy consumption and economic 
activity raises important questions for both theory and policy. The orthodox 
view is that both increased energy consumption and improved energy efficiency 
provide a relatively small contribution to the growth in economic output. Con-
sistent with this view, orthodox economists argue that technological change can 
reduce energy consumption with relatively little effect on economic growth. In 
contrast, some ecological economists claim that over the last century economic 
growth has largely been achieved by providing workers with increasing quant-
ities of energy, both directly and indirectly, as embodied in capital equipment 
(Cleveland et al., 1984). Ecological economists therefore view energy as con-
tributing more to economic growth than is suggested by its small share of total 
costs (5–10 per cent). They are correspondingly more sceptical about the feasib-
ility of decoupling.
 The success of climate policy depends in part on which of these views is 
correct – or more precisely, which more accurately describes the situation for 
different regions and stages of economic development (Foxon, 2017; Stern and 
Kander, 2012) But debates on this topic involve a host of theoretical and meth-
odological issues that are both highly technical and difficult to resolve. For 
example, there have been several hundred studies that use sophisticated econo-
metric techniques to explore the ‘causal’ relationships between GDP and energy 
consumption, but these have failed to reach a consistent conclusion (Kalimeris 
et al., 2014; Omri, 2014).
 Recently, however, a new field of research has emerged which has the poten-
tial to throw new light on these long- standing questions. This approach hinges 
upon the thermodynamic concept of exergy (the portion of an energy flow that 
can be used to perform physical work), and the use of physical measures of 
energy efficiency that are based upon the second- law of thermodynamics rather 
than the first. The argument is that exergy is the preferred way to measure 
energy flows since it captures both the quantity and quality of energy, while 
second- law efficiency measures are preferred to first- law since they capture the 
distance from the theoretical maximum efficiency.
 Underlying this new approach is the estimation of the useful exergy inputs 
into national economies – where useful exergy is defined as the exergy outputs 
of end- use conversion devices, such as the mechanical drive from an engine, the 
high- temperature heat from a furnace or the visible light from a lightbulb. 
Useful exergy, in turn, is the product of the exergy inputs to those conversion 
devices (which can be estimated from data on final energy consumption) and 
their second- law conversion efficiencies. Researchers in this field are beginning 
to construct consistent time series of the total useful exergy consumption of 
individual countries and regions (Brockway et al., 2014; Serrenho et al., 2016; 
Warr et al., 2010). These databases provide a measure that can be used along-
side the more traditional measures of primary and final energy consumption to 
gain deeper insights into the role of energy in the economy.
 The core claim of these researchers is that useful exergy is a key driver of 
economic growth – and that this contribution is not recognised by orthodox 
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economics (Warr and Ayres, 2012). Increases in economic output have histor-
ically depended upon increased supplies of useful exergy, achieved through a 
combination of increasing use of primary energy, shifting towards higher- quality 
energy carriers (e.g. from oil to electricity) and improving second- law efficien-
cies at all stages of the energy conversion chain. Warr and Ayres (2012) go so 
far to suggest that improvements in second- law conversion efficiency provide a 
quantifiable surrogate for the majority of technical change that contributes to 
economic growth. Hence, far from being a minor contributor to economic growth, 
the combination of increased energy inputs and improved energy efficiency becomes a 
key driver. One implication of this work is that energy efficiency improvements 
by producers can significantly boost economic output – thereby partly or wholly 
offsetting the energy savings per unit of output that result from the improved 
efficiency. In other words, rebound effects for producers could be large.
 This chapter provides an overview of this emerging field. The following 
section summarises the orthodox view of the relationship between energy con-
sumption and economic growth, including the assumptions upon which this 
rests and the limitations of those assumptions. Next, the concept of useful 
exergy is is introduced to show how this may help to improve our understanding 
of this relationship. The following section summarises some recent research that 
estimates the useful exergy inputs into national economies, explores the trends 
in these over time, includes useful exergy within economic models and uses 
those models to identify the drivers of economic growth. We highlight two 
claims: first, that energy efficiency improvement by UK producers have provided 
one- quarter of UK economic growth since 1971; and second, that corresponding 
improvements by Chinese producers have increased global energy consumption. 
The chapter concludes with future directions for this line of research.
The role of energy in the economy
In the models used by orthodox economists, firms combine primary inputs 
(capital and labour) and intermediate inputs (energy and materials) to produce 
goods and services. Primary inputs facilitate production but do not form part of 
the product and are not used up during production (although capital may depre-
ciate). In contrast, intermediate inputs are ‘created’ by production and are either 
embodied in products or used up during production. Subtracting the purchases 
of intermediates from the value of output leads to a measure of value added, 
which is the income received by capital and labour.
 Orthodox models attribute increases in economic output to increases in 
primary and intermediate inputs and improvements in total factor productivity 
(TFP) – where the latter is the portion of growth not explained by increases in 
inputs (OECD, 2001; Solow, 1956). Increases in value added (including, at the 
aggregate level, GDP) are attributed to increases in primary inputs and TFP – 
with the latter accounting for a significant proportion of the total. TFP can be 
estimated as a residual in growth accounting studies or as a parameter in econo-
metric studies, but it has traditionally been treated as exogenous and equivalent 
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to technical change.1 However, more recent models make technical change 
endogenous and simulate the positive externalities from education and research 
and development (R&D) (Aghion et al., 1998; Romer, 1994). These models 
also attribute a portion of economic growth to improvements in the quality of 
capital and labour inputs – such as better- educated workers.
 Central to orthodox economics is the specification of production functions for 
firms, sectors or the economy as a whole, indicating the maximum output that 
can be produced from different quantities of primary and intermediate inputs 
(OECD, 2001). Production functions can either be specified for gross output 
and include all inputs or specified for value added and only include primary 
inputs. Specifications typically include a TFP multiplier that ‘shifts’ the produc-
tion function over time, thereby capturing technical and other changes that 
allow more output to be produced from the same quantity of inputs. Production 
functions can be defined for different levels of aggregation using different func-
tional forms and with differing rates of productivity improvement for each 
input. But it is generally assumed that production exhibits constant returns to 
scale, that markets are competitive, that firms maximise profits and that inputs 
can be substituted for one another following a change in relative prices. Using 
these assumptions, it can be shown that the rate of growth of output over time 
is a weighted average of the rate of growth of each input and the rate of growth 
of TFP. The weight on each input is the ‘partial output elasticity’ for that input, 
or the percentage change in output following a percentage change in that input, 
holding other variables constant. With these assumptions, it can be shown that 
the partial output elasticity is equal to the share of that input in total costs. This 
result has been labelled the cost share theorem (Kümmel et al., 2010).
 The cost share theorem, together with the assumption of input substitutabil-
ity, has important implications for the role of energy in economic production. 
Since energy represents a small share of total costs for most producers (<5 per 
cent), the theory implies that increases in energy inputs and improvements in 
the productivity of those inputs should make only a minor contribution to eco-
nomic growth. Similarly, constraints on energy supplies are unlikely to have a 
major impact on economic growth since it should be possible to substitute away 
from energy. Taken together, these assumptions imply that energy consumption 
can be substantially decoupled from economic output.
 This approach has been criticised by ecological economists, who challenge the 
core assumption (derived from the national accounts) that capital and labour 
should be treated as primary inputs, and that energy and materials should be treated 
as secondary inputs that make no contribution to value added. This makes little 
sense from a physical perspective, since all physical, biological and economic activ-
ity depends upon flows of high- quality energy that are then returned to the 
environment in the form of low- temperature heat. Like the biosphere, the 
economy is driven by solar energy, both directly and as embodied in biomass and 
fossil fuels. Labour and capital are not productive on their own – they only add 
value by harnessing the ‘free’ energy flows provided by nature. The productivity of 
capital and labour therefore depends entirely upon the associated energy flows.
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 Linked to this, ecological economists question the treatment of energy as a 
‘produced’ input that can be substituted by capital and labour. Technically, the 
scope for substitution will be constrained at the level of the economy as a whole 
since producing more capital requires more of the thing that it is substituting for 
(Stern, 1997). In addition, many production functions violate the laws of 
thermodynamics, since they allow output to be produced with little or no energy. 
More realistic constraints on the relative magnitude of different inputs could 
mean that economies are less flexible in adjusting to rising energy prices than is 
traditionally assumed (Berndt and Wood, 1979; Lindenberger and Kümmel, 
2011). Such constraints may undermine the cost share theorem, meaning that 
the dependence of capital and labour on energy flows could magnify the eco-
nomic impact of changes in those flows (Giraud and Kahraman, 2014).
 The common treatment of energy as an undifferentiated input is also prob-
lematic. Energy carriers differ in quality on multiple dimensions, including their 
flexibility of use, amenability to storage, energy density, economic productivity 
and capacity to do work (Cleveland et al., 2000). Since high- quality energy 
carriers are more productive, they should be given more weight in aggregate 
measures of energy consumption. When this is done, aggregate energy intensity 
is found to be declining more slowly than is commonly assumed (Cleveland 
et al., 2000; Berndt, 1978). Studies that neglect changes in energy quality may 
therefore overlook an important contributor to economic growth (Gentvilaite 
et al., 2015; Stern, 2010).
 In contrast to the neglect of energy by orthodox economists, economic 
historians attribute a central role to energy in explaining previous long- term 
surges in economic growth – and in particular the nineteenth- century industrial 
revolution (Allen, 2009; Kander et al., 2014; Pomeranz, 2009; Wrigley, 2013). 
The continuing importance of energy is also suggested by the large impact of 
energy price shocks on economic output (Kilian, 2008), and by the limited 
decoupling that has been achieved to date. For example, Csereklyei et al. (2014) 
analysed 99 countries over the period 1971–2010 and found that, on average, 
every 1 per cent increase in per capita wealth was associated with a 0.7 per cent 
increase in per capita energy consumption. But it is not clear whether this 
strong correlation is due to economic growth causing increased energy consump-
tion (the orthodox view), increased energy consumption causing economic 
growth (the ecological view), or a combination of the two. While it is possible 
to test this econometrically, the results are ambiguous and sensitive to the 
method, data and specification employed (Kalimeris et al., 2014; Omri, 2014).
 These various strands of theory and evidence raise concerns about the valid-
ity of orthodox models, the accuracy of the cost share theorem and the feasib-
ility of absolute decoupling. If economic growth depends upon increased energy 
consumption, it may be difficult to reduce global carbon emissions while at the 
same time increasing global GDP. However, the studies arguing for the import-
ance of energy are limited in number, variable in quality and inconsistent in 
approach – and have largely been ignored by mainstream economists. The 
approach described below – termed ‘exergy economics’ – represents an attempt 
138  Paul Brockway et al.
to build a bridge between these two communities. The distinctive features of 
this approach are: the use of exergy as a thermodynamic measure of energy 
quality; the focus on the ‘useful’ stage of the energy conversion chain, rather 
than the primary or final stages; and the willingness to challenge key assump-
tions of orthodox economics, such as the cost share theorem. These are 
summarised next.
Foundations of exergy economics
The concept of useful exergy
Exergy is a measure of the portion of an energy flow that can be used to perform 
work, i.e. the portion that is ‘available’ or ‘useful’. As with energy, exergy is 
measured in joules, takes a variety of forms (e.g. kinetic, electrical or chemical) 
and can be converted from one form to another. But while energy is solely a 
measure of quantity, exergy is a measure of both quantity and quality – where 
quality is defined as the capacity to perform work. So, for example, 1 kWh of 
electricity has the same energy as 5 kg of water at 20°C, but the electricity has 
more exergy (i.e. is of higher quality) owing to its greater potential to be con-
verted to physical work. The biggest difference between energy and exergy arises 
when considering thermal energy (heat). For any given quantity of heat within 
a particular environment, a temperature- dependent portion constitutes low- 
grade heat that has little or no ability to perform work. This represents a portion 
of an exergy flow that has been dissipated, or ‘destroyed’.
 The concept of exergy derives from the second- law of thermodynamics, 
which (in one form) states that every energy conversion process involves the 
loss of some measure of energy quality – which means that some exergy is neces-
sarily destroyed. Energy, on the other hand, is always conserved and cannot be 
destroyed, as per the first- law of thermodynamics.
 The term ‘exergy’ was first introduced by Zoran Rant (1956), although the 
principles on which it is based date back to the nineteenth century (Anderson, 
1887). Exergy may be formally defined as the maximum physical work that can 
be extracted from a system as it reversibly comes into equilibrium with its 
environment. The exergy of a system depends upon the differences between that 
system and its environment, which may be in terms of kinetic energy, potential 
energy, temperature, pressure or chemical potential (Baierlein, 2001; Romero 
and Linares, 2014). Exergy can be defined for materials as well as for energy 
flows,2 and has been proposed as a global sustainability indicator (Romero and 
Linares, 2014) and a universal measure of resource availability (Valero and 
Valero, 2011).
 Here we focus upon the use of exergy as an alternative measure of the chain 
of energy flows within a national economy. At the top of this chain is primary 
exergy, derived from fossil fuels, nuclear fission and renewables. The exergy of 
fossil fuels differs from their energy content by a so- called ‘exergy factor’ 
(Szargut et al., 1987), while the exergy of nuclear and renewables depends upon 
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how they are measured.3 Sources of primary exergy are processed and converted 
into commercial energy carriers (secondary exergy) such as electricity, gasoline 
and diesel which are ultimately delivered to consumers (final exergy) with some 
losses along the way (e.g. resistive losses in electricity grids). The last stage of 
exergy conversion takes place within end- use devices such as engines, boilers, 
furnaces, motors and light bulbs which convert final exergy into useful exergy, 
such as low- and high- temperature heat, mechanical power and electromagnetic 
radiation.
 Following end- use conversion, useful exergy is preserved or trapped within 
passive systems for a period of time to produce energy services (Cullen and 
Allwood, 2010; Cullen et al., 2011). So, for example, the heat delivered from a 
boiler (conversion device) is held within a building (passive system) for a period 
of time to provide thermal comfort (energy service). Unlike useful exergy, 
energy services cannot be measured in common units and hence cannot be 
aggregated. Useful exergy is eventually dissipated as low- temperature heat, but 
improvements in second- law conversion efficiency (e.g. more efficient boilers) 
or the ability of passive systems to trap exergy (e.g. more insulation) will allow 
more energy services to be provided per unit of useful exergy.
Useful exergy and economic production
The main reason for thinking about useful exergy in this context is that it pro-
vides a more relevant measure of the contribution of energy to economic 
production and human welfare. The exergy that is destroyed at each stage of the 
conversion chain contributes no economic value and no energy services, but 
the useful exergy at the final end of the chain contributes to the production of 
marketable goods (e.g. the heat used to manufacture steel) and to the energy 
services required by consumers (e.g. the light energy used for illumination). 
Improvements in second- law conversion efficiency at all stages of the energy 
chain allow more useful exergy to be delivered from the same amount of primary 
energy – and is this, rather than the total energy outputs of conversion devices, 
that has economic value. Hence, it is the productive part of energy flows – 
useful exergy – that should be the focus of attention within economic models.
 In a series of papers, Ayres and Warr estimated the useful exergy flows within 
national economies over the past century and included these within simple 
models of economic growth (Ayres and Warr, 2010; Ayres et al., 2003; Warr 
and Ayres, 2012; Warr et al., 2008). Their results suggested that the output elas-
ticity of useful exergy was at least ten times greater than the cost share of energy, 
and much larger than the output elasticity of labour. Moreover, when energy 
was replaced with useful exergy, the estimated contribution of TFP to economic 
growth largely disappeared – at least for the period prior to 1970. Their explana-
tion for these results was that energy (cf. exergy) is more productive than 
orthodox economists assume, and that the productivity of primary exergy has 
increased over time owing to continuing improvements in second- law conver-
sion efficiency.
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 The studies by Ayres and Warr embody a number of innovations, including: 
estimating aggregate time series of useful exergy; using this data within eco-
nomic models (despite the fact that useful exergy is not a traded commodity); 
and employing an unconventional ‘linear exponential’ (LINEX) production 
function. The latter has not been accepted by orthodox economists because it 
violates some of the standard assumptions of neoclassical production theory.4 
However, the theoretical arguments in favour of employing useful exergy are 
persuasive and the concept is not wholly unfamiliar to economists since it 
amounts to ‘quality- weighting’ energy inputs.
 Comparable quality- weighting of labour and capital inputs is now an 
standard feature of orthodox growth accounting (OECD, 2001). As an illus-
tration, Figure 8.1 shows time series of both standard and quality- weighted 
capital, labour and energy inputs for Portugal over the period 1960–2010, 
where the latter is defined as useful exergy. Since quality- weighted inputs 
grow faster than the standard input measures, they can explain a larger pro-
portion of economic growth, leaving less to be attributed to a residual (TFP). 
The next section summarises the contribution of researchers who building 
upon Ayres and Warr’s work.
Figure 8.1 Normalised time series of inputs and outputs to production in Portugal.
Source: Santos et al. (2018), with permission.
Note
Capital inputs measured as a stock of assets and a flow of services. Labour inputs measured as total 
hours worked and total hours worked adjusted with a human capital index. Energy inputs measured 
as primary energy supply and useful exergy consumed.
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Research findings and insights
Exergy accounting
A first step in understanding the contribution of useful exergy to economic 
growth is to map the exergy flows through a national economy. An estimate of 
these flows for a single year allows the locations and magnitudes of exergy losses 
to be identified, the relative efficiencies of different processes to be compared 
and the technical (but not necessarily economic) potential for improvements to 
be highlighted. Similarly, an estimate for several years allows the trends in 
exergy use and efficiencies to be identified, while estimates for several countries 
allow their relative efficiencies to be compared. Estimating useful exergy 
involves: (a) collecting data on primary and final energy consumption and con-
verting these to an exergy basis; (b) mapping final exergy flows onto different 
Table 8.1 Breakdown of end-uses, by useful exergy category and energy carrier group
Energy carrier group Category of useful exergy End-use

















‘Wet’ appliances (e.g. dishwashing)
Cooking
Cooling Space cooling (AC)
Refrigeration






Food and feed Muscle work Draught animal work
Human work
Source: Miller et al. (2016), with permission (and without changes).
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categories of useful exergy (such as mechanical power and heat) and different 
end- uses within each category (e.g. cars trucks); and (c) estimating average 
exergy efficiencies for those end- uses (see Table 8.1).
 The first national exergy accounts were compiled by Reistad (1975), whose 
study coincided with rising oil prices and increasing concern about energy effi-
ciency. Interest declined following the oil price collapse of 1981, but was rein-
vigorated after 2000 by Ayres and Warr (2005; Warr and Ayres, 2012). Other 
authors have since refined the methodology, both in terms of the level of disag-
gregation and the accuracy of efficiency estimates (Brockway et al., 2014; Miller 
et al., 2016; Serrenho, 2013). There are a growing number of single and multi- 
country studies within the OECD (Ayres et al., 2003; Brockway et al., 2014; 
Hammond and Stapleton, 2001; Serrenho, 2013; Serrenho et al., 2016; Warr 
et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2008) and the methodology has now being extended 
to Mexico (Guevara et al., 2016), India (Magerl, 2017) and China (Brockway 
et al., 2015). Lack of data remains a serious obstacle, but there have been signi-
ficant improvements over the last few years with increasing efforts towards 
standardisation (Sousa et al., 2017).
Exergy efficiency
A key outcome of useful exergy accounts are time series estimates of primary 
to useful exergy efficiency – that is, the ratio of useful to primary exergy 
consumption (εPU = BU/BP) – as well as final to useful exergy efficiency 
(εFU = BU/BF). These estimates reflect both improvements in conversion effi-
ciency and structural change within the economy. As an example, Serrenho 
et al. (2016) estimate that εFU in Portugal increased from 6 per cent in 1850 
to 20 per cent in 2010, with most of this improvement occurring during the 
post- war period of electrification and industrialisation. Similarly, Brockway 
et al. (2014) estimate that εPU in the UK increased from 9 per cent to 15 per 
cent between 1960 and 2000, but has since remained stable (Figure 8.2). 
Closer examination reveals efficiency improvements in all end- use categories 
in the UK, with primary to useful heating efficiency increasing from 8 to 12 
per cent, electricity efficiency from 8 to 14 per cent and mechanical drive 
from 11 to 21 per cent.
 While εPU in Portugal and the UK stabilised only recently, it has remained 
around 11 per cent in the US for half a century (Figure 8.2). The tendency for 
the rate of improvement in exergy efficiency to slow in advanced economies was 
first observed by Williams et al. (2008), who termed it ‘efficiency dilution’. The 
reason is the increasing proportion of exergy being used in less efficient end- uses 
(e.g. air- conditioning, car travel, space heating), combined with a slowdown in 
the rate of efficiency improvement for individual end- uses. Most advanced eco-
nomies are ‘outsourcing’ heavy industry to emerging economies and since heavy 
industry is relatively exergy efficient (although exergy intensive), this reduces 
the aggregate exergy efficiency of those economies. In contrast, the exergy effi-
ciency of emerging economies is improving rapidly (Figure 8.2).
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 Improvements in exergy efficiency mean that the useful exergy inputs to 
national economies are growing faster than either primary or final exergy inputs 
(Figure 8.3). For example, the 10-fold growth in useful exergy use in China 
between 1971 and 2010 was supplied by a 4-fold increase in primary exergy 
combined with a 2.5-fold improvement in primary to useful exergy efficiency.
 Table 8.2 decomposes the trends in useful exergy consumption in the US, 
UK and China to identify the relative contribution of increases in primary 
exergy, changes in the relative importance of different end- uses (structure) and 
changes in the efficiency of those end- uses. If emerging economies follow the 
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Figure 8.2  Trends in primary to useful exergy efficiency in the UK, US and China 
(1971–2010).
Source: Brockway et al. (2014, 2015), with permission (two separate figures merged).
Table 8.2  Decomposing the drivers of useful exergy consumption in the UK, US and 
China over the period 1971–2010
Country Primary exergy 
(DB)
Structure (DS) Efficiency (De ) Useful Exergy 
(DT = DBDSDe )
China 3.96 1.66 1.48 9.76
US 1.32 0.90 1.29 1.53
UK 1.01 0.90 1.58 1.43
Source: Brockway et al. (2015), with permission (and without changes).
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(OECD), their rate of efficiency improvements will decline in the future. One 
possible implication is that orthodox economic models may underestimate the 
future growth of energy consumption in those countries (Brockway et al., 2015).
Economic insights
Exergy intensity of national economies
Once estimates of primary, final and useful exergy are available, their relation-
ship to GDP (Y) can be examined. The primary exergy intensity of a national 




Hence, reductions in primary exergy intensity may result from either improve-
ment in primary to useful exergy efficiency (εPU = εPFεFU) or reductions in useful 
exergy intensity (θU). As an illustration, Figure 8.4 illustrates the long- term 
trends in primary exergy and useful exergy intensity in five countries (Serrenho 
et al., 2016). This period includes transitions from agricultural to industrial soci-
eties (which occurred somewhat later in Portugal), together with two world 
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Figure 8.3  Normalised trends in primary exergy, useful exergy and primary to useful 
exergy efficiency in China between 1971 and 2010.
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Figure 8.4  Primary exergy (top) and useful exergy (bottom) intensity of Portugal, UK, 
US, Austria and Japan, 1850–2010.
Source: Serrenho et al. (2016), with permission.
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between countries, one notable feature stands out: primary exergy intensity has 
declined over time while useful exergy intensity has remained relatively stable.5 
This implies that most of the reduction in primary exergy intensity has derived 
from improvements in primary to useful exergy efficiency. While all five coun-
tries have experienced a relative decoupling of primary exergy from GDP there 
Figure 8.5  Final exergy (top) and useful exergy (bottom) intensities in the EU-15, 1960 
to 2010.
Source: Serrenho et al. (2014), with permission.
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has been little or no decoupling of useful exergy. Indeed, the useful exergy 
intensity of the modern Portuguese economy is comparable to what it was 
in 1860.
 Figure 8.5 provides more recent estimates of final and useful exergy intensi-
ties for the EU 15. Again, the picture is complex, but there is little evidence of 
a long- term trend towards lower useful exergy intensity. Serrenho et al. (2014) 
show that, once differences in residential energy use (linked to average temper-
atures) and high- temperature heat (linked to heavy industry) are taken into 
account, useful exergy is statistically constant across time and equal for the EU 
15. Taken together, this evidence is suggestive of a strong link between useful 
exergy and economic output. However, the trend is not universal (e.g. useful 
exergy intensity is rising in Mexico (Guevara et al., 2016) and falling in China 
(Brockway et al., 2015)) and closer investigation is required to understand the 
underlying determinants.
Useful exergy as a factor of production
A second insight is gained by replacing primary energy with useful exergy within 
models of economic production. As noted, this was first done by Ayres and Warr 
(2005) who employed a LINEX production function and were able to explain 
US economic growth over the period 1900–1973 without the need for a TFP 
multiplier.6 However, there seems little prospect of this function being accepted 
by mainstream economists, so researchers are seeking more conventional ways 
to include useful exergy.
 One approach is to estimate standard, three- input (capital, labour and 
energy – KLE) ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES) production func-
tions, with primary energy (E) being replaced by useful exergy (BU = εPUBP).7 
CES functions form the foundation of many macroeconomic models, but 
(remarkably) the parameter values tend to be assumed rather than estimated 
(Sorrell, 2014). Traditional approaches to estimating substitution elasticities 
are problematic since they rely upon the cost share theorem, but estimating 
the CES function requires non- linear techniques that can be unreliable (Hen-
ningsen and Henningsen, 2012; Prywes, 1986). Further, it is necessary to 
impose assumptions about the ‘separability’ of inputs that typically lack 
empirical justification (Sorrell, 2014). Heun et al. (2017) estimate aggregate 
CES functions for the UK and Portugal using data on useful exergy and other 
inputs over the period 1960–2009. They find that the partial output elasticity 
of each input varies over time and differs from the cost share – thereby ques-
tioning the validity of the cost share theorem. However, they also find the 
results are sensitive to the specification used and the estimated output elastic-
ities change rapidly over short periods of time.
 Santos et al. (2018) take an alternative approach, using ‘co- integration’ tech-
niques to test for the existence of an aggregate production function8 for Portugal 
over the period 1960 to 2009.9 If time series of labour, capital, energy (or useful 
exergy) and GDP are found to be co- integrated, this suggests there is a stable, 
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long- term relationship between them (Dickey et al., 1994). This relationship 
may in turn be interpreted as an aggregate production function, and the estim-
ated parameter values can be used to derive the partial output elasticities. 
Santos et al. test 32 different specifications that vary in terms of whether a TFP 
multiplier is included, whether capital and labour inputs are quality- weighted, 
whether energy inputs are included, and whether these are measured as primary 
energy or useful exergy.
 To interpret the results as an aggregate production function, the variables 
must be co- integrated, the parameters must be non- negative and there must be 
evidence that the inputs ‘cause’10 the output. Santos et al. find that none of the 
specifications incorporating a TFP multiplier meet these criteria – suggesting 
that standard formulations are incorrect. Instead, the only specification that 
meets these criteria is when both capital and labour are quality- adjusted and 
useful exergy is included – again suggesting that standard formulations are incor-
rect. Moreover, this specification includes two co- integrating relationships, one 
of which is interpreted as a constraint on input combinations as a consequence 
of the essential contribution of useful exergy to economic production. Overall, 
this rigorous study provides strong support for the inclusion of useful exergy as a 
factor of production.
Rebound effects from improved exergy efficiency
Improvements in exergy efficiency make useful exergy cheaper, thereby boosting 
economic output and encouraging the substitution of useful exergy for capital 
and labour. This in turn reduces the exergy savings from those improvements – 
a form of rebound effect.
 There is a large and growing literature on rebound effects, but most studies 
focus upon energy efficiency improvements by consumers rather than producers 
since these are easier to estimate. This is unfortunate, since rebound effects for 
producers may potentially be larger (Saunders, 2013; Sorrell, 2007). The devel-
opment of economic models incorporating useful exergy opens up a new route 
for investigating such effects. Following Heun et al. (2017), Brockway et al. 
(2017) estimate aggregate three- input CES production functions for the US, 
UK and China over the period 1980–2010, replacing primary energy with useful 
exergy. Following Saunders (2008), Brockway et al. (2017) derive an expression 
for the rebound effect that relies upon the cost share theorem.11 This leads to a 
mean estimate of the rebound effect 13 per cent for the US and UK, and 208 
per cent for China. Or in other words, Brockway et al.’s (2017) results suggest 
improved exergy efficiency leads to significant exergy savings in the US and UK, 
but increased exergy consumption in China.
 The confidence intervals on Brockway et al.’s (2017) estimates are large, and 
the method has other limitations such as the arbitrary choice of nesting struc-
ture and the continued reliance upon the cost share theorem. However, the use 
of an exogenous, thermodynamic measure of energy efficiency (εPU) represents 
an important step forward – and points the way to further work in this area.
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Including useful exergy within energy–economy models
The next stage is to incorporate useful exergy into whole- systems models of 
the economy and to use these to develop projections of future economic 
growth and energy consumption. Such models can overcome some of the lim-
itations of aggregate and sectoral production functions and can better capture 
the dynamic feedbacks that drive economic growth (Ayres and van den 
Bergh, 2005). Widely used computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are 
insufficient for this purpose, since they embody many of the problematic 
assumptions of orthodox theory and assume rather than estimate many of the 
parameters (Sorrell, 2014). A more promising approach is to employ macro- 
econometric models, consisting of a group of simultaneous equations that 
represent key macroeconomic relationships. These include identities (such as 
GDP being equal to the sum of public and private consumption, investment 
and exports) and behavioural relationships estimated from historical data 
(Fair, 1984).
 The MAcroeconomic Resource COnsumption model (MARCO–UK) is 
the first attempt to integrate useful exergy within such a model and currently 
consists of 30 identities and 27 behavioural equations estimated from UK data 
over the period 1971–2013 (Sakai et al., 2018). Both useful exergy (BU) and 
final to useful exergy efficiency (εFU) are endogenous variables, with the 
former being estimated from its lagged value, GDP and quality- adjusted labour 
and capital. Useful exergy is also an explanatory variable for other variables, 
including consumption, investment, exports, labour supply and final energy 
consumption. Capital and exergy are specified as complementary, with one 
being required to activate the other. Constructing the model in this way 
captures both the drivers of improvements in εFU and the contribution of 
those improvements to output growth – which occur through both the con-
sumption and production side of the economy. For example, lower- priced 
useful exergy improves productivity and stimulates increased production 
through additional capital investment.
 MARCO-UK allows the development of counterfactual scenarios in which 
the values of key variables are held at their base year values – thereby allowing 
the contribution of those variables to economic growth to be estimated. Initial 
results (Figure 8.6) suggest that improvements in final to useful exergy efficiency 
have contributed one- quarter of UK economic growth since 1971 – comparable 
in scale to that contributed by capital investment. In contrast, increases in 
labour inputs are estimated to have contributed only 10 per cent of the observed 
growth. Put another way, the results suggest that improved energy efficiency has 
played a far more important role in driving UK economic growth than is tradi-
tionally assumed.
 These results are provisional and require further analysis and development. 
But the MARCO-UK framework is flexible and can be extended in a variety of 
ways, including to other countries.
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Conclusions, future directions and policy recommendations
Orthodox economics provides the lens through which most researchers and 
policymakers view the world, but that lens may obscure or distort some 
important features – such as the critical role of energy in economic production. 
The neglect of energy derives from the foundational assumptions of orthodox 
economics and could lead to misleading policy recommendations.
 This neglect of energy has long been criticised, but alternative approaches 
lack a coherent theoretical framework and methodological approach. The 
developments described in this chapter could provide a more robust alternative, 
based around the concept of useful exergy. As illustrated above, a number of 
research topics are currently being pursued and the initial results suggest that 
improved exergy efficiency is a key driver of economic growth. However, the 
research is at an early stage and is handicapped by lack of data, and the unfamil-
iarity of the exergy concept inhibits wider acceptance.
 Nevertheless, research is progressing in a number of directions, including: 
disaggregating the MARCO-UK model to the sector level; extending the co- 
integration approach to other countries and functions (Santos et al., 2018); 
extending the exergy framework to incorporate passive systems and energy ser-
vices (Cullen et al., 2011); investigating the relationships between useful exergy, 
energy services and human needs (Brand- Correa and Steinberger, 2017); and 
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Figure 8.6  Counterfactual simulations of UK economic output 1971–2013 using the 
MARCO-UK model.
Source: the authors.
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Taken together, these have the potential to significantly improve our under-
standing of the relationship between energy use and economic activity, and 
thereby the feasibility of absolute decoupling.
 The policy implications of this work are mixed: if improved energy efficiency 
is essential to economic growth it should be given much greater policy support; 
but if rebound effects are large the environmental benefits of those improve-
ments may be less than anticipated. But such conclusions are likely premature: 
what is more important – given the imperative of accelerated energy- GDP 
decoupling – is the willingness to question established assumptions, and to 
explore alternative ways of understanding the role of energy in the economy. 
Exergy economics is a step in that direction.
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Notes
 1 However, when TFP is estimated as a residual it also reflects measurement error and 
other factors such as omitted variables.
 2 The exergy content of a quantity of materials is the amount of exergy required to 
produce the material from a reference environment by reversible processes.
 3 The exergy and energy content of electricity are identical. But there are different 
ways of accounting for the primary energy/exergy content of nuclear and renewable 
electricity sources and no consensus on the preferred approach (Johansson et al., 
2012).
 4 Such as the requirement that the marginal productivity of an input should decline 
when the use of that input increases (Saunders, 2008).
 5 A closer examination reveals an increase in useful exergy intensity after the Second 
World War in all countries except Portugal, followed by a modest decline after 1970. 
The first period coincides with the ‘golden years’ of post- war economic growth, while 
the second begins around the time of the first oil crisis. But taking the period as a 
whole, Serrenho et al. (2016) find no evidence of a time trend at the 5 per cent 
significance level.
 6 The LINEX function was first introduced by Kümmel (1982) and imposes additional 
constraints on the allowed combinations of inputs.
 7 A (KL)E CES function is specified as: ,
 where ρ and ρ1 define the ease of substitution between inputs, δ and δ1 define the 
contribution of each input to economic output, λ defines the rate of productivity 
growth and φ is a scaling factor. Estimation involves obtaining values for these six 
parameters.
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 8 Santos et al. (2018) assume a simpler ‘Cobb Douglas’ production function of the 
form: . The αi terms define the partial output elasticity of each 
input and λ defines the rate of productivity growth. The Cobb Douglas was chosen 
because it can be straightforwardly related to the co- integration specification, but it is 
restrictive because it assumes a unitary elasticity of substitution between each 
variable.
 9 With time series data it is common for one or more of the variables to be non- 
stationary, creating the risk of ‘spurious regressions’. But it is possible for two or more 
non- stationary variables to be co- integrated, meaning that certain linear combina-
tions of these variables are stationary and that there is a stable long- run relationship 
between them.
10 This relies upon Granger causality tests. A time series (xt) is said to ‘Granger cause’ 
another time series (yt) if the prediction of y is improved by the inclusion of past 
values of x in addition to past values of y. Granger causality tests are designed to show 
whether one variable can meaningfully be described as dependent variable and the 
other as independent, or whether the relationship is bidirectional, or whether no 
relationship exists (Stern, 2011). This is test of ‘statistical precedence’ rather than 
causality as normally understood, since the fact that A precedes B need not neces-
sarily mean that A causes B. For example, a meteorological forecast of rain can be 
shown to Granger cause rain!
11 Brockway et al. (2017) define energy rebound as:  where  is 
the elasticity of primary exergy consumption with respect to primary to useful exergy 
efficiency. They use the implicit function and cost share theorems to derive an 
expression  for .
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9 Energy- saving innovations and 
economy- wide rebound effects
Gioele Figus, Karen Turner 
and Antonios Katris
Introduction
A common characteristic of human societies is the ongoing effort to achieve the 
same or better outcomes with less use of natural resources. Especially during the 
industrial revolution, steam engines were increasingly used to provide mechanical 
power and to increase the productivity of labour. Engines, however, required an 
energy source to operate and the fuel of choice at the time was coal. Even back 
then, engineers were seeking to improve the efficiency by which engines were 
using coal with a view to reduce the resource requirements and therefore the asso-
ciated costs. However, as Jevons (1865) first identified, the improvements in the 
energy efficiency of steam engines made the use of those engines more attractive, 
thereby accelerating the use of coal. This was partly due to the fact that steam 
engines were used in the production of iron, so efficiency improvements reduced 
the cost of iron, thus increasing its consumption, and indirectly the use of coal. 
The net result was that continuous improvements in efficiency of steam engines 
throughout the industrial revolution were accompanied by continuous increases in 
the consumption of coal – the so- called ‘Jevons’ paradox’.
 Jevons’ paradox is an extreme example of a more general phenomenon, 
known as the ‘rebound effect’. This is an umbrella term for a variety of eco-
nomic responses to improved energy efficiency, whose net result is to reduce the 
energy savings achieved. For example, people may take the benefits of improved 
insulation in the form of warmer homes rather than realising the full potential 
reductions in energy consumption (a direct rebound effect). Alternatively, they 
may spend the cost savings on other goods and services that also require energy 
and emissions to be produced (an indirect rebound effect). One hundred and 
fifty years after Jevons, the rebound effect is still closely associated with energy 
efficiency improvements in both production and consumption (Khazzoom, 
1980). Its existence makes some commentators sceptical towards the use of 
energy efficiency policies as a climate change mitigation tool.1 The fact that a 
part of the technologically feasible energy savings is almost inevitably eroded 
creates the impression that energy efficiency improvements deliver less than 
what the allocated funds can theoretically achieve. However, this neglects the 
fact that reductions in energy consumption may not be the only goal.
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 In 2014, the International Energy Agency (IEA) published a study detailing 
how energy efficiency improvements can serve a multitude of purposes includ-
ing, but not limited to, climate change mitigation (IEA, 2014).2 According to 
IEA, energy efficiency improvements provide benefits in five main fields, 
namely: macroeconomic, public budget, health and wellbeing, industry and 
energy delivery. In each of these fields, IEA identified specific areas that could 
benefit from efficiency improvements, with the nature and magnitude of those 
benefits being closely related to how the efficiency improvements are imple-
mented. This ‘multiple benefits’ approach not only emphasises the wide- ranging 
benefits of energy efficiency, but also crucially highlights the true source and 
nature of the rebound effect. The rebound effect is not an observable phenom-
enon that reduces the value of energy efficiency policies. Rather it is associated 
with the fact that improvements in energy use may generate a wide array of 
positive outcomes throughout the economy and society.
 For example, improvements in the energy efficiency of domestic boilers will 
make heating cheaper and households may take advantage of this by enjoying 
higher levels of thermal comfort. This will increase their ‘consumer surplus’3 
which contributes to aggregate social welfare – as will the impacts in other fields 
identified by the IEA. Energy consumption will normally be reduced, but not by 
as much as it would have been in the absence of the increased demand for 
heating. Since energy consumption contributes to climate change, it imposes 
costs on other people both now and in the future. But these ‘external costs’ must 
be set against the multiple benefits of the efficiency improvement, including the 
benefits to consumers of warmer homes. Provided the latter are larger than the 
former, energy efficiency improvements provide net benefits to society.
 In our Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council End Use Energy 
Demand (EPSRC EUED) research project ‘Energy saving innovations and 
economy- wide rebound effects’, we explore the potential, economy- wide socio- 
economic impacts of improved energy efficiency. In the case studies presented 
in this chapter we examine the impact of improved energy efficiency in house-
holds in both the UK and Scotland, as a devolved nation within the UK. Using 
economy- wide macroeconomic modelling we identify how a reduction in the 
physical energy use requirements of different household income groups impacts 
the UK and Scottish economies. Moreover, since energy efficiency policies 
could serve as a means to pursue multiple policy objectives, we explore options 
for funding energy efficiency programmes from the public budget and analyse 
the potential impact of these options.
 Through these case studies we seek to present evidence that there are more 
important elements to energy efficiency policy than just the changes in energy 
use. Therefore, policy consideration needs to adopt a wider view of the impacts, 
rather than focusing solely on potential rebound effects. In each case, we 
estimate the rebound effects associated with the energy efficiency improve-
ments. But as discussed above, these effects may be a barrier to implementing 
energy efficiency policies owing to the negative connotations of the ‘lost’ energy 
savings. We therefore propose an alternative metric for evaluating the 
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effectiveness of energy efficiency policies in reducing energy use and/or carbon 
emissions. This is the Carbon (or Energy) Saving Multiplier, which indicates 
the total4 carbon or energy savings for each unit of carbon or energy saved by 
the target of the energy efficiency policy.
 This chapter is structured as follows. The next section summarises the results 
of our analysis of the impact of household energy efficiency improvements, 
focusing on UK and Scottish households. The following section proposes an 
alternative metric to evaluate energy efficiency policies and applies this metric 
to an illustrative household energy efficiency improvement example. The con-
cluding section provides remarks and reflections on potential future steps.
Analyses of the economy- wide impact of improved household 
energy efficiency
When considering energy efficiency policies, significant attention has been 
allocated to the associated rebound effect. This has driven a growing literature 
focused upon estimating the direct and indirect rebound effects following energy 
efficiency improvements by households. By combining econometric analysis and 
Input–Output (IO) analytical techniques, a number of studies have estimated 
the effectiveness of energy efficiency policies in reducing energy use and/or 
carbon emissions at the economy- wide level (see for example Brännlund et al., 
2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman et al., 2011; Freire- Gonzáles, 2011; 
Lenzen and Dey, 2002; Mizobuchi, 2008). This approach uses the IO models to 
estimate the energy use and emissions that are ‘embodied’ in different goods and 
services.
 However, IO models rest upon a number of simplifying assumptions, includ-
ing a fixed production structure, fixed market prices and fixed nominal wages. 
As a result, they are limited in their potential to capture the full macroeconomic 
impacts of improved energy efficiency. For example, reduced energy require-
ments will reduce the current cost of energy for consumers, who may seek a 
higher level of comfort by using a portion of the energy they originally saved. 
To assess these broader, economy- wide implications of improved energy effi-
ciency, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach is preferred, since 
this relaxes some of assumptions that restrict other analytical methods. CGE 
models are based upon IO models, but (unlike the latter) are able to simulate 
adjustments to prices and other variables, together with substitution between 
different inputs. CGE models typically simulate a regional or national economy 
but can be extended to the multi- regional level.
 CGE models are large- scale numerical economic models that capture the 
interaction among key economic actors within an economy, such as industries, 
final consumers, government, markets for factors of production and external 
transactors (imports/exports). The behaviour of an economic actor is described 
by mathematical functions based on rigorous economic theory. These models 
are parametrised on data from the real world and solved numerically with the 
help of computer software. The solution is found under the assumption that 
Energy-saving innovations  159
the represented markets within the economy are simultaneously in equilibrium. 
CGE models can simulate the impact of policies such as improvements in energy 
efficiency and capture, in principle, the impact and ramification of such policy 
in different components of the economy. Results from simulations may be sens-
itive to assumptions regarding the specification of the model and the availability 
of estimates for key exogenous parameters. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis of 
those assumptions is a key element of the majority of research works using CGE 
models.
 A growing number of studies have used CGE models to identify the potential 
economy- wide impacts of energy efficiency improvements (see for example 
Allan et al., 2007; Anson and Turner, 2009; Broberg et al., 2015; Glomsrød and 
Taoyuan, 2005; Grepperud and Ramussen, 2004; Hanley et al., 2009; Koesler 
et al., 2016; Turner, 2009; Yu et al., 2015). The typical approach is to compare 
the economy- wide energy consumption in a baseline scenario to that in a scen-
ario that includes an energy efficiency improvement in one or more sectors. A 
common characteristic of these studies is their primary focus on industrial 
energy efficiency improvements. Household energy efficiency has received much 
less attention, with only a handful of studies to date (Duarte et al., 2016; 
Dufournaud et al., 1994; Koesler, 2013; Lecca et al., 2014). This is one of the 
main drivers of our decision to focus on household energy efficiency.
Household energy efficiency improvements in the UK – can public 
support be justified?
In the first of two case studies presented in this chapter, we focus on the UK as a 
whole. We identify five household income groups based on their gross weekly 
equivalised income.5 In the case of UK households, the majority of the energy 
purchases are for residential use, i.e. lighting, cooking and heating. However, as 
the weekly income rises, so does the portion of energy spending for mobility 
purposes. Furthermore, the lowest- income households spend a larger portion of 
their disposable income on energy than the more affluent ones (energy spending 
7 per cent of total consumption for the lowest- income households and 4 per 
cent for the highest- income ones).
 We explore the impact of increasing the efficiency of household energy use in 
the UK so that they can run their homes (heat, cook, light etc.)6 while using 10 
per cent less physical energy. We examine two cases, one where all households 
receive the energy efficiency improvement (Scenario a) and a second where only 
the lowest- income group (20 per cent of UK households with the smallest weekly 
income) becomes more energy efficient (Scenario b). We initially study the impact 
of energy efficiency in isolation, by neglecting the capital and other costs associ-
ated with enabling energy efficiency (e.g. the installation of new boilers, or insula-
tion).7 For the purpose of our work, the focus is solely on the energy use within the 
UK, not considering the energy embodied in imported goods.
 Reducing the energy requirements of households frees up a portion of the dis-
posable income of each household, which in turn can be spent elsewhere. 
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Because of the higher purchasing power of the households, we observe an 
increase in the demand for UK and imported goods and services.8 This leads to 
a demand- driven expansion of the UK economy. As suggested by the IEA 
Multiple Benefits framework (IEA, 2014), an energy efficiency improvement in 
households delivers a multitude of macroeconomic benefits for the UK. 
Table 9.1 summarises the estimated changes in some key macroeconomic indi-
cators due to the improvement in household energy efficiency. These are pre-
sented for two conceptual periods, the short run (SR) where industry capital 
stocks are fixed, and the long run (LR) where industry capital stocks are fully 
adjusted to the new macroeconomic equilibrium.
 As can be seen in Table 9.1, at least in the LR when the economy has 
reached a new equilibrium, we observe a gross domestic product (GDP) expan-
sion regardless of the target of the efficiency improvement. This implies 
increased employment and investment, as the sectors where the households 
spend their realised savings adapt to meet the increased demand. There is a 
Table 9.1  Percentage change in key macroeconomic variables, relative to the baseline 
scenario, following a costless 10 per cent increase in household residential 
energy efficiency
Scenario a Scenario b
SR LR SR LR
GDP 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.02
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.32 0.21 0.03 0.01
Investment 1.14 0.79 0.15 0.11
Unemployment rate –0.82 –2.08 0.04 –0.13
Employment 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.01
Nominal wages 0.42 0.45 0.02 0.03
Imports 0.70 0.58 0.07 0.05
Exports –0.49 –0.37 –0.04 –0.02
Total energy use –0.67 –0.89 –0.09 –0.11
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.52 0.58 0.06 0.07
Household total energy consumption –1.66 –1.87 –0.22 –0.24
Residential energy consumption –2.35 –2.62 –0.30 –0.33
Household rebound in residential energy 76.53 73.82 79.03 76.71
Household rebound in total energy 78.89 76.33 80.65 78.50
Economy wide rebound1 69.86 59.68 71.94 63.91
Source: the authors.
Note
1  Rebound occurs when the potential energy savings from an increase in energy efficiency are 
bigger than the actual energy savings. In this study we calculate the rebound effect as
 , where AES are actual energy savings and PES are potential energy savings.
  Depending on what is included in actual energy savings, it is possible to obtain different defini-
tions of rebound. For instance, the rebound in residential energy use only considers savings in the 
residential sector, while the economy wide rebound considers energy savings in the whole 
economy. See Figus et al. (2017b) Appendix D for details.
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significant difference in the level of expansion when only the lowest- income 
households are targeted (Scenario b) compared to the case where all the house-
holds receive the efficiency improvement (Scenario a). The explanation for this 
difference is that low- income households only account for a rather small portion 
of UK household consumption. In addition, the lowest- income households 
benefit less from the increases in wages and capital income as they rely more on 
transfers from the government, which are fixed in real terms. However, 
increased energy efficiency in the lowest- income households and the subsequent 
increase in demand has some impact on the income of other household groups, 
and this gives some additional momentum to the economic stimulus.
 However, improving energy efficiency does not imply that there are only 
positive outcomes. Examining the Consumer Price Index (CPI), it is clear that 
increased demand for goods and services leads to an increase of output prices. 
This reduces the competitiveness of UK production sectors and consequently 
the level of exports. Moreover, it can be seen that even though physical energy 
requirements have been reduced by 10 per cent, the actual reduction of residen-
tial energy used is much smaller (around 2.62 per cent in the case where all 
households are targeted). This implies a significant rebound (>70 per cent) that 
is driven by the fact that the price of energy9 is relatively lower, thus creating an 
incentive to consume more energy which especially benefits those households 
that are under- heating their properties, or in general did not fully meet their 
energy needs. In addition, to produce the additional goods and services which 
households consume, additional energy use by industry is necessary. But while 
the energy used by non- energy firms increases, the energy used by energy indus-
try itself falls. This is because the reduction in energy demand in the residential 
sector more than offsets the increase in demand in industries. The net result is a 
reduction in the total energy used by industry. For this reason, the economy- 
wide rebound is smaller than the household rebound.
 Our findings clearly demonstrate that improving energy efficiency simultan-
eously delivers energy savings, albeit less than what was technically feasible, 
together with wider macroeconomic benefits. It is important to point out that the 
economic expansion depicted in Table 9.1 does not imply that all sectors are 
experiencing increased activity. The difference between the household rebound 
and the economy- wide rebound demonstrates that overall industrial energy 
demand falls as a result of the increased energy efficiency in the residential sector.
 So far, we have analysed the impact of improved household energy efficiency 
in isolation, without accounting for the cost of implementation. Since the role 
of energy efficiency is gaining increasing policy attention (see for example the 
Energy Efficient Scotland programme10), it is likely that those implementation 
costs will be funded by the public budget. Especially for low- income households 
that are interested in adopting efficiency improvements but who lack the funds 
to invest in improving their energy efficiency, the intervention of public spend-
ing is necessary. Assuming that the government would be reluctant to increase 
its deficit, we explore two main funding options: reallocation of existing govern-
ment spending and increased income tax.
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 In the case of reallocation of existing spending, the government funds the 
energy efficiency improvements by spending less on other goods and services. 
This reallocation is only temporary, five years, assuming that by the sixth year 
the efficiency improvement programme has been completed and paid for. The 
temporary reduction in government spending leads to a SR contraction in GDP. 
However, we assume that UK producers have perfect foresight.11 As a result, 
they anticipate that the reduction in government spending is temporary and 
adjust their investment strategy accordingly. This leads to a GDP contraction 
shorter than the five- year period. Once the full cost of the energy efficiency 
improvements has been covered, i.e. after the five- year period, the LR results are 
identical to the ones presented in the costless case. Thus, it is evident that a 
temporary disturbance in government spending, and therefore the economy as a 
whole, to fund energy efficiency improvements, ultimately leads to permanent 
positive outcomes across the economy.
 The other funding option we explore is a temporary increase in income tax. 
This allows the government to continue spending at the same level as before, 
while generating additional revenue to fund energy efficiency improvements. 
Additionally, since households benefit from the energy efficiency improvement 
of their dwellings, an increased income tax is an indirect way to make house-
holds pay for those improvements. It is important to note that increased income 
tax has distributional effects as higher- income households pay more tax. Fur-
thermore, in the case where only the lowest- income households receive the effi-
ciency improvement, the implication is that all the other households are paying 
for actions that they receive no, or at least limited benefits from. Under this 
funding option, our findings indicate an initial contraction of economic activ-
ity. This is due to the fact that increased income tax reduces the take- home 
wage of workers who in turn demand higher wages, thereby raising the produc-
tion costs of industrial sectors. When all households benefit from energy effi-
ciency improvements, the LR results are close to those observed in the costless 
case. However, when only lowest- income households receive the energy effi-
ciency improvements, the associated demand boost is insufficient to compensate 
for the increased income tax, with the result that LR GDP is marginally (–0.005 
per cent) below the original level. One of the drivers of this observation is made 
clear when examining the changes in the disposable income of the different 
household groups. The poorest 20 per cent of households experience a SR 
increase in disposable income of 0.58 per cent. On the other hand, all the other 
household groups experience reductions in their disposable income, which 
persist even after the income tax is reverted to the original level.
Household energy efficiency improvements in Scotland – a regional 
economic policy tool?
Our second case study focuses on Scotland as a devolved nation within the UK. 
We use a CGE model12 that simulates the structure of the Scottish economy to 
investigate the impacts across that economy of energy efficiency improvements 
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in Scottish households. Since the movement of workers between Scotland and 
the rest of the UK regions is relatively free of frictions, we assume that workers 
can freely migrate in and out Scotland from/to the rest of the UK. We model the 
net interregional migration of workers in response to the difference between 
the national and the regional unemployment rate and real wage. We assume that 
workers will migrate to the region that has the lowest unemployment rate and 
the highest real wage. A second important difference is that instead of disaggre-
gating households into income groups, we identify a single representative 
Scottish household category. We assume that a costless energy efficiency 
improvement takes place that allows these households to achieve the same level 
of comfort and/or services while using 5 per cent less physical energy.13
 In the base case scenario, we assume that the Scottish government spending 
is fixed. Changes to tax revenues are transferred to the central government in 
Westminster. Essentially, this reflects the fiscal arrangement between Scotland 
and the UK before April 2016. We call this FIXGOV.
 Simulation results are reported in the second and third column of Table 9.2. 
Simulation results show SR results that are qualitatively similar to the UK case 
above (Scenario a). The 5 per cent energy efficiency improvement leads to a 
small expansion of the Scottish GDP (0.04 per cent), driven by an increase of 
household consumption by 0.3 per cent. This drives a net increase in investment 
Table 9.2  Percentage change in key macroeconomic variables following a  5 per cent 
increase in Scottish household energy efficiency under alternative fiscal regimes
Time period FIXGOV FIXBAL TAX
SR LR SR LR SR LR
GDP 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.39
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11 –0.08
Unemployment rate –0.24 0.00 –0.31 0.00 –0.34 0.00
Total employment 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.39
Nominal gross wage 0.11 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.12 –0.19
Real gross wage 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Household consumption 0.30 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.66
Investment 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.38
Exports –0.12 0.00 –0.14 0.00 –0.15 0.14
Non-energy industries output 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.39
Energy industries output –0.41 –0.41 –0.41 –0.37 –0.40 –0.22
Energy use –0.89 –0.57 –0.87 –0.51 –0.85 –0.36
Energy demand by producers –0.22 –0.24 –0.22 –0.19 –0.21 –0.03
Energy demand by households –2.70 –1.47 –2.65 –1.41 –2.60 –1.26
Government expenditure – – 0.06 0.24 – –
Government budget 53.70 165.50 – – – –
Income tax – – – – –0.10 –0.45
Household rebound 46.03 70.53 46.94 71.82 47.97 74.82
Economy-wide rebound 27.65 53.62 29.01 58.14 30.69 70.61
Source: the authors.
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(0.12 per cent), total employment (0.06 per cent) and nominal wages (0.11 per 
cent). Like in the UK case, the increase in wages puts upward pressure on output 
prices, so that Scottish sectors lose in terms of international competitiveness.
 However, the initial increase in the real wage (0.03 per cent) together with 
the fall in the unemployment rate (–0.24 per cent) triggers net in- migration. As 
workers migrate to Scotland, the real wage falls and the unemployment14 rate 
increases until in the LR they are back to their baseline values. The latter is a 
key finding as the decrease of output prices (driven by movement of labour) 
means that over time the competitiveness of Scottish industries is gradually 
restored and any negative impact on export activity is eliminated by the time 
the Scottish economy reaches a new equilibrium. However, restoration of export 
competitiveness implies additional demand from abroad for the outputs of Scot-
tish sectors, which in turn requires the use of additional energy compared to the 
SR. Therefore, the initial energy savings are gradually eroded as the Scottish 
sectors increase their production to meet the export demand.
 Up until this point, we have assumed that any budget savings15 realised by 
the Scottish government will be transferred to the central UK government. 
However, since April 2016 the devolved Scottish government has acquired the 
power to determine income taxes and use the revenue obtained. To explore 
what the potential impact of new fiscal powers could be in the case of increased 
household energy efficiency, we examine two ways in which the government 
could use the budget savings: they could be returned to the economy via 
increased government purchases (FIXBAL case) or via reductions in income 
taxes (TAX case). Table 9.2 summarises the key macroeconomic effects of these 
two uses of the budget savings, along with the standard case where savings are 
accumulated and returned to UK government (FIXGOV).
 The results in Table 9.2 show that if the budget savings driven by the 5 per 
cent household energy efficiency improvement are returned to the economy via 
government purchases, this leads to increased government consumption of 0.06 
per cent in the SR and 0.24 per cent in the LR. Essentially, the additional 
revenue obtained as a result of the energy efficiency- driven economic stimulus is 
recycled into the economy generating additional stimulus. As a result, we 
observe larger increases in GDP, employment, investment and household con-
sumption compared to the case where the budget savings are accumulated. 
However, the additional economic stimulus also leads to further erosion of the 
economy- wide energy savings achieved via this energy efficiency improvement.
 In the case where we assume that the budget savings are returned to the 
economy via income tax reductions, we find that these are sufficient for a 0.1 
per cent tax cut in the SR and 0.45 per cent in the LR. However, as discussed in 
the UK case study, changes in the income tax have impacts on both the demand 
and the supply side of the economy. On the demand side, a lower income tax 
means increased household disposable income and therefore increased consump-
tion (0.66 per cent in the LR). This is significantly larger than both the 
FIXGOV and the FIXBAL approaches. At the same time, the increased 
net- of-tax wage of households puts downward pressure on the demand for higher 
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wages. This reduces the cost of labour and stimulating production and employ-
ment. Moreover, due to the competitiveness boost of reduced labour costs, the 
export activity of Scottish industries is also stimulated. Overall, a reduction in 
income tax delivers significantly greater economic stimulus than the other two 
cases, which in turn is associated with greater increases in employment, invest-
ment and other variables. However, the additional production also requires the 
use of additional resources including, but not limited to, energy.
 In general, we find that greater fiscal autonomy allows for greater economic 
expansion from the efficiency improvements, when the government uses the 
additional revenue from taxes to increase current government spending or 
reduce the income tax rate. However, the extent to which those improvements 
reduce economy- wide energy consumption is inversely proportional to size of 
the economic expansion.
A saving multiplier as an alternative to rebound indicator
These case studies in the previous section demonstrate that the erosion of the 
energy savings achieved from improved energy efficiency largely depends on 
how the economy reacts to the increased disposable income of households, and/
or to the reduced energy costs for industries. It has been also indicated that a 
number of studies (see Madlener and Turner, 2016; Sorrell, 2007; Turner, 2013 
for reviews) have sought to identify the indirect and wider economic rebound of 
increased efficiency in both consumptive and productive energy use. IO analyt-
ical techniques were often used to conduct such studies (e.g. Chitnis et al., 2013, 
2014; Druckman et al., 2011; Freire- Gonzáles, 2011; Lecca et al., 2014; Lin and 
Du, 2015; Pfaff and Sartorius, 2015; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013a, 2013b), but 
all of them have used the rebound effect to estimate the effectiveness of energy 
efficiency and gauge the impact across the different supply chains.
 The problem with rebound as an indicator is that it solely focuses on what 
we fail to achieve from efficiency improvements, rather than what we actually 
achieve. It is not surprising, therefore, that the concept has generated resistance 
from policymakers. Moreover, there is no standardised approach to estimate 
rebound effects. Most studies calculate rebound as the ratio of the ‘actual energy 
savings’ over the ‘potential energy savings’. While actual energy savings can be 
accurately calculated in an energy–economic modelling framework, problems 
arise when ‘potential energy savings’ need to be determined. The main issue 
revolves around the energy used by energy producers to produce output. Follow-
ing an energy efficiency improvement, the demand for the output of energy pro-
ducers falls and as a result we observe quantity adjustments on the energy used 
by those industries. Guerra and Sancho (2010) argue that these quantity adjust-
ments need to be included in the ‘potential energy savings’, whereas Turner 
(2013) argues that they should be reflected in the actual and not the ‘potential 
energy savings’. Different studies adopt different approaches in specifying the 
‘potential energy savings’ that in turn contribute to the divergence in rebound 
estimates. This leads to conflicting messages to policymakers.
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 The aforementioned issues could be partly addressed by using a ‘multiplier 
approach’, especially in cases where IO is used as the methodological framework. 
Multiplier analysis is commonly used by policymakers in a range of areas, such as 
estimating how many jobs are created across the economy for a set number of jobs 
created in a specific sector. Multiplier analysis relies upon IO models and is there-
fore limited by the assumption that prices and wages remain constant. However, 
the policy community is familiar with this approach and it relies upon relatively 
straightforward calculations. These are desirable qualities when studying the 
impacts of improved energy efficiency, since inconsistencies in calculation 
methods contribute to the existing confusion. As an alternative then to rebound, 
we propose the use of a Carbon (Energy) Saving Multiplier (CSM).
 In our work, CSM is calculated using an interregional IO table from the 
World Input Output Database project (Timmer et al., 2015). This version of the 
table we used for our work captures the economic interrelationships between 35 
sectors in 41 countries and regions, together with the associated energy use and 
carbon emissions. We define as CSM the ratio of the direct and global supply 
chain carbon savings over the direct carbon savings. Direct are the carbon 
savings that occur at the point where the efficiency improvement takes place 
(e.g. Agriculture sector or households) and supply chain savings are the ones 
that occur in the domestic and international upstream supply chains, as a result 
of the reduction in energy demand. For household energy efficiency improve-
ments, the CSM measures the domestic and international reduction in carbon 
emissions following a unit reduction in emissions at the household level.
 To illustrate the use of the CSM, we use the example of a 10 per cent reduc-
tion in UK household demand for the outputs of the UK ‘Electricity Gas and 
Water Supply’ (EGWS) sector. This corresponds to $5,525.8 million less spend-
ing on the sector (Table 9.3) and reduces household CO2 emissions by 6,172 
kilotonnes (kt). Reduced demand for EGWS output means reduced EGWS pro-
duction and therefore reduced demand from its upstream supply chain, both 
domestic and international. As a result, a total saving of 16,625 kt of CO2 is 
achieved globally. This means that for each kt of CO2 saved by UK households, 
2.69 kt of CO2 are saved globally – which is the CSM.
 As demonstrated by this example, the CSM is defined in such a way that 
clearly shows what needs to be included in the numerator and the denominator, 
helping to avoid inconsistencies in its calculation. Moreover, it focuses on 
savings achieved (in this case carbon) rather than savings missed. The CSM 
remains constant even if we assume that the households, or any targeted sector, 
opt to use a part of the initially realised monetary savings for more heating, 
lighting, cooking or water (i.e. a direct rebound). As seen in Table 9.3, even if 
we assume a 10 per cent or a 50 per cent rebound (take back of original demand 
reduction) the direct and supply chain savings are eroded but the CSM remains 
the same.16
 What actually changed the CSM are the re- spending decisions of households. 
To illustrate, we explored an alternative scenario where households spend all of 
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This leads to an increase of 514 kt in UK CO2 emissions and 794 kt globally. 
These findings indicate a more significant impact in the domestic supply chains 
than the international ones, signalling that the hotel and restaurant sector relies 
more on domestic suppliers than overseas. This finding is also reflected in the 
erosion of the CSM. The domestic CSM is eroded by 4 per cent (from 2.56 to 
2.48) while the global one is eroded by 3 per cent (from 2.69 to 2.57), demon-
strating a larger impact within the UK compared to abroad.
 In general, the methodological procedure used to calculate the CSM17 not 
only allows us to estimate the effectiveness of energy efficiency improvements, 
but also enables the disaggregation of the impacts along different supply chains. 
This way we can gain a better understanding on which sectors and in which 
nations are more likely to be impacted by an efficiency improvement and any 
subsequent re- spending decisions.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
In this chapter, we have discussed how rebound as a standalone indicator of the 
effectiveness of energy efficiency policies can be misleading and ultimately dis-
couraging for policymakers. A focus on rebounds highlights the failure to 
achieve the technologically feasible energy use reductions but neglects the wider 
range of economic and social benefits that energy efficiency improvements can 
deliver. As our work has shown, energy efficiency improvements can contribute 
to a range of policy objectives, beyond climate change alone.
 As shown in our UK case study, household energy efficiency improvements 
can provide a stimulus to a country’s economy, as IEA (2014) suggests is pos-
sible, leading to increases in employment, investment and wages, while achiev-
ing a substantial, yet smaller than anticipated, reduction in energy use. This 
observed rebound effect is not indicative of the failure of energy efficiency 
policy, rather it is a necessary companion to the broader improvements in social 
welfare that the efficiency improvements provide.
 Through this work, we have also highlighted that the magnitude of the benefits 
largely depends on the number and the purchasing power of the beneficiaries of 
energy efficiency. When the policy targets all households in an economy we 
achieve the maximum socio- economic benefits – which are likely to be substantial 
enough to cover the public funds required to support the efficiency improvement. 
However, policy often targets less privileged households that are less likely to be 
able to afford the efficiency improvement. In this case, our findings indicate that 
the energy efficiency improvement provides a smaller stimulus to the economy, 
while improving the welfare of low- income households through, for example, 
warmer homes. In the case where only the lowest- income households benefit from 
the improvement, it is of paramount importance to carefully design the policy and 
how it will be funded. Our research has shown that funding via increased taxation 
can be disruptive for the economy, leading to a slight reduction in economic activ-
ity, despite the realised benefits for low- income households. On the other hand, a 
reallocation of existing funds ultimately leads to an economic stimulus.
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 At the regional level, energy efficiency can also have expansionary impact 
to the economy. However, the greater openness in the goods and labour 
markets leads to differences in some of the indicators. Most notably, at the 
national level we observed a LR reduction in export activity due to a rise in 
prices, which is not observed when studying a region. The in- flow of labour 
puts downward pressure on wages and therefore prices leading to LR export 
levels that are on par to the pre- efficiency ones. Apart from that, even at the 
regional level, energy efficiency improvements deliver benefits in terms of 
GDP, employment, investment and household consumption increases, while 
also fulfilling the climate change policy role by driving reductions in economy- 
wide energy use. It can be seen then that energy efficiency can be used as an 
instrument for regional development.
 Part of the regional, and national, benefits gained by energy efficiency 
improvements are the increased revenue from taxes due to increased produc-
tion. This additional fiscal space could prove to be a useful tool to achieve 
further economic stimulus for the regional economy, provided that the region 
has the authority to use the accumulated budget savings. As we saw by exploring 
two different options, recycling the realised budgets savings has the potential to 
provide not just a demand- driven stimulus to the economy, if the savings are 
returned as increased government purchases, but also a permanent boost to 
competitiveness if the savings lead to a reduction of income tax rates. In any 
case, the combination of energy efficiency improvement and recycling of the 
accumulated budget savings from this improvement are useful policy tools in 
achieving macroeconomic targets for the regional economy.
 Our findings are in agreement with the IEA claims that energy efficiency can 
deliver, among other things, macroeconomic benefits for the wider economy. 
We have found this to be the case both for regional and national economies. It 
is important to keep in mind that this by no means implies that the entirety of 
the economy will be better off following an energy efficiency improvement. 
Instead, there will be winners and losers, with the energy sectors facing a drop 
in activity and, in some cases, particular household groups. Overall, energy effi-
ciency improvement is beneficial for both the economy and the environment, 
and this should be a strong incentive for policymakers to support such policies, 
always following careful consideration of the funding and what its impact 
might be.
 However, even though research such as ours demonstrates the macro-
economic benefits of energy efficiency, the use of rebound as an indicator of its 
effectiveness could still create barriers to the support of such policies. In an 
attempt to resolve this issue, we proposed and demonstrated the use of an altern-
ative metric, the CSM. CSM makes use of multiplier analysis, a familiar analyt-
ical tool for policymakers, to focus attention on the carbon or energy savings 
achieved, rather than failed to be achieved, while providing a fuller set of 
information to policymakers. This includes the spatial breakdown of the savings 
and/or any impacts from re- spending, along with the full set of information pro-
vided by the rebound indicator. Of course, there are limitations on the way in 
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which the CSM is calculated and used, but the combination, in future research 
projects, of CSM with the CGE models used for our two case studies, could 
resolve the existing issues.
 In summary, our project leads us to four main conclusions.
1 The rebound effect could be a misleading indicator in that it only accounts 
for the ‘negative’ portion of the outcome of an efficiency improvement in 
energy use. Evaluations of energy efficiency programmes should adopt a 
holistic approach and carefully assess the full range of benefits and costs of 
such programmes without focusing solely on a single indicator.
2 Improving household energy efficiency delivers both reduced energy use 
and increased economic activity. However, there is typically an inverse 
relation between the energy savings achieved and the size of the economic 
expansion. A bigger economy requires more inputs such labour and capital 
but also energy and other intermediate inputs.
3 Government- funded energy efficiency programmes can help low- income 
households who are not able to heat their homes properly. In addition, they 
can be used as a means of economic stimulus. However, the way in which 
the necessary funds are raised must be weighed carefully against the benefit 
of a more efficient use of energy.
4 Alternative measures such as the CSM can highlight the positive impact of 
energy efficiency improvements by focusing on the achieved savings in 
energy use and carbon emissions. This can be used as alternative to the 
rebound indicator and, in conjunction with other macroeconomic indi-
cators, provide policymakers with a more comprehensive picture of the 
likely impact of energy efficiency measures.
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Notes
 1 Reducing the need for energy would reduce the emissions associated with the genera-
tion and use of this energy.
 2 While this specific terminology originates with the IEA (2014), arguments and evid-
ence that energy efficiency will enhance economic welfare in a range of ways, includ-
ing as a result of macroeconomic expansion, have been considered in other studies, 
notably (in terms of reflecting on the recent dominant focus on rebound effects) in 
the recent contribution by Gillingham et al. (2016).
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 3 Consumer surplus is the difference between what people are willing to pay for a good 
and what they actually pay.
 4 As will be discussed in the relevant section, it is possible to spatially disaggregate the 
total carbon or energy savings, so that we observe the impact in a national or inter-
national level.
 5 To disaggregate the households in the CGE model, data from the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) Living Costs and Food Survey have been used. The methodology used 
by ONS is described in the technical reports that can be found here: www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/
methodologies/livingcostsandfoodsurvey#technical- report. Detailed information on the 
CGE model used for this case study can be found at Figus et al. (2017).
 6 The energy required to run a house constitutes what we refer to as residential energy. 
The key difference between a household’s residential energy use and total energy use 
is that in total energy use we include the energy required for private transportation 
purposes.
 7 Note that, while the enabling phase constitutes a temporary cost, the achieved effi-
ciency can be considered as permanent, at least throughout the lifetime of the 
accommodation.
 8 We assume that UK and imported goods and services are imperfect substitutes. As a 
result, UK consumers are more likely to turn to UK outputs rather than imported 
ones to spend their energy savings.
 9 Note that here we refer to both the reduction in the effective price of residential 
energy services driven by the increase in energy efficiency, and the reduction in the 
market price driven by the fall in demand for energy.
10 Details on the programme and its route map are available online at: www.gov.scot/
Resource/0053/00534980.pdf.
11 This reflects a situation where the government announces in advance its intention to 
divert some of the current spending to fund energy efficiency improvements for only 
5 years. This allows firms to have a clear vision of how future government spending 
are going to be allocated and to plan investment accordingly.
12 For a detailed exposition of the CGE model used please refer to Figus et al. (2018).
13 Differently from the UK case above, here we consider household energy efficiency 
improvements in all household energy use, including private transport. Hence, we 
call this household energy efficiency rather than residential.
14 We assume that wages respond immediately to changes in the economy. On the 
other hand, we assume that there is a single modelling period (year) lag in the migra-
tion response as workers observe the economic circumstances in the previous period 
and decide on whether to move or not in the current one. Essentially, migration 
occurs from year two onwards, until the labour market returns to equilibrium.
15 In our central scenario (FIXGOV) we assume fixed government spending, as also 
seen in Table 9.2. Therefore, any budget savings come from additional revenue from 
income taxes, indirect taxes on consumption goods etc.
16 This finding is accurate in an IO framework where we assume no changes in prices 
and wages. In a more sophisticated modelling approach such as CGE, which con-
siders a wider set of changes within the economy, this finding might not be the same.
17 For a detailed discussion of the methodology used please see Turner and Katris 
(2017).
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Part IV
Policy mixes and 
implications

10 Political acceleration of 
sociotechnical transitions
Lessons from four historical 
case studies
Cameron Roberts and Frank W. Geels
Introduction
Chapters in this book have already established that transitions in energy demand 
are inherently complex affairs, which resist attempts at straightforward modelling, 
forecasting or policy influence. This is to be expected, given that the sociotechnical 
approach that is core to this book emphasises complex interactions between 
different factors in the transition process. But it also creates a huge problem for 
policymakers looking for ways to make transitions happen quickly. By fully embrac-
ing the complexity and heterogeneity of transitions in energy demand, it becomes 
difficult to fully understand the implications of any one transition policy ex ante, 
much less to actively design policies to achieve particular outcomes. This chapter 
aims to address this problem using past transitions, which can give us a valuable 
window into how the sociotechnical complexities of transitions and their deliber-
ate acceleration play out in the real world.
 The historical research on transitions that has been conducted so far has 
given transition scholars plenty of discouraging news. Smil’s (2010) study of past 
energy transitions, for example, argues that they are necessarily long and arduous 
processes – a finding that will be discouraging to anybody who understands the 
urgency of reducing carbon emissions. Some scholars, unsurprisingly, have 
therefore tried to challenge this view, arguing that there is scope for transitions 
to sustainability to occur more quickly (Sovacool, 2016; Sovacool and Geels, 
2016). Typically, however, these arguments depend critically on intentionality, 
citing the fact that the past energy transitions cited by Smil had no powerful 
actors deliberately trying to speed them up, but that transitions to low- carbon 
energy systems, by virtue of their urgency, will be deliberately accelerated by 
governments and other powerful actors.
 This suggests another kind of historical investigation: What, in practice, 
occurs when policymakers deliberately try to accelerate sociotechnical trans-
itions? What political and policy strategies are most effective at doing this, what 
effects do they have, and under what circumstances are they most likely to be 
adopted? To answer these questions, this chapter uses four historical case studies 
of transitions that were deliberately, and successfully, accelerated by policy-
makers. We define a deliberately accelerated transition not necessarily as one 
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that was initiated by policy action, but one in which the rate of change was 
deliberately increased as a result of government policies.
 Our four case studies were selected to consider deliberately accelerated 
transitions occurring in a wide variety of contexts. First, we considered two 
different kinds of motivation for the deliberate acceleration of transitions: 
Problem- driven transitions, motivated by a dramatic crisis; and opportunity- 
driven transitions, driven by attempts to capitalise on a technological or eco-
nomic opportunity. Second, we considered drivers accounting for the 
development of a new system: Commercial development, in which most of 
this work comes from private companies (though, in line with the focus on 
deliberate acceleration, much of this is encouraged by policy incentives); and 
institutional development, in which government institutions plan and imple-
ment the transition directly. These criteria give us a 2x2 matrix of transitions 
(Figure 10.1). We have identified a transition to roughly occupy each of the 
four quadrants in this matrix:
1 The British transition from a railway- based transport system to a road- based 
transport system (1918–1972). This transition was mediated mainly by a 
private sector market for cars and travel, and exploited the opportunity pro-
vided by a new technology. It was accelerated by the public construction of 
highways in the 1960s.
















Figure 10.1 The positioning of the four case studies.
Source: the authors.
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2 The British transition from Victorian mixed agriculture to modern, special-
ised grain agriculture (1920–1970). This occurred in response to an urgent 
wartime food shortage and was implemented by individual farmers and agri-
cultural supply firms in the context of supportive policies.
3 The Dutch transition to a natural gas- dominated heating system 
(1945–1973). This occurred in response to a major opportunity in the form 
of the Slochteren gas field and was implemented mainly through state- 
coordinated infrastructure projects.
4 The Danish transition to an urban heating system dominated by district 
heating (1973–1990). This occurred in response to the 1973 and 1979 oil 
crises and was implemented primarily by state and municipal coordination 
efforts.
 In addition to the two dimensions outlined in Figure 10.1, this list of cases 
also allows us to study four countries, two sectors and several historical contexts. 
Commonalities occurring in these diverse transition contexts are likely to be 
important for deliberately accelerated transitions more generally. To study these 
case studies, we used secondary historical sources, chosen to reflect diverse 
aspects of the transition, including technologies and infrastructures; policies; 
changes in user preferences and markets; cultural discourses; and business 
developments.
 The following four sections present brief historical narratives of these case 
studies, broken into two phases: The formative phase, when the relevant tech-
nologies, institutions and networks of actors were taking shape, and the acceler-
ation phase, occurring after policymakers intervened in the transition and the 
rate of change sped up accordingly. In each phase, we describe both the devel-
opment of the niche technology, and the state of the incumbent regime with 
which it competed. These case studies inform an analysis section which looks 
for common patterns that might be hallmarks of successful policy acceleration 
of accelerated transitions towards reduced energy demand. It also considers the 
differences between the case studies, to look for ways in which their diverse con-
texts led to different strategies and outcomes. A final section draws conclusions 
from this analysis and proposes specific policy implications.
Case study 1: the transition from British Rail to 
road transport
Formative phase (1918–1945)
Prior to the First World War, the railways were the dominant form of transport in 
the United Kingdom. Cars were mainly an upper- class luxury. The war, however, 
had a major impact on both systems. The railways, which had been nationalised 
for war use, came out of the war faced with an unanswered policy question about 
how best to return them to the private sector (Aldcroft, 1975; Dyos and Aldcroft, 
1974). Due to fears about monopolism, the answer that policymakers arrived at 
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was to return the railways to private hands only on the condition that they abide 
by a strict programme of fare regulations, which among other measures subjected 
all fare changes to government review (Dyos and Aldcroft, 1974; Scott, 2002). 
Partly due to war damage, the railways struggled to provide adequate service. The 
railways’ strategy to overcome these difficulties largely consisted of a political cam-
paign, arguing for a relaxation of the regulations facing them. Despite some small 
victories in this campaign, the railways’ ability to compete with road transport was 
badly hampered during this period.
 Road transport, meanwhile, had benefited from the war. Wartime improve-
ments in vehicles and production technologies and infrastructures allowed 
price–performance improvements that put car ownership within reach of some 
of the upper- middle classes. Members of the working classes who had learned to 
drive during the war were also able to start lorry and bus businesses, often using 
military surplus vehicles (Aldcroft, 1975). Road transport thus rapidly moved 
from an upper- class luxury to a utilitarian transport system. New users developed 
new uses for cars, such as road touring (Jeremiah, 2007). Investors also took an 
interest in road transport businesses, including bus and lorry firms, car manufac-
turers, and road builders (Church, 1994). These businesses were able to compete 
successfully with the railways, due largely to the aforementioned regulatory 
imbalances (Roberts, 2015; Scott, 2002). Because the railways were unable to 
easily adjust their fares, bus or lorry operators could simply show up at railway 
stations before a train was leaving, and undercut it (Bagwell, 1988). Strategies 
like this, along with general public frustration with the railways, allowed these 
businesses to grow rapidly at the expense of the railway companies.
 The road industry, in turn, began to develop political power in the form of a 
well- organised motor lobby, as organisations such as the Royal Automobile 
Club, the Automobile Association, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and 
Traders, oil companies and road construction interests (Hamer, 1987). While 
these groups initially disagreed about their policy preferences and advocacy 
strategies, by the end of the 1930s they had coalesced behind the British Roads 
Federation, which advocated aggressively for greater government investment in 
motor roads. The British Roads Federation was supported in these efforts by per-
sistent growing pains in the road transport system, such as rural blight and the 
increasing rate of road accidents, both of which seemed to demand an infra-
structural solution (Dyos and Aldcroft, 1974; Jeremiah, 2007). They also bene-
fited from increasing public enthusiasm, which portrayed it as an exciting, 
efficient, and modern way to escape the tyranny of the railways. The result of all 
these pressures was that by the end of the 1930s, the British government was 
investing in a major programme of trunk road construction, with the slogan ‘the 
quickest way to safety’ (Roberts, 2015).
Acceleration phase (1945–1973)
At the end of the Second World War, the railways were once again faced with a 
backlog of wartime repairs. This time, however, they were never returned to 
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private hands: The post- war Labour government nationalised the trains under 
the British Transport Commission in 1948 (Aldcroft, 1975). In 1955 they 
launched a modernisation programme, designed to address wartime damage and 
bring new technologies, such as diesel traction, into use on the railways 
(Bonavia, 1981). This plan, however, was late to arrive, poorly designed, slow 
to be implemented, underfunded, and, ultimately, inadequate (Aldcroft, 1975). 
It also faced considerable public and political criticism; a problem which only 
worsened as it faced repeated cost overruns. Politicians and the media began 
criticising the railways as a Victorian system, out of step with modern times and 
therefore undeserving of state support (Roberts, 2015). In 1961, as policymakers 
became more and more reluctant to invest additional money into the railways, 
Transport Minister Ernest Marples appointed Richard Beeching to lead British 
Rail, giving him political cover as he made major cuts to the system, pruning it 
back only to its most profitable lines.
 The car industry, meanwhile, boomed after the Second World War (Church, 
1994), as middle- class incomes surged and cheaper cars, such as the Morris 
Minor, entered the market. Cars became fashionable, seen as a symbol of pro-
gress, prosperity and freedom. While the growth in car ownership was slowed 
during the immediate post- war years by an export- focused industrial policy, car 
ownership nevertheless increased rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s (Church, 
1994). Commercial road transport also flourished, as did related businesses, such 
as road builders. Politicians and the media began talking excitedly about a 
coming ‘motor age’ (Roberts, 2015).
 These developments, however, increased pressure on existing infrastructures, 
as the nation’s limited network of A roads was threatened with severe conges-
tion. Motorways quickly emerged as the favourite solution to this: The govern-
ment passed a Special Roads Act to permit their construction in 1949 
(Merriman, 2011). The motor lobby, meanwhile, had come out of the war more 
united and well resourced than ever, and had developed an effective strategy of 
targeting both local and national policymakers to advocate for the construction 
of specific motorways (Hamer, 1987). They scored an early victory with the 
completion of the Preston Bypass in 1958. That same year, the government 
began the construction of the M1, which was completed a year later. In 1962, 
Transport Minister Marples promised 1,000 miles of motorway in the next ten 
years; a target which was narrowly met in 1972. By then, the roads had become 
the country’s dominant transport infrastructure, with cars and buses together 
accounting for the majority of all travel.
Case study 2: the UK transition from traditional mixed 
farming to specialised wheat agriculture
Formative phase (1918–1938)
Traditional British agriculture was a Victorian system, in which farms used a 
mixture of crops and animals to create an interdependent system. Cleaning 
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crops helped with pest removal and were then fed to animals whose manure pro-
vided fertiliser. Most motive power, meanwhile, came from animal or human 
labour. This system, however, was in crisis during the agricultural depression of 
the interwar period, during which foreign imports undercut British grain pro-
duction, starving farms of income and investment. Workers moved to the cities, 
farmers abandoned their properties, and many fields were simply left to go 
fallow. Britain’s crop area declined from 147,000 acres in 1870 to 54,700 acres 
in 1930.
 This slowed the adoption of agricultural innovations. Tractors, combines, 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides were all first developed in the nineteenth 
century, and had diffused widely in grain- exporting countries such as the United 
States and Canada, by the 1930s. British farmers in the midst of the agricultural 
depression, however, were unable to invest in them (Martin, 2000). Machinery 
in particular also suffered technical teething problems, such as the challenges 
associated with using tractors on relatively small British farms. British farmers 
during this period were also broadly sceptical of technology (Holmes, 1985). 
Land improvements such as field drainage, a Victorian innovation that is par-
ticularly important in making heavy soils suitable for grain agriculture, were 
scaled back during this period.
 This situation created a reaction that set the stage for the later development 
of British agriculture. Aesthetic and cultural concerns about the impacts of the 
agricultural depression on the rural landscape became prominent in public dis-
course (Martin, 2000; Rooth, 1985). Farmers concerned about their situation 
also began agitating against the government (Wilt, 2001). This led the Conser-
vative government, concerned about the potential loss of important rural seats, 
to begin looking for ways to placate them. The immediate result of this was the 
passage of the 1932 Wheat Act, which set a fixed price for wheat, financed by a 
levy on flour (Grigg, 1989). Efforts to address the root of the problem, however, 
were blocked by international trade politics. British industrial strategy during 
this period emphasised the export of industrial goods and free trade, which gave 
grain- exporting countries, such as Canada, the USA and Australia, a strong 
influence over British trade policy (Rooth, 1985). Thus, at the 1932 Ottawa 
Conference, the same government that had passed the Wheat Act gave 
commonwealth nations privileged access to British grain markets, making 
Britain a dumping ground for Canadian and Australian grain (Wilt, 2001).
 Farmers continued to organise in light of this, with the farm lobby adopt-
ing a long- term strategy of cultivating deep connections with important gov-
ernment ministers (Wilt, 2001). The farm lobby, normally split between 
conflicting goals of the National Farmers’ Union (NFU), the Central Land-
owners Association and the agricultural labour unions, started to unite behind 
the NFU in favour of policies that would ensure British farmers’ income and 
farm production through mechanisms such as guaranteed prices, subsidies, 
and modernisation (Wilt, 2001). Government ministers built relationships 
with the new lobby, both to look for solutions to the agricultural depression, 
and to shore up their rural support.
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Acceleration phase (1945–1970)
In 1938, the Czech crisis made clear the urgency of securing the nation’s food 
supply in the event of a war. The war posed two threats to the food supply: First, 
German submarines threatened to block off food imports, and second, ships were 
needed to transport war material (Cox et al., 1987; Grigg, 1989). To cope with 
these problems, policymakers consulted with the farm lobby, and particularly with 
the NFU (Wilt, 2001). This relationship was further strengthened in 1939 by the 
appointment of Sir Reginald Dorman- Smith, former President of the Farmers’ 
Union, as Minister of Agriculture (Wilt, 2001). He developed a new policy para-
digm that was largely in line with what the NFU and its allies had been advo-
cating for years already, aiming to maximise production at reasonable prices for 
consumers, while protecting stable incomes for farmers (Bowers, 1985). To accom-
plish this, Dorman- Smith established a subsidised guaranteed price for wheat, as 
well as a far- reaching programme of agricultural modernisation. Because the addi-
tional horses needed to power the expanded production would take several years 
to breed, the only solution was to purchase Fordson tractors from the United 
States. Cheap loans were provided for machinery and land improvement, and the 
government established local War Agricultural Executive Committees, all of 
which included NFU representation, to assist with the modernisation and with 
putting more land into cultivation (Bowers, 1985; Grigg, 1989; Martin, 2000).
 These measures facilitated the successful expansion and modernisation of 
agriculture during the Second World War. They also entrenched the NFU in an 
increasingly strong position as the ‘right hand’ of the Ministry (Wilt, 2001). 
Wartime investment in farms, meanwhile, had knock- on effects. The increased 
use of machinery, in particular, demanded more space on farms for vehicles to 
manoeuvre, forcing farmers to simplify farm layouts and thus abandon mixed 
agriculture in favour of chemical fertilisers and pesticides (Whetham, 1974).
 These changes continued to take hold after the war, as farming evolved into 
an agri- business. In the policy sphere, institutional arrangements and problem 
definitions, particularly the fear of another war, meant that many policies to 
support farmers continued in the post- war period in order to maintain domestic 
food security (Cox et al., 1987). The NFU, meanwhile, became an important 
part of the agricultural policy process, fiercely defending agricultural subsidies 
(Cox et al., 1987). Institutional arrangements around farming became an ‘iron 
triangle’ linking the Ministry of Agriculture, NFU, agricultural supply industries 
and research organisations, which locked in a system of specialised agriculture 
during the post- war era.
Case study 3: the Dutch transition from coal to natural gas
Formative phase (1948–1959)
At the end of the Second World War, the heating sector in the Netherlands 
was dominated by coal. This Dutch coal industry, however, faced competition 
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on two fronts. Domestically, the price of coal was being undermined by oil 
heating, which was cleaner, more convenient, and easier to control precisely 
than coal furnaces (Correljé et al., 2003; Correljé and Verbong, 2004). Cheaper 
American coal was also undercutting Dutch coal, which had trouble competing 
due to the difficult geology of Dutch coal seams, as well as a strong labour 
market that forced Dutch coal mines to pay high wages (Correljé and Verbong, 
2004). The result was that while coal remained the dominant form of heating in 
the Netherlands, the commercial and political power of the coal industry was 
weakening. The government, meanwhile, had no energy policy to speak of, and 
public discourse about energy issues was rather limited.
 While this was happening, two industries provided a niche for the develop-
ment of gas heating. The first of these was city gas produced locally in cities 
using gasified coal, or piped in from coke furnaces, and used primarily for 
cooking (Correljé and Verbong, 2004). The second was a growing oil industry 
in the north of the country, which produced natural gas as a by- product. Oil 
companies saw this gas as a distraction from their primary product and looked 
for ways to get rid of it as reliably as possible, rather than looking for a very high 
profit. They were therefore happy to sell it at cheap, prearranged prices to public 
utilities (Correljé et al., 2003). This allowed the northern village of Coevorden 
to be the site of the first Dutch experiments with natural gas for heating, 
cooking, and lighting (Raven and Verbong, 2007).
 The government, interested in creating a national gas supply system, bro-
kered an agreement in 1954 between the State Gas Company (SGB) and the 
Dutch Petroleum Company (abbreviated in Dutch as NAM), a business alliance 
of the oil companies Exxon and Shell. The agreement said that SGB would 
have a monopoly to distribute NAM’s gas on a cost- plus basis (Correljé and 
Verbong, 2004). While local city gas interests blocked the further expansion of 
natural gas infrastructure (Raven and Verbong, 2007), this agreement establish 
some important principles for the future development of natural gas, most 
importantly that it would be produced on the basis of monopoly production, 
with fixed prices (Correljé et al., 2003).
Acceleration phase (1959–1973)
In 1959, the Dutch oil industry discovered the Slochteren gas field in the north 
of the country. The sheer volume of gas in this field threatened to overwhelm 
existing institutions and infrastructures (Correljé and Verbong, 2004). The gov-
ernment and the oil industry therefore began negotiations to determine how 
best to exploit the Slochteren field. While these negotiations were facilitated by 
the principles established in the 1954 agreement and the existence of a broadly 
pro- business political culture, there were tensions between different opinions 
and goals. Shell proposed a segmented market approach. Exxon, however, had 
had problems with such an approach in the United States, when cheap natural 
gas had undermined their oil business. They therefore proposed a full- scale 
national transition to natural gas for heating, cooking, and many industrial uses. 
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The state, which was mainly interested in maximising tax revenue, was eventu-
ally persuaded of the value of Exxon’s approach, and hammered out the specifics 
of the relevant legislation using a ‘pre- baked’ negotiation process, in which 
different segments of Dutch society were represented in closed- door meetings 
(Correljé and Verbong, 2004).
 Full agreement was reached in 1962: A nationwide network of gas infrastruc-
ture would be built, connecting all Dutch cities to the Slochteren field. NAM 
would have a monopoly on gas in the Netherlands, and the gas would be sold at 
a market value price, set at the same level as heat from coal or oil. Consumers, 
as a result, would neither lose nor gain financially from the deal. This principle 
would guarantee considerable profits for NAM, due to the relative cheapness of 
natural gas extraction and distribution, while approximately 70 per cent of the 
gas’s value would be recouped by the state due to various taxes and fees (Correljé 
et al., 2003). City gas interests, meanwhile, were simply side- lined from the 
negotiations.
 Once this agreement was reached, the explicit alliance of the state with 
prominent businesses allowed a rapid expansion of the natural gas system. Pipe-
line construction began in 1963, and despite the delicate negotiations to over-
come the obstacles put up by various local interests, the pipelines had reached 
every mainland municipality by 1968 (Correljé et al., 2003). Meanwhile, a 
nationwide publicity campaign, portraying natural gas as clean, efficient, and 
modern, combined with a rebate programme for appliance conversions, success-
fully persuaded consumers to switch to natural gas heating (Correljé and 
Verbong, 2004). Often, city gas workers were hired to make the necessary retro-
fits to consumer appliances (Correljé et al., 2003).
 What remained of resistance from coal interests was disarmed using a similar 
strategy of compensation. Coal workers were offered retraining schemes, while 
coal companies were given lucrative positions in the natural gas regime 
(Correljé and Verbong, 2004). Coal interests attempted a ‘cosy coal’ advertising 
campaign, but this was largely ineffective. By the 1970s, natural gas accounted 
for the vast majority of Dutch heating; the system had achieved political lock- in 
due to significant tax revenues that helped fund the Dutch welfare state; and 
the last coal mines were being closed (Correljé et al., 2003).
Case study 4: the Danish transition from oil to district heating
Formative phase (1945–1973)
Denmark became heavily dependent on oil for most forms of energy after the 
end of the Second World War, as cheap foreign supplies quickly displaced indi-
genous energy sources (Chittum and Østergaard, 2014; Johansen, 1986). By 
1973, imported fuels, mostly oil, accounted for more than 90 per cent of Danish 
energy supply. As with the Netherlands, there was no meaningful government 
energy policy during this period, nor was there any major public discourse about 
energy issues. Most policies influenced the energy system only inadvertently. 
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Post- war housing policies and local government reforms, for example, gave 
municipalities increasing control over local infrastructures.
 Not all Danish heating, however, used individual household boilers. District 
heating had been developing as a niche technology in Denmark since 1903, 
mostly using waste heat from power plants or industry, and run by either muni-
cipalities or local cooperatives (Eikeland and Inderberg, 2016). The consolida-
tion of the electricity system after the war allowed the expansion of this system, 
as urban generating systems made increasing use of combined heat and power. 
District heating in Denmark also benefited from some cultural and institutional 
facts about Danish society, such as an affinity for cooperative enterprises, often 
seen as a core part of Danish identity (Campbell et al., 2006). This found policy 
expression in municipal kommunekredit arrangements, in which municipal gov-
ernments would underwrite loans to cooperative enterprises, including those 
involved with expanding the district heating system. It also ensured that many 
early district heating systems would be run on a non- profit basis, contributing to 
their social, cultural, and political legitimation. By the time the energy crisis hit 
in 1973, Danish district heating accounted for 30 per cent of Danish homes, 
and had a strong set of established practices, technologies and networks.
Acceleration phase (1973–1990)
The 1973 oil crisis hit Denmark especially hard, due to its heavy dependence on 
foreign oil. Danish cities had to resort to extreme measures, such as turning off 
every other street light and banning Sunday driving, to conserve energy (Johansen, 
1986). High indirect taxes and public austerity imposed by the government in 
response to the crisis created high unemployment and a negative growth rate 
(Johansen, 1986). This created a sense of urgency among Danish policymakers and 
the public, as they debated ways to avoid a future energy crisis. The Danish gov-
ernment quickly overturned its old laissez- faire approach to energy policy, and 
began planning interventions in the energy system, the first of which was the cre-
ation of the Danish Energy Agency in 1975 (Hawkey, 2016).
 While the lack of a domestic fossil fuel energy source made it easy to reach 
agreement about the need to transition away from oil, there was controversy 
over what exactly should be used as an alternative. Early policy papers preferred 
a nuclear–electric system, in which a series of new nuclear power plants would 
power heat pumps to heat Danish homes and buildings (Nyborg and Røpke, 
2015). This plan, however, ran into a series of obstacles. Public concern about 
the environmental effects of nuclear power led to widespread opposition 
(Nyborg and Røpke, 2015). Electrical utilities, who might have been the key 
industrial supporters about the plan, were instead lukewarm about it: The plan 
called for just one power company to be given the license to operate nuclear 
power plants, and neither of Denmark’s two biggest utilities wanted to risk being 
the one left out of the deal (Hawkey, 2017). Because the nuclear–electric 
heating plan relied so heavily on a few very large and controversial pieces of 
infrastructure, these issues became massive handicaps.
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 An alternative approach, supported by several prominent academic and 
activist groups as well as many on the political left (Johansen, 1986), was to 
heat buildings using district heating and combined heat and power. While it did 
not initially benefit from state support, this plan had many political, techno-
logical, and institutional advantages over nuclear–electric heating. District 
heating already enjoyed favourable public opinion and it could also be easily 
expanded incrementally, meaning that it required less political consensus to go 
ahead. As public concern about nuclear power increased, it became a popular 
option. While the political divide over the solution to the energy problem 
meant that policies explicitly supporting district heating were slow to be imple-
mented during the 1970s, it made far more incremental progress than the 
nuclear plan. The 1976 Electricity Supply Act, for example, mandated that all 
new electricity production, apart from renewables, must be combined heat and 
power. This created a ready supply of heat that could be used for future district 
heating projects (Chittum and Østergaard, 2014; Hawkey, 2016).
 In 1979, a second energy crisis, combined with public resistance to nuclear 
power, finally settled the debate, and the Heat Supply Act of that year used 
several aggressive policy measures to accelerate the uptake of district heating. 
It required municipalities to produce five- year heating plans and granted 
broad legal powers with which to enforce them. It established different 
heating zones, some of which were designated only for district heating expan-
sion (Chittum and Østergaard, 2014; Hawkey, 2016). It also included strong 
consumer protections: All district heating systems were to be run on a non- 
profit basis; consumers were to be given representation on their boards; and 
in the event of any district heating system being sold, its customers would be 
given the right of first refusal to purchase it and form a cooperative (Chittum 
and Østergaard, 2014). Policies passed throughout the 1980s further acceler-
ated the system’s growth, sometimes deliberately and sometimes unintention-
ally. Energy taxes, for example, passed mainly for fiscal reasons, made oil even 
less competitive with district heating, and other legislation from that period 
simply required buildings to connect to district heating networks, or forbade 
electric power in new buildings (Klok et al., 2006). Less coercive contribu-
tions to the acceleration of the transition to district heating came from meas-
ures like the Danish Energy’s technical catalogues, which spread technical 
knowledge, or kommunekredit arrangements, that ensured the availability of 
capital.
 The combined impacts of these policies were a rapid acceleration in the 
development of district heating. While district heating networks are capital- 
intensive, government policies ensuring stable markets and low financial risks 
ensured that the district heating systems enjoyed cheap financing (Danish 
Energy Agency, 2012). This, combined with strong consumer confidence and 
ever- increasing technical competence among Danish district heating businesses 
and engineers, allowed the system to grow rapidly and continuously. In the 
present day, 60 per cent of Danish houses are connected to district heating net-
works; twice as many as before the energy crisis (Statistics Denmark, 2016).
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Analysis
On their most basic level, these case studies show that it is possible for govern-
ments to deliberately increase the pace of sociotechnical change. They also show 
that successful strategies for deliberately accelerating transitions do not typically 
rely on market mechanisms alone, as the policies used in every single one of our 
case studies involved some level of direct government intervention. This could 
take the form of direct investment in infrastructure, as was the case in the British 
transport and Dutch natural gas. It could also involve intervention in markets, as 
was the case with the British government’s fixed price for wheat, the Dutch gov-
ernment’s fixed price for gas, or the Danish government’s non- profit requirement 
for district heating companies. The Danish and Dutch cases also show the value of 
direct, prescriptive planning of new systems, by either national or municipal gov-
ernments. This finding has important implications for the role of market- based 
mechanisms (such as carbon taxes) versus more direct intervention strategies for 
the acceleration of transitions in energy demand.
 This level of intervention, however, brings with it another problem. Because 
each of the case studies considered here depended on highly aggressive policy 
interventions, they also necessarily depended on a political context that facilit-
ated these interventions, whether it took the form of a major public crisis, as in 
the British agricultural and Danish district heat cases, public enthusiasm for a 
new technology, as in the British transport case, or the government’s ability to 
conduct negotiations behind the scenes, as in the Dutch heating case. This 
finding, that deliberate acceleration is not just a policy problem, but is also a 
political problem, is not new. Past research on sociotechnical transitions has 
often highlighted the political difficulties inherent in accelerating them (Geels, 
2014; Meadowcroft, 2011). The comparative historical approach advanced in 
this chapter, however, can help address this issue by suggesting ways that these 
political challenges can be addressed.
 Both the policy and political questions are addressed by three key similarities. 
Because these occur reliably in four diverse case studies, there is a strong case that 
they are more general attributes of successfully accelerated transitions. The first of 
these is the lack of strong resistance to deliberate acceleration policies from regime 
actors. In some cases, this was partly due to exogenous conditions. Deliberate 
acceleration in the Dutch and British cases, for example, relied on the structural 
weakness of the coal and rail industries respectively, while in the British agri-
culture case, deliberate acceleration owed much of its success to a major landscape 
disruption of the food importation regime. In the Danish heating case, incumbent 
resistance was avoided by the absence of a domestic oil industry in the first place. 
This does not suggest, however, that policymakers should simply sit and wait for 
the right conditions to weaken regime opposition. The right policies can help 
disarm regime resistance, either during the formative phase, as was the case with 
British rail regulations which created a structural weakness in the incumbent rail 
industry, or in the acceleration phase, as was the case with Dutch government 
policies to compensate coal incumbents during the transition to natural gas.
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 The second similarity is the lack of strong public opposition to the deliberate 
acceleration. This sometimes benefited from explicitly positive discourses sup-
porting the new system, as was the case with British transport and Dutch natural 
gas. In the case of Danish district heating, it arose from a deeper cultural affinity 
for the new system, due to its suitability for cooperative enterprise. As with the 
previous point, however, policies could also be designed to encourage public 
support, or at least to disarm public opposition. In the case of Danish district 
heating this was done by including strong consumer protections in the legis-
lation aimed at accelerating the transition. In the Dutch natural gas case it was 
done by protecting the public from any adverse effects of the transition by 
limiting prices and then simply shutting them out of the process by conducting 
negotiations behind closed doors.
 The final similarity in all four cases is the existence of a viable niche 
innovation before the transition was deliberately accelerated. In Danish dis-
trict heating and British agriculture, a mature niche innovation developed 
independently of government interventions. In the latter case, in fact, most 
of the technological capabilities for industrial wheat agriculture were per-
fected in foreign countries. In the other two cases, however, the mature niche 
innovation and its supporting networks emerged partly as a result of policies 
implemented during the formative phase. In the case of Dutch natural gas, 
this occurred with the help natural gas networks in Coevorden in the 1950s, 
and in the case of British transport, this occurred due to road construction 
programmes of the 1920s and 1930s.
 The common theme to all these similarities is that they all remove potential 
sources of friction that could impede deliberate acceleration policies. This fric-
tion can come from incumbents, from the public or from technological teething 
problems. Another point that comes out from this analysis is that in many cases 
of successful acceleration, these sources of friction do not exist at the outset due 
to contextual conditions. There is also, however, evidence that where they do 
exist, they can be deliberately removed through strategic policies, often in a way 
that supplements favourable contextual conditions. This suggests that, while 
context matters, policymakers’ hands are not tied when it comes to accelerating 
transitions in energy demand, and that they can, with the right strategy, create 
their own luck by disarming possible barriers.
 It is a salient point in and of itself that the main similarity between all four 
cases is the lack of certain key impediments to accelerating the transition, rather 
than any specific positive drivers. This suggests that while positive drivers can 
vary depending on the specificities of each political and transition context, the 
absence of a few key sources of friction, whether this occurs by happenstance or 
policy design, is important. It is, nevertheless, worthwhile to consider what 
common drivers of the transition occur between the four case studies. One has 
already been mentioned above: The absence of technical obstacles to block the 
transition depends on the positive presence of a viable niche innovation. This 
can be seen clearly in all four cases, none of which involved attempts to develop 
and upscale a brand- new technology or system from scratch.
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 Beyond this aforementioned point, there are two important positive similarities 
between the cases. The first is the involvement in each case of organised actors 
outside of government, not just as political lobbyists (though this was an important 
function, particularly in the UK transport case), but as on- the-ground enactors of 
change that shared the government’s vision. This was particularly obvious in the 
Dutch case, with the importance of the oil and gas industry in negotiating and 
implementing the transition plan, and in the British transport case, where the car 
and road industries played such a key role. It played a slightly different role in the 
other two cases. In the British agricultural case, farm organisations, particularly 
the NFU, played a key role during the war, when they were even given spots on 
the War Agricultural Executive Committees. In the Danish district heating case, 
this role was played by rural energy cooperatives and municipal utilities, many of 
whom were already invested in district heating, and who helped develop the rel-
evant infrastructure. These alliances with practitioners outside of government 
played a key role in each case, due both to the political leverage and the on- the-
ground implementation skills that they provided.
 A final major driver that appears in all four cases is relative consensus within 
political institutions. Not one of these cases included any significant opposition 
to the deliberate acceleration by opposition parties or large activist groups, and 
indeed many of them are marked by a high degree of unity between actors in 
the policy process. In the British agricultural case, this took the form of the 
NFU uniting disparate farm groups, which represented different and often con-
flicting interests within the agricultural system (labour, landowners, farmers 
themselves), to fight the wider collective threat posed by imports and the agri-
cultural depression. This allowed a very clear assertion of agricultural interests 
to the government, which was itself relatively united, with the governing 
Conservative Party having a strong incentive to listen to the farmers, and the 
opposition Labour party doing little if anything to oppose the changes.
 Similar policy consensus was formed in the Dutch case by the ‘pre- baking’ of 
the transition plan, in a closed- door meeting between representatives of 
different political groups. This enabled a heat bill with enough compromises 
that the opposition did not oppose it. In the British transport case, enthusiasm 
for motorway construction and road transport more generally occurred in both 
major parties, with the post- war Labour government writing legislation to 
provide for motorways that the Conservatives then built. The Danish case is 
perhaps the strongest demonstration of this point, because it was precisely the 
lack of a strong political consensus that held up any energy transition for six 
years between the energy crisis in 1973 and the passage of the Heat Supply 
Act in 1979. Once the government gave in to those who opposed the 
nuclear–electric plan and embraced district heating, things were able to change 
quickly. The importance of these kinds of united political fronts was most likely 
due to the fact that the deliberate acceleration of transitions is a big, ambitious 
policy that is easily derailed by political opposition. Therefore, support from 
opposition parties and other political factions is critical in ensuring that efforts 
to accelerate change can be sustained.
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 There are also, however, important differences in how each of these trans-
itions occurred. These relate primarily to the role of national and historical 
context in shaping what kinds of interventions were viable in each case. These 
case studies identify three important contextual factors that influence this. The 
first of these has to do with the political economy of the country in which 
the transition takes place. In the United Kingdom, a liberal market economy, the 
most viable acceleration strategies depended on price interventions, subsidies or 
infrastructural projects, whose second- order effects accelerated the transition 
through market mechanisms (although the fixed price for wheat during the 
Second World War was an exception to this). Denmark and the Netherlands, 
both of which are coordinated market economies, were also able to supplement 
market strategies with aggressive and sometimes coercive interventions such as 
price fixing, regulations, and detailed planning, often to impressive effect.
 Another important difference is the magnitude of the crises that spurred gov-
ernment action. Political momentum for policy changes emerged very quickly 
in the two cases involving sudden, urgent problems: British agriculture and 
Danish district heating. In each of these cases, the political status quo shifted 
almost overnight from support of incumbents to support of radical change. The 
Dutch district heating and British transport cases, meanwhile, relied on oppor-
tunities rather than problems for political momentum, meaning that this 
momentum was built up more gradually.
 A final important difference is the existence or non- existence of a policy 
consensus in the formative phase. This had important implications for the tem-
porality of the acceleration phase. Sometimes, expert consensus emerges around 
desirable policy interventions in advance of the necessary political conditions to 
implement these interventions (Kingdon, 1984). This was the case in British 
agriculture, where government ministers became increasingly sympathetic to 
the NFU’s suggestions before the outbreak of war but could not implement them 
due to international politics. It also occurred in the Dutch case, where the gov-
ernment maintained an interest in a nationwide natural gas infrastructure 
throughout the 1950s. In both of these cases, the prior consensus allowed policy 
action to follow very quickly after the crisis. In the Danish and British transport 
cases, however, the crisis provided political consensus in advance of any con-
sensus on policy, resulting in a period of urgent debate that delayed policies for 
deliberate acceleration. In the British transport case, this took the form of piece-
meal attempts to improve rail transport and integrate it with the roads during 
the 1950s. In the Danish case, it took the form of a six- year long period of 
debate between the proponents of nuclear–electric heating and district heating.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Despite taking place in very different contexts, our four case studies have three 
important things in common. In each one, there is a lack of regime resistance to 
the acceleration of the transition, a lack of public resistance to the transition 
and a mature niche technology that can be exploited. The fact that these occur 
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in such a diverse set of cases suggests they are features of deliberate acceleration 
more generally. Our research also shows that both the creation of favourable 
conditions, and the exploitation of pre- existing favourable conditions, are reli-
able options for deliberate acceleration policies.
 Our cases also show that factors such as governance structure, different kinds of 
crises and the role of policy consensus can lead to different temporal patterns of 
acceleration, and to different kinds of policies being effective at accelerating trans-
itions. It is therefore important for policymakers to pay attention to their context 
in order to design the right kinds of interventions for deliberate acceleration.
 These findings suggest a few key policy implications for the deliberate accel-
eration of transitions in energy demand:
•	 Successful	policy	interventions	are	likely	to	take	advantage	of	technologies	
that are already well developed, with strong supporting networks. These 
can be developed using innovation policies in advance of deliberate accel-
eration.
•	 If	 there	 is	a	 strong	 regime	that	might	block	deliberate	acceleration	of	 the	
transition, policy interventions may find a way to weaken its influence, 
either by empowering its opponents or by introducing regulations that will 
weaken its power.
•	 Successful	 acceleration	policies	 are	 likely	 to	promote	new	 technologies	 as	
public goods, avoiding monopolies or coercive policies that will aggrieve 
users.
•	 The	odds	of	success	at	deliberate	acceleration	will	be	greatly	increased	if	the	
government promoting these policies can forge a strong united front, both 
with industry and practitioner communities, and with other factions within 
political institutions.
•	 Finally,	though	these	four	case	studies	are	instructive,	policymakers	should	
be cautious trying to copy lessons from foreign examples, and should take 
into account the political, economic, cultural and technological particulari-
ties of the systems they wish to influence.
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11 The challenge of effective 




‘It’s all been about cost and not use’ said a former member of UK Parliament, 
now a member of the House of Lords. He went on to suggest that political sens-
itivities over energy prices are damaging the prospects for effective policies to 
save energy and reduce bills. This was, he observed, because such policies are 
regarded as increasing the price of energy. This is true in the immediate sense, 
because current government practice is to add the costs of policy to energy 
tariffs, rather than meeting them from tax revenues. There is however ample 
evidence that even when the costs of energy efficiency policy are added to 
tariffs, this has resulted in lower bills (Rosenow et al., 2017). Moreover, beyond 
savings on bills, reducing the need for energy in buildings, particularly for 
heating, has integral societal benefits for welfare, climate protection and jobs 
(Deasley and Thornhill, 2017; Rosenow et al., 2017; Washan et al., 2014). 
Using less energy is also a means to improve system security and resilience: it 
reduces reliance on imports and should lower the total costs of developing a 
low- carbon system (Watson et al., 2017).
 The UK government however seems slow to respond to the evidence of 
multiple benefits, despite the best efforts of researchers, advisory bodies and 
lobbyists. This chapter explores reasons for this paradox. It considers the 
impact of a political focus on the short- term cost of energy efficiency policies 
and asks whether this is effective even within its own terms of cost reduction. 
It also considers whether its short- termism downgrades public goods of climate 
protection and societal welfare. The account is informed by a sociological per-
spective and is based on ethnographic study of policymaking practices in the 
UK. It departs from the more familiar economic evaluation of policy to con-
sider the experiences of a sample of policymakers, government advisers and 
industry practitioners. This approach is adopted because there is already con-
sistent evidence about the societal value of upgrading our building stock and 
reducing the need to use energy for heating. What is lacking is the more inter-
pretative exploration of why such apparently clear evidence does not lead to 
more concerted policy action. Instead, there is continuing contest and struggle 
over policy costs relative to societal benefit, resulting in policy instability and 
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uncertainty. Investment in upgrading buildings and appliances has been 
uneven and has declined significantly in the last few years. Current policy is 
also regarded as too limited to meet climate protection targets, even after any 
additional policies implied by the UK Clean Growth Strategy 2017 are taken 
into account (CCC, 2018).
 The chapter begins with a summary of recent patterns of energy use in build-
ings and the impacts of policy changes, before moving to discussion of con-
temporary energy efficiency policymaking. The qualitative data are derived from 
interviews, policy documents, observation and participation in policy forums. 
Specifically, the account is based on: 12 interviews with 15 expert representa-
tives of the main parties to energy efficiency policymaking in the UK (6 UK 
government officials, 1 representative of a government advisory agency, 7 repre-
sentatives of energy efficiency trade, business and campaigning organisations, 
and one senior researcher and former energy advisory body manager). I also 
attended, and participated in, trade conferences and government and advisory 
body meetings concerned with energy efficiency and low- carbon heat policy. 
Lastly, I was chair of the Advisory Group contributing to the UK Committee on 
Climate Change (CCC) 2016 advice to UK government: Next Steps for Heat 
and Energy Efficiency. The different data sources are used as a means of triangu-
lation between perspectives and help to minimise over- reliance on a single 
source. The material is part of a larger dataset from comparative research on 
heat and energy efficiency policy and practice in Denmark, Germany and UK.
Energy use in UK buildings and energy efficiency policy
Energy use has been decreasing during the early part of the twenty- first century. 
In households for example there has been a 29 per cent reduction in average 
energy use since 2004, and the average annual energy bill has reduced by £490 
between 2004 and 2015 despite increasing energy prices (Deasley and Thorn-
hill, 2017; Rosenow, 2012; Rosenow et al., 2017). Much of the change is attrib-
uted to the effects of policies, in particular the successive variants of the Energy 
Supplier Obligation (ESO) although this was first introduced in 1994 (Mal-
laburn and Eyre, 2014; Rosenow et al., 2017). Regulatory requirements to use 
condensing boilers for gas central heating, and incremental increases in Euro-
pean Union (EU) efficiency standards of electrical appliances have also played a 
critical role (CEBR, 2011; Elwell et al., 2015). In this period then, policies to 
improve energy performance of buildings and appliances have been associated 
with both reduced energy use and cost savings. Furthermore, analysis demon-
strates that socially cost- effective energy efficiency measures could reduce house-
hold energy use by a further 25 per cent by 2030, with benefits including lower 
bills, better health, and fewer households in fuel poverty, as well as climate pro-
tection (Rosenow et al., 2017).
 The evidence has however failed to convince the UK government to main-
tain public investment in energy- saving policies. Instead, since 2012 an increas-
ingly politicised debate on energy prices has resulted in withdrawal of all public 
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funding for energy efficiency and significant reductions in the ESO budget 
(CCC, 2017). Public funding for the Warm Front scheme for low- income 
households in England has ended, and ESO energy- saving targets have been 
lowered. The 2016 zero carbon homes policy in England was also withdrawn in 
2015, despite cross- sector support for its implementation. Annual UK invest-
ment in energy efficiency has declined by 53 per cent and there has been an 80 
per cent to 90 per cent reduction in number of household measures installed 
since 2012, with the sharpest declines in England (ACE, 2016; CCC, 2016).
 Scotland is the exception to this pattern, as is discussed further in the recom-
mendations and conclusions section of the chapter. Other UK policies have also 
been removed or scaled back, and energy savings and emission reductions in 
public and commercial buildings have stalled since 2008 (CCC, 2017). The 
CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme for large energy users in public and private 
sectors was designed originally as an energy- saving incentive but became a form 
of energy tax and has been on hold since a review of business energy taxes was 
announced in 2015. The UK Clean Growth Strategy 2017 includes aspirations 
for improved energy efficiency in buildings, but the necessary policies are 
missing (Carbon Brief, 2017; CCC, 2018). The UK CCC 2018 review of the 
Strategy also concludes that even if the promised heat and energy efficiency pol-
icies materialise, these will be insufficient to meet the legislated 4th 
(2023–2027) and 5th (2028–2032) carbon budgets for buildings.
A sociological perspective on UK energy efficiency policy
There are quite a lot of reports out there now … that show a really clear 
story that there is a very positive net benefit from energy efficiency at the 
national level, and it’s getting us nowhere.
(CEO Trade Association A)
Given the gap between evidence of societal benefits of reducing energy use and 
policy to secure such benefits, the sociological conjecture explored here is that 
effective policy is hampered by contemporary political adherence to classical 
economic theory of efficient markets as the core solution to societal problems. 
The commitment to extending the sphere of markets as a means to govern the 
allocation of resources has characterised neoliberal modes of UK government 
since the 1980s (Bowman et al., 2014; Crouch, 2011; Hodges and Lapsley, 
2016). Sociologists of scientific knowledge argue that such economic theory is 
not simply derived from empirical findings about existing markets but is instru-
mental in attempts to format such an economy and bring it into being (Beunza 
et al., 2006; Callon, 1998). It is a theory that is being tested in vivo, and sociolo-
gists are studying its material impacts on societies (Mackenzie et al., 2007).
 In line with the sociology of science and economic sociology, dynamics of 
energy supply and use are interpreted not as a result of universal laws of markets, 
but as governed by societal institutions (including in the UK those of consumer 
capitalism), theories and technical expertise, codes of conduct and understandings 
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of normal practice (Caliskan and Callon, 2009; Shove, 2017). Energy prices are 
interpreted as socially organised facts, and not as abstract summations of market 
information (Beunza et al., 2006). Energy efficiency policies are components of 
the sociotechnical arrangements that constitute markets. Tensions over policy 
costs relative to energy prices are interpreted as politically inflected and 
entangled with competing economic theories about value (Fligstein, 1996).
 The privatisation and liberalisation of the UK energy system during the 
1980s and 1990s is a central example of the application of classical economic 
theory to the redesign of the energy system. Energy is now constituted as a 
market commodity, and price is used as the critical indicator of value. Energy 
use is defined as a matter of the financial economics of supply and demand. The 
model consumer is expected to understand the concept of economic self- interest 
and to respond by, for example, switching energy suppliers or upgrading prop-
erty, where this results in a calculable financial return. Policy and regulation are 
defined ex ante as sources of market costs and inefficiencies, rather than as a 
means to secure public goods. Government’s role becomes that of ‘supporting 
the market to discover solutions’, including shaping the market ‘where necessary 
to overcome barriers’ (DECC, 2013, p. 7).
 Applied to energy saving, the efficient markets hypothesis assumes that rising 
energy prices will increase economic opportunities to invest in building or appli-
ance upgrades which deliver the same, or better, material standards from using 
less energy. All property owners, whether domestic or commercial, are expected 
to act on the same logic: when the modelled financial savings from insulation or 
appliance upgrades, discounted over the notional lifetime of the measures, are 
greater than the capital costs of installing them, then investment should follow. 
On the supplier side, where a service can be provided more cheaply by investing 
in energy efficiency rather than selling energy, then in theory the supplier 
should choose the efficiency option. The value of energy saving is hence equated 
primarily to a monetary sum recoverable over a relatively short term which 
demonstrates its cost- effectiveness compared to other spending options. As one 
interview respondent said, ‘in the UK we do seem to take quite a strict defini-
tion of what we see our benefits to be. So, it’s very much based around what … 
can be financialised …’ (Policy Manager, UK Trade Association B).
 According to such economic theory, investing in energy saving has value 
when the costs are paid back from energy bill reductions in a relatively short 
period. The corresponding political perspective is that policy imposes costs that 
damage market efficiencies. Any policy measure therefore has to pass a cost- 
efficiency test: is policy cost outweighed by evidence of its beneficial market 
impact in overcoming something defined as a barrier? The existence of barriers 
to an efficient market is usually inferred from low demand for retrofit from prop-
erty owners, despite evidence of monetary benefit. Property owners are defined 
as economically rational consumers whose failure to act on evidence of eco-
nomic advantage is caused by ‘barriers’ such as lack of information about oppor-
tunities, perceptions of inconvenience and disruption, lack of trust in suppliers, 
or perverse incentives (CCC, 2016, 2018). Whether the costs of a policy 
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designed to ameliorate these factors are justified by evidence of value in expand-
ing the energy efficiency market is however subject to political contest. There is 
for example disagreement over what counts as relevant factors to be included in 
a calculation of costs and benefits, and over the value and weighting to be 
attached to them.
 The argument about the material consequences of this approach to energy 
efficiency policy is developed in the following three sections, first in relation to 
the ESO, then in relation to the Green Deal, and lastly in relation to the UK 
response to the EU Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. In the sub-
sequent sections of the chapter, these examples inform discussion of the 
counter- efficiencies of using policy to make efficient markets, and reflection on 
the structural problems of institutionalising energy- saving policy in UK govern-
ment. Finally, I consider some of the ways forward and conclude with a summary 
of the argument.
The ESO: designing policy to address market failure?
The Carbon Emissions Reduction Target, which was a supplier obligation, 
treated something like eight million homes, came in under cost, was very 
effective in terms of treating carbon emissions.
(UK BEIS Official, economist)
The ESO is a major example of the application of efficient markets theory to 
domestic energy efficiency policy. It was originally designed to overcome a per-
ceived flaw in the design of liberalised energy markets, following privatisation of 
gas and electricity. The disaggregated market structure had provided motivation 
for energy suppliers to increase their profitability by increasing sales, while 
keeping wholesale market prices down and minimising the costs of customer ser-
vices. The SO, introduced in 1994, aimed to change the market calculus by 
enforcing an energy- saving target on large suppliers. It was intended to simulate 
the economic rationality of an energy services model, based on the USA 
concept of Least Cost Planning. This argues that an energy supplier should 
choose to save a unit of energy, rather than supplying it, when this is the 
cheaper option (Rosenow, 2012). The SO was envisaged as a means to stimu-
late such a market in energy services: suppliers could work with private contrac-
tors or with managing agents such as local authorities to meet the target at 
notional least cost. As explained by a former energy advice agency manager:
That argument was bought by, for example, Stephen Littlechild as [energy 
markets] regulator … It came out of … a neoclassical economic framework: 
‘This is a market failure that we need to address; this is the way to do it’.
(Senior Researcher)
In the 1990s, the gas market regulator was an important voice of dissent about 
the principle of adding energy efficiency costs to tariffs on the grounds that this 
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would distort the energy price mechanism and damage a competitive market in 
energy efficiency (Rosenow, 2012). The SO was however adopted and became 
increasingly ambitious as it became clear that suppliers met the obligations 
easily, despite repeated claims about their difficulties. Successive versions of the 
SO (from Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance (1994–2002) to the 
Energy Efficiency Commitment (2002–2008) and Certified Emissions Reduction 
Target (CERT) and Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP) 
2008–2012) increased the energy- saving target and allowable programme costs. 
The funds supported growth of a significant energy efficiency industry, with 
around £1 billion per year being invested by 2012, particularly in low- cost meas-
ures such as loft and cavity wall insulation and heating system upgrades.
 In the direct sense of number of measures installed at relatively low cost, and 
industry development, the SO has been evaluated as cost- effective, but its mass 
market approach has weaknesses. Energy savings are deemed, using government-
 defined metrics, rather than measured, and the lack of direct evidence about 
actual energy savings has lead to questions about the long- term systemic value of 
the scheme. This has been linked to suggestions that there is an underlying lack 
of public confidence in the potential for major energy saving from building 
upgrades, which further erodes the foundations for comprehensive policy. The 
‘one size fits all’ model can also lead to inappropriate solutions and poor- quality 
work: ‘particularly with vulnerable people, you need to worry about how it’s 
being done and the advice … and much more contextual issues than just whack 
in some cavity wall insulation’ (Senior Researcher). Local authorities working 
with ESO suppliers have criticised the growing complexity, and lack of con-
tinuity, of the scheme rules, which add hidden costs to project management 
(Webb et al., 2017). Neither has the ESO stimulated the envisaged energy ser-
vices market, which is a labour- intensive industry requiring skilled analysis of 
appropriate building retrofit, coordination of advice, finance and supply chain, 
and performance guarantees. Instead the post- privatisation energy retail busi-
ness model, driven by short- term price competition, has continued.
 Latterly the political focus on energy prices has led to significant scaling back of 
the ESO: in comparison with the former £1 billion per annum budget, the revised 
Energy Company Obligation (ECO) has a budget ceiling of £640 million per 
annum at 2017 prices (BEIS, 2018). The energy- saving target is correspondingly 
lower, and the scheme is focused on low- income households. A UK BEIS official 
explained that policy action is directed to maximising the value from less money 
in relation to a ‘triangle of things that we’ve got to do’ (UK BEIS Official, 
domestic policy). The triangle entails balancing the combined demands of a 
Conservative Party manifesto commitment, an obligation to lessen fuel poverty, 
and the political requirement to reduce policy costs: ‘the reduced £640 m a year, to 
hit the “one million homes improved through insulation” target in the manifesto 
over the life of this parliament, and we’ve got to try and take forward progress 
against our fuel poverty targets’ (UK BEIS Official, domestic policy). The reduced 
ESO budget, resulting from political sensitivities over perceived escalating bills, 
has however resulted in loss of energy efficiency industry capacity. The National 
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Audit Office (NAO) 2016 criticised the political focus on short- term price, at the 
cost of public value. In line with practitioner perspectives expressed in this 
research, NAO conclude that future costs of rebuilding supply chain competence 
and skills are likely to be higher than necessary, with essential industry innova-
tions, such as those for solid wall insulation, stalled.
 The changing rules and objectives of the ESO since its introduction in 1994 
demonstrate the difficulties of using an individual policy mechanism to build a 
market which values energy saving, without changing the underlying design of the 
market. Policy could instead pursue a macroeconomic strategy, combining taxa-
tion, regulation and market incentives to govern systemic renovation of building 
stock to meet the 2050 zero carbon buildings target (European Commission, 2016).
The Green Deal: designing policy to address market barriers?
[The] Green Deal didn’t work. Even ministers are prepared to say that.
(UK BEIS Official, domestic policy)
The Green Deal (GD) was a UK policy device intended to tackle ‘market 
barriers’ through provision of loans to pay for investment in energy- saving 
measures. Loans were made available to owner–occupiers and private landlords 
defined as ‘able to pay’ to retrofit their property. The debt was expected to be 
repaid through energy bills using the ‘golden rule’ that savings on energy costs 
would exceed loan repayments. Initial modelling had suggested that 14 million 
households would take up the offer between 2013 and 2020 (DECC, 2011). In 
practice around 14,000 were signed up between 2013 and 2016. The UK gov-
ernment decided to cease funding the Green Deal Finance Company in 2015, 
because the low take up of loans made the framework too costly to justify further 
support (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). The GD proved to be an extremely expen-
sive and inefficient experiment in energy market economics: the NAO 2016 
report concluded that the
£240 million expenditure on the GD has not generated additional energy 
savings, because its design and implementation of the scheme did not per-
suade people that energy efficiency measures are worth paying for. The 
Green Deal has therefore not been value for money.
(NAO, 2016, p. 12)
 The GD mechanism sought to use economic theory to create a model con-
sumer responsive to financial self- interest. In some ways it achieved exactly that, 
but with the opposite outcome to that intended. Households were expected to 
procure an unfamiliar, and potentially difficult- to-manage, energy services con-
tract, without clear quality assurance and with uncertain costs. In addition, the 
cost of the GD Assessment, and the interest rate attached to GD finance, meant 
that the target population evaluated the offer as poor value for money, and as 
adding new costs arising from the mechanism to attach debt to their property. 
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This led to perceived risk of damage, rather than improvements, to the market 
value of their house (Marchand et al., 2015). On the same calculus, the finance 
sector assessed the scheme rules and concluded that the risk of default on GD debt 
following a house sale was high, further increasing the cost of loans. The policy 
focus on economic theory, rather than on the value of the retrofit for quality of 
life, meant that the GD failed to engage either households or private landlords in 
a meaningful way. Poor quality control over the process for managing GD assess-
ments and contracts also allowed bogus companies and scams to operate, further 
undermining trust among a public already highly distrustful of financial institu-
tions (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). Overall, the scheme demonstrated that using 
public resources to devise market metrics to persuade owners to retrofit their prop-
erty is a very inefficient way to save energy.
The UK government response to the EU Energy Performance 
of Buildings Directive: measuring the optimal level of 
investment in energy efficiency
The EU Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EU EPBD) requires 
Member States to decide the optimal level of investment in energy performance 
of buildings, and to devise policy to ensure that this standard is met. The Direc-
tive was expected to be a foundation for new policy measures, but in practice 
the results appear limited, leading to concerns that the use of a concept of cost 
optimal investment is reducing the application of the EU EPBD to ‘a tick box 
exercise’ (Senior Manager, Energy Services Company). Findings from the larger 
research project have shown that the UK formula for estimating cost optimal 
performance is relatively conservative in attributing value to energy saving, in 
comparison with other European countries (Hawkey, 2016). Appraisal method-
ology follows Treasury supplementary Green Book guidance (DECC, 2015), 
which applies a long- run variable cost (LRVC) formula to assign a value to 
welfare gains from increases in energy performance standards of buildings. The 
LRVC of energy is calculated on the basis of existing gas and electricity net-
works. Most of the maintenance costs are excluded from estimated future energy 
costs of buildings, because these costs are regarded as unaffected (in aggregate) 
by changes in demand. The resulting calculation attributes lower benefit to 
investment in energy efficiency than in other European countries, justifying 
lower building standards than if the full costs of networks were included in the 
LRVC formula. Over their lifetime, occupants of such buildings are likely to use 
more energy ‘making the retrofitting issue even worse’ (Policy Manager, UK 
Trade Association B).
 The use of a cost optimality formula also affects the pace and standards of 
building retrofit. The concept of an optimal present cost is related to assump-
tions that future prices will fall, and/or that economic growth will lead to 
wealthier future populations who are better able to pay. In the short term the 
argument is that the available finance could have a higher return from 
investment in other opportunities. Policymakers are conscious of the potential 
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conservative implications of the formula, which may be used as a reason for 
delay, as explained by this official:
This is the big crux of it … what is the definition of cost optimal? Is it 
what’s cost optimal for the person that’s living in the home today? Or is it 
thinking about what are the measures that we need to do over time?
(UK BEIS Official, heat and business)
Current UK policy adopts a cautious view of the value of retrofit. A senior offi-
cial explained that government is not setting an optimal path for all building 
stock upgrade, in line with a 2050 zero carbon budget. There is, he said, no plan 
‘that goes from here to, say, 2050 and says “We’ve got to do these homes now 
and these homes then” other than in terms of fuel poverty’ (UK BEIS Senior 
Official, energy). The cautious stance was further exemplified by the UK 
Conservative government decision to cancel the 2016 zero carbon housing 
standard, which was perceived by UK CCC, trade associations and campaigning 
organisations as exerting effective pressure on the housing construction indus-
try. Its cancellation has reduced industry investment in innovation and skills 
(CCC, 2016). Despite the UK commitment to the EU EPBD target for all new 
buildings to be ‘Nearly Zero- Energy’ from 2020, the UK Clean Growth Strategy 
2017 lacks any policy to deliver this. As a result, higher carbon emissions from 
buildings are locked in, and Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS), as the government department responsible for meeting carbon 
budgets, has to find equivalent carbon savings elsewhere, potentially at a higher 
cost. Limited or cautious investment and delay are normalised, on the expecta-
tion that action will be more affordable in future.
 The short- term cost minimisation approach is perceived by energy efficiency 
advocates and by at least some government officials as a false economy: ‘costs 
don’t fall by waiting, costs fall by actually doing stuff ’ (Senior Researcher); ‘if 
you don’t do anything we’re not going to see the costs come down’ (UK BEIS 
Official, heat and business). At present, the dominant position taken by govern-
ment is however that early action results in a higher total cost, because meas-
ures are installed before their costs have decreased. This is ignoring the risk that 
inaction now is contributing to increasing climate disruption in future, with 
ultimately high costs. Minimising this risk requires action based on the precau-
tionary principle and a societal welfare approach, which sets annual retrofit 
targets to ensure a low- energy building stock by 2050. Such a strategy is likely to 
be essential in a system reliant on renewable energy and would set a very 
different benchmark for effective policy.
The counter- efficiencies of managing market efficiencies: cost 
metrics and policy performance
We have an anti- regulatory agenda now in general. And in the previous 
administration, our Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
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Government was almost pathologically opposed to anything, well anything, 
but certainly anything like that.
(CEO, Trade Association A)
The examples of the ESO, the GD and the UK application of cost optimal for-
mulae to the EU EPBD demonstrate the displacement of policy to ensure a low- 
energy building stock onto the problem of devising cost metrics to justify policy 
to ameliorate market barriers. The approach eschews use of mandates and direc-
tives to govern change, which was depicted by a senior government official as 
‘not … the way these things have been done in the UK historically’. Politics of 
deregulation are in turn making it harder ‘to use some of the levers that we 
might want to do otherwise … for those to be politically acceptable we need to 
show that they’re not adding any cost to consumers’ (UK BEIS Official, heat 
and business). Each element of investment is assessed separately, and officials 
‘score small victories quite highly’ (UK BEIS Official, domestic policy). One of 
the side effects is that of obscuring the potential socio- economic value of a 
whole area, or even whole building, solution:
Everyone has been worrying about some correlation factor in SAP … 
instead of stepping out and thinking about the house …
(CEO, Buildings and Construction Organisation)
We look at the effectiveness of energy efficiency interventions … in isola-
tion … what’s cost effective in this very narrow window? … So, all you’re 
left with is some kind of big components … like solid wall insulation in 
tower blocks, air source heat pumps off the gas network. And then you 
design separate programmes … you don’t start looking at the integration of 
those things across different types of schemes and initiatives.
(Senior Policy Manager, Third Sector Organisation)
Turning energy efficiency policy benefits into a monetary sum is also an impre-
cise art: ‘It’s fiendishly difficult to work out what the energy and carbon savings 
might be [from a revised ESO]’ (UK BEIS Official, economist). Officials aim to 
model not just the direct costs and benefits of any policy, but also its ‘addition-
ality’ over and above the status quo. This includes analysing its expected inter-
action with other policies, which may be either counter- productive or 
synergistic, and which are subject to considerable uncertainty and complex con-
tingencies. What counts as a factor in the cost–benefit equation is also ulti-
mately a matter of value judgement. Societal benefits of public subsidies for 
example were considered under- valued: 
We never think about spill- over, either within the household in terms of 
other action once they’ve taken that first one, or to other households who 
see their peers doing things and think ‘Oh, we’ll do that.’ You know, we 
have a very, very narrow definition of additionality. 
(CEO, Trade Association A)
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The monetising of costs and benefits in turn leads to a further demand for policy 
to anticipate and avoid the risks of gaming the rules: ‘do we see suppliers 
increasing the cost artificially, because it’s subsidised?’ (UK BEIS Official, energy 
policy evaluation). The result is the search for ever more precise policy rules: 
as failures are happening, the inclination of the public sector is to manage 
risk more and more carefully. If you manage risk more carefully … you’re 
forced down to ever lower levels of detail, and ever more levels of bureau-
cracy to manage risk, which frustrates the private sector even more. 
(CEO, Buildings and Construction Organisation)
There is then a risk of a vicious circle where increasingly refined technical for-
mulae reinforce business dependence on government to make the market work, 
while government officials are increasingly frustrated with the lack of initiative 
by businesses.
 The same counter- efficiencies are present in the commercial sector, where 
discrete market instruments ‘to nudge corporations into thinking about what 
their ongoing energy costs are and making the case that they could be better off 
if they made improvements … has been largely unsuccessful’ (Policy Manager, 
Trade Association B). The Climate Change Levy and the CRC Energy 
Efficiency Scheme (due to be abolished in 2019) were perceived by trade organ-
isations as using overly complex rules, reinforcing a focus on short- term payback, 
and resulting in least possible action. With energy costs a small proportion of 
total commercial costs in most cases, property owners have invested very little 
in upgrading the performance of their buildings (Mallaburn, 2016). An emphasis 
on corporate social responsibility, health and productivity are regarded by trade 
organisations as more effective, but these are not integral to UK energy effi-
ciency policy. The current approach is experienced as one that presents a spuri-
ous accuracy with counter- productive effects. Instead, a senior independent 
adviser to government suggested the need to ‘stop predicting to the pound out-
comes on what energy saving will do. Recognise that however good the science, 
when you put humans in charge, the chance of getting outcomes predicted 
are low’.
The problem of institutionalising energy efficiency policy in 
UK government
It always feels like there’s lots of good work going on, dotted around all over 
the place. But trying to join it up into one place …
(UK BEIS Official, domestic energy)
Departmental structures within UK government are themselves part of the chal-
lenge of devising progressive policy for a low- energy building stock. Energy 
saving is relevant to multiple specialisms, none of which focus on the problem 
of low- energy, low- carbon buildings. Within BEIS there is a structural division 
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between energy efficiency and energy markets, which has persisted following the 
2016 merger of the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and 
UK Business, Innovation and Skills. DECC was itself set up only in 2008, under a 
UK Labour government, because energy privatisation had been expected to 
remove the need for a specialist energy function. Energy efficiency had formerly 
been treated as an environmental issue and was part of the UK Government 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). A short- lived DECC 
Energy Efficiency Deployment Office was introduced in 2012 by the UK 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government to accelerate energy saving; 
it was shut down following the 2015 election of the Conservative government, 
and its work dispersed. Housing, Communities and Local Government (England), 
Health and Treasury also have an interest in the potential for energy saving to 
meet health, welfare and economic goals, but none have a direct remit.
 Establishing common metrics of value across departments for energy- saving 
policy is a potential means to establish a more integrated approach, but it is 
regarded as contentious because it could lead to requirements on departments to 
cede control over components of their budget. Attempts to integrate health 
metrics, such as Quality Adjusted Life Years, into cost–benefit formulae for energy 
saving in housing, for example, have not succeeded: ‘I don’t think we’ll ever get to 
a place where the Department of Health says, “Well, you can have a billion 
pounds of our health funds, because you can then go away and reduce the queues 
at doctor’s surgeries” ’ (UK BEIS Official, domestic energy). The problem is exacer-
bated by political commitment to reducing public spending, such that money 
invested in one area is lost from another. The resulting fragmented structural loca-
tion of energy efficiency policy contributes to perceived constant change in 
scheme rules, which tend to weaken both the skills and capabilities available for 
policy implementation, and the willingness of trade, industry and third sector 
organisations, as well as local authorities, to invest in capacity.
 The difficulty of establishing secure and effective policy to reduce energy use 
is arguably a historical legacy of the precedence given to supply side technology 
policy (Steward, 2012). The result is a circumscribed view of policy options, 
marginalising the socio- economic logic for a whole- systems analysis to compare 
costs of investment in efficiency with investment in supply for a low- carbon 
system (Hawkey et al., 2016). Historical neglect of energy use is regarded by 
trade and third sector organisations as resulting in repeated overestimation of 
future supply needs, and failure to value energy saving on an equal basis with 
supply in energy and capacity market policies. In the following quote from a 
third sector enterprise, the manager references the economic concept of the 
‘marginal abatement cost curve’ (MACC). The curve plots the alternative 
options for reducing emissions from energy against a metric for cost per tonne of 
carbon abated. The marginal cost calculation is used to indicate the cost of 
reducing each additional unit of emissions:
When you look at the MAC curve, and you look at demand versus supply 
options … energy efficiency always looks like the no- brainer, but what we 
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like to do in this country is then look at the cost effectiveness profile associ-
ated with all the things that are in that cost- effective bracket, and then we 
start saying, ‘Well this is really expensive.’ No, it’s not, because if you look 
at the wider MAC curve, this isn’t expensive. This is more cost effective to 
do than all the stuff that you’re already doing up here, Hinkley Point etc.
(Policy Manager, third sector organisation)
The MACC concept is used by government in energy and climate policy but is 
subject to contention over the impact of different cost assumptions on the cost 
ranking of different technologies and solutions (Grubb, 2014). The financial 
value attributed to supply vs. demand measures is contested, with industry sug-
gestions that the carbon abatement price set by policy is more advantageous for 
supply side technologies: ‘carbon saving from supply side technologies such as 
wind or nuclear [is set] … at far higher value than that for energy saving in 
buildings’ (Senior Manager, energy services business and former market analyst). 
Consistency in carbon- saving metrics across supply and demand remains elusive, 
perpetuating the lack of consensus over the substantive value of a systemic focus 
on reducing energy use.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Despite stalled progress, there is much that can be done to improve the building 
stock across the UK. These actions will however require a valuation framework 
structured by acceptance of societal responsibility for welfare and sustainable 
prosperity, rather than a sole focus on the theory of efficient markets and short- 
term price metrics. Achieving such a change in perspective needs greater con-
sensus on the societal value of improving every building and systematically 
reducing energy use. Such strategies have precedents, particularly in countries 
with limited indigenous fossil fuel reserves such as Denmark or Japan. It is 
however usually oil crises or accidents, such as the nuclear accident at 
Fukushima in Japan, which have prompted systematic action. There is a ques-
tion about whether we can learn from past innovations in practice, without the 
immediate crisis conditions. Part of the answer to this question lies in recognis-
ing the sociality of markets where rules of conduct, beliefs and values are formed 
and practised. This sociality is recognised by businesses and consultancies who 
are concerned to galvanise action: ‘what it takes is people on the ground organ-
ising to do something’ (CEO, Non- Domestic Energy Efficiency Consultancy); 
‘we’ve got to create … an outcome- oriented movement of people who share a 
common cause, and they want all this to work’ (CEO, Buildings and Construc-
tion Organisation). Recommendations for policy are discussed below.
 An accessible starting point for consensus building, and the consequent 
development of new social norms, is the use of regulatory standards. There is 
however political opposition to new regulatory standards, based on belief in the 
economic efficiencies of deregulation. The importance of regulation to cost- 
effective policy is however exemplified by UK regulation to enforce use of gas 
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condensing boilers. The regulation was announced in 2003 for a start in 2005; 
80,000 gas fitters were trained in 2 years, and an initial period of financial 
support was followed by exclusion of less efficient boilers from the market once 
the technology was established (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2014). The value of such 
regulation is formally recognised by at least some government officials:
the changes that were made in 2005 … were really successful in terms of 
bringing industry on board who were really originally resistant and sceptical 
and were saying it was all going to be far too difficult and the costs are all 
too high. And then within literally a couple of years, the cost of the tech-
nology had come right down, installers were happy with doing it, and the 
penetration of the technology … was really quick.
(UK BEIS Official, heat and business)
A refurbishment standard for every building, and progressively increasing stand-
ards for appliances, could achieve the same effect. Regulatory standards make 
sociotechnical innovation in businesses and supply chains a matter of necessity. 
There is evidence for example that the announcement of a (very modest) 2018 
minimum energy efficiency standard for the private rental sector prompted 
immediate action. Enforcement of standards is critical to their effectiveness and 
requires trained building inspectors to assess quality of work, including solid wall 
insulation, air tightness and heat and ventilation system efficiencies. Prominent 
publication of tables to compare the energy standards of public and commercial 
buildings can also prompt investment, because of reputational concerns (Mal-
laburn, 2016). The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme for example originally 
included annual publication of league tables, which, according to one trade associ-
ation, worked effectively because businesses disliked being exposed as ‘doing really 
poorly in comparison to your peers’. Perceived reputational damage, he argued 
‘really does drive … a lot of activity amongst businesses’ (Policy Manager, UK 
Trade Association B). Such tables would also enable public procurement of lease-
hold buildings to require the highest energy performance standards.
 In the domestic sector, the Bonfield Review, ‘Each Home Counts’ (Bonfield, 
2016), is a potential building block to improve standards and performance guar-
antees, backed by regulation, for all retrofit and renewable energy installations. 
It proposes making any subsidies available only to businesses that comply with 
increasing standards, making businesses active in resolving cost and quality 
problems. The cost of loans to property owners is also likely to decrease as a 
result of such systematic standards. Developing a professionalised supply chain 
to retrofit all buildings is likely to require development of energy services suited 
to different sectors, whether private home owners, social or private sector land-
lords, commercial or public buildings. The smart meter programme is arguably 
the current policy mechanism intended to stimulate an energy services market 
in the domestic and small business sectors (see Chapter 6). The smart meter 
data is expected to provide market opportunities for new businesses to sell 
‘comfort’ as an energy service. Such companies would have an incentive to 
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make a profit from selling less energy by retrofitting the property, where this is 
the lower cost option. The Energy Systems Catapult has received public funding 
to pilot a Home Energy Services Gateway, connecting households with busi-
nesses to test technologies, services and business models. The NAO is however 
investigating the smart meter programme, which is behind schedule, and subject 
to criticism of costs and inflexible operating systems. Overall the low public 
trust in existing energy utilities makes the development of a self- regulating 
market for energy services unlikely. Public investment to set high standards in 
all buildings, to provide independent and impartial advice on options, and to 
enforce the quality of work by service providers, is needed.
 Beyond regulation and standards, trade associations and campaigning organi-
sations advocate the treatment of energy efficiency as a ‘national infrastructure’. 
This should, they suggest, ensure an integrated cost–benefit analysis of investing 
in decreasing energy use vs. increasing supply. In England, the National Infra-
structure Commission (NIC) is one potential route to a stable cross- 
departmental government strategy for energy efficiency retrofit. The NIC is an 
executive agency of UK Treasury and has the means to secure affordable 
finance: ‘Just by having that long- term strategy you’re attracting the large 
growing green bonds market’ (Policy Manager, Trade Association B). The Com-
mission is required to assess UK long- term infrastructure needs, and to make 
recommendations to government, once in each Parliament. Its first assessment 
is due to be published in 2018, but its original chair, and Labour peer, Andrew 
Adonis, has resigned over fundamental disagreement with government on its 
approach to infrastructure, particularly in the context of the UK exit from the 
EU. The NIC recommendations around energy use and their impact are there-
fore uncertain. In addition, UK Treasury will not necessarily provide finance, as 
a senior official explained:
Just because something is infrastructure doesn’t suddenly mean there’s vast 
amounts of money available for it. I think sometimes the two things are 
seen as automatically going hand in hand.
(UK BEIS Senior Official, energy)
Financial and business models, as well as engagement of commercial and resi-
dential property owners, are critical unresolved challenges for any compre-
hensive retrofit strategy (CCC, 2016; Washan et al., 2014). There is however 
scope to learn from the increasing jurisdictional and policy diversity within the 
UK. Unlike England, public investment in energy saving has been maintained 
in Scotland, with a small increase since 2012 from £190 to £192 million. The 
focus has been area- based home energy- saving schemes targeted on low- income 
households. In 2015 however, the Scottish government made energy efficiency 
a national infrastructure priority; further plans published in 2018 outlined a pro-
gramme of work to 2032.
 The aim is to provide an offer of support to all building owners to improve 
the energy efficiency of their property. An investment of around £0.5 billion is 
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promised during the current Parliament, which is likely to run until 2021. Policy 
development has proceeded since 2015 through three pilot phases, with cross- 
sector work coordinated by local authorities to test project management for 
area- based building retrofit. The programme is a core part of the first Scottish 
Energy Strategy (2017), which, in line with restricted devolved powers over 
energy, focuses on reducing energy use. A critical device for planning, prioritis-
ing and carrying out retrofit is a proposed local government duty to develop a 
comprehensive local heat and energy efficiency strategy (LHEES) and imple-
mentation plan. Strategies will be customised to the circumstances of each area 
and will be based on options appraisal using socio- economic metrics encompass-
ing health, climate protection and local economic benefits.
 The Scottish programme has already prompted a new cross- departmental 
government focus on energy efficiency in health, housing, social policy, climate 
change, economy and enterprise. Methods for developing and implementing 
strategies, securing finance, managing contracts and procurement, engaging the 
public and commercial property owners are as yet under- specified, but there is 
public commitment to proceeding, calling on cross- sector problem solving to set 
a long- term framework for investment (Scottish Government, 2018). It may be 
argued that this comprehensive strategy is more feasible in smaller devolved 
governments than in the UK government. If that is true however, then it is an 
argument for more devolution of powers across the nations and regions of 
the UK.
 Whatever the governance structures, it is critical that long- term ambitious 
energy- saving programmes are implemented across the UK, because of the 
urgency of action in the face of climate change and existing legislative com-
mitment. The UK Clean Growth Strategy does set out intentions for future 
action on buildings in England, but policies need to be specified. There is for 
example a target of retrofitting houses to Energy Performance Certificate 
(EPC) Band C by 2035, but this is qualified on grounds of practicality and 
cost, which will blunt its effectiveness. There is also no plan to reinstate the 
zero carbon homes standard, despite the EU EPBD requirement for near- zero 
carbon new buildings by 2020. An effective starting point for a comprehensive 
strategy in UK government is the use of a White Paper. This was suggested by 
the academics appointed to advise the UK CCC on its heat and energy effi-
ciency advice to UK government (Webb, 2016). A White Paper on heat and 
energy efficiency, combining building and technology regulation, taxation and 
incentives for every building owner, could be used to secure significant social, 
economic and environmental benefits. It would work to trigger Treasury 
review and reform of cost–benefit formulae and tax and accounting frame-
works to support new low- carbon heat and energy efficiency policy. This 
would in turn be a means to integrate low- carbon buildings and heating into 
industrial strategy. Demonstrators of options for low- carbon heat and low- 
energy buildings are already being initiated through the UK Industrial 
Strategy challenge funding for local energy system demonstrators (Innovate 
UK, 2018).
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 A policy focus on heat and energy efficiency is the necessary catalyst for 
innovation in investment and energy services; it provides a means to initiate 
high standards in the energy efficiency, building and heat supply trades. As 
proposed in Scotland, local authorities could be mandated to develop an area-
 based energy efficiency strategy to deliver the retrofit of buildings and to 
decarbonise heat supply. This could combine funding sources (Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO) budgets, grants, gas and electricity distribution 
network operator funds) to capture systemic benefits from energy efficiency 
such as avoided or deferred costs of network reinforcement. It would also 
serve as a means to establish the governance process for achieving a low- 
carbon heat supply for a low- energy building stock, using measured rather 
than modelled energy consumption.
 In conclusion, I have argued that present political sensitivities over energy 
prices, combined with a belief in deregulation of markets, are undermining 
effective policy for saving energy. Devising energy efficiency policy through pro-
gressive refinement of market metrics is proving to be an uneven and slow, if 
not counter- efficient, route to energy saving in buildings. Wider societal bene-
fits from policy to upgrade the whole building stock for a low- energy system 
become a secondary consideration, acknowledged in principle (as in the Clean 
Growth Strategy, 2017), but not prioritised in practice. The current stalled 
investment in insulating homes, lack of progress in non- residential buildings 
and lack of potential for long- term planning of area- based programmes in 
England is further undermining confidence in the actual energy savings which 
could be achieved.
 Given the considerable uncertainty in scenarios for the future UK energy 
supply, and the fact that scenarios are not predictors of actual future systems or 
of energy costs, there are societal reasons for maximising energy saving through 
a comprehensive programme for low- energy buildings. From a sociological per-
spective, patterns of energy use, technologies, market institutions and strategies 
are societally produced; ‘energy efficiency’ is itself embedded in assumptions 
about material standards of living and political- economic commitment to eco-
nomic growth, with implications for resource- intensive consumption (Shove, 
2017). This sociotechnical system can be remade to serve changed needs for a 
low- carbon system, but at present the wider perspective on societal prosperity is 
marginalised by political commitments to market mechanisms, deregulation and 
a small state.
 The chapter has explored the sociology of policy processes for energy effi-
ciency; it raises questions about the current politics of energy price, which are a 
reminder of the inevitable interconnection between energy and political values 
and beliefs. It highlights the necessity for a changed societal perspective on 
value, which is not reliant primarily on neoliberal belief in market mechanisms 
as universal solution to societal problems. The latter is proving to be an ineffi-
cient means to a low- energy building stock and is likely to impose higher costs 
on society, as we fail to comprehend the necessity to act on climate science 
rather than classical economic theory.
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12 Policy mixes for sustainable 
energy transitions
The case of energy efficiency
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Introduction
Any new policy goals pertaining to sustainable energy transitions and associated 
policy instruments to help foster such change will not exist in a vacuum. Rather, 
they will become embedded in pre- existing policy contexts with legacies of goals 
and instruments already in place (Kern and Howlett, 2009). It is this messy 
reality which ultimately influences policy outcomes instead of theoretical con-
siderations around ‘first best’ policy options and ‘optimal’ policy design. It is 
therefore increasingly important to explicitly study policy mixes, how they can 
be designed and how they can be implemented in order to promote deliberate 
sustainable energy transitions (Rogge et al., 2017). The policy mix literature is 
an attempt to make sense of this empirical complexity.
 This chapter therefore focuses on policy mixes for sustainable energy trans-
itions, an emerging area of research at the interface of policy sciences and 
sustainability transition studies. However, definitions of what constitutes a 
policy mix vary widely in the literature. For example, while economists focus on 
the interactions of multiple instruments (Lehmann, 2012), the policy design 
literature goes beyond that by also including policy goals (Kern and Howlett, 
2009). In addition, innovation studies have called for a reconceptualisation of 
policy mixes to better capture their complexity in a ‘real- world’ context, includ-
ing the underlying policy processes through which policy mixes develop 
(Flanagan et al., 2011, Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). Within The Centre on 
Innovation and Energy Demand (CIED), we have built on these various streams 
of literature to further conceptual and empirical insights on real- world policy 
mixes for sustainable energy transitions (Rogge et al., 2017).1
 Research on policy mixes started initially with an interest in multiple policy 
instruments targeting a given policy field (such as energy policy). In contrast to 
earlier proposals to address each policy goal via one policy instrument, this early 
literature on policy mixes – typically grounded in economics – acknowledges 
the existence of situations in which ‘several – instead of one – policy instru-
ments are used to address a particular environmental problem’ (Braathen, 2007, 
p. 186). Further, ‘[p]olluting sources may be affected directly or indirectly by 
several policies addressing the same pollution problem. This is referred to as a 
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policy mix’ (Lehmann, 2012, p. 1). The aim of this literature is mainly to under-
stand how different instruments interact to avoid negative effects.
 Accordingly, much of the early research on policy mixes for energy trans-
itions has focused on the analysis of interactions of policy instruments designed 
to affect the operation of energy systems (e.g. Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; Spyridaki 
and Flamos, 2014). This line of thinking in terms of mixes of policy instruments 
has also been picked up by organisations like the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) which published a report on ‘Interactions of Policies for Renewable 
Energy and Climate’ (IEA, 2011a). In another publication it argued that 
[t]he need for a policy mix has been recognised by many governments, but 
experience to date has been that the interactions among multiple policies 
are often not well understood nor well- coordinated, which can lead to 
policy redundancy or policies undermining one another, reducing the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the overall package. 
(IEA, 2011b, p. 60)
However, definitions of policy mixes since have extended beyond instrument 
interactions. Consequently, there is a range of interesting strands of research on 
policy mixes for energy transitions (see the section below). These may combine 
attention to the instrument mix with corresponding policy strategies with their 
long- term targets, and/or with the associated policy processes; the analysis of 
overarching policy mix characteristics such as consistency, coherence or cred-
ibility; and policy design considerations. Such a broad perspective on policy 
mixes for energy transitions draws influences from multiple areas, including gov-
ernance arrangements for policy mixes (e.g. Howlett and Rayner, 2006), instru-
ment mixes in energy policy (e.g. del Río, 2010; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003) and 
innovation policy mixes (e.g. Flanagan et al., 2011). It also connects more expli-
citly to the sustainability transitions literature (Markard et al., 2012). The policy 
relevance of such a consideration of broader policy mixes is also evidenced by 
the interest of the IEA that published a report on ‘Real- world Policy Packages 
for Sustainable Energy Transitions’ (IEA, 2017).
 While policy mix thinking is relevant generally in all policy fields, it is specifi-
cally important in the context of energy transitions. Public policy is expected to 
heavily contribute to sustainable change in energy systems, not only by internalis-
ing externalities but also by addressing a range of other structural and transforma-
tional system failures (Weber and Rohracher, 2012). However, energy systems are 
a complex web of sub- systems, including a diversity of fuel supply, conversion and 
use systems, which are often addressed by a range of different policies – making the 
overall policy mixes large, complicated and most likely incoherent.
 Much of the emerging research on policy mixes for energy transitions has, 
however, focused on energy supply, while there is much less research on energy 
efficiency policy mixes. This is so despite the fact that energy efficiency is 
considered as critically important to achieving an energy transition in line with 
the pledges made in the Paris Agreement (IEA, 2015) (see Chapter 1 and 
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Chapter 2). In addition, the respective policy literature has often pointed out 
that due to the variety and complexity of end- users of energy, there are no 
‘silver bullet’ policies that can stimulate action across this variety of actors. 
Instead of single instruments, it has been argued that there is a need to design 
comprehensive energy efficiency policy mixes which address the various chal-
lenges different actors are facing in advancing energy efficiency (Nilsson, 2012). 
This is reflected in policy strategies aimed at influencing energy efficiency but is 
not studied much in the existing energy efficiency policy literature.
 This constitutes the main empirical gap in the literature that our research 
was trying to address. The aim of this chapter is to summarise some of the 
empirical research on energy efficiency policy mixes conducted as part of CIED 
in order to draw out overall academic insights and avenues for further research. 
We also provide policy reflections on policy mixes for sustainable energy trans-
itions in which energy efficiency plays a key role. The next section introduces 
recent conceptual and empirical advances in the interdisciplinary literature on 
policy mixes for energy transitions. The following section discusses selected 
research on energy efficiency policy mixes in the UK, Finland and at the EU 
level conducted by CIED. The final section summarises what overall lessons we 
have learned from this work, develops policy recommendations and suggests a 
number of avenues for future research.
Advancing research on policy mixes for energy transitions
Given the rapid increase in interest in the topic of policy mixes for energy trans-
ition two CIED authors (jointly with Michael Howlett) guest- edited a recent 
special issue in the journal of Energy Research and Social Science (November 
2017, Vol. 33)2 which goes beyond looking at instrument mixes. As summarised 
in Rogge et al. (2017) the contributions in this special issue are clustered around 
five themes: policy mix rationales, interactions and coordination of policy 
instruments, designing effective policy mixes, policy mixes for creative destruc-
tion and the role of actors and institutions in shaping energy transition policy 
mixes. Below we will discuss a number of selected contributions to the special 
issue in order to illustrate these different strands of work.
 In terms of policy mix rationales, Jacobsson et al. (2017) argue that European 
Union (EU) interventions in the context of decarbonisation mainly rest on neo-
classical economics assumptions. They propose that this approach neglects 
important insights about the non- linear nature of technical change and industrial 
dynamics that are very relevant in the context of energy transitions. They propose 
an innovation system approach as a rationale for intervention and draw lessons for 
how effective instrument mixes can be designed which pay greater attention to 
dynamic efficiency and the structural build- up of innovation systems.
 Contributing to the theme of instrument interactions, del Río and Cerdá (2017) 
analyse the impact of instruments to promote renewable electricity on CO2 prices 
established through a cap and trade scheme or carbon tax. Their research shows 
that negative interactions can be mitigated through coordination, and that the 
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adaptability depends on the choice of instruments and design features of each 
tool. They also find that the negative impact on CO2 prices is more likely under 
quantity- based than under- price-based instruments.
 In terms of designing effective policy mixes, Falcone et al. (2017) provide an 
analysis of policy mixes in the Italian biofuel sector. They explore different 
crises scenarios in order to identify and recommend the most effective policy 
combinations to foster a sustainable energy transition using a fuzzy inference. 
Their findings show that the most effective policy mixes vary across the scen-
arios and according to different pursued objectives.
 Under the theme of policy mixes for creative destruction, Rogge and Johnstone 
(2017) analyse the effect of deliberate phase- out policies of established technolo-
gical regimes on the development and diffusion of low- carbon technologies. Based 
on the case of the German transition towards renewable electricity, they show 
through a survey of innovation activities of German manufacturers of renewable 
power generation technologies that Germany’s nuclear phase- out policy had a 
positive influence on manufacturers’ innovation expenditures for renewables.
 In terms of the role of actors and institutions in shaping energy transition policy 
mixes, Bahn- Walkowiak and Wilts (2017) undertake a closer analysis of the 
institutional background of policy mixes. Their contribution raises questions 
about the potential impact of different institutional settings on the consistency 
and coherence of policy mixes in the field of resource efficiency. They map the 
distribution of institutional responsibilities in 32 EU countries and find that 
resource efficiency policies are still mainly disconnected from energy issues. The 
paper stresses the need to include institutional and multi- level governance con-
siderations into the design and development of policy mixes.
 These five themes are showcasing the variety of strands of research on policy 
mixes for energy transitions but empirically much of this research has focused 
on energy supply policy mixes. However, little work within these themes focuses 
specifically on energy efficiency.
Applying policy mix thinking to the case of energy efficiency: 
what have we learned?
Having reviewed recent research on policy mixes for sustainable energy transitions 
and identifying some key themes, this section will summarise selected empirical 
analyses of energy efficiency policy mixes which have been conducted as part of 
CIED and which contribute to discussions in a number of these strands.
How do complex policy mixes develop over time and how consistent 
and coherent can they be? The cases of UK and Finnish energy 
efficiency evolution
Much of the existing energy policy mix literature only captures the policy mix 
at one point in time. We argue that in the context of long- term energy trans-
itions, further analysis is needed to investigate how real- world policy mixes 
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develop over time and how their characteristics change. In line with existing 
literature in the field of policy design, we claim that this is important as it influ-
ences the potential performance of such complex mixes.
 In Kern et al. (2017) we therefore adopted the definition of policy mixes as 
‘complex arrangements of multiple goals and means which, in many cases, have 
developed incrementally over many years’ (Kern and Howlett, 2009, p. 395). 
Conceptually, we drew on the work of Howlett and colleagues who have 
foregrounded two relevant characteristics of policy mixes: consistency and 
coherence. Howlett and Rayner (2013) define consistency as ‘the ability of 
multiple policy tools to reinforce rather than undermine each other in the 
pursuit of policy goals’ (p. 174). They define coherence as the ‘ability of 
multiple policy goals to co- exist with each other and with instrument norms in 
a logical fashion’ (ibid.).
 However, such characteristics of mixes are never static since goals and instru-
ments may be added to and subtracted from the mix over time. Existing research 
has distinguished four processes through which policy mixes typically change: 
layering, drift, conversion and replacement (Howlett and Rayner, 2007, 2013; Kern 
and Howlett, 2009; Table 12.1).
 Layering refers to adding new policy goals and instruments to the mix without 
discarding previous ones (Howlett and Rayner, 2013). Howlett and Rayner 
(2007) argue that this often results in incoherence among goals and inconsist-
ency of instruments. Drift refers to changing policy goals without ‘changing the 
instruments used to implement them. These instruments then can become 
inconsistent with the new goals and most likely ineffective in achieving them’ 
(Kern and Howlett, 2009, p. 395). Conversion involves the reverse situation in 
which instrument mixes evolve while the old goals are retained: ‘If the old goals 
lack coherence, then changes in policy instruments may either reduce levels of 
implementation conflicts or enhance them, but are unlikely to succeed in 
matching means and ends of policy’ (ibid.). Replacement refers to a process in 
which a conscious effort is made by policymakers to fundamentally restructure 
Table 12.1  Relationship between policy development processes and the expected coher-




Coherent Replacement: conscious effort to 
restructure goals and instruments by 
sweeping aside the old mix and designing 
a new one from scratch
Conversion: instruments 
evolve while the old goals are 
retained
Incoherent Drift: changing policy goals without 
changing the instruments used to 
implement them
Layering: adding new policy 
goals and instruments to the mix 
without discarding previous ones
Source: based on Kern and Howlett (2009, p. 396).
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both goals and instruments in a coherent and consistent manner by sweeping 
aside the old mix and designing a new one from scratch (Howlett and Rayner, 
2007). However, most policy mixes develop through either layering, conversion 
or drift, often resulting in inconsistent and incoherent policy mixes (Howlett 
and Rayner, 2013).
 We applied this framework to the development of building energy efficiency 
policy in Finland and the UK between 2000–2014. The analysis was based on a 
systematic review of existing databases,3 policy documents and IEA country 
reviews to identify current building- related policy goals and instruments at the 
national level, as well as identifying goals and instruments, which had been 
added, amended and removed during this timeframe. This information allowed 
us to trace policy developments over time. We utilised 19 stakeholder inter-
views to check the list of policy instruments and elicit information about the 
development of the policy mixes (including insights related to their coherence 
and consistency).
 In the case of Finland, the development of the policy mix tended to follow a 
replacement process in the form of coherent long- term policy goals and (increas-
ing) consistency of the instrument mix used to implement them. These pro-
cesses have led to a policy mix with some promise of effectiveness. In contrast, 
the UK analysis revealed a pattern more akin to drift as the introduction of 
social and carbon reduction goals into traditional energy efficiency ambitions 
led to a set of partly incoherent goals. The goals are combined with a relatively 
consistent and prior to 2015 largely well- targeted instrument mix but which also 
displayed some gaps. The case also showed a rapid accumulation of new instru-
ments (layering).
 Overall, the analysis showed that both countries have developed extensive 
policy mixes to address building energy efficiency, including a variety of goals 
and instruments and making use of many different instrument types. In both 
countries, more new goals and instruments have been added over time than 
have been, which poses increasing challenges in terms of policy coordination as 
well as evaluating such increasingly complex mixes. Our analysis also showed 
that while in the UK there has been a lot of ‘churn’ in policy instruments, 
Finland has had a somewhat more stable policy mix, where the added policies 
have not as radically altered the mix. This is important in the context of policy 
mixes for energy transitions as a rapidly fluctuating policy environment can slow 
down innovation processes, as companies generally prefer a more stable climate 
for investment. This means that the UK policy mix may deter low- energy 
innovations and their diffusion.
What kinds of comprehensive and well- targeted instrument mixes 
are needed for stimulating energy efficiency improvements?
The comprehensiveness of policies has long been argued to be a relevant success 
factor of environmental and energy policies (Sovacool, 2009; Walls and Palmer, 
2001). However, in these studies, comprehensiveness has remained a loosely 
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defined concept. Drawing on conceptualisations of comprehensiveness in the 
field of marketing and environmental management systems (Atuahene- Gima 
and Murray, 2004; Miller, 2008), Rogge and Reichardt (2016) have concretised 
policy mix comprehensiveness as a characteristic which ‘captures how extensive 
and exhaustive its elements are’ (p. 1627). While they also include the degree 
to which policymaking and implementation are based on extensive decision- 
making, in this paper (Rosenow et al., 2017), we focused on the comprehensive-
ness of the instrument mix in the area of energy efficiency in selected EU 
Member States.
 In line with Rogge and Reichardt (2016) we argue that instrument mix 
comprehensiveness can be assessed according to the degree to which it considers 
relevant failures and barriers (Lehmann, 2012; Sorrell, 2004; Weber and 
Rohracher, 2012). More specifically, it can be captured by assessing whether the 
instrument mix includes technology push, demand pull and systemic instru-
ments (Cantner et al., 2016). We developed an analytical framework that can 
be used for the empirical assessment of energy efficiency instrument mixes and 
their degree of comprehensiveness (Rosenow et al., 2017). The main building 
blocks of the framework we applied in this chapter are (a) technological specifi-
city, (b) types of policy instruments and (c) sector specificity.
 Technological specificity can be assessed using two dimensions: the cost of 
supported technology and the complexity of supported technology. Instrument 
types are critical for comprehensiveness as there is great variety of policy instru-
ment types. Depending on the type, policy instruments also support specific 
technologies or are technologically neutral. A sector specific analysis may reveal 
important gaps in the instrument mix. This is important since the ambitious 
energy efficiency targets required for sustainable energy transitions mean that all 
sectors have a significant contribution to make (Braungardt et al., 2014). While 
comprehensiveness may also be assessed through the lens of additional dimen-
sions (for example the degree to which all relevant actors are addressed or the 
degree of geographical coverage etc.), we argue that our analytical framework 
covering three key aspects offers an approach that can be applied relatively 
easily to existing instrument mixes within the energy efficiency policy domain.
 We applied this concept of instrument mix comprehensiveness to the field of 
energy efficiency. The empirical analysis focuses on national energy efficiency 
policies that have been notified by EU Member States to the European Com-
mission as part of their transposition of Article 7 of the EU Energy Efficiency 
Directive (EED). The EED establishes a framework of measures to ensure the 
achievement of the EU’s 20 per cent energy savings target by 2020 (EU, 2012). 
Data on instrument mixes in selected EU Member States was obtained from 
national experts from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.4
 The data shows that in the selected EU Member States none of the instru-
ment types utilised by these countries specifically target highly complex and 
capital- intensive technologies, but instead focus on technologies characterised 
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by relatively moderate costs and complexity. We argue that a comprehensive 
energy efficiency instrument mix needs to cover the full range of technologies 
regarding complexity and costs. The limited focus on more complex and costly 
technologies indicates that further policy development is required in order to 
achieve deeper energy efficiency improvements across all sectors.
 This finding may partly be a function of the focus on existing commercialised 
technologies (rather than innovative technologies or technology combinations) 
that characterises Article 7 policies. However, it also indicates a possible gap in 
the instrument mix supporting deeper energy efficiency improvements, whereby 
the next set of mass market efficiency measures are not being sufficiently sup-
ported or incentivised. This gap needs to be addressed if ambitious EU targets 
are to be met. However, adding such instruments may be costly and, therefore, 
politically contested.
 Future research should identify more precisely (through ex post analyses) the 
degree of comprehensiveness of the instrument mix. In particular, one focus of 
such studies should be the types of technologies targeted within the energy effi-
ciency space as this becomes increasingly important given the diversity of 
national approaches to delivering EU energy- savings targets.
Accelerating sustainable energy transitions by fostering creative 
destruction through policy mixes?
When major transformations of energy systems are needed, particularly at a 
rapid pace, it is not sufficient that a policy mix aims at incremental improve-
ment and innovation support. In such cases, the policy mix also needs to entail 
more disruptive instruments to overturn unsustainable energy regimes based on 
fossil fuels and high levels of energy consumption. What elements such policy 
mixes should comprise, was the focus of a study published by Kivimaa and Kern 
(2016) that this sub- section is based on. Empirically, it analysed whether con-
temporary policy mixes for low- energy innovation in the UK and Finland have 
the characteristics proposed.
 The core idea proposed in the study is that well- designed policy mixes for 
sustainable energy transitions would include elements of ‘creative destruction’, 
involving both policies aiming for the ‘creation’ of new and for ‘destabilising’ 
the old. However, creating such policy mixes is by no means easy as it is 
dependent on the prevailing political climate (Howlett and Rayner, 2007). Yet, 
we argue that energy transitions benefit from analyses of the degree to which 
this takes place, and how existing policy mixes could be improved in this regard.
 The framework developed in Kivimaa and Kern (2016) proposes to concep-
tualise policy mixes from the perspective of creative destruction. It draws on 
multiple innovation and transition concepts, including disruptive innovation 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1997), technological innovation 
systems (Bergek et al., 2008; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Suurs and Hekkert, 
2009), Strategic Niche Management (Hoogma et al., 2002; Smith and Raven, 
2012) and transition management (Kemp and Rotmans, 2004; Rotmans et al., 
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2001). Drawing from technological innovation systems and Strategic Niche 
Management literatures, it is clear that to support the emergence of new inno-
vative niches, policy mixes need to address the following functions:
1 knowledge creation, development and diffusion (e.g. R&D funding 
schemes, innovation platforms, educational policies);
2 new market formation (e.g. regulation, economic policy instruments, public 
procurement);
3 price–performance improvements (e.g. deployment and demonstration sub-
sidies enabling learning- by-doing);
4 entrepreneurial experimentation (e.g. policies stimulating entrepreneurship 
and diversification of existing firms);
5 resource mobilisation (e.g. R&D funding subsidies, low- interest loans, 
labour- market policies);
6 support from powerful groups/legitimisation (e.g. foresight exercises, 
labelling); and
7 influence on the direction of search (e.g. strategic goals, targeted R&D 
funding, regulations, tax incentives, voluntary agreements).
In addition, Kivimaa and Kern (2016) argue, with support from the literature on 
transitions management and disruptive innovation, that in cases of unsustain-
able energy regimes, policy mixes also need to address the following regime 
destabilising functions:
1 control policies that internalise environmental costs (e.g. pollution taxes, 
carbon trading);
2 significant changes in regime rules (e.g. structural reforms in legislation or 
significant new overarching legislation);
3 reduced support for dominant regime technologies (e.g. withdrawing 
support for unsustainable technologies by cutting/removing R&D funding 
and other subsidies, or technology bans); and
4 changes in social networks and replacement of key actors (e.g. increasing 
the number of niche actors in advisory councils and forming new organisa-
tions and networks with key roles in system change).
Empirically, we examined the policy mixes in Finland and the UK addressing 
energy efficiency and energy demand reduction. The analysis covered three 
regimes – mobility, electricity and heating of buildings – cutting across multiple 
policy domains including innovation, energy, fiscal and transport policies. The 
method utilised was a policy instrument mapping exercise systematically going 
through four international data sources: the IEA’s reviews of energy policies and 
policies and measures databases on energy efficiency, the European Environ-
mental Agency’s database on climate change mitigation policies and measures, 
the European Commission’s Erawatch research and innovation policy database 
and the IEA Sustainable Buildings Centre’s Building Energy Efficiency Policies 
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database. In addition, the data was supplemented with searches made on gov-
ernmental websites to get descriptions of the objectives, justifications and main 
content of the policy instruments, and to identify new organisations and 
networks.
 The study identified 73 policy instruments in the UK and 65 in Finland. In 
both countries there was an imbalance of policy instruments between niche 
support and regime destabilisation, although several ‘control policies’ were 
found in both countries. This imbalance was not only reflected in the number of 
instruments but also in policy content. Specifically, significant changes in 
regime rules and in policy networks and actors were rare. In addition, in the 
UK, we did not find reducing policy support for high- energy technologies 
beyond EU requirements. This is not surprising given the political difficulties of 
such changes but highlights gaps in the existing policy mixes.
 Some of the destabilising functions proposed here connect to a recent and 
emerging debate on exnovation policies that aim to end use of given technolo-
gies by deliberately removing the infrastructure it relies on (David, 2017). In 
addition, our study links to the debate on the need for explicit phase- out 
policies to support sustainable energy transitions (Rehner and McCauley, 2016; 
Rogge and Johnstone, 2017). Further research could examine the development 
of ‘creative destructive’ policy mixes over time, how the instruments function in 
practice and their impact on the strategies of different policy target groups.
How to expand policy mix studies to the analysis of policy processes?
As mentioned above, recent research on policy mixes for energy and sustain-
ability transitions has developed a broader perspective on policy mixes which 
includes policy strategies, policy mix characteristics (such as consistency and 
credibility), and increased attention to actors and institutions (Rogge et al., 
2017). One of the additional aspects highlighted as particularly worthy of 
further consideration within broader policy mix research are policy processes 
and the role they play for advancing sociotechnical transitions towards sustain-
ability (Flanagan et al., 2011; Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). Research shedding 
greater light on the process dimension of policy mixes calls for extending the 
interdisciplinary nature of policy mix research by more explicitly incorporating 
theories of the policy process (Sabatier and Weible, 2014).
 As argued in Kern and Rogge (2018), such a greater attention to policy pro-
cesses promises three advantages. First, policy processes can have direct impacts 
on innovation rather than just an indirect impact by shaping policy strategies 
and instrument mixes (Reichardt et al., 2017). Second, studying the co- 
evolution of policy and sociotechnical change calls for more explicit attention 
to policy processes, which in turn may enable a better understanding of the 
dynamic nature and causal links between the two (Hoppmann et al., 2014; 
Reichardt et al., 2016). Third, a more sophisticated conceptualisation of policy 
processes may allow for a more proactive consideration of the underlying pol-
itics when drafting policy advice regarding policy design and procedural aspects 
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and may thus have a greater chance of being adopted (Edmondson et al., 2018; 
Rogge and Reichardt, 2016).
 Only few studies in the field of sustainability transitions have so far substan-
tively drawn on theories of the policy process (Kern and Rogge, 2018). Exemp-
tions include Markard et al. (2016) drawing on Sabatier’s advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF ) (Sabatier, 1988), Geels and Penna (2015) drawing on 
Baumgartner’s punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) as 
well as Normann (2015) drawing on Kingdon’s multiple streams approach 
(Kingdon, 1995). However, most of these contributions rather loosely build on 
theories of the policy process and typically refrain from justifying their choice 
vis a vis alternatives. In addition, they often rely on the ‘classic’ version of these 
analytical frameworks, neglecting more recent debates and further conceptual 
developments in the policy sciences literatures.
 Therefore, in Kern and Rogge (2018) we provide a critical review of five well- 
established theories of the policy process. These include Sabatier’s ACF, Kingdon’s 
multiple streams approach, Baumgartner’s punctuated equilibrium theory, Hajer’s 
discourse coalitions framework (Hajer, 1995), and Pierson’s policy feedback 
approach (Pierson, 1993). For each of these theories we provide an overview of 
the origin, key concepts, empirical applications, recent theoretical advances and 
most important criticisms (see Table 12.2). Perhaps most importantly we also offer 
reflections on their suitability for answering research questions of interest to 
scholars in the field of sociotechnical transitions towards sustainability. Overall, 
we find a great potential for cross- fertilisation of ideas across transition and policy 
studies, but we also identify two important shortcomings.
 The first shortcoming is that these theories are often applied to study the 
emergence of single policy instruments or purposively designed policy pro-
grammes, rather than to explain the evolution of messy, real- world policy mixes. 
However, as such policy mixes are particularly important in the context of 
energy transitions, we argued that the reviewed theories of the policy process 
may have to be adapted to the logic of thinking in terms of policy mixes. For 
example, greater attention should be paid to policy changes which guide the 
direction of change, e.g. towards low- carbon solutions (Kern and Rogge, 2016).
 The second shortcoming is that analyses often stop short at the output of 
policy processes and do not study policy outcomes and impacts, which are of 
particular importance in studying sustainable energy transitions. Indeed, many 
of the reviewed theories only help to explain how and why policies were 
adopted, with little attention to how these policy outputs impact the sociotech-
nical system. In Kern and Rogge (2018) we differentiated between direct and 
indirect links between policy processes and sociotechnical change which both 
should be taken into consideration in future policy mix studies. While the indi-
rect link manifests itself through policy outputs (e.g. changes to the instrument 
mix) leading to impacts on the sociotechnical system, the direct link suggest 
that the nature of policy processes, such as a participatory policymaking style, 
can also directly influence sociotechnical change, e.g. through influencing per-
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 Within CIED we have started to tackle both shortcomings by developing an 
interdisciplinary conceptual framework for investigating the co- evolution of policy 
mix and sociotechnical change (Edmondson et al., 2018). In order to explicitly 
consider the role of policy processes in this co- evolutionary process we have drawn 
on Policy Feedback Theory, which focuses on how policies shape politics and the 
resulting effects on further policymaking. Integrating this theory of the policy 
process with sociotechnical transitions thinking allows us to account for multiple 
policy effects (resource, interpretative and institutional) on sociotechnical change 
and resultant feedback mechanisms (cognitive, administrative and fiscal) influen-
cing the policy processes that underpin further policy mix change.
 We have illustrated this novel analytical framework using the case of the UK 
zero carbon homes policy mix. This is an example where an ambitious policy 
target lost political support over time due to a range of policy effects and feed-
back mechanisms, ultimately leading to its abandonment. The example high-
lights that policy mixes for sustainable energy transitions should be designed to 
create incentives for beneficiaries to mobilise further support, while at the same 
time addressing a number of prevailing challenges that may undermine political 
support over time. Overall, we think that drawing on a range of policy process 
theories can enrich academic analysis and provide more adequate policy think-
ing about policy mixes for energy transitions.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
The research summarised in this chapter aptly demonstrates that policy mix think-
ing is an important analytical perspective in the context of policies to support sus-
tainable energy transitions. This is because various policy mix conceptualisations 
allow scholars and policy analysts to better deal with the complexity of real- world 
policymaking rather than simplistic economic theoretical thinking about policy 
that still dominates scholarly and policy debates to some extent.
 While instrument interactions matter and have been the subject of much 
research, this chapter has argued that there are important other issues to consider. 
Such issues include different policy mix rationales, processes of designing and 
maintaining effective policy mixes over time, the need to deliberately phase out 
unsustainable technologies and practices, and the important role of actors and 
institutions in influencing the design and implementation of policy mixes. The 
research summarised above provides important early insights into these issues.
Research implications
Our research identified a variety of avenues for future investigations. Given the 
complexity of studying policy mixes (the larger the mix analysed, the less depth 
and complexity can be addressed), there is only relatively little research that 
takes a comparative perspective. However, as our CIED research discussed 
above shows, comparative analysis can lead to interesting insights. It can high-
light issues in a policy mix that only reveal themselves in comparison to another 
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policy mix (in a different country or sector, for example). Such comparative 
work could help explain key similarities and differences, thereby potentially 
identifying generic (e.g. technology or sector- related factors) as well as country 
specific factors (e.g. national policy traditions or policy styles) (e.g. see Howlett 
and Ramesh, 1993).
 There are also open questions about which institutional arrangements can 
foster the development of well- coordinated and comprehensive policy mixes 
and which capabilities are required for managing complex policy mixes. Few if 
any studies focus on how policymakers and implementing organisations can 
acquire or develop such competences. This development of competences is 
especially difficult in administrative contexts, where civil servants’ work is 
focused on developing one specific new policy instrument in isolation and who 
often remain in a department only for a short time, as is the case in the UK.
 In addition, the evaluation of real- world (rather than intended) policy mixes 
for transitions has been little addressed (Kivimaa et al., 2017). There are 
important questions about how to evaluate the impact of such policy mixes ex 
post and ex ante. While much research focuses on characteristics of policy mixes 
such as coherence or consistency as a proxy for potential success, more sophist-
icated methodologies are needed to analyse potential or actual effects of 
complex policy mixes on energy transitions. One possibility to make progress in 
this regard is to draw on the evaluation literature and adopt their approaches to 
policy mix analysis as has been proposed by Kivimaa et al. (2017).
 One further avenue for future research is to explore how to phase policies 
and alter policy mixes in line with progress of energy transitions. This is an issue 
raised recently e.g. in Meckling et al. (2017) but there is not much explicit con-
sideration of these issues in the sustainability transitions literature yet. Future 
research should therefore combine policy mix thinking with the work on 
different phases of transitions and work out which combinations of instruments 
are most appropriate for which phase.
 Finally, future research should pay greater attention to the politics of design-
ing policy mixes. While Rogge and Reichardt (2016) include policy processes in 
their framework for studying policy mixes, there is little detail on how the 
politics of such processes might be conceptualised. As summarised above we 
conducted a review of different policy process theories and their potential use in 
the context of studying the politics of sustainability transitions (Kern and 
Rogge, 2018) and have developed a novel framework based on the policy feed-
back literature (Edmondson et al., 2018) but much research remains to be done 
on this important aspect of policy mixes.
Policy recommendations
Given the broad scope of the research reported in this chapter and the varied 
empirical cases which our research has covered, the idea here is to draw out 
some broad principles for policymaking rather than providing suggestions about 
specific interventions or policy changes.
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 In line with existing work on energy efficiency policy our research on energy 
efficiency policy mixes strengthens the notion that there are no ‘silver bullets’, 
i.e. single instruments that can bring about energy transitions. Instead policy-
makers need to develop well- managed portfolios of policy goals, strategies and 
instruments to foster energy transitions. These policy mixes need to be continu-
ously (re-)assessed and modified as necessary when the transition progresses and 
may need to be backed up with supportive changes in administrative organisa-
tions and processes.
 In terms of supporting energy efficiency and energy demand reduction as a core 
contribution to sustainable energy transitions, it has been argued that ‘efficiency 
first’ should be a primary policy goal (Rosenow and Cowart, 2017). For policy-
makers this principle means that, put simply, the policy mix should prioritise 
incentivising investments in customer- side efficiency (including end- use energy 
efficiency and demand response) whenever they would cost less, or deliver more 
value, than investing in energy infrastructure, fuels, and supply alone. While this 
may sound very much like common- sense policy, unfortunately this principle is 
not heeded in much energy policy. For example, in the UK not a single pound of 
the £256 billion investment pipeline for energy infrastructure is allocated to 
energy efficiency improvements (Rosenow and Cowart, 2017).
 Beyond such broad principles informing policy mix design, there is ‘no one size 
fits all’, ideal instrument mix, but policy mixes need to be tailored to specific goals 
and the (institutional and country) settings they are applied in. What is important 
is that this tailoring sufficiently acknowledges the existing policy mix, on top of 
which new policies are designed. This may require the phase out of existing 
policies supporting unsustainable energy production or consumption, while 
creating or maintaining sufficient support for innovation (Kivimaa and Kern, 
2016). We have also emphasised the need for comprehensive instrument mixes, 
which in the case of aiming for radical energy efficiency improvements, for 
example, means not just to focus on near- term, relatively cost- effective technolo-
gies, but also requires incentives for costlier, more complex technologies which are 
needed for deep energy efficiency improvements (Rosenow et al., 2017).
 Much of the emphasis on the coherence and consistency of policy mixes in 
the literature may suggest that in order to develop successful mixes, policy-
makers need to aim for a complete overhaul of existing policy arrangements or 
completely new policy packages. However, Howlett and Rayner argue that 
policy patching can also be a successful strategy, ‘much in the same way as soft-
ware designers issue “patches” for their operating systems and programmes in 
order to correct flaws or allow them to adapt to changing circumstances’ 
(Howlett and Rayner, 2013, p. 177). Our empirical research on Finnish energy 
efficiency policy shows that a patching strategy can be successful so it is 
important for policymakers to know that developing promising policy mixes 
does not require ‘starting from a clean slate’ (Kern et al., 2017). This is a prom-
ising insight for policymakers and should encourage an honest assessment of 
current policy mixes for energy transitions along the lines discussed above, 
which can then be used to inform suitable patching strategies.
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Notes
1 Various other terms such as policy portfolios, policy bundles or policy packages have 
been used in similar ways (see Howlett et al., 2015). However, we prefer to use the 
notion of policy mixes as these other terms often have a connotation of deliberate and 
well- designed policy mixes, which does not characterise most policy mixes in reality.
2 See www.sciencedirect.com/journal/energy- research-and- social-science/vol/33.
3 These included: IEA policies and measures databases on energy efficiency, the Euro-
pean Environmental Agency’s database on climate change mitigation policies and 
measures in Europe; the IEA Sustainable Buildings Centre’s Building Energy Efficiency 
Policies database and the ODYSSEE–MURE database.
4 All of the experts were part of the Energy Saving Policies and Energy Efficiency 
Obligation Schemes (ENSPOL) project, which was funded by the European Commis-
sion. The full list of involved institutions can be found on the ENSPOL project 
website (http://enspol.eu).
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13 Managing energy and climate 
transitions in theory and practice
A critical systematic review of 
Strategic Niche Management
Kirsten E.H. Jenkins and Benjamin K. Sovacool
Introduction
Ambitious goals for reducing carbon emissions require a rapid and extensive 
deployment of low- carbon technologies throughout the economy, with far- 
reaching implications for infrastructures, institutions, social practices and cul-
tural norms. As the International Renewable Energy Agency (IREA) and 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2017) recently noted, meeting the goals 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement – limiting global temperature rise to below 
2°C above pre- industrial levels – demands we reduce the carbon dioxide 
intensity of the global economy by 85 per cent in 35 years. This corresponds to 
an average reduction of energy- related carbon dioxide emissions of about 2.6 per 
cent per year, or 0.6 Gigatons per year (IREA and IEA, 2017).
 Meeting such targets will necessitate low- carbon transitions across multiple 
sociotechnical domains, namely electricity and heat, industry and buildings, for-
estry and agriculture, and transport, to name a few (Geels et al., 2017). Yet, so 
far, progress on global energy and climate policy has been phlegmatic, and the 
pace of change is set to become ever more lethargic in the wake of the Trump 
Administration’s plans to reinvest in carbon- intensive forms of energy such as 
tar- sands, oil and natural gas, and coal. Admittedly, the rate and scale of this 
transformative change has few historical precedents and represents a major 
policy challenge (Sovacool, 2016). 
 Transitions frameworks for understanding the pathways by which these changes 
occur have emerged in response to universal and localised energy challenges, 
including the coupled threats of climate change, fossil fuel depletion and fuel 
poverty. This chapter focuses on new technological innovation, the destabilisation 
of dominant energy regimes and the reframing of transitions goals through one 
such framework: Strategic Niche Management (SNM) (Markard et al., 2012; 
Schot and Steinmuller, 2016). SNM promotes ‘the reflexive management of real- 
world experiments in the form of pilot and demonstration projects, in which new 
sociotechnical configurations can grow and conditions for their ‘up- scaling’ can be 
elaborated” ’ (van den Bergh et al., 2011, p. 13). In essence, SNM offers a means of 
learning about and enhancing the development and diffusion of new technologies 
with the aim of meeting low- carbon and low- energy goals.
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 Since the articulation and development of the SNM field by the end of the 
1990s (Kemp et al., 1998; Weber et al., 1999), applications have increased stead-
ily, gaining particular traction with energy scholars. Articles have been pub-
lished with regards to electricity production and use with a focus on biomass 
(Raven, 2005; van der Laak et al., 2007; Verbong et al., 2010), zero energy 
buildings (Jain et al., 2016; Martiskainen and Kivimaa, 2018), clean vehicles 
(Hoogma et al., 2002; Sushandoyo and Magnusson, 2014) and the role of actors 
(Caniëls and Romijn, 2008; Lovell, 2007) among others. As a further example, 
Sovacool (2017) surveyed social science theorists about conceptual approaches 
for transitions in the transport sector to electric mobility, where both SNM and 
sociotechnical transitions theory were prominently discussed.
 In this chapter, we provide an updated, confirmatory analysis of the ten- year 
literature review of the SNM literature provided by Schot and Geels (2008). 
Moreover, we present a synthesis of lessons learnt for both academic studies and 
policymakers working towards low- energy transitions. Specifically, we ask: what 
insights do 15 years of SNM literature offer for how to manage, or accelerate, low- 
carbon energy transitions? Arranz (2017) notes in a meta- survey of the sociotech-
nical transitions field the need for more refined understanding of what it takes to 
drive energy transitions – a progress typically undertaken by looking at past trans-
itions (Grubler et al., 2016). This chapter makes another important step towards 
this goal through its focus on forward- looking policy recommendations.
 We begin with a brief overview of the SNM heuristic, necessary to context-
ualise the results that follow. We then present the methodology behind our 
systematic review and content analysis covering 15 years of SNM literature 
(between 2002 and 2016) published across 9 databases, as well as 22 newsletters 
developed by the Sustainability Transitions Research Network (STRN). This 
approach allows for the identification of emergent research themes, as well as 
data about authors, their methods, and case studies in addition to analytical 
strategies and proselytised policy recommendations.
Theorising sociotechnical transitions: a brief summary of 
Strategic Niche Management
The development of the SNM theory coincided and coevolved with that of the 
multi- level perspective (MLP) model on sociotechnical systems (introduced in 
Chapter 2), and arguably appears a subset of this larger theory. Much of the SNM 
literature concerns the early adoption of new technologies that have the potential 
to contribute to sustainable development goals, with the assumption that innova-
tion journeys can be facilitated by creating and supporting technological niches, 
protected spaces that allow experimentation (Schot and Geels, 2008). This, in 
theory, supports new technological pathways capable of penetrating the prevailing 
regime, destabilising or replacing unsustainable technologies in the process. In 
focusing on developments at the niche level, SNM presents ‘a necessary and reflex-
ive component of intentional transformation processes of regimes’, where actors 
can push new, sustainable technologies on to the market (Kemp et al., 1998, 
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 While SNM was initially created as a management tool, in practice, it has 
also been used as an analytical one. Given that SNM is planned, focused and 
intended to direct sociotechnical change, it follows that studies investigating or 
utilising the model should engage with statements on (1) what we are transi-
tioning towards, and (2) how it is possible to achieve this. To this end, we seek 
to summarise any emergent recommendations from 15 years of research.
Research methods: a systematic review and content analysis
To collect data for our study, a systematic and extensive search was conducted 
for peer- reviewed academic, energy- related articles on SNM published between 
2002 and 2016, in addition to a complete search of the newsletters of the 
STRN. We acknowledge from the offset that there are earlier publications in 
the SNM field not captured by this data range (indeed, some of the most cited 
emerging in the late 1990s). Nevertheless, we focus on the last 15 years in order 
to provide a state- of-the- art summary of the most recent developments in the 
field, building on and corroborating the analysis done by Schot and Geels 
(2008). Furthermore, we acknowledge that our energy- related sample excludes 
transitions in other sectors. Yet, given the book is concerned with energy trans-
itions specifically, this segregation is as useful as it is necessary.
 For research articles, only those published between 1 January 2002 and 31 
December  2016  were  collected.  To  identify  relevant  articles,  the  authors 
searched for the paired terms of ‘Strategic Niche Management’ and ‘energy’, 
‘SNM’ and ‘electricity’, ‘SNM’ and ‘buildings’, ‘SNM’ and ‘transport’ and 
‘SNM’ and ‘vehicles’ within three fields, the article title, abstract and key-
words. These categories were inclusive, meaning that a single article could 
not be counted multiple times in different categories, i.e. if they appeared in 
‘energy’ and ‘electricity’ they would only be coded once. We coded for ‘energy’ 
first, meaning that the majority of papers were allocated here – later cat-
egories then allowed us to capture ones that would otherwise have been 
excluded from the sample. These searches were undertaken across nine article 
databases,  resulting  in  the  following  sample  from  each:  ScienceDirect 
(31 papers), JSTOR (0), Project Muse (0), Hein Online (0), SpringerLink 
(0), Taylor and Francis Online (7), Wiley Online (1), Sage Journals (3) and 
Annual Reviews (0), selecting only the articles that were peer reviewed, full- 
length and written in English.
 For the STRN newsletter, we collated all editions published from its estab-
lishment in 2011, to the end of 2016 – the latest publication at the time of data 
collection – and, using the same sampling search criteria as above, sampled from 
the articles listed in their ‘publications’ section. Given that these newsletters 
are designed to explicitly engage with the SNM literature, it was not necessary 
to select articles based on three fields outlined above, the title, abstract and key-
words. This led to the identification of one additional article.
 In total, we generated a population of 45 papers. To analyse these resources, 
we used a content analysis methodology similar to Sovacool (2014). In keeping 
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with a contents analysis approach, we primarily focused on quantitative forms of 
assessment. In all but two instances (see sections headed ‘Topics’ and ‘Policy 
recommendations’ ), categories of analysis were identified before coding began, 
allowing us to record the articles that met our criteria across those categories 
only, resulting in a targeted sample that focused on our key questions.
 We coded the contents of articles according to ten main categories of ana-
lysis; author discipline, author region, author gender, method, case study, topic, 
attitude towards the speed of transitions, contribution type, analytical strategy 
and policy recommendations. Each category contained a number of more spe-
cific codes, which are outlined in Table 13.2. To determine the coding outcome, 
coders read the title, abstract and article keywords (when available), before 
searching the rest of the article for key terms and phases. We recognise that 
there is some subjectivity inherent in this process. Across all coding categories, 
basic statistics were then conducted to calculate percentages, frequencies and 
distribution across years.
Table 13.2 Content analysis coding framework
Category Sub-category
Author discipline Science & Engineering, Economics & Statistics; Social Science; 
Arts & Humanities; Interdisciplinary; Other
Author region Africa; Asia–Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand); 
Europe (including Russia and Turkey); Latin America and 
Caribbean; Middle East; North America
Then each specific country
Author gender Male; Female; Indeterminate
Method Experimental; Surveys; Modelling; Qualitative; Literature 
Review; None; Mixed Method
Case study Geographical Case Study; Technological Case Study; If so, 
comparative?
Topic Solar; Biofuel; Wave; Wind; Smart Grids; Community Energy; 
Energy Efficiency; Zero Energy Buildings; LEDs; Electric Vehicles; 
Incumbents; Other; Theoretical 
Attitude to speed of 
transition 
Negative; Neutral; Optimistic




Financial Support; Regulatory Support; Policy Mixes; 
Intermediaries Resourcing; Sectoral Diversity; Diverse 
Performance Targets; Mutual Learning; Flexible Institutional 
Structure; Brokering and Partnership Management; Private 
Sector Empowerment; Evaluation and Feedback; User Training 
and Awareness; Standardisation and Licensing
Source: the authors.
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Author demographics
We began the content analysis by looking at three categories relating to the 
demographics of authors: disciplinary affiliation, location and gender. In all cat-
egories, we coded for each individual author, not just the lead author. This 
meant that a paper could receive numerous counts for the same category e.g. 
two ‘female’ and one ‘male’.
 For disciplinary affiliation, we coded the affiliation listed for all paper authors and 
classified those based on the categories used in Scopus, along with the categories of 
‘not listed’ or ‘other’. As authors can list multiple affiliations these categories were 
inclusive. This meant that an author working under ‘management’ and ‘engineering’ 
would be coded for both ‘management’ and ‘engineering’. Where multiple authors 
on the paper recorded the same affiliation, it was only coded once. A paper was 
coded as ‘interdisciplinary’ if two or more of the authors listed different disciplinary 
affiliations, if the affiliation itself mentioned more than one discipline e.g. ‘Depart-
ment of Management and Engineering’, or if it said ‘interdisciplinary’ in its title.
 For author region, we coded each country listed on the paper. To get an 
accurate sense of geographical bias, if any, we coded for all paper authors. Where 
authors listed multiple country affiliations, each one was scored.
 Finally, for author gender, authors were coded into ‘male’, ‘female’, and ‘indeter-
minate’ as some authors only used initials or had names common to both genders.
Methods
For paper method, we coded for seven categories: ‘experimental’, ‘surveys’, 
‘modelling’, ‘qualitative’, ‘literature review’, ‘none’ and ‘mixed method’. Articles 
were only coded for each method listed, meaning they could achieve more than 
one score. Where more than one method was present, they were determined to 
be ‘mixed method’ and further notes were taken. Examples include the presence 
of semi- structured interviews and documentary analysis, or a documentary 
analysis, field study and participatory observation.
Case studies
We coded for whether the articles used geographical case studies (at any scale), 
technological case studies, or both, and whether these case studies were com-
parative. Studies were coded as comparative whenever they compared two or 
more geographical areas or technologies, with further analysis undertaken as to 
the depth and content of the case study examination. This allowed us to record 
the scope of the research articles. For papers using geographical case studies, we 
then coded for which countries they were studying.
Topics
For this category, our purpose was to discern the general topic of research, rather 
than to determine the exact nuances of the papers. We began by recording short 
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notes on the topic of the article – derived from the title, keywords and abstract, 
where possible. This included the terms ‘incumbents’, ‘community energy’ and 
‘electric vehicles’ for example, as well as a ‘theoretical’ category. We then 
inductively built a list of 15 final topics. From these notes, 15 topical themes 
emerged as summarised in Table 13.2. Each paper was then allocated to all 
appropriate categories. Papers could be coded in multiple categories i.e. if they 
referred to both ‘smart grids’ and ‘incumbents’.
Pace of transitions
We were also interested in attitudes towards the speed of energy transitions, 
and whether the articles assessed whether it would, could, or should be a fast 
or a slow process. Articles were coded as ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’. 
Papers were determined to be ‘positive’ either if they reported potential trans-
itions within ten years or used the term related to a quicker pace, e.g. ‘fast’, 
‘rapid’, ‘quick’ or ‘accelerated’. ‘Neutral’ papers either referenced uncertainty 
over the pace of transitions or gave no comment, including those that did not 
offer any estimated time in years. Papers were determined to be ‘negative’ if 
they stated it would take longer than ten years or used terms such as ‘slow’, 
‘long’ and ‘gradual’.
Analytical strategy
For analytical strategy, we categorised articles according to whether the publica-
tions tended to centre their analytical strategy on ‘agency’, ‘structure’ or 
‘meaning’; in keeping with the classic social theory triangle of agency, structure 
and meaning – or the three ‘I’s’ of interests, institutions and ideas – that often 
guide the analysis of analytic strategy and empirical focus (Sovacool and Hess, 
2017). We use the term ‘centre’ to acknowledge that each paper may involve 
elements of multiple types. Papers coded to the category of ‘agency’ prioritised 
the agency of people and their strategies, covering a range of actors, from indi-
viduals, organisations and collective groups. ‘Structure’ refers to macrosocial, 
infrastructural and institutional hardware; and ‘meaning’ refers to the cogni-
tive, discursive and normative systems that orient action. For meaning, this 
implies a focus on language, symbolism, narratives, performativity, and how 
technologies co- construct and negotiate meaning for human subjects. Most 
papers were coded to the one category representing their main focus. However, 
where they explicitly compared two or three theoretical approaches, they were 
coded in both.
Policy recommendations
Finally, we coded for policy recommendations by recording information on the 
suggested recommendations for users, decision- makers, planners, policymakers 
and regulators in each article. A recommendation was determined to be 
242  Kirsten E.H. Jenkins and Benjamin K. Sovacool
‘non- academic’ when it provided advice or explained lessons for an external 
stakeholder group, including policymakers and business groups, for example. 
Coders read the discussion and conclusion and determined whether non- 
academic recommendations were either ‘present’ or ‘absent’. When they were 
present, the relevant information was extracted and then analysed inductively.
Results: unveiling 15 years of Strategic Niche Management 
research on energy transitions
This section of the chapter presents the results of the content analysis, follow-
ing the same structure outlined above.
Author demographics
Across all articles analysed in the sample, a total of 96 author affiliations were 
listed, covering a range of disciplines. As panel A of Figure 13.2 shows, authors 
were strongly associated with social sciences and management disciplines, which 
made up a total of 74 per cent of the overall sample. The least represented dis-
ciples were life sciences and medicine and engineering and technology, which 
may be unsurprising. Of the papers analysed, only 12 were identified as having 
interdisciplinary authorship meaning that despite an increasing shift in aca-
demic pedagogy towards interdisciplinary research, many authors continue to 
work in the confines of their own disciplines.
 Authors reported affiliations with all global regions, although panel B of 
Figure 13.1 shows that there was a heavy bias towards European contributions, 
which made up 82 per cent of the sample. Of those from Europe, 27 per cent 
were from Dutch authors and 26 per cent were from UK authors. We acknow-
ledge that this is likely related to the availability of research funds in particular 
countries (as well as, arguably, the origin of the transitions concept itself ). It 
was also possible here to identify recurring authors – (eight papers), Smith (five 
papers), Seyfang (four), Lovio (four), Hielscher (three), Verbong (three) and 
Hargreaves (three). This shows not only a geographical limit to the diffusion of 
this concept, but also an authorial limit. Particularly underrepresented global 
regions include the Africa (1 per cent), Middle East (2 per cent) and North 
America (2 per cent), although we do note that our sample only selected papers 
written in English from major databases, which may not be readily accessible in 
some global regions.
 For author gender, shown the bottom panel of Figure 13.1, while male con-
tributions did dominate (65 per cent), female authors were fairly well repres-
ented at 34 per cent of the total sample. Only 1 per cent of author genders could 
not be identified. We identify this gender balance as being positive. Sovacool 
(2014) recognises in his content analysis of 9,549 papers published in the social 
science research in the energy field, only 15.7 per cent could be identified as 
female. Although our sample is evidentially significantly smaller, our analysis 
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Figure 13.1 Strategic Niche Management author demographics (n = 100).
Source: the authors.
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Methods
For methods, shown in the top panel of Figure 13.2, the most favoured approach 
was secondary data analysis (44 per cent) followed closely by qualitative (43 per 
cent). The comparative lack of survey (5 per cent), modelling methodologies 
(3 per cent) and experimental (0 per cent) methodologies shows new avenues 
for methodological expansion. Few studies stated no method (5 per cent). Of 
the total papers coded, 35 per cent were identified as being mixed methods 
studies, primarily relying on a combination of semi- structured interviews and 
documentary analysis, although with a number of papers also utilised participa-
tory fieldwork including fieldtrips, meeting participation and participant obser-
vation. There was methodological diversity throughout the years.
 The finding that the top methods employed by SNM researchers are qual-
itative and dependent on secondary data sources has at least two implications. 
First, and positively, as qualitative analysis is typically used to explore the 
socially constructed nature of a phenomenon, the predominance of these 
methods suggests a focus on the social elements of energy transitions. Whereas 
Sovacool (2014) identified a need for energy studies research to expand meth-
odologically towards socially sensitive approaches – including the utilisation of 
more research interviews, field research, focus groups and other human- centred 












Figure 13.2 Strategic Niche Management article methods (n = 45).
Source: the authors.
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 Second, as both a positive and a negative, qualitative analyses also give find-
ings that are context specific. Positively, research conclusions and policy recom-
mendations independent of context can be meaningless, thereby context 
enriches results. Negatively, outside of the presence of multiple cases reinforcing 
the same results or comparative studies, this hinders the ability for widespread 
application of the findings and the ability to draw policymaking principles from 
them. Further, without transparent documentation of the processes undertaken, 
qualitative analyses can be hard to replicate.
 As a result, and drawing on the relative under- emphasis of experimental, 
survey and modelling methodologies in this sample, we argue for both a con-
tinuation of socially oriented methodologies and, crucially, increased attention 
to modelling techniques and approaches, which may be more testable to statis-
tics, and falsifiable and replicable. The result is findings that may be more 
readily applicable in practice.
 Indeed, a preference for qualitative or literature- based methods ignores 
experimental designs that have shown great promise across the fields of behavi-
oural science, psychology, and applied sociology (Sorrell 2007; Sovacool and 
Hess 2017), especially when they investigate scales of social action and actors’ 
roles (Stern et al., 2016). Raven (2005) stated that 
SNM can be used for improving the design of experiments, for evaluating 
policies in the past, for using SNM as part of scenario development, or for 
designing future policies on niche management. However, SNM has not 
been used as such in practice, but mainly as a research tool. The policy 
claims that are often made by SNM researchers still remain a promise; 
SNM needs real- life experimentation in society. 
This is a promise of SNM that remains largely unfilled.
Case studies
Papers contained a range of both geographical and technological case studies. In 
the case of geographical case studies, these were not well distributed globally. 
Few studies utilised examples or analysis of countries or regions in the Global 
South. Further, most publications were nationally focused, with limited investi-
gations into international commodity systems or international intermediaries 
such as European Union policymakers. Across all papers analysed, only 16 per 
cent utilised comparative case studies, whether it was two technologies, two 
countries or several technologies across different countries. We take this to 
represent limited engagement with ‘lessons learnt’ and their application to 
different international and technological contexts.
 There was no clear trend in the countries studied through time. Nonetheless, 
there was a predominance of SNM scholarship both originating from and using 
case studies of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This indicates a relat-
ively limited scope of global application, empirically supporting the statement 
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from Caniëls and Romijn (2008, p. 257) that ‘the main preoccupation of the 
SNM researchers has clearly been on the initiation and management of (indi-
vidual) experiments’, with little consideration for the next stages of market 
establishment and beyond. Moreover, our finding further reinforces the conclu-
sion of Hoogma et al.’s (2002) book, which has led to substantial research on 
the local- global distinction between experiments and niches (see Geels and 
Raven, 2006) as well as spatially informed research on cross- local/transnational 
dynamics (see Sengers and Raven, 2015).
 Indeed, this points to a continued failure to better understand the conditions 
under which niches, or mainstream alternatives, can truly break through into 
the wider system (Arranz, 2017). An implication is the need for a greater 
emphasis on knowledge transfer within the SNM research community, both 
within academic circles and outside. While innovation niches may first emerge 
within one country or area – the place where the technology is first designed, 
piloted or implemented, for example – a technology will not ‘break through’ 
into the regime without the supporting impetus to do so. This comes, in part, 
from widespread geographical diffusion and embedding consistent with a tech-
nology or social innovation entering the mainstream marketplace.
Topics
An article’s topic reveals what is considered to be a ‘niche’ technology or 
process. Overall, our analysis demonstrated a slight favour for the reporting of 
energy production niches (43 per cent) as opposed to energy consumption 
(39 per cent), actors (including intermediaries) (9 per cent) or other (9 per 
cent). The category ‘other’ included theoretical contributions and the ideas of 
Citizen Participation Initiatives (CPI), donor interventions, product–service 
systems and alternative technology movements, among others. Generally speak-
ing, niche technologies were considered across the full range of the energy 
system and at both commercial and domestic scales. Although our chapter 
covers a short time span, Figure 13.3 shows some changes in the popularity of 
different niche topics. Alongside a general increase in SNM publications 
throughout the years, there was a clear increase in research on intermediaries, 
for  instance,  driven  mostly  by  UK  academics  including,  notably,  papers  by 
Seyfang et al. (2014), Hamilton et al. (2014) and Smith et al. (2016).
 Moreover, our qualitative coding process did reveal three other topics that 
occurred with frequency: financial support, mutual learning and brokering. 
These topics reaffirm and update similar findings and ‘conceptual categories’ 
presented by Schot and Geels (2008), where ‘learning’ and ‘networking’ were 
included as key recommendations (although to make the meaning of these cat-
egories more transparent, we name them slightly differently). To be specific, 
‘protection’ becomes ‘financial support’ (including market protection through 
subsidies and regulation), ‘learning’ becomes ‘mutual learning’ and ‘networks’ 
becomes ‘brokering and partnership management’. Surprisingly given the origins 
of the literature, there was no clear category relating to expectations/visions.
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 Sixteen of the papers referenced the need for what we term financial support of 
certain elements of niche innovation. These recommendations manifested as either 
funding particular intermediary groups or as providing subsidies for niche technolo-
gies or taxing others. As an illustration, in the context of smart grid projects, 
Verbong et al. (2013, p. 123) state ‘users are often regarded as a potential barrier to 
smart grids deployment and financial incentives the best instrument to persuade or 
seduce the users’. In keeping, Kamp and Forn (2016) referenced that in their case 
of Ethiopian biogas, entrepreneurial activities were hindered by inadequate financ-
ing possibilities. Kamp and Vanheule (2015) explain that improving finance mech-
anisms will enable end- users to purchase small wind turbines. In all cases, 
appropriate financing was seen to provide opportunity to remove a barrier and to 
increase niche diffusion. Steinhilber et al. (2013, p. 537) summarise such recom-
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the right mix of regulatory pressure and funding options corresponding to the 
current condition of its national industries and markets, to make innovation attrac-
tive for both the supply and demand side’. Thus, in order to manage energy and 
climate transitions, niches must be appropriately supported fiscally.
 Fifteen papers referred to the need for mutual learning, a category that contained 
notions of face- to-face learning, aggregated knowledge and knowledge exchange, 
emphasising the social embedding of energy technologies. Seyfang et al. (2014) 
stress the importance of learning throughout their paper, explaining that in order 
to strengthen a UK grassroots energy niche, a group of intermediary organisations 
is needed that has the capacity to consolidate and aggregate the learning and 
experiences of local projects with a view to repackaging them for implementation 
elsewhere. This includes learning- by-doing and pro- active learning interactions. 
As recognition that a community energy niche is heavily grounded in civil society 
and community engagement, this draws on the social, human and organisational 
capital alongside and in complement to finance, natural or manufactured capital. 
Taking a policy focus towards mutual learning, Browne et al. (2012, p. 149), refer-
encing Schwoon (2008), suggest that ‘policy- makers should also focus on “techno-
logical learning” or “learning- by-doing”, which can lead to substantial cost 
reductions and result in “early mover advantage” ’.
 Twelve papers then referred to the topics of brokering and partnership manage-
ment. Building on the category of mutual learning above, this considered the 
role of particular groups in directing niche implementation – i.e. who is able to 
share knowledge. We base the title of this category on the paper by Hargreaves 
et al. (2013, p. 878), who relay that ideas of ‘brokering and partnership manage-
ment’ exist as growing recognition that community energy intermediaries ‘can 
no longer focus solely on internally building local community energy projects 
but must actively try to work beyond the community energy sector – brokering 
partnerships and engaging in lobbying activities – to try to shape wider con-
texts’. This idea is supported in other papers. Kamp and Vanheule (2015, 
p. 479) add that ‘upscaling can be enabled by network expansion through the 
development of key partnerships with local authorities, financing institutions 
and local NGOs’. Hamilton et al. (2014) refer to the body responsible for this as 
a ‘moderator’ who can convene participatory forums, encourage learning pro-
cesses and provide leadership, capacity and institutional support with a view to 
facilitating long- term goals. Importantly, this idea builds on the role of ‘inter-
mediation’, where certain groups are able to consolidate, grow and diffuse niche 
innovations. According to Seyfang et al. (2014, p. 40), better- resourced inter-
mediary groups ‘could take the initiative in offering resources to new projects, 
transferring lessons from local projects, liaising with energy utilities and policy-
makers, and developing standardized models for easier replication’.
Pace of transitions
In terms of the temporal pace of transitions, the majority of papers either did 
not give an estimated timespan (47 per cent) or gave a pessimistic or negative 
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view (47 per cent) implying that it would either take more than ten years or 
emphasising qualitatively that transitions processes were long, slow, and cum-
bersome. Negative statements on timespan typically occurred in reference to 
economic, institutional and cultural barriers to niche development.
 In the few cases where a positive timespan was given (6 per cent), it was 
typically in relation to electric vehicles niches and came with a caveat – that 
diffusion may appear fast but dispersed, and therefore not necessarily holistic or 
efficacious. For example, Bakker et al. (2015) exhibit that while quick progress 
was made for electric vehicle recharging infrastructure, several market movers 
made different types of electric vehicle plugs, flooding the market and inhibiting 
the development of a global standard. Thus, ‘fast’ may not mean effective for 
the related niche development of electric vehicles. Sushandoyo and Magnusson 
(2014) illustrate potentially uneven transitions paces as they explored a 20-year 
timeline for the development of hybrid buses. Their results demonstrated rapid 
diffusion only towards the end of this range. This shows different pace along 
with design, diffusion and stabilisation phases of innovation making ‘take- off ’ 
and the pace of transitions hard to predict.
 Such pessimistic framing of transitions does go against some recent empirical 
evidence highlighting numerous ‘fast’ transitions that have occurred in both 
national energy supply and the diffusion of end- use devices (Sovacool, 2016). 
We note, however, that while market diffusion may sometimes occur quickly, it 
often only results after decades of pre- development. Rotmans et al. (2001) 
support this idea as they note that transitions may appear to be quick, even 
when their pre- development is long. This phase – also known as the valley of 
death – is, in many ways, what the SNM literature has been developed to under-
stand. Nevertheless, with conscious of the real path dependencies and lock- ins 
in incumbent regimes, we refer here, to the need for positivity and practically 
oriented forward thinking about the potential of energy transitions.
Analytical strategy
When coding for analytical strategy, there was a slight dominance of papers in 
the ‘agency’ category (55 per cent), followed by ‘structure’ (36 per cent) and 
‘meaning’ (9 per cent). While one paper did engage with all three approaches 
(Caniëls and Romijn, 2008), this was a literature review. Reflecting this, papers 
discussed a range of actors, from individuals and organisations to collective 
groups. This included, most notably, a strong focus on community energy groups 
and intermediaries as drivers and enablers of energy transitions. Given the 
planned nature of SNM outlined above, and indeed, the focus on ‘management’ 
within the approach in general, this focus on agency was determined as neces-
sary and unsurprising as we consider who manages transitions or is affected by 
them. Nonetheless, analytical strategies emphasising agency can assume that 
people are atomistic agents whose action can be explained without deep con-
sideration of structure (Jackson, 2005). Indeed, Mouzelis (1995) warns that the 
micro- turn in social theory towards agency has led to an almost complete 
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neglect of asking questions about bigger entities, reification, or the structural or 
functional attributes of larger systems.
 In our sample, the almost complete emphasis within the SNM literature on 
only agency and structure – and not meaning – implies a failure to appreciate 
the power of language, symbolism, narratives, performativity, rhetorical visions, 
and how technologies can co- construct and negotiate meaning for human sub-
jects (although this was touched upon briefly in some instances e.g. through 
Verbong et al.’s (2008) statements on expectations and visions). This absence 
of papers considering the meaning category will be surprising to some, given the 
potential argument that SNM was built upon science and technology studies 
with a particular emphasis on the dynamics of expectations as one way of giving 
meaning to the (future) world.
 In this vein, we note that it may be possible to analyse and explore how (and 
why) the SNM research has been guided to an overemphasis of agency and 
structure at the expense of meaning. Indeed, it seems fruitful for the SNM com-
munity to continue to engage with relational theories that emphasise agency, 
structure and meaning together. Such approaches may emphasise social rela-
tions and interactions, but they also highlight the webs of social structure and 
meaning in which actors are suspended and which they change through their 
action (Geels, 2009; Rutherford and Coutard, 2014). We say ‘continue to 
engage’ as acknowledgement that although relational perspectives on niche 
development can be developed in more detail, they do already exist.
 At least four papers in the sample seemed to recognise the value of a pro-
cessual approach, or at least combined different analytical strategies. Hatzl 
et al.’s (2016, p. 58) paper explained the typical distinction between (a) grass-
roots social innovation and (b) market- based technological innovations, repre-
senting an ‘agency’ vs. ‘structure’ split. In their work they argued that CPIs for 
niche developments, represented ‘a continuum from market- based to grassroots 
characteristics in order to facilitate a more detailed picture of niche develop-
ment’. Here, social arrangements such as CPIs are both ideologically motivated 
but also show market- based characteristics such as profit seeking.
Policy recommendations
Across the entire sample of SNM literature, 56 per cent of papers contained 
explicit policy recommendations, leaving 44 per cent without non- academic 
impact statements. In terms of type and scope of recommendations, financial 
support (n = 16); regulatory support (n = 4); policy mixes (n = 4); intermediaries 
resourcing (n = 3); sectoral diversity (n = 4); diverse performance targets (n = 3); 
mutual learning (n = 15); flexible institutional structure (n = 3); brokering and 
partnership management (n = 12); private sector empowerment (n = 3), evalu-
ation and feedback (n = 4), user training and awareness (n = 1) and standardisa-
tion and licensing (n = 3) were suggested repeatedly. Table 13.3 provides one 
indicative recommendation for each of the categories listed above. These ideas 
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 Interestingly, recommendations were given for both government policy-
makers, local authorities and specific technology user groups, including industry 
members and intermediaries. Kamp and Vanheule (2015, p. 497) stated to this 
end that ‘niche upscaling is not solely in the hands of the government. Rather 
than standing aside, technology supplies, research institutes and NGOs can 
enable change themselves with targeted and joint efforts’. In this regard, the 
range of non- academic stakeholders deemed to be of relevance was wide.
 Moreover, where recommendations were present, they contained a diverse 
array of suggestions, ranging from both directly implementable options to 
broader policymaking principles (and even, in one instance, recommenda-
tions to avoid biofuel crop monoculture (Eijck and Romijn, 2008)). As illus-
trated in Table 13.3, this includes a distinction between technocratic 
solutions – e.g. technology standardisation and licensing (e.g. Kamp and 
Vanheule, 2015) – and socially oriented user- based engagement (e.g. 
Hargreaves et al., 2013), where Raven et al. (2008, p. 475) identified that ulti-
mately, ‘ready- made solutions cannot be dropped into a context without local 
negotiations’. Fitting the socially oriented recommendations category, 
Seyfang et al. (2014, p. 42) advocated for ‘imaginative policy’ support before 
going on to suggest what this might look like, including steers towards flexible 
institutional infrastructure. Browne et al. (2012, p. 150) outlined a clear series 
of recommendations that crossed these two categories, where they advised 
that policymakers should consider:
1 developing a transition strategy and engaging in scenario planning with 
industry stakeholders;
2 identifying potential ‘lead adopters’ and develop a strategy for SNM;
3 developing stakeholder partnerships with industry and consumer groups;
4 promoting the adoption of new sociotechnical regimes through awareness 
campaigns and education;
5 changing the taxation structure to tax negative externalities and create 
positive incentives through excise relief and subsidies;
6 providing long- term certainty through a constant mix of policy and regu-
latory signals.
A further strong example was provided by Tsoutsos and Stamboulis (2005) who, 
in a standalone section, suggest three key policy aims: (1) the development of 
focused learning mechanisms, (2) the encouragement of new types of players 
and 3) flexible financing mechanisms, adapted to the characteristics of indi-
vidual applications and environmentally consistent academic evaluation.
 Some studies introduced a ‘mutual learning’ category to encompass sugges-
tions for creating individual groups responsible for knowledge sharing or 
increased education across the full range of relevant stakeholders (e.g. Kamp 
and Vanheule, 2015). Sushandoyo and Magnusson (2012) argue that this should 
include provision of information on internal synergies, scale economies and 
projections of future sales and production volumes in the case of developing 
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technologies. Verbong et al. (2008) identified the need for clearly expressed 
expectations and visions at the beginning of and during niche transformations.
 Admittedly, although our analysis does not reveal the degree to which SNM 
findings and approaches are integrated in practice, it does illustrate the range of 
potential options for doing so. This diversity of potential policy options can be 
perceived as strength as it illustrates a range of different tools that can be 
applied in different contexts, plus the ability to tailor solutions. However, more 
work is needed that looks at exactly how, if and where policy lessons have been 
applied as attempts to and lessons from translating them into actual politics 
have not been well documented. Stemming from our analysis, we suggest that 
one fruitful avenue would be to look at the politics behind the policies, creating 
coalitions of stakeholders, so that low- carbon transitions occur.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Our systematic review of the literature has exposed both trends and gaps in 
the SNM literature and importantly, summarised key recommendation for 
transitions management. With this in mind, we offer four key findings and 
conclusions.
 First, there is an intellectual diversity within the transitions management 
community that we laud. Our review has demonstrated some positive demo-
graphic trends within authors. We have found contributions from across many 
academic disciplines, a fair balance of male and female contributors to the liter-
ature, a diversity of methods applied variously and analytical strategies that 
focus on the social integration and fostering of innovations, including concerns 
for energy groups and intermediaries. The recent SNM literature engaged with a 
range of geographical and technological cases, with studies primarily focusing 
on the UK and the Netherlands, but also with less typical case studies of China, 
India, Ethiopia and Malaysia. Cumulatively across the sample years, the top 
three technological case studies included solar energy, biofuels and electric 
vehicles.
 Second, we identify positive qualitative or topical trends within the com-
munity. There is a commitment to technological agnosticism, illustrated by a 
range of technological and geographical cases used within papers. There also 
appears to be a ready commitment to policy engagement, in that that a majority 
of publications analysed (56 per cent) provide a series of non- academic recom-
mendations stemming from empirical and theoretical work. These recommenda-
tions were targeted at government officials, industry members and intermediaries, 
among others, showing wide application and relevance. The most frequently 
reoccurring recommendations or topics focused on (1) the appropriate financing 
of niche innovations, (2) mutual learning between stakeholders and across 
niches, and (3) brokering and partnership in order to strengthen niche develop-
ment. As a key contribution of this chapter in line with the policy focus of the 
book it sits within, focusing on these areas increases our ability to manage energy 
and climate transitions.
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 Third, there were also worrying demographic trends related to geographic 
and methodological bias. There was a heavy bias towards European authorship, 
which contributed 82 per cent of the sample (with 26 per cent from UK authors 
and 27 per cent  from Dutch authors).  In addition, geographic case  studies are 
not well distributed globally with few studies in the Global South and most pub-
lications taking on national case studies, with limited investigations into inter-
national commodity systems or international intermediaries. Further, while 
positive in some regards, the predominance of qualitative and secondary data 
methodologies has downsides as well. This methodical focus leads to results that 
may be hard to replicate and, in many cases, and context specific, with knock- 
ons for the ability for widespread application of the findings and the ability to 
draw policymaking principles from them. Experimental research designs have 
also been largely avoided by the SNM community.
 On the grounds of these failings, we make recommendations for future 
research and policy- oriented commitments. It follows that our recommendation 
is to improve this negative demographic trend is for greater emphasis to be 
placed not only on increasing the breadth of case studies but also on comparing 
them. Doing  so  could  aid  the  identification  of more  generalisable  or  scalable 
lessons or policy principles. Moreover, we appeal for broader methods, capable 
of capturing a broader range of perspectives on the challenges we face and most 
pressingly, their solutions.
 Finally, and also critically, there was an apparent inability to draw com-
parative lessons either across technologies or countries within the SNM liter-
ature, and in some cases, where they were absent, engage with non- academic 
impact statements. These failures have at least three consequences. First, a 
failure to translate information between countries may leave niches isolated, 
preventing mainstream adoption. Second, a failure to compare technologies 
restricts lesson learning, therefore increasing the probability of negative mis-
takes. As demonstrated by Bakker et al. (2015), it also inhibits the develop-
ment of a global standard technology that, through pervasive uptake, can 
challenge regime technologies. Third, a failure to engage with non- academic 
impact statements represents, in essence, a failure to maximise the discursive 
potential of academic research. It follows that we call for more synthesis 
across the literature and further attempts to take academic discussion towards 
practical implementation. We have identified a conservative and pessimistic 
approach to envisioning the timing, temporal pace or accelerative potential 
of low- carbon energy transitions within the SNM literature as well. We 
wonder if the very hesitancy from SNM theorists to validate the notion of 
expedient transitions, and the continued dominance of techno- economic 
analyses rooted in modelling, contributes in part to the very ‘lock- in’ or ‘path 
dependency’ they critique. The theorists endow the fossil fuel regime with 
perhaps more agency than it actually has or need have. The point being that 
the very discourse we in the academy utilise to frame and engage on energy 
and carbon transitions can distort and even reinforce trends in that very 
empirical space.
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Towards systematic reductions in 
energy demand
Kirsten E.H. Jenkins, Debbie Hopkins 
and Cameron Roberts
Introduction
Transitions in Energy Efficiency and Demand began by outlining the challenge put 
forth by the Paris Agreement – the aspirational target of keeping the increase in 
global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre- industrial levels, and the firm 
target of achieving an increase well below 2°C. At the time of writing this book, 
media headlines suggest that this target is slipping through our grasp and the 
scientific evidence warns of failing targets (Climate Action Europe, 2018; Rogelj 
et al., 2016). Indeed, to have a reasonable chance of reaching these goals, emis-
sions must peak by 2020 and fall by more than 70 per cent in the next 35 years 
(Cooper and Hammond, 2018; Geels et al., 2018); a formidable and unpreced-
ented challenge that requires radical and far- reaching transformations of the 
whole energy system, including significant increases in energy efficiency and 
considerable reductions in energy demand.
 In the introduction, we noted too, that the process by which we tackle the 
issue of energy demand defies any simple solution: No single policy or innova-
tion is likely to make a notable impact. Thus, the means of reducing carbon 
emissions are various, ranging from the increased efficiency of existing energy- 
using devices, to the development of entirely new systems, and complex, relying 
on elaborate combinations of technology, policy, social practices, infrastructure, 
and culture to succeed. There are also many stumbling blocks – both historically 
embedded and contemporary – that might prevent rapid and consistent pro-
gress. Examples of this include the complexity of energy demand; the need for 
large- scale, rapid change; growing demand for energy; societal disinclination to 
change; the insufficiency of market mechanisms, and the plethora of economic 
barriers. Against this somewhat pessimistic backdrop, this chapter offers over-
arching insights gathered from the book’s various and wide- ranging case studies, 
to end with a cautiously hopeful, and optimistic path forward.
 Through a common commitment to a sociotechnical approach, the chapters 
presented in this book have sought to use a wide range of social science perspec-
tives to tackle the complexity of the energy demand reduction challenge. Our 
aim was to do this for an academic audience, while also having in mind the 
needs of various decision- makers, such as policymakers, entrepreneurs, 
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engineers, activists, researchers and others involved with the areas of energy 
efficiency and energy demand. The result has been a diverse range of chapters 
that examine how new low- energy innovations emerge and diffuse, and how 
this process is shaped by market forces, government policy, social interactions 
and cultural norms, as well as the complex interactions between all of these – 
and other – factors. The innovations examined in this book include new 
technologies, energy systems, business models and behaviours, as well as 
combinations of these.
 This chapter proceeds as follows: First, we restate the importance and utility 
of the sociotechnical approach and the framework of innovation emergence, 
diffusion and impact first outlined in Chapter 2. Second, we discuss the import-
ance of this approach for energy demand reduction in the UK context. Third, 
we outline what this means for countries beyond the UK. Finally, we introduce 
a series of policy principles that set the scene for our overall conclusion, an 
agenda for ongoing research and policy action into the systematic reduction of 
energy demand.
 This conclusion necessarily takes a big- picture perspective. Because energy 
demand is such a complex phenomenon, running through virtually every aspect 
of human society in one way or another, and influencing (and being influenced 
by) so many different sociotechnical systems, there can be no one- size-fits- all 
solution. Thus, we note from the offset that given the wide breadth of topics 
covered throughout this book, only each chapter can give specific, case- relevant 
recommendations. Rather than duplicating these, this conclusion aims to offer 
general principles and heuristics.
Restating the sociotechnical approach
The most obvious takeaway from this volume, especially for a non- academic 
reader, should be the value of a sociotechnical perspective. This has, first and 
foremost, offered a novel framework for considering not only the technical 
aspects of the demand reduction challenge, but also its social, political, eco-
nomic and cultural complexities. More specifically, it has drawn together a series 
of theoretical advances that guide the way we can and should consider such 
challenges, and, most pressingly, their solutions. For academics who may already 
be familiar with the sociotechnical approach, the chapters in this volume 
suggest fruitful new areas for scholarship that applies sociotechnical theory to 
the challenge of energy demand reduction. Beyond academia, this approach 
presents a useful way to imagine and understand the challenge of demand reduc-
tion and wider societal implications.
 Transitions in Energy Efficiency and Demand contains many examples of the 
value of a sociotechnical approach. Chapter 9 (Figus et al.) investigates energy- 
saving innovations and economy- wide rebound effects and demonstrates the 
benefits for aggregate social welfare that can be achieved though improvements 
in the energy efficiency of domestic boilers, for instance. In contrast, however, 
Chapter 6 (Jenkins et al.) uses issues in the rollout of smart meters in the UK to 
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show what happens if people are forgotten throughout the transitions process, 
cautioning that some social groups may become more vulnerable or margin-
alised. Similarly, Chapter 5 (Hopkins and Schwanen) points to the selectively 
managed experimentation with vehicle automation that involves some actors, 
but excludes others, perpetuating existing power dynamics. Finally, Chapter 11 
(Webb) illustrates that effective policy towards energy efficiency in UK build-
ings may be hampered by political reliance on classical economic theories and 
short- term price metrics, and a failure to link up policy strategies; a uniquely 
social failing. In each case, the sociotechnical approach reveals the actors we 
need to engage with if we are to reach climate change and emissions reduction 
targets in a socially- just way. These insights also restate the importance of both 
technologically radical and socially radical change, or as is the ultimate aim, a 
systematically radical combination of both (Dahlin and Behrens, 2005).
 In various places, our chapters also show that the challenge of reducing 
energy demand is much more complex than simply relying on market mecha-
nisms to incentivise people to invest in the ‘right’ innovations. This fairly blunt 
approach is likely to result in unintended consequences, which could either 
undermine the transition, or make it harmful for vulnerable groups. Jenkins and 
Sovacool (Chapter 13) provide perhaps the clearest set of practical lessons that 
can be taken from a sociotechnical approach (at least as far as niches are con-
cerned), when they observe that the existing literature on Strategic Niche Man-
agement emphasises the critical roles of niche experiment financing, mutual 
learning, and brokering partnerships for successful niche development.
 A second key point revealed by our sociotechnical approach is that of co- 
evolution between different elements of a sociotechnical system (Geels, 2004). 
Linkages may emerge between the evolution of technologies and users, or 
between technology, industry structure and policy institutions (Geels, 2005). 
For instance, the linkages between technology, industry structure and policy 
institutions are shown in Brockway et al.’s (Chapter 8) exploration of exergy 
economics, and Webb (Chapter 11) identifies the inevitable interconnection 
between energy and political values and beliefs. These chapters reinforce our 
point that energy demand must be viewed as a holistic problem, and cannot be 
reduced to any one factor, viewed in a vacuum, nor addressed with any one solu-
tion such as a new technology or a new regulation governing energy companies. 
In this vein, Kern et al.’s work on policy mixes (Chapter 12) provides critical 
insights on the co- evolution of policy and sociotechnical change which calls for 
more explicit attention to policy processes, and which in turn may enable a 
better understanding of the dynamic nature and causal links between the two.
 Beyond these two overarching lessons, we further identify merit in the spe-
cific sociotechnical themes of emergence, diffusion and impact, initially intro-
duced by Geels et al. (Chapter 2). Although these themes overlap and are 
non- linear, they provide a process- oriented framework that explores how low- 
energy innovations develop and become established; how they achieve wide-
spread adoption, and, crucially, how low- energy innovations ultimately impact 
energy demand.
264  Kirsten E.H. Jenkins et al.
 Under the theme of emergence, the chapters reveal, in accordance with 
Geels et al. (2018), that we must identify the techno- economic, finance and 
investment, cognitive (contrasting views and perceptions around consumer 
preference, for example) and social (including instabilities within networks of 
actors) uncertainties that limit the emergence of new innovations. Doing so is 
especially important considering that the aforementioned co- evolution pro-
cesses will inevitably create further obstacles for sustainable alternatives, which 
are already saddled with the teething problems facing all new technologies (e.g. 
smart meters) (Mokyr, 2010; Unruh, 2000).
 For the theme of diffusion, gaining endogenous momentum behind innova-
tions, and understanding how these innovations can become embedded within 
policy, social, business and user environments is central. Finally, in terms of 
impact, and with the acknowledgement that it is extremely difficult to do so, we 
must seek to better understand the influence of incremental innovations, such 
as loft and cavity wall insulation; explore rebound effects; analyse impact scen-
arios, and develop modelling tools for systematic sociotechnical transitions 
(Geels et al., 2018). Taken together, the detailed consideration of emergence, 
diffusion and impact provided in this book provides opportunities for far- 
reaching transformations. From here and working towards practical utility of our 
research and findings, we now consider what the sociotechnical approach means 
for the UK, for international audiences, and for policy practice.
Reflections on the UK context
To date, the UK has made significant progress in decreasing energy demand 
through both technological innovations and the offshoring of manufacturing 
(Hardt et al., 2018), yet as the chapters in this book demonstrate, much more 
can be done. Despite the recognition from the UK government that reducing 
demand is a more cost- effective approach to reaching national climate goals 
than building additional capacity, all of the so- called ‘low- hanging fruit’1 have 
been plucked and at the time of writing, energy efficiency and demand policy in 
the UK is somewhat confused. In fact, without further progress, the Committee 
on Climate Change (2016, 2018) warns that UK policies will fall well short of 
the fifth carbon budget – a legal emissions restriction that forms part of a long- 
term target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80 per cent below 1990 
levels by 2015.
 Taken together, the case studies presented in this book have shown that UK 
progress on energy demand transitions is something of a mixed bag. Some 
innovations – including electric vehicles (EVs), automated vehicles (AVs, also 
known as ‘driverless’, ‘self- driving’ or ‘autonomous’ vehicles), and smart meters 
– certainly still appear to be in the emergence phase. EVs for personal mobility 
(Chapter 4), for instance, are constrained by the lack of simultaneous develop-
ment of energy storage of mobile power supplies. The emergence of AVs 
(Chapter 5) is constrained in the experimentation phase by limited visions of 
the ‘real world’, with fewer opportunities for surprises and second- order 
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learnings. Likewise, smart meters (Chapter 6) are still undergoing technological 
development and face the constraint of resistant and reluctant consumers.
 Progress is slow at best as policymakers appear to reluctantly and tentatively 
commit to change. This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by Bergman’s 
work on EVs (Chapter 4), which shows that policymakers’ visions of how 
change will occur still uphold the dominant regime structure of the car industry, 
which is based on the continued prominence of conventional vehicles in the 
medium term. Also, in the transport sector, Hopkins and Schwanen (2018a, 
2018b; Chapter 5) show how a technological solutionist discourse prevails in 
responding to the environmental externalities of transport. This is despite the 
fact that transport accounts for approximately 25 per cent of the UK’s CO2 
emissions (with two- thirds of that coming from cars and vans) and therefore 
offers a significant option for large- scale energy demand reduction (Chapter 4; 
Chapter 5; Committee on Climate Change, 2014). It seems that British policy-
makers are uncomfortable even imagining radical change in transport- related 
energy demand, much less implementing it.
 The two UK cases discussed by Roberts and Geels (Chapter 10) on historical 
transitions show that this somewhat reticent approach to embracing radical 
sociotechnical change is not new to the UK. The transition to road transport in 
the UK was only given policy support after the British road transport system was 
already widely established. Policymakers dramatically accelerated the transition 
to modern agriculture in response to a wartime food shortage, but in that case, 
they acted only in response to an existential threat combined with a decade of 
lobbying from farmers. Moreover, their actions mainly consisted of developing a 
domestic system that had been in place overseas for since the late nineteenth 
century. If this pattern continues in the era of climate change, the UK might 
thus be limited to being a follower, rather than a leader, in low- carbon 
transitions.
 A further case- in-point are current approaches to energy efficiency improve-
ments in buildings, which account for approximately one- quarter of UK carbon 
emissions and therefore, present considerable potential for further savings and 
improvements (Clarke et al., 2008; Rosenow et al., 2018). Chapters by Brown 
et al. (Chapter 7) and Webb (Chapter 11) identify failures with policy initi-
atives such as the Green Deal, despite the fact that the Committee on Climate 
Change (2015, 2016) estimates that there is cost- effective potential to reduce 
direct emissions from all buildings by a third by 2030, and to achieve near- zero 
emissions by 2015. If proactive policies are implemented and support restored, 
this retrofit rollout alone could add approximately £25.3 billion of value added 
to Britain’s GDP (Guertler and Rosenow, 2016). In this regard, UK decision- 
makers must not only imagine positive change, but also heed the positive busi-
ness case for it.
 Constructively, the chapters on diffusion and impact highlight a number of 
key findings towards averting and redressing this somewhat unsupportive policy 
trend and provide evidence of what successful policymaking might look like. For 
instance, Kern et al. (Chapter 12) demonstrate that to be effective, UK 
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policymakers need to develop well- managed portfolios of policy goals, strategies 
and instruments, the mix of which needs to be (re-)assessed and modified as 
necessary. These policies, they argue, should focus on ‘efficiency first’ as a policy 
goal which goes against the current strategy, where, to date, none of the £256 
billion investment pipeline for energy infrastructure has been allocated to 
energy efficiency improvements (Rosenow and Cowart, 2017).
 Following a case study of stalled progress on energy efficiency policy for UK 
buildings, Webb (Chapter 11) reinforces our earlier point that British policy 
mindsets must shift away from classical economics’ insistence on the efficiency 
of markets towards a valuation framework structured around societal responsib-
ility for welfare and sustainable prosperity. Webb adds that to reach energy effi-
ciency goals, the British government may even require departmental reform, as 
energy- saving is relevant to multiple ministries, none of which are focused on 
the issue (particularly in the case of low- carbon buildings). British policymakers, 
activists, researchers, and others trying to influence change, should more care-
fully look at what kinds of broader sociotechnical developments can enable 
greater political will to accelerate transitions to sustainability. Thus, UK energy 
demand and energy efficiency policy requires a consistent, front- and-centre seat 
at a number of interlinked tables.
Lessons for other countries
Roberts and Geels (Chapter 10) warn that despite being instructive, policy-
makers should be cautious when copying lessons from foreign examples given 
their different political, economic, cultural and technological particularities. 
Nonetheless, the primarily British case studies discussed in this book certainly 
have relevance beyond the British context and suggest a wider range of broadly 
applicable lessons.
 First, we stress the importance of visions and expectations. While these might 
seem rhetorical and ultimately not constitutive of actual on- the-ground change, 
the evidence in this book shows that they can have powerful performative 
impacts not just on the uptake of energy- saving innovations, but also on the 
effects that these innovations have once adopted. Roberts and Geels (Chapter 
10) show how visions of a motorised future in the UK; of clean, efficient, natural 
gas in the Netherlands; and of a cooperatively- run, sustainable heating system 
in Denmark, proved decisive in shaping choices by both policymakers and 
private actors that allowed the deliberate acceleration of sociotechnical trans-
itions. Bergman (Chapter 4), on the other hand, demonstrates how visions and 
expectations not only help determine whether low- energy innovations diffuse 
widely, but also what form they will take after doing so. This is important given 
that during the emergence phase, any innovation has several ways in which it 
can be used in practice. EVs can simply result in the same patterns of automo-
bility, for instance, or they can result in completely new kinds of travel patterns 
that have a much greater effect on energy demand. Where the UK has arguably 
failed in this regard, other countries can succeed.
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 The second international lesson relates to the importance of incumbent power 
and resistance, which appears, one way or another, in virtually all chapters of this 
book. Drawing on Hughes (1987), Chapter 2 (Geels et al.) identifies sources of 
so- called ‘lock- ins’, including sunk investments in skills, factories and infrastruc-
tures, for example, as well as economies of scale and the momentum of estab-
lished rules and institutions, each of which restricts opportunities for change. 
Others refer to incumbent business models and industry groups. In their work 
on the emergence of AVs, Hopkins and Schwanen (Chapter 5) contribute to 
understandings of the politics and power- laden nature of urban experimenta-
tion, with reproductions of the status quo. Roberts and Geels (Chapter 10) go 
into detail illustrating how overcoming incumbent resistance is not just a matter 
of fighting it directly; sometimes, such as in the case of Dutch natural gas, 
incumbent actors can be bought out, or even co- opted to become active part-
ners in the transition. If enough incumbents can be brought onside in this way, 
then their power acts in favour of energy transitions rather than against them, 
and therefore, may create the necessary pre- conditions for radical change to 
happen. These incumbents are not just policy and industry elites, but also users. 
Admittedly it is strange to think of users (who, in the case of energy demand, 
are essentially the various and multiple general publics), as incumbents. Like 
industrial and political actors, however, they have entrenched interests, prac-
tices, and preferences that they are reluctant to change. They, too, might have 
to be bought out for radical change to occur.
 A third common point is that of technological and policy mixes. This book has 
illustrated the paramount importance of looking both at the interaction 
between different kinds of interventions and innovations, and at the broader 
sociotechnical effects that can have. Kern et al.’s research on policy mixes 
(Chapter 12) has some obvious lessons for this as it applies to policy measures 
that take account of existing complex policy mixes, and which simultaneously 
take advantage of existing innovations while developing new, more radical ones 
for the future. This point is articulated by Brown et al. (Chapter 7), who recom-
mend a mix of standards and regulations, financial measures, new institutions, 
and intermediaries to address the problem. Policymakers should be fully aware 
of all the policy and technological mixes they are dealing with before interven-
ing to change something. They can also look for pre- existing systems or policies 
they can build from, rather than trying to create radical change from scratch.
 The final insight has to do with users and practices. Users impose normative 
conditions on transitions, as discussed by Jenkins and Martiskainen (Chapter 3) 
and Jenkins et al. (Chapter 6). They therefore must play a fundamental role in 
the innovation process not only for the sake of moral considerations such as a 
commitment to democracy, but also because transition policies that succeed at 
the expense of some vulnerable element of society are likely to be politically 
unstable. Users should therefore be active participants in energy transitions, 
rather than passive beneficiaries, a finding reiterated by Hopkins and Schwanen 
(Chapter 5). Ultimately, the various publics have the biggest single role (albeit 
a collective, often unguided, and sometimes unconscious one) in actually 
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enacting change. As Figus et al. (Chapter 9) show, the ultimate impact of 
rebound effects depends to a large extent on the specific circumstances of par-
ticular user groups and how they compensate for energy savings in one area with 
increased energy use in other areas.
 Taken together, these lessons may seem somewhat abstract, but alongside the 
specific recommendations and applications presented in each chapter – which 
draw on material from New Zealand, Denmark, Japan and Finland, among 
others – they provide important practical recommendations and cautionary 
tales.
Recommended policy principles
While the primary value of Transitions in Energy Efficiency and Demand lies with 
its sociotechnical approach and the range of substantive insights and conceptual 
contributions developed throughout each chapter, we also offer a secondary 
benefit: nine promising policy principles for accelerating high efficiency, low 
demand change. Developing the points made above, we now discuss each of 
these in turn.
 First, policymakers should, whenever possible, be ambitious, inclusive, and 
challenging when setting their visions, roadmaps, plans and other devices for 
orienting a transition in energy demand. While incumbent actors might have 
the easiest claim to expertise on the future possibilities that exist, this comes 
with a bias that might lead to reproduction of existing patterns of energy 
demand, rather than wholesale change. Chapter 2, for instance, demands a 
broader view of the process, which takes into account learning and experimen-
tation, the multiple conditions necessary for systemic change, and the coalitions 
of interest that can block or support emerging niche innovations (Geels et al., 
Chapter 2). Bergman (Chapter 4), recommends that policymaker’s engagement 
with visions includes a larger variety of futures, scenarios of disruption and fail-
ures to meet emissions reductions and other targets. These, he argues, could be 
commissioned from a wider variety of actors, including outsiders and niche 
players who can challenge, rather than support, dominant visions.
 Second, policymakers should avoid looking for single, silver bullet technological or 
policy interventions and move towards policy and technological mixes. This necessitates 
an embrace of complex, multi- faceted approaches that include targeted regula-
tions, subsidies, public relations campaigns, and other strategies that take account 
of (and, when possible, augment) existing policy and technological mixes. Criti-
cally, this includes a move beyond a sole focus on market mechanisms or drop- in 
technological fixes (e.g. Chapter 5; Hopkins and Schwanen). As Geels et al. 
(Chapter 2) show, this forces us to look beyond carbon pricing as a policy panacea. 
Research on policy mixes provides a particularly promising avenue here: Brown 
et al. (Chapter 7) develop an especially nuanced and tangible set of recommenda-
tions in keeping with this notion that includes a mix of regulations, financing and 
incentives along with the establishment of new institutions and the recognition of 
energy efficiency as a strategic infrastructure priority.
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 Third, policies should aim to support present- day incremental change, while also 
building towards radical change in the future. This applies to all aspects of develop-
ing efficiencies in energy demand, including technologies, networks, business 
models, regulatory structures and user practices, and comes as acknowledgement 
of both the dramatic change required, and of the cumulative effect of small steps 
to get there. It further suggests a rethinking of the radical/incremental dicho-
tomy that is so prevalent in discussions about climate policy. While radical 
policy changes to deliberately accelerate transitions should be the ultimate goal, 
incremental changes should be seen not as an inferior alternative to these, but 
as near- term facilitators of the more aggressive cuts to energy demand. This 
becomes especially important when you consider that the more individuals that 
are successfully engaged and take on energy efficiency schemes, the greater the 
potential success of transition pathways.
 Fourth, users should be considered as a critical component in any process of 
change. The ultimate impact of transition policies on users should be socially 
just, and supportive of practices that already exist at the user level. Wherever 
possible, policymakers should try and build on practices that users are already 
demonstrating or needs that they are already articulating. Jenkins and Mar-
tiskainen (Chapter 3) note, to this end, that throughout the transition process, 
governments and business must identify those who may be vulnerable and then 
both ascertain and make provision for them through targeted subsidies, exemp-
tions and efficiency measures (e.g. in energy efficiency policy). As one very tan-
gible option, this may take the form of a funded Energy Cafés that acts as a 
triage service, bringing together local authorities, health workers, community 
organisations and individuals in a trusted setting, providing advice and ensuring 
that energy needs are met. The risk of not doing this is that we fail particular 
social groups through insufficient consumer engagement, as is warned by Jenkins 
et al. in their exploration of the UK smart meter rollout (Chapter 6).
 Fifth, transitions should have a clear normative goal. Innovations do not just 
take the form of new technologies, but can also be social or procedural in 
nature, and this makes them inherently normative affairs. The energy justice 
framework introduced in Chapter 3 suggests that transitions in energy demand 
should occur in a way that ameliorates, rather than exacerbates, energy poverty. 
In order to fulfil this aim, it thus becomes paramount that we engage with a 
wide range of both practical and normative voices. This will require the British 
government, for one, to address its current tardiness (shown by Webb in 
Chapter 11) in responding to the voices of researchers, advisory bodies and 
lobbyists, even when they highlight the benefit of alternative transition path-
ways (or indeed, caution their failure, as was the case with the Green Deal 
(Mallaburn and Eyre, 2014)).
 Sixth, transition policies should, where possible, act on technologies that already 
exist. Radical innovations are useful, but they take time to develop and up- scale. 
As Geels and Roberts (Chapter 10) suggest, focusing on technologies that are 
already well established in other contexts means that policymakers are simply 
acting to consolidate, and, perhaps, to accelerate, transitions that are already 
270  Kirsten E.H. Jenkins et al.
well underway, and can also benefit from previously developed technical per-
formance, user communities, and business networks. Knowing their strengths, 
these can be developed using innovation policies in advance of deliberate accel-
eration e.g. promoting them as public goods, avoiding monopolies or coercive 
policies that will aggrieve users.
 Seventh, transitions will always have unintended consequences, and wherever 
possible, these have to be acknowledged, anticipated and managed. This is particu-
larly important in energy demand, as energy- saving innovations have a tend-
ency to produce rebound effects, which reduce their ultimate effectiveness. It 
is also key in the context of Brexit, where certain types of outcomes may be 
difficult or impossible to anticipate (Geels et al., Chapter 2). Bergman 
(Chapter 4) shows how this could be achieved by commissioning visioning 
documents from a larger variety of actors, including outsiders and niche 
players, who can challenge, rather than support, the views of incumbents. 
This, he writes, would enable more scope and choice for policymakers to 
meet policy goals and targets, and leave us better prepared for foreseeable and 
unforeseeable changes to transport in the future; a lesson that undoubtedly 
extends beyond his case study of EVs. It seems important, too, to acknow-
ledge small, often knock- on consequences.
 To this end, Figus et al. (Chapter 9) warn that a focus on rebounds highlights 
the failure to achieve the technologically feasible energy use reductions and 
neglects the wider range of economic and social impacts that energy efficiency 
improvements can deliver beyond climate change alone. These include, the co- 
benefits of household energy efficiency stimulating the UK’s economy, leading 
to increased employment, investments and wages which achieving substantial, 
yet smaller than anticipated, reductions in energy use, for instance. Or, as 
Shrubsole et al. (2014) warn, a negative set of implications that extend as far as 
increases in feelings of social isolation if windows are too airtight and noise 
cannot infiltrate.
 Eighth, the spatial dynamics, and potential spatial and temporal asymmetries of 
policy interventions need to be acknowledged, and where possible, avoided. This has 
implications across the three dimensions of innovations discussed in this book; 
emergence, diffusion and impact. In the emergence and diffusion phases, for 
instance, innovations are likely to have spatially and temporally distinct charac-
teristics, playing out at national through to local scales. As an illustration, 
Chapter 5, Hopkins and Schwanen point to the replication of existing dynamics 
in the trialling of new technologies. Given the likely costs of emerging innova-
tions (e.g. AVs, EVs) diffusion in wealthy suburbs – and policies to accelerate 
diffusion – are likely to have unequal impacts. Guiding visions and expectations 
are also often a- spatial; they homogenise places and overlook diversities in 
people, infrastructures, cultures, etc., with implications for public and political 
acceptance. Likewise, impacts may benefit some places, while disadvantaging 
others, at least in the short- medium term. 
 Ninth, and finally, policies should aim to address all three facets of transitions: 
The emergence of radical alternatives, the diffusion of new sociotechnical 
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systems and their ultimate impact on energy demand. Thus, it is critical that 
going forward, sustained and long- term policy to support sustainable innovation 
accounts for the various steps along the innovation pathway, to ensure not just 
successful emergence into the marketplace, but also that the innovation(s) is/are 
as impactful as possible in order to meet the challenge of energy demand 
reduction.
Conclusion: the future of energy demand research and policy
If there is one lesson we hope the readers of this book take away, it is the value 
of a sociotechnical approach in understanding transitions in energy demand. 
Looking beyond this, we hope that readers engage with each of the chapters 
that are relevant to their own practice and implement the recommendations 
given within. We return too, to the new areas of research reflected upon in 
Chapter 2 (and summarised and in one case, further developed in Table 14.1), 
which not only have the potential to build on each other to achieve radical, 
systematic change, but place this volume at the forefront of a new research 
agenda into the future of energy demand research and policy.
 What is more, we reiterate the magnitude of this challenge and state once 
more, that reductions in energy demand will not be accomplished by following 
any one magical formula. This book’s focus on complexity and context- 
dependence should be sufficient evidence of that. We have provided general 
principles, heuristics, cautionary tales and ideas, but transitions on- the-ground 
will always depend on the ingenuity, imagination and dogged effort of those 
who work on making them happen. To all engaged in meeting this challenge, 
we wish them good luck.
Note
1 The distribution of energy- efficient boilers, as one example.










Source: the authors, with reference to Geels et al., Chapter 2.
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